Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/166

Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

No. 116

Vienna, March 2, 1919.
[Received March 5.]

Sirs: I have the honor to inclose herewith a number of extracts from reports sent me by Lieutenant Leroy King who is at present in Agram.

I have [etc.]

Archibald Cary Coolidge

[Enclosure 1—Extract]

Extracts From Reports of Lieutenant L. R. King

Report No. 2, February 22d.

The Jugo-Slav Government has to consider:

1. The unity of Jugo-Slavia.

2. The effect on Jugo-Slavia as a whole (with relation to the Entente) of any unreasonable or extreme territorial claims by any one of its component states.

These two considerations are being constantly balanced, the tendency is to consider the effect on the Entente as of the first importance. Also, the Serbs and Croats do not care a bit about the special claims and wishes of the Slovenes. They care much more about Jugo-Slavia, and most about their own particular claims. I think, however, that the Serbs are much more reasonable and wise about the Banat than are the Slovenes about Carinthia. The Serbs are a disciplined people, and are not inflamed by wild optimism.

The Jugo-Slav State is still so unformed and new that the Slovenes and Croatians go ahead and do what they like, and then refer back to Belgrade for support if they need it, and become furious if they don’t get it. Conversely, (Johnson, a British Secretary of Legation here whom I used to know in Paris, tells me) the Slovenes and Croats will not obey orders sent out from Belgrade unless they feel like it. The Jugo-Slav Government needs recognition by the Entente (not merely the U. S. A.) in order to have the prestige and power to control the Croats and Slovenes.

. . . . . . .

[Enclosure 2]

Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A. C. Coolidge

Report No. 6

Belgrade, February 24, 1919.

Military situation.

1. Colonel Kafalatovitch, Chief of Operations of the Siberian Army, has given me the following information which I have supplemented from other sources to a small extent.

2. The Serbian Army is now the instrument of the Jugo-Slav Provisional Government, as the Serbian Government proper has been merged with the Jugo-Slav Government. The Jugo-Slav Government is still unrecognized by the Entente and has been in existence for such a short time that it is not yet a strong organization, while the Serbian Army is victorious and has much prestige. So the Serbian Staff run the army in all details. They do not even know whether they ought yet to call it the Jugo-Slav Army, but they use the army as the Provisional Government directs.

3. About two weeks ago the Serbian Staff took actual command of all the different Jugo-Slav forces, and it is now gradually and by degrees exercising this control. Up to two weeks ago the Slovenes and Croatian forces were under the command of a staff at Agram, composed mostly of officers of Jugo-Slav blood and loyalty who had been in the Austrian Army during the war. It was this staff that appointed General Maester, who was not under the control of the Serbian Staff at the time of the shooting affray in Marburg.

4. The Serbian General at Laibach was sent there in the first instance as a “délégué” and advisor; and took command of the various Slovene contingents only two weeks ago. He now commands all the forces in that country. There have been two battalions and three batteries of Serbian troops under his command in Slovenia for some time; but these, Kafalatovitch affirms, have been always kept “in reserve”.

5. The Slovene troops, under officers appointed from Agram (like Maester) have been acting independently of the Serbs. Now that all troops in Slovenia and Croatia are under Serbian military command, backed by the Provisional Jugo-Slav Government, Kafalatovich says they will be controlled to a greater and greater extent as time goes on, though he admits that the problem is difficult owing to the rather vague power of the Provisional Government. The prestige of the Serbian officers will counterbalance the tendency on the part of the Slovene and Croatian officers and soldiers to pay little attention to a government which up to now is more of an idea than an actual power. Serbian officers are being constantly sent out to the various units.

6. There are about 10,000 troops in Slovenia, of which 800 men (2 battalions) and 1 field and 2 mountain batteries are Serbian. The rest are purely Slovene with the exception of a “régiment” (numbers probably small) created by the Slovenes out of returned Serbian prisoners of war, who were sent to Slovenia (or went there themselves) from Austria after the armistice. A larger proportion of these 10,000 troops are along the Italian line of occupation than on the Austrian frontier; and many are guarding lines of communication, or doing police work.

7. Kafalatovitch issued an order yesterday to the Serbian command in Slovenia to take the greatest care not to make reprisals against the Austrians, nor to make any hostile preparations. (This was the result of Dodge’s³⁰ action on your telegram). He denies absolutely that any offensive is contemplated; and further says that all shooting across the line has been done by the Austrians. He may have been misinformed by the Slovenes commanders who still are acting more or less independently, but he certainly is speaking the truth as far as he knows it. He is well aware of the necessity for keeping the armistice. The Serbian Staff will do all they can to stop offensive action of any kind; but they are under difficulties as they have not yet got complete control.

8. I learn from Kafalatovitch that the Bulgars are making preparations on the Macedonian front by organizing bands of from 100 to 200 men, whom they are expected to send across the provisional frontier in the spring, for the purpose of sowing discord among the Macedonian population and turning it against the Serbs. They are stated to be in close understanding with the Italians who have a general and troops at Sofia, and who are everywhere trying to hamper the Jugo-Slav State. The Italians allow Bulgarian soldiers to be transported in Italian motor-trucks back along their lines of communication into Albania. The Italians are doing all they can to inflame the Albanians against the Serbs, and trouble is expected in that quarter. Information is very meagre, but General Plunkett, the English officer attached to the Serbian General Staff, with whom I have consulted, thinks there is much truth in the above statements with regard both to Bulgaria and Albania. He says Italy is striving to wreck Jugo-Slavia in every direction, and that she ought to be “sat on”.

9. The Italians, so Dodge tells me, have just sent 30 officers to Laibach, each officer having 10 “orderlies”. They give no particular reason for their presence and the Slovenes are excited and suspicious. They say that under the armistice they have a right to go anywhere in “Austria-Hungary” which also annoys the Slovenes. I also hear that Italians have appeared in Marburg, giving the same reason for their presence there.

10. General Plunkett informs me that the Italians recently proposed (at Fiume) that an Allied Commission of officers composed of British, French, Serbian, etc., but headed by an Italian should open and operate the railway from Fiume to Agram and Budapest. This means the Italians would control it and could bring up some of their troops on the slightest pretext. I believe the proposal has been rejected.

11. The Italians are choking Croatia by their occupation of Fiume, and are doing everything to cause discontent and trouble, both there and in Slovenia. They are determined to break up Jugo-Slavia if they can.

12. This is the view of the general situation I get here. Communications are very bad and the unorganized condition of Jugo-Slavia so acute that it is difficult to separate important incidents from small ones; but from a combination of what I hear I am sure I have given in general an accurate impression.

L. R. King

Feb. 25.

13. It is stated that the Bulgars have at present 90,000 men who are equipped and ready for action at short notice. It is also said that the Italians are fostering and helping this force. I think the number must be greatly exaggerated.

14. The telegraphic communication is cut between Belgrade and Trieste, presumably stopped by the Italians.

30. H. Percival Dodge, special agent of the Department of State in Serbia since June 28, 1917.