Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/25

Lieutenant R. C. Foster to Professor A. C. Coolidge 65

Subject: Conference with Mr. I. J. Paderewski.

1.
Paderewski stated that his stand had been a non-party one and that his coming to Poland was with the desire to assist in the forming of a Government that would embody the national wishes of the people. Before leaving the Allied countries he had received the support of his mission by high officials, especially in England. The uniting of all the parties was his aim.
2.
He stated that during his journey to Warsaw he had passed through Posen where he found the people well organized and in full accord with his Mission. In Cracow the same condition prevailed and it was only on his arrival in Warsaw that he found disorganization [Page 366] and unwillingness to support his idea of the formation of a coalition Government.
3.
These opinions were formed only after having received and conversed with delegations of a majority of the parties and representing thousands of the population.
4.
Several days after his arrival in Warsaw he called upon Pilsudski and discussed his mission. Pilsudski then suggested to him that he form a cabinet, but this Paderewski refused to do for the following reasons.
Pilsudski had been put in at the head of the Government by the Regency. This Regency had been put in power by the Germans and had played the game of the Germans to the end that they had in no way the confidence of the people, in fact were opposed by them. Pilsudski therefore represented through the appointment by the Regency the German influence and if he in turn turned over to Paderewski the formation of a cabinet, Paderewski would not be working thro wish of the people but under the auspices of the old German influence.
5.
Paderewski stated that Pilsudski was supported only by the socialist party and by the army. He believed the socialist element to be but a small one as the majority of the population being of the peasant and farmer class were naturally conservative. The farmer also would not support any socialistic or communism whereby his little plot of land would be taken out of his hands and control. The army supported Pilsudski only on account of his former military heroism but this popularity had dwindled appreciably during the last few weeks as the present government has failed to pay the army.
6.
From Warsaw Paderewski went to Cracow where at a large conference the idea was conceived of calling together a large National Council which would form the basis of a National appeal for the election of a coalition cabinet. The election of a man to perform this task would take place at this meeting. There would be 25 delegates from Posen and the same number from Galicia and 50 members from Warsaw of which only half could be socialists.
7.
It was during the night of this conference that the farcical Coup d’État took place in Warsaw and Pilsudski sent General Szepticki to Cracow to ask Paderewski to return to Warsaw and form a new cabinet. The station before arriving at Warsaw it was learned, however, that the cabinet members had been released and were still in power.
8.
Paderewski therefore approached Pilsudski with the idea of the National Council and received the reply that he personally was willing that such a meeting should take place but that the prime minister Moraczewski would have to be consulted. Moraczewski stated that he would be willing to act in a coalition cabinet but in a general conference with the socialist leaders in [which?] a Mr. Perl, the editor of the [Page 367] most prominent Socialist paper, took the leading part, the socialists refused to take part in any such National council.
9.
It is interesting that the socialists did not suggest the representation of the Jews in this council and it was only through the suggestion of Paderewski that they were included.
10.
The party of socialist peasants who form a body separate from the Pilsudski socialists due to their fear of radical social communist ideas, have not decided as yet whether they will take part in the conference.
11.
Posen and Galicia warmly support the idea, and the conference will be held on January 16th in Warsaw the socialists not being represented.
12.
Paderewski states that this conference will represent fully 98% of the Polish population.
13.
Regarding the present government Paderewski states that it is almost universally considered as being inefficient and incompetent and points out the weakness that was shown through its unwillingness to compromise. He states that the public funds amounting to some 200,000,000 marks at the beginning of the Pilsudski regime have now been exhausted and have been expended by the government for political socialistic propaganda. The army has not been paid for three weeks, is not clothed, no industries have been restarted and no public charitable works undertaken.
14.
The Milice can be regarded as a Red Guard organization as the old Polish Milice has been replaced by the Minister of the Interior, Thugut, with strong socialists. This Milice depends on the Minister of the Interior whereas the Army depends on the Ministry of War. The Army is, however, a loyal national body and many cases of conflicts between members of the Army and the Milice can be cited.
15.
Paderewski stated that there are as many as 500 Bolshevist delegates in the city that are working with the knowledge of the Socialist party as shown by the fact that when these men are caught carrying arms they are simply disarmed and let go again. He considers Perl as the leader of the socialists, the power and schemer behind Pilsudski’s throne, and an out and out Bolshevist.
16.
On the military situation Paderewski was very much depressed. He stated that the army consisted of about 60,000 men and that there was only enough ammunition to last through a two days battle. They lacked clothes and equipment also. In the case of troops being sent to Poland it would be necessary to provide food also and in this connection he stated that there was only about one months food supply in Warsaw.

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R. C. Foster
  1. Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 30, January 20; received January 28.