Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/15½
Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace11
Subject: Separatist tendencies in Bavaria.
In synthesizing the impressions which I have gained during my stay in Munich, few features have been more prominent than the particularist sentiments shown almost without exception by those with whom I have had to do. Already in Bern, the German Minister, Adolf Müller, confined his talk to Bavarian matters and the Bavarian Legation urged that I should rely solely on the Bavarian authorities for passport visa and traveling facilities. In Munich all thoughts seem concentrated on Bavarian matters and one hears on all sides such expressions as: “Conditions in Bavaria” contrasted with those “in the Empire”, as if Bavaria were no part of the Empire. As I look back over the political discussions I had in Munich, I realize that the topic was socialization in Bavaria, Feeding of Bavaria, raw materials for Bavaria, etc. Where the question of the relations of Bavaria to the Empire were discussed, there were always complaints. The particularism was of course of various grades but, especially in the last weeks it took the form of distinct separatist demands. Dandl (former prime-minister) and Pfeffer (secretary of the clerical party) expressed extreme discontent with the centralist course that was being steered in Weimar and declared that Bavaria’s interests were gravely compromized thereby. Eisner (though himself no Bavarian) felt very bitter over this and he and his followers regard his pronouncements at the socialist congress in Bern as a first step towards initiating a Bavarian foreign policy. This point has been developed at length with obvious intention by various visitors. De Fiori (intimate friend of Auer and Adolf Müller) put it as a necessity that Bavaria should succeed in gaining influence on German policies or else must go her own way. Auer hates everything Prussian and his whole ardent patriotism is Bavarian, rather than German. In my conversation with him extending over two hours, he kept reverting to the desirability of a Bavarian arrangement with the Allies to secure raw materials and food. Col. v. Sonnenburg (head censor for Bavaria during the war and now in charge of the press service) declares that the whole German system is as bad today as it was prior to the revolution, that we must not let ourselves be deceived by German duplicity, only in Bavaria has the military spirit been destroyed, only there can we find trustworthy men to deal with. During the crisis following Eisner’s assassination, search was made for a foreign secretary. At this time I became conscious of a tendency on the part of those visitors [Page 67] who were in the midst of the party negotiations to sound me, as to my acquaintanceship with Prof. Forster, with Dr. Mühlon, with Prof. Bonn, with Mr. Eiffe. I was very reserved in expressing any opinion whatsoever and in my own mind I formed the conviction that these were candidates for the post and that the one who stood the best with the allies possessed in that fact the surest recommendation. This surmise was later fully confirmed, for four members of the majority socialists called on me confidentially and naїvely told me that this was the criterion that counted and that—well—a private personal opinion expressed to them would decide them and in consequence probably decide the choice. I of course had no opinion to offer, but did express surprise at such importance being given to the choice of a foreign secretary at a time when Weimar had decided that Bavaria was to be shorn of her privilege of maintaining diplomatic representatives abroad. My visitors declared that this matter surely had not yet been definitely settled; Bavarian public opinion had still its word to say. Baron Steglitz (the Saxon ex-Minister) and Djiembowski (Saxon Chargé d’Affaires) with whom I have talked concerning Bavarian particularism are equally convinced of its potency and feel concerned. Dr. Merkle (of the Foreign Office) and Fechenbach, who regard themselves par excellence as the successors to Eisner, have taken up Eisner’s idea of the necessity for Bavaria to break through the ring drawn about Bavaria by Germany’s foreign policy. Eisner’s trip to Bern cleared the atmosphere, though it was an open act of rebellion against Berlin. Some coming Bavarian statesman must again have the courage to take the bit in his teeth. As for the communist leaders, they rave against Berlin. Landauer tells me he means to get a “Rate”-republic in Bavaria whether Germany likes it or not. A strange episode occurred on my departure from Munich. Geh.-Rat v. Müller (interim head of the Foreign Office) appeared at the station. He said he learned I was going via Konstanz to see the Baden Minister Dietrich. Would I mind telling Dietrich that he would like to confer concerning joint action with Baden against the excessive centralist doings in Weimar. There must have been some purpose in asking me to be the message bearer. V. Müller is one of the old school of state functionaries.
The “Second Revolution” has of course greatly exaggerated the anti-Prussian feelings in Bavaria. The Bavarians are certainly incapable of being militarized today; but if Prussian troops were to come to restore order, there would be a chance to see just how far resistance would be possible. No fight could be more popular.
During my last days in Munich, Prof; Jaffe, Minister of Finance, came to me on strange errands. He wanted me to tell him how negotiations stood concerning the importations of foodstuffs. I assured him I had no knowledge of these and would not be able to [Page 68] say anything even if I were informed. I suggested that his natural source of information would be the German authorities. This led to a bitter complaint against the negotiations in Spa. The Bavarian government was not represented there. Erzberger was a schemer whom surely we did not trust. There was also a Bavarian general at Spa, who for a time sent reports to the Bavarian Government; but he belonged to the old school and merely sent such silly vituperations and colored accounts that the government had no use for them. “And so our interests are being offered at auction without our participation and we are being overpowered in the peace negotiations, as we were in the war by Berlin, which has learned nothing and has no conception of how to deal with other peoples. We must find a way out.” Jaffe is a man whose sincerity I distrust and whose capabilities I count very low. He can not long retain his place in the ministry, although he clings to it with all his might. Nevertheless, such utterances on the part of a member of the government are significant, especially if he has been put forward as an enfant terrible, to tell truths with the possibility of their being disavowed.
When visitors have talked on the separatist strain, I have asked them, whether they really believed Bavaria could stand alone from the economic point of view. The reply usually was that it would be difficult, but that commercial treaties might help. Besides Bavarian industries were largely doomed in any event and an agrarian Bavaria could get on very well by herself. The separatist movement is surely one of the headless extravagances of the day; but I think it should be known, when its manifestations become so evident.
In the foregoing account, I have spoken of Bavarian sentiment; I ought, however, to point out that my watchtower was Munich and that the echoes coming in from regions with a Frankian population seem to differ considerably. It was a point I intended to study on the spot, when I was recalled. On the other hand I am sure that the tendency is not a mere attempt to curry favor by casting all the blame on the “unspeakable Prussians”. I got a taste of this in Baden in the two days I was there. The two things are different.
- Transmitted to the Commission by the Minister in Switzerland under covering letter No. 251, March 15; received March 18.↩