Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/54: Telegram
Colonel Williams, Third Army, A. E. F., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received April 22—1:10 p.m.]
[From Dresel via General Harries2]
In talk with Rantzau3 Saturday evening, he began by stating that formal invitation to Versailles had astonished him, and that he should only go if he were specifically directed by the government to start. As far as he could see an ultimatum was intended as [and?] it was not clear why he should have to go to Paris to receive this. Passing to [Page 83] discussion of terms he said that conditions apparently proposed would reduce Germans to abject slavery. An eminent financier had just assured him that full possession of the Sarre district and Upper Silesia were absolutely indispensable to economic existence of nation. He would never sign any peace nor would the Ministry in his opinion agree to one which deprived Germany even temporarily of these two districts, and he was convinced that the German people would back this up. If another ministry chose to accept such conditions that was their lookout. Questioned as to how, in case of refusal of terms, German people could continue to exist, he made no definite answer and repudiated my suggestion that possibly an arrangement with Russia might be attempted.
Throughout the interview he insinuated a peace, such as apparently will be imposed, could not be in accordance with President’s Fourteen Points.4 He stated that he made no specific [apparent omission] as to Alsace-Lorraine, specially Wiesbaden, or the size of the indemnity as announced, and I gather that the protests on these points will not be serious. The free port for Danzig will, as I infer, also not meet with much opposition.
His attitude was of great depression and he showed a remarkable irritation towards the French. He gave the impression of sincerity although I [am] not convinced he will not ultimately recede from his position. From the papers, a proclamation just issued by Ebert,5 and interviews with several well-informed persons, I have guarantees that the views of Rantzau meet with much support. A plebiscite on the question of acceptance of the terms is now being much discussed and appears entirely probable. As to this Rantzau would not commit himself. The Independent Socialists would undoubtedly favor acceptance of the terms as published but it is exceedingly doubtful whether their influence will be decisive.
I venture to suggest that whatever definite statement can be made indicating that at least a limited amount of discussion of terms will be permitted might have reassuring influence.
I emphasized throughout the talk the belief that German economic rehabilitation will be in the interests of the whole world and that on the conclusion of peace our attitude will be only cooperation to this end. I also pointed out the ruinous consequences of summary rejection of peace. I shall endeavor to impress this as strongly as possible in future conversations and shall be grateful for suggestions as to anything that can be said further along these lines. Dresel. Harries.
- Brig. Gen. George H. Harries, Chief, U. S. Military Mission, Berlin, Germany, December 3, 1918–September 30, 1919.↩
- Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- For text of the Fourteen Points, see Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, pp. 15–16.↩
- Friedrich Ebert, Chancelor of the Provisional German Government, elected President by the National Assembly, February 11, 1919.↩