Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/62

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest , August 29, 1919.

1. It is inconceivable that the Roumanians could continue as they have been doing were they not backed by somebody. One of the most prominent of the Roumanian Generals, after a good dinner on the evening of the 26th of August, stated to an American officer in effect that the whole trouble was due to the fact that two of the nations represented on the Interallied Military Mission were playing at International politics. This leaves no question as to which two were referred to.

2. The attitude of the Jugo-Slav plenipotentiary shows conclusively that he fears a combination of Italy, Austria, Hungary and Roumania, which would geographically, tactically, and in nearly every other way separate the Jugo-Slavs from the rest of Europe. The attitude of both the French and the Italian representatives at meetings of the Mission is peculiar and at times erratic. Frequently they apparently take opposing sides, but eventually get together. If for any reason it is apparently advisable in their opinion to retard progress they will combine and get into gesticulatory arguments in machine gun French, and it is impossible without being rude to check them.

3. At yesterday’s meeting (August 28th, 1919) there was the strongest kind of evidence before us to indicate that Friedrich intended to remain at the head of the new Government, and that he was organizing a ministry which would practically be a continuation of the Archduke’s cabinet. We had also received word that Friedrich had been disseminating information that he was in direct touch with the Peace Conference and among other things had stated that M. Clemenceau telegraphed him directing that three Hungarian plenipotentiaries be sent immediately to the Peace Conference. In addition it was not certain in my mind that Friedrich when he had been called before the Mission at the time of the Archduke’s resignation, had not misunderstood the Mission’s intention and construed what was said to him as a suggestion to do just what he is now understood to have done. At the meeting in question, Friedrich, a Hungarian, spoke in German which was interpreted into French by an Italian Officer and then into English by a French Officer, this leaving so many channels of interpretation that some mistakes were inevitable. I recommended that M. Friedrich be invited to come before the Mission, accompanied by several members of the Cabinet, belonging to other parties, so that there would be plenty of witnesses, and that he be asked whether or not he had given out press reports in regard to sending Hungarian plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference, whether or not he had ever received word from the Supreme Council that they desired him to continue at the head of the Government, and also as to what his understanding was of the instructions from the Supreme Council as transmitted to him on the occasion of the Archduke’s resignation. The British member sided with me, but the other two insisted that all of this should be placed in a telegram and wired to the Peace Conference for instructions. I told them that in my opinion this simply meant a delay of two or more days and that every day meant the loss to the Allies of millions of dollars worth of property looted by the Roumanians. As fast as any argument could be advanced they beat around the bush and introduced irrelevant subjects. I told them that this Mission would be responsible for any delays which could be avoided by intelligent action on its part, and if this Mission as such insisted on a policy of procrastination it left me no alternative but to inform my Government, and that in many matters I would necessarily be left to individual action. They immediately changed front, agreed to send for Friedrich, wrote out the questions to be propounded to him, and sent for him; but before he arrived we received his official communication announcing the formation of the new Government so that the whole affair lost any significance except as indicative of the occasional attitude of the Latin members of the Mission. The foregoing is not to be interpreted as indicating that there are any brawls at the Mission’s meetings, because our relations are most amicable and the proceedings harmonious.

4. General Graziani yesterday read to us M. Clemenceau’s reply to his message that he was not to be permanent chairman of this Mission.²⁶ The message was to the effect that M. Clemenceau had no objection to daily rotation in chairmanship. As matters stand, 50% of the meetings are presided over by the American and British representatives, and several times as much progress is made as would otherwise have resulted. A rumor is current today that M. Friedrich is inclined to accept the last unofficial ultimatum from Roumania which was sent you in code on the night of the 27th of August 1919,²⁷ and which in brief was: Roumanian occupation of Hungary for one year, cession by Hungary to Roumania of all strategic points, eventually the political union of the two countries, and several other points. I am forwarding reports of many rumors as received, not because they can be always verified, but because taken in connection with other information in your possession they might clear up a few otherwise obscure points.

5. I have been entertaining Roumanians, French, Italians and British to the limit and my personal relations with all of them are satisfactory, with the possible exceptions of the Roumanian Commander-in-Chief, Mardarescu, and the Roumanian Commander in the city of Budapest, Holban, who are such infernal liars that it is difficult to be patient. They have had the nerve to say that the Roumanian forces have seized nothing which was not necessary to their field operations, and all this while being confronted with proof that heavy machinery, out of machine shops, Gobelin tapestries, rugs, carpets, delicate scientific instruments, etc., were being seized in vast quantities.

6. In my telegram of yesterday²⁸ I called attention to the advisability of promptly recognizing a government of some form or other in Hungary at the earliest possible date because the Roumanians invariably advance the argument in justification of their looting that whatever they do is in enemy country. Whenever it is replied to them that it is not a question of taking what belongs to the enemy, but of really robbing the other Allies, when they are taking Hungarian assets, they always immediately change the subject and start in on other subjects, but invariably with their beautiful sophistry. I greatly doubt if it will be possible in this country to carry on an election which could express the will of the people.

7. As matters stand this Mission will be unable to accomplish a single thing unless backed by something stronger than telegrams to the Roumanian Government. It looks as though these telegraphic ultimata were accompanied by an explanation through other channels that the sting is to be removed before being applied. In any event they seem to have about as much effect as a milk poultice on a wooden leg. It is needless to add that the Roumanians are continuing as heretofore their systematic looting. So far they have disregarded practically every request sent them by this Mission, which is not only humiliating, but naturally results in the Hungarians beginning to lose all hope of assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

8. I must again invite attention to the fact that in a little over a week my entire staff except myself and a few enlisted men will be obliged to leave Budapest, and that it will be impossible to accomplish much without a few officers and a good stenographer. The detachment could be reduced to about twelve men, but that would be the minimum. If it is intended that this Mission continue its sessions, it is urgently requested that either my present staff be authorized to remain or that their substitutes be sent immediately.

H. H. Bandholtz

26. For discussion by the Supreme Council of the question of the chairmanship, see HD–38, minute 2, vol. vii, p. 836.
27. Telegram No. 34 not printed.
28. No. 35½, not printed.