Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII
Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/294
Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received April 2.]
Sirs: I have the honor to enclose herewith Report No. 11 from Professor Brown in Budapest, which he has just sent to Vienna by special courier. This report seems to me to be of a most urgent nature, and by far the most important news that has come from Budapest since the new government has been in power there.
I have [etc.]
By
Captain, Infantry, U. S. Army
Professor Philip M. Brown to Professor A. C. Coolidge
Subject: Political situation. Important talk with Kunfi.
Sir: 1. I have had a personal call from Mr. Kunfi the Commissary for Public Instruction in the new Soviet Republic in Hungary who is a leading personality in this Government as well [as] a member of the last Carolyi Government. I was much impressed by Kunfi and by what he said. I feel that it is of sufficient importance to warrant my sending this report by special courrier to Vienna to be forwarded to Paris at the first opportunity. I shall also prepare a telegram giving the gist of this report to be sent in cipher from Vienna.
2. Kunfi began by stating that the new Government had not declared war against anyone, that it desired to live on peaceful relations with all. I then asked him about the recent incident of the capture of several hundred French troops, whether that was to be considered as an act of war. He stated that it had been reported to him as act of the people of the locality and that the troops seemed only too willing to surrender. I spoke of the seriousness of such an incident from the point of view of the Entente, and he stated that he would immediately take up the matter with his colleagues. I asked Kunfi if his Government was prepared to accept the new advanced line of demarcation laid down in the ultimation of March twentieth. He said they could not formally accept but would not resist military occupation of the zone in question. He remarked that boundaries had but little significance to Socialists so long as there was freedom of trade and communication. “Hungary must not be strangled economically”.
3. Speaking of the mobilization of the “Red Army”, Kunfi stated that it had absolutely no aggressive purpose but was for the purpose of maintaining the new regime in power. (I understand, as a matter of fact, that they have had great difficulty in securing volunteers even at the inducement of 450 kronen a month with food, clothing, equipment, and special allowances for their wives and children).
4. Mr. Kunfi emphasized the importance of sending in food and coal as the most effective means of keeping the people quiet and avoiding excesses. I informed him that Captain Gregory had notified me of the despatching of food trains from Zagreb and Trieste. (I now understand that serious trouble is expected in Zagreb between the Serbs and Jugo-Slavs which may render it impossible to get this food through into Hungary.) Kunfi said that with food and coal the people could get to work and much trouble might be avoided. I stated that Captain Gregory also had informed me that he was endeavoring to arrange for shipments of coal. I fully concur with Kunfi in his [Page 426] argument in this connection. I am sure more good than harm could be done by sending in both food and coal. The Entente has more to gain by appearing as friends of the Hungarians than as enemies.
5. I questioned Mr. Kunfi as to the relations of the new Government with the Russian Bolshevists. He said that they were “affinities” having the same cause, but differing as to methods. He informed me confidentially that Lenin had expressed to the Hungarian Socialist Government his hope that they would avoid the mistakes of the Russian Bolshevists.
6. I asked Kunfi as to the distinction between Socialists and Communists, the latter term being now generally employed with regard to the new regime. He said it was only a question of “tempo”: that the Communists insisted on accelerating the process of Socialization, and that they frankly had the ascendency in the new Government. He assured me however that the Government would in no way approve of terrorization and bloodshed. The bourgeoisie would have to accommodate itself to the new order or there would be excesses. He felt confident that the Government had the situation well in hand. I can fully confirm this as far as one can judge by public order and security. It is quite admirable at present.
7. I asked Kunfi whether the new measures for Socialization such as the sequestration of bank deposits would apply to foreigners. He replied “certainly not” and stated that if any American was molested he would have only to apply to the competent authorities to receive immediate redress. He suggested that I should personally recommend any Americans who might have complaints to present, but I made clear that such matters were within the purview of the Spanish Consul and that I had nothing whatever to do with the same. His assurances on this subject, however, may be of considerable value and significance.
8. Mr. Kunfi most earnestly stated in behalf of his colleagues that they desired that Kun Bela, the Commissary for Foreign Affairs, should be the intermediary between the Entente and Lenin for the sake of reaching a friendly understanding. Kunfi also added that this was greatly desired by the Bolshevists in the Ukraine. I agreed to transmit this important communication to Paris.
9. I can only repeat that I was deeply impressed by Kunfi and by his exposition of the situation which I find substantially confirmed by other sources here as well as by the events themselves. Whatever their first élan and their expressions of solidarity with the Russian Bolshevists, I am strongly inclined to believe that the Hungarian Government is not a Bolshevist Government. They are extreme Socialists who desire to accelerate the process of Socialization in Hungary. I do not believe they have any ulterior ends in view, certainly not of a political character. It goes without saying, of course, that they are [Page 427] in sympathy with all Socialists and are working together for the triumph of Socialism in every country. Their point of view is not national, or even international. Their fight is a fight against capitalism. They recognize only class struggles.
10. The situation seems to me to be reduced to the following: we are confronted by a fait accompli here in the establishment of a real Socialist Government which is the radical heir of the late Carolyi Government. It is possible that this Socialist Government may not have the approval of the Hungarian people as a whole. This remains to be seen. In the meantime the “Council-Republic” has the situation apparently well in hand here in this capital, and probably in the country. Of the latter I cannot judge clearly as yet.
11. The question before us is whether it is desirable that this regime should be overthrown or recognized. Intervention probably would be easy from the military point of view if handled skillfully; but would military intervention result in the permanent elimination of the Socialistic Government? It seems to me at least doubtful. I doubt if the Entente would care to appear as the enemy of Socialism, though perhaps sworn to hostility against Bolshevism.
12. On the other hand, a friendly understanding might easily be reached with the present Hungarian Government that would doubtless ease the international situation considerably. It might be based on the idea of self-determination and autonomy as applied first of all to the nationalistic problems of Hungary, and secondly, as applied to the right of the Hungarians themselves to choose the kind of government they may prefer, without interference either from Russia or elsewhere.
13. I have carefully explained that I am here in no diplomatic or political capacity, and I have entered into no official or direct relations with the present Government. I have made clear that I serve merely as a means of transmitting information. If it should be desired, however, that I should serve as a “conduit” between the Entente and this Government, the way of communication is quite open without any embarrassing implications.
14. It is true that my report on the Political Situation dated yesterday9 pointed to military intervention as the best way of meeting this extraordinary emergency. This opinion, however, was based on the supposition that the alternative of a friendly understanding with this Government was out of the question. I now feel that in the light of the démarche of Kunfi and the actual trend of events, such an understanding might possibly be considered as desirable. The present report, therefore, must be considered, not as superseding, but as supplementing my preceding report number 10 of yesterday’s date on the subject of the Political Situation.
- Not printed.↩