Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/274
Mr. Albert Halstead to the Secretary of State 94
Subject: The Hungarian army in Budapest.
Sir: I have the honor to make the following comment on the conditions in Hungary:
The fall of the Bela Kun government was due to the note of the Peace Commission in Paris of July 27th,95 which so strongly indicated that there could be no peace with Hungary until the Bolshevik Government was overthrown. The note was further influential in that it indicated a determination to be just if the armistice conditions were complied with. The note was tactful and strong and what was needed at the moment. Its effect was the greater because of the unofficial negotiations which had been taking place, that indicated the practical effort to solve the problem. I trust I may be permitted to say that without those unofficial negotiations the note of July 27th would not have been as effective, and would have been insufficient to overthrow the Bolshevik dictator.
It was only after the morale of the Bolshevik army had been destroyed that the Rumanians were able to make any progress. They have never stood against the Hungarian troops. Their approach may have hastened the formation of the new government, but Bela Kun would have been thrown out at the meeting which was to have been held in Budapest today.
The new government of Hungary started well—it made it at once apparent that it had done with Bolshevism and that it was ready gradually to include members other than those from the Working Men’s Council in the cabinet. It was prepared to hold elections at as early date as possible and even now it desires that the elections should take place in September. Such progress in the brief period of its life is remarkable. It showed an appreciation of the real necessities of the situation. At the same time the cabinet was prepared to meet any demand of the Allies. While its members would have preferred a workingmen’s government it appears to have appreciated that such a government could not have been permanent and to have been actuated by a really patriotic motive. In such circumstances the arrival of the Rumanians was of necessity discouraging, but the government stood this test reasonably well.
In order to understand the feelings of the Hungarian people it is necessary to appreciate their view of the Rumanians. No apology [Page 628] is made for their political actions during the war, nor for the conduct of Hungarian troops when helping in the occupation of Rumania. In this connection it is only to be said that if peace is to come to this part of the world reprisals for past offenses must not take place and a national pride which delights in the occupation of a conquered capital cannot be encouraged. The Hungarians who are a proud people with a military record that must be recognized have always regarded the Rumanians with contempt, as a people of inferior courage and culture and whose soldiers lack in personal bravery. Consequently the presence of Rumanian troops is immediately provocative and calculated to cause those who are working for the reconstruction of Hungary to feel that their efforts are useless. Already the Rumanians have killed harmless people—have cut off communications and are behaving as conquerors who have no regard for the people they conquer. This behavior cannot bring permanent good order and can only leave a feeling of bitterness and breed a desire for revenge.
If the conditions in Budapest were such as to make the Rumanian troops immediately necessary for the preservation of order there could be some excuse for their continuance in Budapest. In the circumstances they only serve to invite disorder and to interfere with the rebuilding of the country. A small military force is necessary to insure public order and to prevent the creation of a Volkswehr, such as that in Austria, which in the future would interfere with real representative government. Such a force—a few battalions, could come from nations who are regarded by Hungary as their equals and whose troops can be relied upon to conduct themselves in an orderly way. The Czechs and Servian troops would be equally undesirable because of the feeling against them, but no troops would arouse so much resentment as those from Rumania.
I would most respectfully but with the greatest possible earnestness emphasize the imperative necessity of requiring the Rumanian troops to immediately withdraw from Budapest and back to the line between Rumania and Hungary provided in the armistice terms. The new government needs encouragement and advice. This can only be made possible by the presence of allied representatives in the form of a commission. The blockade should be raised so that normal life can begin. The armistice terms must be strictly complied with and the military forces of the country disarmed. With this done Hungary could now solve her own problems and prepare to comply with the peace terms which will be imposed upon her and afterwards to solve her own domestic problems.
I have [etc.]
- Copy transmitted to the Commission by Mr. Halstead under covering letter No. 377, August 5; received August 7.↩
- See HD–15, minute 2, vol. vii, p. 317.↩