Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/19½
Report by Lieutenant George Howe
The Situation in Munich
The present report cannot pretend to give an up-to-date account of the political personalities and movements in Munich, as the writer left his post in that city on February 28th, and in the present uncertain state of affairs daily changes take place. It is, however, possible to give a general account of the feeling of the people, and the atmosphere surrounding the attempt to build up a more or less permanent form of government, from which forecasts as to future movements may be made.
In the first place it is necessary to keep in mind that utter political confusion reigns, owing chiefly to the fact that the aims of the various parties are vague and ill-formulated. As everything must be built up from the ground, the problem facing the political leaders is of such scope that it is almost impossible to bring into prominence any one detail on which to concentrate a call for support. For the same reason the parties within themselves, as well as the A. B. and S. Council, are divided into many conflicting elements, ranging in various degrees from right to left. To add to the difficulty of the situation the Spartacist elements of the Independent Socialists and A. B. and S. Council seem determined to destroy any organization of a constructive character which may be formed, in order to establish the “dictatorship of the proletariate”, a term as vague in Munich as it has proved elsewhere.
At the time of the arrival of the American Mission in Munich on February 6th, the situation seemed comparatively calm and clear. Auer was the man of the day, as he had been for some time. Eisner, in spite of his popularity in certain sections, was losing ground politically. Even in his own ministry he had no supporters, as was amply testified by the confidential statements made to Dr. Field by the undersecretaries. Auer, on the other hand, was gaining rapidly, not only in government circles, but also with the A. B. and S. Councils. On the day previous to the murder of Eisner and the attempted assassination of Auer, Dr. Field and the writer had lunch with the latter and Timm, Minister of Justice in the provisional government. Auer spoke at length on his scheme for the development of the government along Socialistic lines, with a bourgeois element, the disestablishment of the church on a moderate basis, the reduction of the A. B. and S. Councils to their proper functions as local governing and advisory bodies, etc. He stated he had brought the councils around to his point of view by explaining to them clearly the place he proposed to find for them in the [Page 75] body politic, that they had agreed to give the Landtag a free hand, and that he had pledges which assured his election as Prime Minister.
The meeting of the Landtag on February 21st, for which occasion disorders had long been predicted from the Spartacist elements, marked the end of all moderate hopes. The murder of Eisner, though there seems no reason to believe it to have been the result of a reactionary plot, stirred the more violent elements into open revolt. The attempted murder of Auer, which was at first believed to have been a consequence of Eisner’s assassination, really appears to have had more significance. There is ample reason to believe his death was plotted beforehand by the Spartacist element of the A. B. and S. Council. A workman named Lindner, a member of the Council, was chosen to carry out the attack, as he did at the very time when Auer, speaking before the newly-convened Landtag, was deploring the death of Eisner. It is not, therefore, an exaggerated conclusion to draw that the Spartacists were attacking in the person of Auer the idea of an established order, which would have brought them back to a political state more or less resembling other liberal governments of today. It also seems probable that in the present state of mind similar attacks may be made whenever the efforts of the more conservative elements promise to bear fruit.
Whereas, however, Auer might well have been considered a martyr, and the attack on him have estranged many adherents of the Spartacist idea, the unfortunate circumstance of Eisner’s assassination put quite a different face on the matter. Auer and his like were considered, through their conciliatory attitude towards the bourgeoisie and the old regime, to have been in some measure responsible for Eisner’s death. Auer would indeed have been lynched had it not been announced and believed that he was on the point of death. His influence appears to have been permanently lost, especially as he is not a strong leader in a crisis, but rather a pacifier and pourer of oil on troubled waters.
