Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/204
Mr. Albert Halstead to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received July 28.]
Subject: The Hungarian problem and the United States.
Sirs: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of telegram No. 137 of July 22d, 12:00 P.M., signed by the Honorable Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss. I had realised the delicacy of the Hungarian situation and had sought to be particularly careful to avoid anything that would have approached committing the Commission or the United States in any way. The idea had been that if it were possible to present a concrete proposition to the Commission that body could pass upon it. It appeared to me that if anything could be done through the Hungarians themselves to change the disastrous condition of affairs in Hungary that change would necessarily be a betterment.
My telegrams and dispatches have indicated the confirmed belief that the real solution was to be reached by intervention on the part of troops of the Allies alone. That policy, recommended also by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy and France, and by Captain Gregory of the American Relief Administration was presented to the Commission. For reasons, which though not officially stated to me and for which I have the greatest respect that policy has not been approved.
Therefore when another method was suggested I felt I should ascertain how far it was practicable, so that the matter could be presented in completed form to the Commission. However, in order that the Commission might be informed of what was under consideration, I telegraphed it in my 620 of July 18th80 and my 637 of July 22d.81
That the Commission may be fully aware of exactly what has been done, I relate the history of the discussions up to the receipt of telegram 137 of July 22d, 12 P.M. It was Dr. Bauer who first suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham, British military representative here, that Mr. William Boehm could solve the problem. Mr. Boehm is a Social Democrat who was formerly commandant [Page 616] of the Hungarian Army, and appears to have had and to have the most influence with that organization. Dr. Bauer desired to know whether he should negotiate or whether Colonel Cunningham and I would undertake it. This was before I had any knowledge of the plan. Colonel Cunningham stated that he thought it was better for Dr. Bauer to talk with Boehm. When he was asked what conditions would be imposed, Colonel Cunningham declared that he was unable to make conditions but that certainly the Bolsheviks should leave the government, cease all association with the Russian Bolsheviki and end the propaganda and terror before the Allies and Associates would be able to consider anything. Colonel Cunningham made it clear that he was acting wholly unofficially. Dr. Bauer asked if the Soviet Government could continue, and with great caution he was informed so as to make no promise, and yet not destroy any possibilities, that the importance of the peasants and the ultimate participation of all the people in the government would have to be considered.
Colonel Cunningham immediately told me of this conversation. I thought he had handled the matter with the greatest delicacy, and told him that, and that I personally agreed with his ideas. I indicated my interest in any effort to solve the Hungarian problem but said at the same time that I had no instructions and could not indirectly or directly commit the government of the United States. He and I agreed that Prince Borghese, an Italian minister who is assigned as chief of the Italian political mission here, should be informed. In view of the unpopularity of the French with the Hungarians, it was feared that at first their participation might prevent any results. The Italians on the contrary are not unpopular and Prince Borghese, a very straightforward man, knows the Hungarian situation. It was also realised that the Italians and French were not exactly on the most amicable terms.
On the 22d, Mr. Boehm called upon Colonel Cunningham and they discussed the overthrow or elimination of the Bela Kun regime. Mr. Boehm seemed to regard any restoration of private ownership as a difficulty, both for political and technical reasons. He felt that the people of Hungary could not be immediately informed of the probable return to private ownership, but it was suggested that a technical commission might settle the matter. This suggestion made it possible for the discussion to be continued, as it built a bridge by which the two could come together. Mr. Boehm in the first sparring avoided indicating any serious difference of opinion with Bela Kun, but he finally seemed to agree that the overthrow of Communism and establishment of a temporary military dictatorship under Boehm, Haubrich and Agoston, with an Interallied Commission to assist would [Page 617] be a solution. He was particularly interested in the Workmen’s Council’s participation, but it was pointed out that the Peasants’ Council and later the Citizens’ Council would have to be considered, so that there might be what could be called a consulting body which would advise the military dictatorship at such times as elections were practicable.
