Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/80

Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 73

Vienna, February 10, 1919.
[Received February 17.]

Sirs: I have the honor to enclose herewith the reports made by Lt. Col. Miles and Lt. LeRoy King, by Prof. Martin and by Prof. Kerner⁴⁸ which give their recommendations as to the provisional boundaries that should be drawn between the Austrians and the Yugoslavs in Carinthia. The four gentlemen have spent two weeks in working on this question, besides previous study. They have consulted many and contradictory maps and documents, they have heard able as well as enthusiastic advocates of opposing views. From all that I can judge they have conducted their work in an admirable spirit of impartiality and desire to find the most just as well as the most practicable solution, recognizing, however, that their task was merely that of providing a temporary arrangement which should avoid bloodshed and not a final delimitation of frontiers. They have done everything in their power to be as fair as possible. They have talked with many of the native population and they have repeatedly threshed out their results in discussion with one another.

It should be remembered that Lt. Col. Miles is an officer with much experience in dealing with the Slav peoples in the Balkans, having been with both the Serbians and the Bulgarians in the Balkan Wars. Professor Martin is a professional geographer of wide experience. Professor Kerner is of Slav origin and able to converse freely with the Slovenian peasants. The party was accompanied by two representatives one Austrian and one Yugoslav, both of them, I am told, men of intelligence and fairmindedness, though each was anxious to score every point for the cause he represented. I venture to think that these reports are worthy of the serious consideration of the Commission.

It will be noticed that the opinion of Professor Kerner differs very seriously from that of the other three gentlemen. This difference has not been unexpected by me. As I have only just read the reports and the pouch will soon close and as I wish the Commission to be in possession of these important documents as soon as possible, I am forwarding them without comment on my part. I shall discuss them in my next report when I have had time to think them over and to examine some of the documents that accompany them which I have retained for this purpose.

I have [etc.]

Archibald Cary Coolidge

[Enclosure 1]

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles and Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 8

7 February, 1919.

Subject: Provisional line of demarcation in Carinthia—methods of investigation, and decision.

1. In accordance with the protocol signed at Graz⁴⁹ there were two points to be considered of which the first (a) is specified as the controlling factor in deciding on a line of demarcation:—

a. The clear and unmistakable features of the terrain.

b. The national desires of the people on general lines.

In addition we had to consider the expressed purpose and the spirit of the protocol as a whole, which was essentially intended to prevent the renewal of hostilities. Our methods of study, and the form of our inquiries, were based solely on the above considerations.

2. The geographical features of the country were carefully studied on the spot and by the aid of maps and relief maps. The study of the desires of the population, and of the effect of the proposed line of demarcation on the keeping of the peace, was carried on in the field as outlined below.

3. The protocol specified that we were to be accompanied by one officially appointed representative of both the Carinthians and the Laibach Governments. In addition we made the following verbal stipulations to insure absolute neutrality and fairness:

a. We were to use automobiles provided by the two contending governments and would make equal use of Carinthian and Yugo-Slav cars if so requested by either side.

b. We were to receive no hospitality whatever during our stay in Carinthia.

c. The automobiles were to carry neither the Carinthian nor Yugo-Slav flag.

d. We reserved the right to keep our itinerary secret, and to visit any place or district on any day, or at any hour, we might elect.

4. We chose Klagenfurt as our base of operations in Carinthia because this town is in the center of lower Carinthia, and within easy reach by automobile of any part of the disputed territory. Klagenfurt is in Austrian hands. In the course of our study we had occasion to spend one night at Unter Drauberg, and two nights at Völkermarkt, both of which towns are at present occupied by Yugo-Slav troops.

5. Our investigation occupied eight full days in the field. We started out early on the morning of each day and rarely got back until well after dark. The routes traversed are shown on the annexed map (annex A).⁵⁰ Many routes were traversed more than once.

