Paris Peace Conf. 184.011102/14
Mr. Albert Halstead1 to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received June 16.]
Sirs: I have the honor to remind the Commission to Negotiate Peace of telegrams sent since my arrival here regarding conditions in Vienna,2 and the general dissatisfaction and despair occasioned by the Peace terms. It seems desirable to explain the situation more fully:
On Monday there was a manifest feeling of unrest and anxiety with rumors as to a possible attempt of the Communistic element to take advantage of the proposed Volkswehr demonstration against reduction in its numbers, which had been demanded by the Italian Military Mission, to overthrow the existing government and to replace it with a Soviet. It was known that large sums of Hungarian money were being distributed amongst workmen. Then the feeling that the peace terms leave absolutely no future for German Austria had bred a partial indifference to impending events.
On Wednesday this feeling had increased and a number of definite statements as to the probable attempt at a coup d’état were made. These were emphasized by more detailed information as to the anxiety of the police authorities which was available that night.
Yesterday Doctor Pistor, secretary of the Handels and Gewerbkammer, and director of the Deutschösterreichisches Warenverkehrsbüro, called at the office of the mission and in a very earnest manner outlined the difficulties of the situation, described the feeling of impotency that prevailed among all thoughtful German Austrians and indicated much resentment because the terms of the peace treaty seem to them to give every consideration to the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, all of whom, they insist, had participated in the war, fighting, with the exception of a small proportion of the Czechoslovaks, with complete loyalty to the old regime but who had, when the collapse of the old empire was apparent become allies of its enemies.
[Page 529]Dr. Pistor explained in detail the plans of the Communistic faction to overthrow the government, speaking specifically of the Hungarian money that had been poured out. He declared that the Volkswehr with its 26,000 men was presumed to be at least one-third Communist and that a second third was uncertain. He told of the plan to attack the jail and release the criminal element so as to secure its support, and asserted that the men who are most in touch with the situation were afraid that the government would be unable, with the forces at its disposal to overcome the expected attack, and indicated that some members of the government, including Doctor Bauer, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Secretary of War Deutsch, were regarded as sympathetic with Communistic ideals, in fact that they were rabid Bolsheviki. He stated that the personnel of the new government had already been arranged, including Tomann, a radical workman and known Bolshevik, Dr. Fritz Adler who assassinated Minister President Sturgkt in 1916 and who, regarded as a second William Tell, was to give moral support. Dr. Pistor said he hesitated to mention the name that rumor had selected for the third member of the Soviet Council, but finally gave that of President Seitz of the National Assembly.
To prevent the success of this menacing plan he said that the only forces available were the six thousand reliable police, the gendarmerie numbering around two thousand men and a battalion of the old Imperial Guard of about four hundred men. Both sides are said to be well armed and to have machine guns as well as armored motor cars. Dr. Pistor expressed the opinion that if the tactics of the Communistic element were skillful the chances for success were greater than those for the defeat of the uprising, much depending on the police being able to divide the forces of the opposition.
At the time Dr. Pistor made this statement he emphatically declared that he preferred the success of the movement to the acceptance of the peace terms as at present drafted. Later he invited Vice-Consul Heingartner and myself to an informal dinner that night where there would be present Lieutenant-Colonel Causey, U. S. A. Communication, Dr. Taylor and Mr. Simpson of the Food Mission and Mr. Upson of the War Trade Board. Mr. Heingartner and I accepted and I made the point that I would attend informally to listen to what would be said but not for discussion of any kind, which would have been out of my province.
Just before leaving the office Thursday evening a newspaper was brought in which announced that the government would not reduce the Volkswehr—it was evident that this announcement would not be made unless the Allies had consented to their refusal—and I did not send the telegram containing the report as to the plans for the coup because it seemed as if the concession to the Volkswehr would weaken [Page 530] the Communistic movement. The dinner last night was more representative than I had anticipated, and in addition to the Americans mentioned the following German Austrians were present: City Secretary Zerdik, Assistant City Secretary Dr. Ellenbogen, Section Chief Riedl, Section Chief Muhlvenzl, Vice Mayor Emmerling, Hofrat Dr. Tayenthal, Dr. Pistor, Regierungsrat Dr. Drucker, Sektionsrat Dr. Langer, Grossindustrieller Fross Bussing, Generaldirektor Prinzhorn, Direktor Koppstein, Direktor Kreisky, Direktorstellvertreter Steyrer, Direktorstellvertreter Plentl and Dr. Widimsky.
Generaldirektor Prinzhorn, President of the Warenverkehrsbüro presided. He discussed with me the existing situation in detail, and at the same table were the Secretary for Commerce and Public Works and Dr. Pistor. In the conversations which the Americans present had with these gentlemen and with every other German Austrian there, the unanimous opinion, expressed in all earnestness and with no apparent intention to impress the hearer, was that German Austria could not exist under the peace terms with the various restrictions on her activities and financial loans; that the only future lay in the union with Germany, which most of those present had in the past opposed, and that they would rather risk a Communistic rule which might last only for a year or two rather than bind themselves to the terms of the peace treaty which they declare is a death sentence to what remains of old Austria. Various statements were made as to the paralysis to industry, the inability to secure coal and to the injurious effect of the closing of the Danube. It was emphasized that without free intercourse with Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Jugo-Slavia industry could not exist even on a reduced basis. It was further remarked that the city of Vienna which had been the financial center for the monarchy and had originally financed most of the enterprises in the new states now carved out of the monarchy must become depopulated and die unless unrestricted and unhampered commercial intercourse, such as existed in the past, were possible.
I have not forgotten that these statements were all made under the stress of great feeling and have only attempted to give the view of leading German Austrian industrialists and officials without expressing an opinion. Further, the apparent tendency to resist the peace terms is increased by the belief that the Peace Conference is not agreed, each of the four great powers have an entirely different point of view from the others, by the feeling that the failure to compel Hungary and Jugo-Slavia to comply with the orders of the Conference show a weakness that would make refusal on the part of German Austria less dangerous.
From many German Austrians, and from Entente sources as well, specific reports are received that the Italians have armed and assisted the Hungarian Soviet, that they have brought money for them from [Page 531] Hungary for use in Austria, and have intrigued here to bring about a Soviet government, the idea being, through the unrest in German Austria and Hungary to weaken the position of the Jugo-Slavs, whose attitude on the Fiume question and in regard to the eastern littoral of the Adriatic is offensive to Italian ambition. French activities in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland are subjects of much comment and it is reported that the Jugo Slavs have felt that they could manage their own affairs and have not welcomed French military officers there.
There is comment and criticism upon the various Entente missions here, the French being said to intrigue against each other, the Italians to have no strong control over themselves, and the English to talk and do nothing. Regarding the Americans here it is stated that the authority is so divided as to prevent the best results, a duplication of effort being very frequent because there is no real coordination.
I have [etc.]