I was personally in full accord with Colonel Cunningham’s proposition. It will be observed that I personally have had no communications on the subject of Hungary with either Dr. Bauer or Mr. Boehm. I trust that that aloofness will be regarded as having safeguarded the Government from any implied approval of the scheme.
I have indicated in my telegram of the 22d the strong belief, with which I understand Colonel Cunningham agrees, that the restoration of aristocratic rule in Hungary is to be avoided, and that if a Soviet Government were to be temporarily suffered, with Allied supervision, it would be such a decided improvement upon the existing terror and disorder as to deserve welcome. This has appeared particularly true inasmuch as it would be inevitably followed by a popular government just so soon as conditions warrant.
Yesterday, further conference was held at which were present Colonel Cunningham, Prince Borghese, Captain Gregory and myself. Captain Gregory has the confidence of all the foreign missions and his excellent work in all the old Austro-Hungarian Empire made his participation in every sense desirable. At this conference, which was held informally, the situation was discussed and certain tentative propositions were agreed upon, which Colonel Cunningham—again there was no personal connection with the Hungarian leader—was to present to him as a possible solution. It was then agreed that if Mr. Boehm accepted the conditions in principle, Mr. Allizé, former French Minister at The Hague, who is the representative in Vienna of the French Government, should be asked to attend. These propositions were as follows:
- 1.
- Boehm to assume the dictatorship with full governmental powers. As associates names of Garamy, Haubrich and Agoston suggested.
- 2.
- Complete stopping of Bolshevik propaganda, repudiation of Bolshevism and the dismissal of the regime of Bela Kun.
- 3.
- Until a government that will represent all sections of the community can be established, a military dictatorship for the period until that government could be established.
- 4.
- To stop immediately all acts of terror, seizures and confiscations.
- 5.
- An advisory body representing the Allies and Associates to be immediately summoned.
- 6.
- Blockade to be raised, and Allies and Associates to arrange immediately to supply food and coal, and to aid in opening the Danube river.
- 7.
- There shall be no prosecutions of a political character.
- 8.
- The question of socialization to be left to the final decision of the permanent government when that is established.
Mr. Boehm saw Colonel Cunningham in the afternoon and made no objections to the propositions. He asked, however, as to what the period of military dictatorship was to last, whether it was to be for weeks, months or years. He was informed that the period at the present moment could not very well be defined. He then accepted the proposition subject to the opportunity to consult his own people—those upon whom he would have to rely to overthrow Bela Kun and his satellites. He, however, indicated that the socialization of the banks and industries presented difficulties political and technical, and that he could not tell the people immediately that there was to be return to private ownership. This matter he did not press. Mr. Boehm stated that he thought it would require two days for him to get an answer.
This matter was presented at a meeting at 10:30 last night, at which were present Colonel Cunningham, Prince Borghese, M. Allizé, Captain Gregory and myself. M. Allizé agreed to the proposition though he was a shade doubtful at first as to whether Mr. Boehm could put it through. It was then thought best that Colonel Cunningham should see Mr. Boehm today. The meeting, I am informed, occurred today. Mr. Boehm told Colonel Cunningham that he was arranging to see his friends and had seen one today but that he could not undertake to overthrow the Kun government until he was assured that the Allies and Associates approved the plan. Asked how long it would take to overthrow Bela Kun he said about forty-eight hours.
The other missions, the British, Italian and French, have I understand forwarded the plan which I gave in my telegram 646 of July 24th, 7:00 A.M., and which was written early this morning before the receipt of your telegram 137 of July 22d, 12:00 P.M. In my 646 [654] of July 24th, 6:00 [5:50] P.M.,82 I reported on the meeting of Colonel Cunningham and Boehm today. That I regarded as reporting facts.
It was stated at the meeting last night that it was understood that four Allied generals were to be sent to Hungary to study the situation, and everybody thought that should they come their presence would be regarded as a partial recognition, and would again strengthen the Bolshevik government. It was fully believed that it was imperative to keep up the impression that the Allies and Associates would absolutely refuse to deal in any way with the Bolsheviki.
I have [etc.]