Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/43
The accounts of conditions in the mines under Polish control are as
usual conflicting. Accusations have been freely bandied about by
both parties. Whatever the reason, the situation was unsatisfactory.
The statement in Annex F.37 that the Czech action was
taken with the “consent” (I do not feel sure that this is a correct
translation of the Czech word used) is puzzling in view of the
surprise and wrath of General Pilsudski, Mr. Paderewski and others
seen by Lieutenant Foster. Possibly there may be some reference to
intrigues with some Polish party leaders. It has been suggested that
it was by no mere accident that the sudden armed advance on the part
of the Czechs after a wait of about three weeks has occurred just
before the Polish
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elections of January 26. This may be mere surmise and the connection
is not clear, but I thought it worth mentioning.
I do not think that the arrest of Captain Karmazin, although he was
in American uniform, need be taken too seriously in view of the fact
that there already was an American officer with the Czech forces and
that the Poles believed that these foreign officers were really
disguised Czechs. It should be remembered that Captain Karmazin is
himself of Czech birth and education.
I shall try to follow further developments in the situation with the
closest attention.
[Enclosure]
Lieutenant R. C.
Foster to Professor A. C.
Coolidge
Vienna, January 27,
1919.
Subject: Occupation of the Duchy of Teschen by
the Czecho-Slovak troops.
On learning from the Polish Government, on the morning of January
23, that there were difficulties between the Czechs and the
Poles in the Duchy of Teschen, it was decided that Lieut.
Commander Eawlings, of the British Mission to Poland, and myself
should go to that district in order to investigate conditions.
On leaving Warsaw that night for Cracow we first heard the
reports that there had already been fighting around Oderberg. On
January 24th we arrived at Cracow in the morning, and were met
by a delegation of the Polish Liquidation Committee, who in
conference gave us the first reports of the arrival of a
so-called Allied Commission at Teschen and the ultimatum issued
by them to the Poles. We immediately got in touch with General
Barthelmy, head of the French Military Mission to Poland, who at
that time was in Lemberg, and learned from him that he knew
nothing of this “Allied Commission” or authority from the
Entente for the occupation of East Silesia by the Czecho-Slovak
troops. A copy of a telegram from Col. Wade, Chief of the
British Mission to Poland, asking the English member of this
so-called Allied Commission at Teschen on what authority he was
acting proved that Col. Wade was also not informed in the
matter.
We therefore determined to leave at once for Teschen, in order to
go further into the question and find out from the “Allied
Commission” itself on what authority it was acting. We left
Cracow by automobile at 2 P.M. and arrived at Teschen at 6
o’clock, going at once to the office of the National Council of
Teschen, where we interviewed the president of this council and
Col. Latinik, commanding the Polish
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troops in this region. A copy of the
statement made by Col. Latinik at that time is attached hereto
as Appendix A.38 From these gentlemen we learned that the
headquarters of this “Allied Commission” was at Mährisch-Ostrau
and that telephonic communication with them was still possible.
Commander Rawlings therefore immediately telephoned to Major
Crossfield, the English representative on this “Allied
Commission” and stated to him that we were anxious to confer
with his commission at once, and suggested that pending this
conference hostilities should be suspended from 10 o’clock that
evening until 10 o’clock the next evening. To this the Colonel
of the Polish troops agreed, but the Colonel commanding the
Czech troops refused to suspend hostilities for this period,
stating that he would agree to such an armistice only from 10
P.M. to 10 A.M. the following morning, and in further
conversation he shortened this period to 4 A.M. He also stated
that he could not guarantee safe passage through the lines that
night. The question of an armistice was therefore given up, but
it was arranged that we be given safe passage across the lines
between 9:30 and 10 o’clock the next morning.
On Saturday, January 25th, we left Teschen by automobile for
Mahrisch-Ostrau, arriving at 10:30 A.M., where we met Major
Cross-field of the “Allied Commission”, who collected the other
members of the “Allied Commission” for a conference at the Hotel
National. The following gentlemen were present at this
conference:
- Lieut. Col. Gillain, (French), Commanding the
Czecho-Slovak troops in that region;
- Lieut. Col. Snyderak, (French, of Czech extraction),
Military Inspector of the District;
- Major Noseda, (Italian);
- Lieut. Voska, (American);
- Major Crossfield, (English);
- Capt. Karmazin, (American Peace Commission);
- Commander Rawlings, (of the British Mission to
Poland); and
- Lieut. Foster, (of the American Peace
Commission).
