Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/474

Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge²⁵

Vienna, 12 May, 1919.

Subject: Report concerning my mission through the French lines to Szeged and Belgrade.

1. I desire to report in detail concerning my mission through the French lines to Szeged and Belgrade, after I had failed to get through the Roumanian lines, owing to active hostilities in the neighborhood of Szolnok.

2. When the news reached Budapest on May 2d that the Roumanians were rapidly advancing, there was great excitement in government circles, and apparently a majority of the Government was in favor of resigning, in order to leave the task of maintaining order in Budapest to a kind of provisional directorium, pending the arrival of Roumanian troops. Kun Bela, however, for reasons of his own, was not ready to make such a decision, owing as I believe, to the menacing attitude of the extreme communists, and he therefore left the decision to the Council of Workmen. They, in turn, were from all accounts opposed to a policy of resistance to the end, but owing to the vehemence and noise of the extremists, finally agreed to such a policy.

3. One of the moderate members of the Government thereupon sent me a representative to state that if such a policy were followed, the gravest results would ensue. He feared a reign of terror, and made an appeal that something should be done to avert this possibility.

4. Lieutenant-Commander Freeman and I, after canvassing the situation, came to the conclusion that it would be most desirable to get in touch with the Roumanians or the French, in order to give time to make some arrangement, if possible, with the Government, that would avert a reign of terror; this in the belief that a delay of a day or two would permit an opportunity for calmer reason to assert itself. The temperament of the Hungarian is such that he cannot sustain a tense attitude for any length of time. Furthermore, it was quite clear that the conservative elements amongst the workmen were entirely opposed to a policy of resisting to the bitter end.

5. It also seemed urgent to Lieut.-Comdr. Freeman and myself that an attempt should be made to obtain assurances from the Roumanians or the French that in case of the occupation of the city there would be no attempt at reprisals; and that no-one would be punished for mere political acts. Assurances of this kind would be quite likely to facilitate the conservative element in their efforts to persuade the extremists and others not to resort to the last ditch policy of desperation, prompted very largely by the fear of personal vengeance.

6. I had a conference with Kun Bela on the night of Friday, the second of May, and offered my services as an intermediary. He promptly accepted, and though in a very tense state of mind, seemed to desire that I should work something along the lines indicated. He proposed that I should leave the following morning.

7. In this same interview, Kun Bela requested very insistently that Colonel Cunningham should come to Budapest—for what purpose I could not ascertain—but I was under the impression that Kun Bela desired to make Cunningham the medium of some very important communication to the Entente. Freeman and I agreed that this would be desirable, and I telephoned, as you will remember, that same night, asking that Cunningham come down at once. We had an idea that his presence at that moment of extreme tension might have a calming, reassuring effect, and enable the conservative element to revise the decision already taken to fight to the end. I greatly regret that it was impossible for him to come.

8. A special train was held waiting for me on Saturday, the third, and I proceeded with Captain Scully as my aide, to the town of Szolnok on the Theiss, that afternoon, arriving only an hour or two after the town had been evacuated by the White Guard, which had occupied the place with Roumanian assistance. Wilhelm Böhm, the Commissioner for War, accompanied me on this train, and afforded me every facility. Confidentially, I would state that he indicated in his conversations with me that he was in no way in favor of a policy of desperation, and seemed to be in sympathy with my point of view. This was also true of his Chief of Staff, who accompanied me later to the French lines.

9. As fighting was actually going on in and around Szolnok when I arrived, it was obviously impossible to think of attempting to go through the lines. I returned to Szeged (Szolnok) to await further attempts to get in touch with the Roumanians. The next morning I was informed that these attempts had failed, and that two of the men sent out under the white flag to arrange for my passage through the lines had been fired upon and killed. I thereupon decided to return to Budapest before proceeding to the French lines, in order to inform myself directly concerning the situation, which I was informed by telephone had become complicated during my absence by the arrival of an Italian Mission.

10. I found that a Commission of four Italian officers had arrived from Vienna, with a proposition to Kun Bela on the part of General Segre that the Revolutionary Government should resign, and request the occupation of the city by Czech troops under the command of Italian officers. Kun Bela then told me that the Italian Mission did not definitely state that this proposition was authorized by the Entente. It certainly was of a character, however, to confuse the situation, and seemed to render my mission through the French lines all the more imperative.

