Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/102: Telegram

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

62. As wired you I left for Bucharest on 6th. Your numbers 27 and 2836 reached here on 8th. Reference to 27, I entered into no diplomatic [Page 675] discussion, although there was much heard in justification of Roumanian conduct which was along same lines as that of Roumanian here. I called upon the Prime Minister morning September 9th, he on me same afternoon. On both occasions Chargé d’Affaires present and immediately after each [he] dictated memorandums of same, which we both signed. Copies will be forwarded as soon as possible. There are two phases situation here:

Roumanians show that they are daily becoming more (?) [irritated] against American Government and Military Mission have been almost at a standstill since arrival. Intended to wire myself desiring to leave September 9th but September 6th Roumania said [if I could leave] that afternoon, they could push right through and [this] also gave [me] Sunday for travelling. Roumania feels request Military Mission might be quietly [quickly] complied with if explained to their higher authority. Also desired [to ascertain] whether growing hostile towards America personally or governmental. Was taken to visit King, then Prime Minister and Minister of War. All told same story, Roumania’s wrongs et cetera, which is told in detail in latest reports [memorandum] of Prime Minister’s interview briefly as follows:

Serbia allowed to loot Banat without interference, Serbia received some Danube River monitors while Roumania did not, Roumania not represented on any reparation commission; Roumania class[ed] with Poland and Czechoslovakia, not treated as independent nation in minority question as embodied in treaty, Roumania at request Peace Conference had gone to war with Hungary thereby annulling armistice November 13 and now Allies trying prevent her having any fruits of victory. These not discussed by me, simply said that Military Mission orders were mandatory, and we were being blocked in carrying them out. Explained necessary preliminary step was Roumanian evacuation Hungary, which required evacuation bank west of Danube River to Ganfield, [give a field] for organization Hungarian Army and police, evacuation Budapest and complete evacuation Hungary by zones as might be requested time to time by Military Mission. This evacuation and details thereof only subject. Prime Minister said that he would agree to above if Hungary guaranteed not attack Roumanian security. Told him could only recommend this to colleagues who could only do likewise to Supreme Council. He seemed to accept this favorably, saying, it was all right while he was in power, adding thought another [successor] would do likewise. He expected resign almost immediately to avoid personally sign obnoxious treaty. This [Successor] will be entirely under his control.

Memorandum my conversation read colleagues. Anti-American sentiment worse Bucharest according Charge d’Affaires than here and [Page 676] can be practically all traced to French influence. French expect dominate Roumania; jealous any commercial or other rivalry in anticipation of which trying to discredit America and American citizens. Nonreceipt of Supreme Council’s telegram to French Chargé d’Affaires37 considered diplomatic joke. Prime Minister sent me copy his intended reply (?) me [; this will be sent?] to you with memorandum. Charge d’Affaires thought visit had done good; certain[ly] we are on more cordial terms with Roumania. If Roumania does not now quickly begin to play the game, can see no use continue this Mission.

Before leaving Paris mentioned might find advisable go Bucharest. Understood this approved. However, regret have gone without specific permission.

Bandholtz
  1. No. 27, supra; No. 28 not printed.
  2. Appendix C to HD–38, vol. vii, p. 857.