Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/295

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 19

Spalato, 29 March, 1919.

(Sent direct to Paris, by authority of Professor Coolidge, because of direct courier service. One copy sent to Professor Coolidge, Vienna.)

Subject: The Dalmatian Coast—question of future nationality (supplementing my report No. 17, of March 21st³⁸).

1. Since writing report No. 17, I have been in Zara and Sebenico, and have motored about the country in the Zara-Benkovac–Knin–Sebenico region. Although I was the guest of the Italian authorities, I had plenty of opportunity to talk to the representative men on both sides and to go to their clubs and societies.

2. The issue in Dalmatia is very plain. The province is Jugoslav by blood and sentiment. Although the Italians here are essentially traders, a large part of even the property is in the hands of the Jugoslavs. In Zara, for instance, there are 4 Jugoslav banks against 3 Italian. Commercially Dalmatia and its Jugoslav hinterland are inter-dependent to a far greater degree than are Dalmatia and Italy. The Italian claim rests primarily on the Pact of London and secondarily on the historical traditions of Rome and Venice—traditions of doubtful value at best, and based on regimes the last of which is now more than a century dead.

3. My statement in report No. 17 that Sebenico is a Jugoslav town and that it is by no means sure that a free vote in Zara would be for Italy is, I am convinced, true. The same conclusion is reached by examination of the question from different points of view—a balance of the claims of the two sides, the pre-war census, the attitude of the people during this difficult period of uncertainty, the general appearance of the towns, the types met in the streets, restaurants, meetings, etc. I was not, however, prepared to be told by the Italians themselves in Zara that not only the Hinterland but also all of the islands were practically pure Slav. The pre-war representation in the Diet of Zara (37 Jugoslavs against 6 Italians) is a well known fact, as is the overwhelming preponderance of Slavs in the province as a whole, as shown by the pre-war censuses.

4. The Italians claim that during the forty years preceding the war the Austrian authorities favored the Slavs and did what they could to eradicate, slowly, the Italian colonies. In general, this is true; but it was always a matter of local issue, varying with time and circumstances, and a part and parcel of the old Austrian policy of playing off one people against another. Against it must be set the period of Venetian control, ending only in 1797—a period of three and a half centuries in which the Italians had every possible advantage and yet never gained even a numerical equality with the Slavs.

5. The Italians also claim that the Croats are incapable of governing the province, and continually bear charges against them on the general ground that they are “barbarians”. From what I have been able to discover, there is not an iota of choice between the intolerance of the two peoples. The blackest and most serious side of the whole question is the bitterness with which the quarrel is waged. Either way the decision goes, a large part of the losing party will be forced, economically at least, to leave the country. But as to the capacity for self-government, while I believe the Italians are right in saying that theirs is the higher culture, I am impressed by what I have been able to see of the ability of the Croat leaders and representative people. Certainly they bear comparison to the native Italians of the Province. It is of course well known that the literacy of the Croats is comparatively high, and even the Italians who have most to say about the squalor and ignorance of the lower Croat peasants admit their intelligence.

6. I mentioned in my last report the autocratic manner in which the Italians are now governing that part of Dalmatia assigned to them by the Pact of London. I found that their authorities in Sebenico and Zara openly admit the deportation of Jugoslav leaders, simply on the ground that they are leaders, and without charging them with flagrant violation of the public order. These deportations are notably wrong in that the men, in many cases, have been sent away at night, on a few hours notice, and without trial. All of them have been sent to Italy where they are confined without communication (save by censored letters) with their own people. The last deportations in Sebenico occurred ten days ago. In this case nine men were arrested in their houses in the middle of the night and left in an Italian destroyer at 5 o’clock that morning for an unknown destination in Italy. In Zara I found that the Jugoslav club, one of the best and most conspicuous buildings in the town, had been taken by the authorities on the excuse that they wanted it for a military headquarters, and an old inn facing a stable yard had been assigned to the Jugoslavs in lieu of it. (Clubs here are not for men alone, but are social centers of the communities.) I mention these things only as showing that the charge of incapacity for government can well be made by both sides.

7. I find the Italians much inclined to harp on the racial difference between Dalmatia and the rest of the Balkan Peninsula. On this phase of the question they usually go farther than the line of the Pact of London, and place the division between Western Europe and the Balkans on the Narento River, in Herzegovina. As a matter of fact, there is no such clear cut division. I know the Balkans pretty well, and to all appearances Dalmatia is very Balkan. Recently I struck a religious fete-day in motoring near Zara. I never saw a better or more varied display of native Balkan costumes—Croat, Albanian and Serb. There are even said to be a few Cutzo-Valachs in the neighborhood of Knin. The larger villages I passed through have Orthodox churches, and many of them Serbian signs in the Cyrillic alphabet— this is in the zone of Italian occupation.