6. We used two automobiles. Colonel Miles and Lieutenant King, together with the two representatives, rode in the leading car, while Major Martin and Professor Kerner, our two official advisors, followed in the second car. We arranged our itinerary so as to prevent as far as possible any preparation for our visit in any particular town or district, and were very successful in this in most instances. When we found organized demonstrations, or other evidence of preparation in any locality, we made a point of returning unexpectedly until we were quite satisfied that we were receiving a fair and normal impression. Our advisors had as complete and full an opportunity for investigation and study as we. Not only were they almost always present when we made our inquiries and asked our questions in the towns, but they had also complete freedom in making their own investigation and asking their own questions. If either or both happened not to be present when significant information was obtained, we would either ask our informant to repeat his statement for their benefit, or turn him over to them to be questioned as they saw fit. Both representatives were constantly present (except that on one day Dr. Ehrlich, the Yugo-Slav representative, was absent at his own request) and were continually asked to make requests and suggestions as to the methods of questioning and study employed. These requests and suggestions were always agreed to and followed out when possible.

7. In dealing with the difficulty of finding out the national desires of people of pure Slovene blood, most of whom spoke both Slovene and German and who lived in country villages and farms, we adopted the only practical method of stopping individuals on the roads and asking them what their feelings and wishes were. In the course of our work we questioned many hundreds of people in the various districts, often stopping nearly everybody we met on the road. In the villages we walked about ourselves and sought people out. In order to give all confidence possible to the Slovene peasants, Lieutenant King, who did most of the questioning for us in the presence and with the consent of the two representatives, would ask the first three or four questions in the Slovene language and then continue in German. The questions almost invariably asked were; first, whether the man or woman was Slovene born, where he or she lived and how long he or she had lived there. Then they would be told that we were Americans and questions would be put as to their preference for permanent Yugo-Slav or Austrian rule, their feelings with regard to the administration which happened to be in control of their town or district at the time etc. Regard was always had to the intelligence of the individual and the particular local subject of investigation.

8. The two representatives also did a certain amount of questioning, and were at full liberty to bring out any point favorable to their respective sides if they could do so. The Yugo-Slav representative, who was a priest in clerical dress and as such was stamped at once as a Yugo-Slav political leader in a country where agitators for the Yugo-Slav cause are nearly all priests, was in most advantageous position to elicit Yugo-Slav sentiments from the Slovene population. The Austrian representative was in civilian dress at all times and rarely announced his official capacity. The Yugo-Slav representative did far more questioning than he, and talked almost entirely in the Slovene language. Both the Austrian and Yugo-Slav representatives were men of justice and fine character.

9. We found that by stopping people on the roads, particularly on market days when they were coming to the towns to sell their produce, and then by asking them where they lived, we could obtain an impression of the desires of a whole district. Our market day investigations were very instructive. On one occasion Colonel Miles checked up impressions by keeping an accurate account of votes and found that both Major Martin and Lieutenant King, neither of whom had made any attempt to count had received impressions that were very accurate.

10. In the towns where there was a predominant Austrian population and sentiment, we always asked to hear the views and desires of the minority, and announced in the hearing of all that we expected and required of the authorities that no man should be oppressed or persecuted for having expressed a minority opinion.

11. In addition to actual field work we studied the documentary evidence presented by both sides. This evidence is attached hereto in two bundles one marked “Yugo-Slav evidence” (annex B) and one “Austrian evidence” (annex C).⁵¹

12. After the field work was over we spent a whole day in Klagenfurt in going over in detail all the data accumulated. We asked our advisors, Major Martin and Professor Kerner, to give their opinions first in each case. The final decision reached was that the line of demarcation should be in general the line of the Karawanken Mountains. We are in perfect accord in this decision on all points, and Major Martin’s recommendation supports our decision in every respect.

• Sherman Miles
• Le Roy King

[Enclosure 2]

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles and Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 9

Vienna, February 9, 1919.

Subject: Detailed reasons for the decision regarding the line of demarcation in Carinthia.

1. Supplementing our report to you (No. 8),⁵² in which our methods of investigation in Carinthia were described and our final decision stated, we submit the following detailed reasons which led to our decision.