11. I left the following morning, Monday May 5th, on a special train provided by the Government, passed through the French lines in an auto belonging to the Government, with my own chauffeur, Private Wilherd, and Lieutenant Weiss, and immediately had a conference with General Charpy, the French officer in command of that district. I made it perfectly clear to him, as I had made it clear to Kun Bela the night before, that I had not come through the lines as an emissary of the Revolutionary Government, but merely as an intermediary for “purposes of information.” I endeavored to let him know the exact situation in Hungary, and particularly emphasized the fact that the delay of the Entente in defining its policy coupled with the unfortunate Roumanian advance, was fast driving Hungary into anarchy, and giving the extremists a pretext and an opportunity to adopt a policy of terrorism. General Charpy took note of all I said, stated that he would transmit it to Belgrade, and expressed a desire that I should myself go to Belgrade. Owing to the uncertainty of the situation in Budapest, I hesitated to be absent any longer than possible, and stated to General Charpy that I felt it was unnecessary in view of the fact that he had all the information I could give.

12. On the following morning, however, Tuesday, May 6th, I received a message from General Franchet d’Esperey,²⁶ urgently requesting that I should proceed to Belgrade in order to confer with General de Lobit. I might add, by way of parenthesis, that this request was presented in a rather peremptory and discourteous fashion.

13. I thereupon sent Lieutenant Weiss back to Budapest, and proceeded with my car and Private Wilherd as chauffeur to Belgrade, accompanied by Major Ehret, of General de Lobit’s staff, who was extremely courteous and of the greatest service to me en route. We were unable to cross the Danube that night, but reached Belgrade the following morning about ten o’clock, after an extremly rough, and I might add, a somewhat dangerous crossing.

14. I was taken immediately to see General de Lobit, who questioned me in detail regarding the situation. He was greatly surprised to discover that the news of Kun Bela’s overthrow which had been communicated by radio from Paris, was entirely false. He was also visibly upset by the news of the Italian intrigue for the occupation of Budapest. I also repeated to him, of course, what I had already stated to General Charpy.

15. A telegram was then drafted, with my approval, for transmission to Paris and Bucharest, giving the substance of my report. General de Lobit requested that I should delay my return as long as possible, in the hope that he would have some reply from Paris which it would be desirable I should have before returning to Budapest.

16. During that day I conferred successively with Mr. Dodge, our Chargé d’Affaires; with Major Colby, the Military Attaché; with General Plunkett, the British liaison officer with the French; and with Admiral Troubridge, who has been associated with the Serbs during the war, and was placed in charge of the navigation of the Danube; giving to them all the first hand information, which they clearly lacked, concerning the exact situation in Hungary.

17. As I stated that my mission was for “purposes of information”, I was able to inform myself pretty accurately as to the exact situation as regarded the French and Roumanians; though, as a matter of fact, I learned little that I had not already inferred myself before coming through the lines.

18. It was quite evident that the French had never been authorized to favor any sort of military action against the Kun Bela Government; and furthermore, that the Roumanian advance was undertaken by the Roumanians on their own initiative without French approval. I discovered that, on the contrary, the French were greatly annoyed over the Roumanian advance, and the prospect of the occupation of Budapest by any other troops than French troops. I also discovered that the French were skeptical concerning the ability of the Roumanians to act effectively, owing to the internal situation in Roumania being far from satisfactory. I gathered also that the Serbs were in no way interested in any military movement that would compel than [them?] to divert forces that might be needed at this time to protect Jugo-Slavia from the Italians.

19. Responding to an urgent request of General de Lobit, I decided to delay my departure another twenty-four hours, in order to await a reply from Paris. It seemed to me desirable that I should show likewise [myself?] as complaisant as possible to the French in this respect, though I was very anxious to be back in Budapest. The following day, Wednesday the 7th, I had an interesting conversation with the Roumanian liaison officer in Belgrade, and endeavored to impress him with the fact that if the Roumanians had any intention of occupying Budapest, they should declare clearly their policy, and especially make it known that they would not permit any political reprisals. This officer told me that the Roumanians had no intention originally of crossing the Theiss, but that the repeated counter attacks of the Red Guard had compelled them to go on to Budapest in order to get rid of what they considered a bad neighbor.

20. No answer having come from Paris, I decided to leave that afternoon for Szeged, thus giving still further time required by my actual journey until Saturday morning for a reply to reach me at Szeged, before returning through the lines.

21. On my arrival at Szeged on Friday afternoon, May 9th, I saw General Charpy, and arranged with him that in case no word had arrived by 8:30 the following morning, that I would in all events, proceed through the lines; as I did not feel justified in remaining longer away from Budapest.

22. The following morning, therefore, I made arrangements through the French to go through the lines; though I must confess that their procedure in this respect would not seem to me quite in good form. It was very much criticized by Major Colby, who had accompanied me from Belgrade. He was kind enough to accompany me with a friend, Captain Dardall, of the French Army, to the lines, where I found representatives of the Kun Bela Government awaiting me with a special train to convey me back to Budapest.