8. But the larger aspect of the Dalmatian question is the economic. With the exception of a few fairly fertile valleys, Dalmatia is a very poor strip of barren rocks lying between a rich hinterland and the sea. Its small production is largely confined to wine and olive oil. Its principal industry is fishing. In wine, oil and fish it has to compete at great disadvantage with Italy, where all three are obtained at less cost and with greater ease. This is the chief local argument against the incorporation of any part of Dalmatia into the Kingdom of Italy. The native Croats say that if the province becomes Jugoslav they can send their produce across the mountains by their caravans and narrow-gauge railroads; but that if they have to cross a frontier and if they are flooded by the cheaper Italian produce of the same kind, they will starve. It appears that about 15 years ago Italy obtained a commercial concession whereby she was permitted to sell her wine and oil in Dalmatia under a very small import tax. This Italian competition nearly ruined the local producers. The strength of the local economic argument is shown, in a measure, by the difference between the native Italian and Croat ideas as to the future of Zara. The Croats there think that under Jugoslavia the town could continue to live as the center of the coastal produce being shipped into the interior and of the produce of the interior coming out. The Italians of Zara, on the other hand, told me that they saw no future for the town, even under Italy—that it would die commercially and remain only the administrative center of a local government and possibly a bathing resort of some small importance.

9. The manufactories in Dalmatia are few and relatively unimportant. There are some cement works near Spalato, and a calcium-carbide factory at Sebenico. The latter was built with Italian money, but had been bought up by Austrian capital before the war began. There are some mines producing a rather poor grade of coal on the Promina Mountain, northeast of Sebenico. The potential water power of the falls of the Kerka River is considerable. There are three of these falls, the largest being about 4 kms. west of Scardona (see Kistanje und Drnis sheet of the 1:75,000 map, herewith, marked “Annex B”³⁹). The Kerka broadens out into a long, narrow lake and drops into the gorge of Scardona over cascades some 130 feet in height. This water power is now used only to light the town of Sebenico. Both the above mentioned coal mines and water power are in the zone of Italian occupation. There are other waterfalls capable of development notably near Almissa and along the Croatian coast.

10. The commercial importance to Jugoslavia of the Dalmatian and Croatian coasts (including Fiume) far outweighs the commercial interests of Dalmatia. Bosnia alone is very rich in lumber and minerals, both largely undeveloped. I recently met the son-in-law of Herr Steinbeiss, the Austrian who owns large forest tracts in Bosnia and who constructed the narrow gauge railroad across the mountains to Knin, in order to get his export to the sea. I was told by this gentleman that the Germans had developed during the war Bosnian mines yielding 50% iron, and that the timber lands of Bosnia would furnish export for many decades to come. In addition to Bosnia, there is the whole of the upper valley of the Save, including Croatia and Slovenia, in need of an outlet to the sea. While the Steinbeiss narrow gauge road from Bosnia down to Knin is well constructed and capable of considerable hauling capacity, the fact remains that the only standard gauge line capable of serving the present needs of the hinterland is the Agram-Fiume line. Standard gauge communication via Knin is a possibility of the future—the mountain pass is about 3,000 feet high, and the cost of construction would be great. It is therefore evident that Fiume is in every sense necessary for the prosperity of Jugo-slavia for many years to come. Losing Fiume but retaining Dalmatia, Jugoslavia would have two cramped outlets to the sea in the two narrow gauge, funicular roads running through Knin and Mostar. But if she loses Dalmatia (by the Pact of London) as well as Fiume, she is reduced to the single loophole of Mostar, with its inadequate harbors of Metkovac and Gravosa.

11. I attach hereto a map (marked “Annex A”—”Dalmazia”)⁴⁰ on which I have drawn the line of Italian occupation, which is approximately that of the Pact of London. I have also indicated on this map the coal mines and water power near Sebenico, as well as the two narrow gauge railroads into the interior, through Knin and Mostar. I have also drawn in what I believe to be the reasonable and natural frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia. This is the line I suggested in my reports Nos. 15 and 16,⁴¹ and which further study of the Adriatic question convinces me is the nearest possible approach to absolute justice.

12. Judged by the standards of today, the Italian claims on Fiume and upper Dalmatia are pitiably weak when compared with those of Jugoslavia. It is a case of a bargain made under the morals of the old diplomacy as against national rights. Italy may have paid, in the blood of her men, her full share of the bargain which brought her into the war: but the Pact of London remains a blood-bargain—the bartering away of a people who have every right to their independence. The map above referred to shows clearly how imperialistic is the Italian land-grab. They have not only cut off from the hinterland the only outlet to the sea at present effective (Fiume), but they have also so cleverly sliced into the Dalmatian coast as to cut squarely across one of the two remaining outlets (such as it is), and have assured to themselves the splendid little harbor of Sebenico, with its potential water power and the only coal mines in the country. Not only that, but the eastern-most curves of their line, north of Spalato and around the islands to the south-east, are so drawn as to allow them to effectually strangle, both by land and by sea, any future Jugoslav development of Spalato or the bay of Castelli. It is a blood-bargain which goes so cynically against the essential rights of a virile people that I cannot believe that it would lead to anything but more blood in the future. If the bargain must be recognized in the coming Treaty of Peace, it is to be hoped that, so far as the United States is concerned, it will be made clear that our recognition is based on no principle for which we have fought.

Sherman Miles

38. Not printed.
39. Map not reproduced.
40. Map not reproduced.
41. Report No. 15 not printed; report No. 16 printed on p. 479.