2. Following the procedure of our discussion in Klagenfurt at which the decision was reached, we will present first our reasons for the adaptation [sic] of the line of the Karawankens Mountains as a whole, and then our reasons for giving to the Austrians each of the several disputed geographical districts north of the Karawankens. Both in the general and in the detailed discussions, we will adhere to the line of reasoning imposed by the Protocol (a copy of which is filed with your Dispatch No. 31)⁵³—that is to say, we shall reason from the three factors of (1), a clear and unmistakable geographical line of demarcation, (2) national desires of the people, and (3) how our decision would affect the chances for peaceful administration of the country between the date of your approval and the final decision in Paris.

3. On the map attached hereto⁵⁴ the line of the Karawankens is drawn in red. This chain of mountains, through most of its length, is a strikingly abrupt and sharp barrier. From the point of view of a clear and unmistakable geographical line it is unquestionably superior to the line of the Drau River (marked in blue), although the latter in every sense fulfills the definition of the protocol. Along the same line of reasoning, the Karawankens are still more superior to any possible line north of the Drau.

4. From the point of view of national desires, our investigation convinced us that the majority of the people between the Drau and the Karawankens (the blue and the red lines) preferred Austrian rule. The outstanding fact is the large number of Slovenes who avowedly prefer Austrian rule, or whose political creed is an undivided Carinthia. Since only the southeastern corner of Carinthia is in dispute, and since all the rest of Carinthia is admittedly Austrian, undivided Carinthia means Austrian Carinthia. The Slovene who does not want to be a Jugo-Slav is a curiosity we should never have believed in had we not seen him, and in large numbers. North of the Drau (the blue line) the Austrian preferences of the people are still more marked.

5. From the point of view of the effect on peaceful administration, we prefer to give the disputed strip of territory between the Drau and the Karawankens (blue and red lines) to the Austrians for the following reasons:

(a) We are strongly impressed by the fact (which our investigations brought out) that the Jugo-Slav occupation of even Slovene territory is in the nature of a strong-handed military control, with unmistakable touches of Prussianism; while, on the contrary, the Austrian administration of the territory occupied by them rests on a much less military basis. Jugo-Slav forces are much more in evidence throughout the territory occupied by them than are the Austrian forces in the Austrian occupied territory. This statement includes not only numbers of men, but also potential strength in artillery. The Austrians are apparently holding their territory largely on the strength of the good-will of the inhabitants.

(b) Not only do the Jugo-Slavs base their administration on military force, but they also use that force as a constant threat against the people. The Jugo-Slav Colonel commanding in Völkermarkt told us that he proposed to answer random rifle fire from the Austrian side with field guns. Since the Austrian forces consist of almost ridiculously weak and dispersed detachments, the fire of the Jugo-Slav cannon is in effect a threat, not against them, but against the civilian inhabitants of the country. The same commander went still further by telling us that, if the random rifle fire from the Austrian side did not cease, he would reply by “punitive expeditions”. Needless to say, such a measure would punish, not the Austrian troops, but the civilian population. We may say in passing that random rifle fire from the irregular troops on both sides is unavoidable, and will probably continue until the country settles down into final conditions of peace; but the opening of artillery or the advance of “punitive expeditions” is quite another matter, and is something we heard of only from the Jugo-Slav side.

(c) The outstanding geographic features of lower Carinthia are the broad, flat valley of the Drau and the rugged and difficult chain of the Karawankens. These features establish the geographical, and hence the economic unity of lower Carinthia. The Jugo-Slav occupation of a part of the valley of the Drau is an economic handicap to the people of the occupied region, and hence a constant factor tending towards a disturbance of the peace. The story of the capture of the Rosenthal by the Austrians on January 6th and 7th, given below, indicates to our minds how strongly the people feel about an economic cutting off of a district by military occupation, and how easily the feeling may be fanned into open hostilities.

6. We will now discuss, in the same manner as above, the four districts marked I, II, III, and IV on the accompanying map.

7. District I, called for convenience “The Island”, can be dismissed with the statement that Major Martin and Professor Kerner agree with us that it should remain in the hands of the Austrians.