23. I did not find any material change in the situation in Budapest, except to learn that the Roumanians had proposed an impossible armistice, which Kun Bela had promptly rejected, and thereby somewhat increased his own prestige; that of his Government; and at the same time greatly stimulated the fiery extremists. It was quite evident to all that the Roumanians had started something that they were unable to finish; and that they did not have sufficient troops at their disposal for the task of capturing and occupying Budapest and the rest of the country. I found also on my arrival the Italians were still there and carrying on negotiations on a variety of subjects; such as the sale of provisions, and the protection of people from Fiume, etc. I was informed that they had not dropped their proposition for the occupation of Budapest although they did not seem to be pressing it with any insistence.

24. I had a long conference with Kun Bela on Saturday night, the 10th of May, and limited my report on my mission merely to stating that I had nothing definite whatever to bring back to him. He was most courteous, expressing great appreciation of all I had done, and added significantly that whatever might happen, he would always feel doubly grateful for what he termed my fair-minded attitude.

25. During the course of this conversation, my previous impression was confirmed that as a matter of fact Kun Bela was not really in favor of a policy of resistance to the bitter end, but that his relations with the extremists quite rendered it impossible for him to appear for one moment as in favor of foreign intervention. He seemed to be doing all in his power to keep the extremists under control, pending a decision by the Entente as to its policy in Hungary.

26. I wish to emphasize most strongly this point, because I still believe that a definite, firm policy by the Entente, exercised in a proper manner, would compel the existing government in Budapest to accept the inevitable, and give no real pretext or an opportunity for the terrorists to carry out their policy.

27. I cannot, however, conceal my grave concern over the situation, because it has become quite apparent to me that with the best of intentions, it is quite impossible for Kun Bela to restrain the more vicious members of the Red Guard. Instance after instance has come to my attention of grave excesses, horrible summary executions; done I am sure without either the approval or cognizance of Kun Bela; which, however, he was unable to prevent. He spoke of his difficulties, of his ceaseless efforts to punish the guilty. The fact remains nevertheless that a progressive demoralization is rapidly going on, and many innocent people are suffering and are in grave danger. I must again repeat that the failure of the Entente to define clearly its policy is precipitating a state of anarchy.

28. There was a strong possibility, and I might add, even a probability that the Kun Bela Government might have been transformed into a moderate Socialistic regime had it not been for the Roumanians’ advance. If the Entente had only been able to act on the suggestion originally made by General Smuts, and urged most earnestly by me, that the Kun Bela Government be permitted to send representatives to meet representatives of the Entente, I am quite certain that this would have afforded the one dignified and acceptable manner of exit for Kun Bela himself personally; who in this manner would have been able to help transform the government and to retire eventually from the government. It is a matter of most profound regret and disappointment to me that this could not have been accomplished, and in all probability the present deplorable situation have been avoided.

29. The only possible alternative now, it appears to me, is the military occupation of Hungary in conformity with the terms of the armistice, and for the purpose of providing the people of Hungary a chance to express themselves without further fear of a dictatorship of any sort. I am sure you will recognize that no one could have gone further than I did in giving Kun Bela and his associates many of whom are moderate and life-long socialists, all benefits of the doubt, and to encourage them in every possible way in their evident policy of eliminating the extremists and converting the government into a more or less moderate Socialistic regime. I have not attempted to palliate in any way the abuses and excesses committed under this regime. My own personal policy, as I think you realize, in the absence of any decision by the Entente, either to intervene or to take any action whatever, was merely to try and help tide over a very dangerous situation, in order to avoid the excesses and the reign of terror which I now feel is actually developing most rapidly.

30. Having done all that I could in this respect, without success, and having in the process placed myself in a more or less embarrassing situation; it seemed to me most undesirable that I should remain in Budapest any longer. This conclusion was particularly imposed by the fact that as a mere mission of observation, it is impossible, under present conditions in Budapest, to remain as the silent spectators of dreadful events, without authority to act, or power to continue to exercise a really effective restraining influence.

31. Finally, it seemed to me that I now could be of most service, if after my trip through the French lines, I should proceed to confer with you in Vienna, and then, with your approval, to go directly to Paris to report in person at the earliest possible moment. The necessity of some decision by the Entente, is at this very moment so imperative that it is possible that I might be of some special service in Paris, rather than continue to remain here. I now hold myself, therefore, ready to leave at the earliest possible moment, if you think it desirable.

Sincerely yours,

Philip Brown

25. Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 277, May 12; received May 22.
26. Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the East.