During the days immediately following the double tragedy, pandemonium reigned. The A. B. and S. Council, with its troops, took practical charge of everything. Timm, Rosshaupter, and other adherents of Auer were arrested. The bourgeois press was seized and suppressed for several days, and subsequently allowed to reappear only under radical supervision. All articles published were of an Independent Socialist tone. All meetings of any but Socialists were prohibited, all persons were obliged to remain within doors after seven p.m., parades of workmen and soldiers marched the streets shouting “death to the bourgeoisie” and bearing signs with such inscriptions as “Long live the New Revolution”, several hotels were stormed with hand grenades, hostages belonging to the nobility were seized as guarantees and plundering was of nightly occurrence.
[Page 76]Strangely enough, however, a certain semblance of order was maintained. Even within the A. B. and S. Council there was a strong element of moderation. Patrols were sent out to do their best to stop the plundering, the ordinary life of the town continued in general unmolested, and the proposal to arm all workmen over twenty was brought to naught by the seizing of the arsenals by so-called “government” troops, which also occupied the principal public buildings. In all this it was impossible to distinguish who was in command, and yet in some way the work was done. The police were frankly powerless.
Almost immediately attempts were made to form a new provisional government. Eiffe, a business man of Hamburg, called in originally as technical adviser to the old provisional government, returned from Berne and telegraphed to Förster and Muehlon to join him and take the leadership, while the Majority and Independent Socialists met together and attempted to form a coalition government. In this connection an incident occurred which shows the state of mind of the various elements, and the mistrust which exists amongst them. Eiffe came to visit the American Mission to expose his unofficial plans, proposing Muehlon as Minister of Foreign Affairs. While he was there a delegation of Majority Socialists came in, which was received in another room, and which stated Forster and Muehlon to be extremely unpopular in Bavaria as being not sufficiently Bavarian, an indication of the strength of the independent Bavarian feeling. The Majority Socialist candidate for Minister of Foreign Affairs, according to them, was Prof. Bonn, for whose candidacy Dr. Field’s official approval was requested—a request which was of course refused. The following day Jaffe, Independent Socialist and Minister of Finance, came in, with a candidate of his own. He had never heard of Bonn’s candidacy. From this incident it may be judged how little cooperation exists.
Meanwhile, at their joint meeting, the Majority and Independent Socialists had succeeded in selecting a common candidate for Prime Minister, in the person of Hoffmann, Minister of Education, belonging to the extreme left wing of the Majority Socialist Party. Not the least amusing incident of a generally tragic situation was the fact that Hoffmann could not be found for three days after his nomination. The provisional Government, under Hoffmann’s leadership, was of course finally formed, but appeared to have little chance of ultimate success.
To summarize, the situation in Munich is one of complete confusion. No party knows exactly what its aims are, there are no leaders of strong personality, and whatever is built up stands under the constant threat of destruction by the Spartacist element. This element has the tremendous [Page 77] advantage of being entirely ruthless and having none of the laborious constructive work in its hands. It appears, however, to be comparatively small, and not to posssess much sympathy among the serious working classes in general, though what it lacks in size and strength is compensated by the mistrust and confusion within the ranks of the constructive elements, and the fact that the bourgeoisie is allowed to have no public voice either in press or meeting. It is therefore not a difficult task for them to tear down whatever is built up, and as long as the present spirit lasts, it seems not unlikely that they will do so.
Meanwhile the financial situation of the government is very precarious with no means of obtaining credits, and the tremendous burden of the daily allowance of eight marks per day made to every unemployed workman—they were about 40,000 when the writer left Munich, and the number was constantly increasing owing to coal shortage—draining the treasury.
The food situation, although it forms a large part of every conversation, appears only indirectly contributory to the dissatisfaction which exists, insofar as lack of nutrition depresses the morale of the people and breeds in it indignation against any regime which fails to fill its stomach. There is no doubt, however, that the hand of any government established on a firm basis would be greatly strengthened by the distribution of supplies.
To conclude, there appears to be a strong feeling of “Bavaria for the Bavarians” in all circles, and of indignation at the thought of outside interference from any other part of Germany. This feeling might well lead to complications in national affairs should matters not go to the liking of the Bavarians. How far this spirit is pervasive it is of course difficult to tell until it is put to the test.
[File copy not signed]