8. District II, is called the Rosenthal, and requires a detailed discussion because Professor Kerner dissents to our opinion that it should remain in the hands of the Austrians.

9. From the geographical point of view, we believe that the southern (red), and not northern (blue) limit of the Rosenthal should be adopted as the line of demarcation. While admitting that the Drau (blue line) fulfills the geographical definition of the protocol, we are convinced that the Karawankens (red line) is a much more clear and unmistakable geographical demarcation. Along this particular part of the frontier the Karawankens are especially rugged and difficult to pass—in fact, they are practicable for passage only at the Karawanken tunnel, the Loibl Pass (about 4,000 feet) and the Wurzen Pass (about 3,000 feet).

10. From the point of view of national desires of the people, we base our opinion that they are pro-Austrian on two lines of reasoning brought out by our investigation, as follows:

(a) Direct questioning of all classes of people, both in the towns and on the roadside, convinced us that the majority sentiment was distinctly pro-Austrian.

(b) The indicative results of the events of January 6th and 7th. These events we found to be as follows: About November 2d the Jugo-Slav forces appeared in the Rosenthal, and soon afterwards occupied the whole of it. In addition to their troops, they organized from the pro-Jugo Slovenes of the district an armed “national guard”. A large and long-established gun factory at Ferlach (Rosenthal) enabled them to supplement the equipment of their regular and irregular forces, at least by sporting arms, which should have been very effective in any irregular warfare. Two months after the Jugo-Slav occupation, on January 6th and 7th, hastily raised Austrian forces took the whole of the Rosenthal in 36 hours without serious resistance on the part of the Jugo-Slavs, and without any casualties worth considering on either side. The most extraordinary feature of this affair, and one that we would not believe until it had been repeatedly confirmed by pro-Jugo-Slavs, was that the fighting started at Arnoldstein by the attack of a group of armed men (part, at least, of whom were Slovenes) from the valley of the Gail. In other words, the fight was started by Slovenes who were not from the Rosenthal but who fought to free the Rosenthal from Jugo-Slav occupation in order to clear their own communication with their markets at Villach. The attack was then pushed on with the aid of Slovenes from the Rosenthal and the mass of the Slovene population there offered no resistance. We desire to point out that this affair, while beneath consideration from a military point of view, is extremely indicative of the real feeling of the people of the Rosenthal and the neighboring Slovene district of the Gail. It is true that part of the Austrian forces which took the Rosenthal were ex-Marines from the Austrian Navy, who had returned to their homes in Carinthia. Nevertheless, the whole affair is a typical example of irregular warfare, without artillery on either side. In irregular warfare, much more than in organized warfare, the factor of the hostility or the friendliness of the population is very strong, and often decisive. Here is a case in which the Jugo-Slavs had two months in which to organize and arm a predominantly Slovene population. They even had a gun factory on the spot. They actually did organize and arm the population, presumably as far as it was possible for them to do so. And yet in 36 hours the whole district was taken from them. Careful investigation on our part failed to bring out a single instance of any armed pro-Jugo-Slav firing on the scattered Austrian detachments as they advanced beyond the immediate vicinity of the river. Even the fighting at the crossings of the river amounted to almost nothing. Men who were avowedly pro-Jugo-Slav, and even some who stated that they had been in the Jugo-Slav “national guard”, confirmed the amazing statement that many Slovenes from the Rosenthal joined the Austrians north of the Drau, before the attack, and came back with the Austrian forces to drive the Jugo-Slavs out of the district, and the equally extraordinary statement that there were Slovenes from the valley of the Gail in the group of men who began the fighting at Arnoldstein. (The Austrians claim that all the men who fought with them at Arnoldstein were Slovenes, but the point is that both sides agree that Slovenes were present.) In short, aside from slight resistance at the river crossings, the irregular Austrian forces simply walked through the Rosenthal and took possession of that Slovene district. No “embattled farmers” here, fighting for their country and their nationality.

11. From the point of view of the effect on peace and order, we are convinced that the Rosenthal should not be given back to the Jugo-Slavs, even for temporary occupation. Were such a step taken, we cannot see that the solemn promise of the Carinthian Government to maintain the armistice on our line of demarcation could possibly guarantee the prevention of such another affair as that of January 6th and 7th, described above. In passing, we would say that we were impressed by the tolerance of the present Austrian occupation of the Rosenthal. We found there pro-Jugo-Slavs who did not hesitate to say openly that they had borne arms in the Jugo-Slav “national guard” less than three weeks before—and these men are now at liberty. We found no hesitancy among the pro-Jugo-Slavs in avowing their political faith before the Austrians, and even in the presence of Austrian troops, nor any indications that they were under constraint by the Austrian occupation.

12. District III, called by us the “Völkermarkt Salient”, can be dismissed with the statement that Professor Kerner and Major Martin concur in our opinion that it should be entirely in the hands of the Austrians, though Professor Kerner states that he would “personally prefer to give it to the Jugo-Slavs”.

13. District IV, the Jaunthal, requires a detailed discussion, since Professor Kerner dissents from our opinion that the line of demarcation should be the southern boundary, and that therefore the Jugo-Slavs must withdraw from it until a decision is given in Paris.

14. From a geographical point of view, we believe the Karawankens (red line) to be better than the Drau (blue line) for the same reasons as stated above in the discussion of the Rosenthal district. We are aware of the fact that in the Jaunthal the red line does not run along such an abrupt or impassable mountain chain as in the Rosenthal district. Nevertheless, we still consider it a better line of demarcation than the Drau. A detail may be mentioned in passing—the line of demarcation should follow the actual watershed across the Seeburg Pass, and not the old boundary of Carinthia (as the red line shows). This is a matter of only a few square miles, which even the Austrian authorities concede without discussion to the Jugo-Slavs.

15. From the point of view of national desires, our investigation convinced us that the sentiment of the majority of the people is slightly on the side of the Austrians. There are only four towns in the district of any size (say between 1000 and 2000 inhabitants each). These towns are strongly pro-Austrian in feeling. We were more interested in getting at the desires of the country people, and therefore limited our investigations almost entirely to people we met on the roadside. On one day we stopped every man on the highroad going to market (it happened to be a market day). In this way we should have found whatever Jugo-Slav sentiment existed, since the richer and more urban German population might have been expected to have been absent. And, as a matter of fact, most of the people we questioned were Slovenes by birth. In spite of this fact, and in spite of the fact that the district was under strong Jugo-Slav military occupation, and the additional fact that the Jugo-Slav authorities invited us to go into the district and knew that we were there, the result of our investigation was a slightly pro-Austrian feeling. We even found the extreme case of Slovenes who spoke no German, who lived in a Slovene town, and yet who said they preferred the Austrians to the Jugo-Slavs. We also got the distinct impression that the pro-Austrian Slovenes were a better class of people than the pro-Jugo Slovenes.

By “better class” we do not mean more prosperous, but better in the sense of making a better general impression as men.

16. The effect of the withdrawal of the Jugo-Slav occupation to the south of the Karawanken mountains may or may not be beneficial. From the point of view of peace, the question is admittedly problematical, and we can only say that we believe peace and order are more apt to be maintained in the Jaunthal if the Jugo-Slavs withdraw than if they do not. The two cases may be summed up as follows:

(a) If the Jugo-Slav occupation remains in the Jaunthal, it will be under the sting of a Jugo-Slav withdrawal from the town of Völkermarkt. We are convinced from what we heard, both at Laibach and Graz, and from what we saw on the spot, that the possession of Völkermarkt to the Jugo-Slavs is a much treasured touch of chauvinism, if not of imperialism. They clung to Völkermarkt in the Graz conference, and actually broke up the conference on it. We believe that they greatly desire to retain Völkermarkt, not only because of its Slovene hinterland, but also as a spearhead across the Drau between the Austrian districts of the Lavant valley and the Klagenf urt basin. We are convinced, and our advisers agree with us, that they must get out of Völkermarkt. If they get out of Völkermarkt, but still retain the Jaunthal, we think the chances are that they would retaliate on the pro-Austrian population by increased military suppression, if not by actual reprisal. It would lie in their power to shell the German town of Völkermarkt from the heights south of the Drau. They could do this on some such flimsy excuse as that given us by the Jugo-Slav commander in Völkermarkt for artillery reprisal to rifle fire (See above, paragraph 5–b). Should they do this, they would probably claim that the Austrians fired cannon first, and no unbiased authority could prove the contrary. Nor could the Austrians make artillery reprisals in kind (even if they wanted to), for there are no Jugo-Slav towns of any importance in range. In this connection we may say that we were also impressed by finding Jugo-Slav artillery near Galizien, which could serve them only to cover an offensive movement into Austrian territory or to shell habitations on the northern bank by way of punishment. Another point to be considered, under the above hypothesis, is that the economic life of the Jaunthal would be seriously crippled. Although both sides say they want to establish commercial intercourse over the new lines of demarcation, we doubt if this will be done, particularly at Völkermarkt. The shutting off of Völkermarkt from its economically dependent territory to the south would be an obvious reprisal on the part of the Jugo-Slavs for having to give up the town. The condition of the roads in the Jaunthal even now indicate economic strangulation as a result of being cut off from Klagenfurt. And we observed, in crossing the lines of occupation in several places, that it was always on the Jugo-Slav side that the roads were barricaded to stop traffic. Lastly, we refer to the general discussion above (Paragraph 5–a and b) to the effect that Jugo-Slav occupation, as we found it, is distinctly more military, in the Prussian sense, than is the Austrian, and hence more apt to lead to trouble. As an example of this, in the Jaunthal, the Jugo-Slav colonel in command at Bleiburg admitted to us that he had named certain German inhabitants of the town as hostages, and that he would execute them in the market place if any of his men were killed in fighting or in riots at Bleiburg.

(b) If the Jugo-Slav occupation is withdrawn from the Jaunthal, a certain amount of looting and pillaging may be expected during this withdrawal. The additional sting of the evacuation of the Jaunthal may be expected to make the Jugo-Slavs more hostile after they establish themselves on the new line of demarcation. But, as against these two unfavorable factors, we believe that disturbances during a short period of Jugo-Slav withdrawal are less apt to lead to serious trouble than is the continuous strain of Jugo-Slav occupation, and that later the mountains themselves will prevent, or at least greatly hinder any Jugo-Slav hostility taking the form of artillery reprisals or “punitive expeditions”. In short, we believe that the complete withdrawal of the Jugo-Slavs to the south of the Karawankens would tend more towards the avoidance of hostilities than would a prolonged Jugo-Slav military occupation of the Juanthal.

17. To sum up our decision, we believe that the line of provisional demarcation, as defined and agreed to in the Protocol, should be the watershed of the Karawankens (technical description of this line to be given in Report No. 10).⁵⁵ We base our conviction on each and all of the three factors of decision of the Protocol (geographical, national desires, and effect on peace), and our conviction holds in each and all of the four districts enumerated above.

18. In reaching the above decision, we confined ourselves strictly to the letter, as well as to the spirit of the Protocol. We refused to consider the effect which a provisional line of demarcation established by us might have on the final frontier as determined in Paris. Having reached our decision without regard to this consideration, we feel at liberty to say that, should the line of demarcation be used by the Austrians as an argument for the final frontier (in spite of the protocol), the burden of proof which we have unavoidably thrown on the Jugo-Slavs would not rest heavily upon them. Theirs is the side which will have the best, if not the only direct representation at Paris; theirs is the side least prejudiced in the eyes of the Entente Powers; and theirs is the side which has the ethnological argument of the Slovene blood (though we believe not Jugo-Slav feeling) in the districts our line gives to the Austrians.

• Sherman Miles
• Le Roy King

48. Reports of Professor Martin and Professor Kerner not printed.
49. Not printed.
50. Map not reproduced.
51. Annexes not attached to file copy of this document.
52. Supra.
53. Protocol not printed; despatch No. 31 printed on p. 498.
54. Map not reproduced.
55. Not printed.