In view of the action taken by this so-called Allied Commission
as outlined to us by Col. Latinik, Commander Rawlings and myself
pointed out the difficulty of the representatives of the Entente
in Poland, and asked on what authority this group of officers
had acted in the name of the Entente. The question was put
separately to each member, and the following answers were given:
- Lieut. Col. Gillain—under orders of Col. Phillipe,
French Colonel commanding the division of Czecho-Slovak
Legionaire[s];
- Lieut. Col. Snyderak—the Czecho-Slovak
Government;
- Major Noseda—the Czecho-Slovak Government;
- Lieut. Voska—orders from Capt. Voska, and on direct
question who Capt. Voska represented, he stated “The
American Peace Commission.”
- Major Crossfield—the Czecho-Slovak Government.
They were then asked if in their knowledge this action on the
part of the Czecho-Slovak Government had been ordered or
authorized by the Entente governments. This question was again
put individually and the answer by all of the officers was that
they did not know. We then brought up the extraordinary position
in which the name of the Entente powers had been placed, and
asked what steps could be taken to bring about an immediate
cessation of the fighting between the Czecho-Slovak troops and
the Polish troops. It was stated that such action could only be
taken by higher authorities at Prague. Commander Rawlings and
myself therefore decided to leave at the earliest possible
moment for Prague, and a special train was placed at our
disposal.
On Sunday morning, January 26, we arrived in Prague and got in
touch at once with Col. Phillipe, who stated he had received his
orders from the Czecho-Slovak Government and advised that we see
President Masaryk, of the Czecho-Slovak Government, at once. He
asked also that we talk with the French Minister. A resume of
our conversation with the French Minister is attached hereto,
(Appendix B); and of our conversation with President Masaryk,
(Appendix C). It having been learned from these gentlemen that
the officers signing themselves as the Entente Commission were
acting without authority from the Entente, after discussing the
matter with the English Minister it was decided that Commander
Rawlings should send an open telegram to Col. Wade, chief of the
British Mission to Poland, at Warsaw, stating that President
Masaryk disclaimed all authority for their action, and that they
were acting only as officers attached to Czecho-Slovak troops.
This telegram we hoped would assist Col. Wade in clearing up the
situation of the Entente representatives stationed in Poland. A
copy of this telegram is attached hereto (Appendix D). As a
result of these conferences the following may be stated as the
steps taken in this occupation of Eastern Silesia by the
Czecho-Slovak troops. The Czecho-Slovak Government had
determined that this step was necessary, and after discussion
with the French Minister word was sent to the French Government
asking the permission of the Entente. This request was sent
approximately three weeks ago but the Czechs had become very
restless on receiving no answer from the French Government, and
had ordered troops to proceed to Mährisch-Ostrau on Saturday,
January 18, when the French Minister received word from his
government that in their opinion it was advisable that this
district of East Silesia be held by French troops and a
detachment was consequently being sent at once.
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This information he transmitted at
once to the Czecho-Slovak Government and on the same day Mr.
Stepanik, of their Foreign Office, returned from Paris bearing
the same dispatch. In view of this message the French Minister
and Mr. Stepanik both counselled patience on the part of the
Czecho-Slovak Government and the troops were not dispatched
until the following Wednesday, when evidently the Government
made up their mind to wait no longer. On Thursday, January 23,
with troops concentrated at Mährisch-Ostrau and plans fully made
for the occupation of the mining districts of East Silesia, the
“Entente officers” mentioned above were asked by the
Czecho-Slovak Government to go to the Polish authorities at
Teschen (posing as an Entente Commission) to request the
immediate evacuation of this territory. The various members of
this commission stated that they took this action in the hopes
that blood-shed might be avoided and the matter settled
peaceably by negotiation. However, it may be stated that there
could have been very little idea of negotiation when troops were
already massed on the Polish frontier and plans laid for
occupation at 2 o’clock that afternoon, and when this “Allied
Commission” stated that unless the Polish authorities accepted
their proposition by that time the country would be occupied by
force. Professor Kerner, of the American Peace Commission, was
in conference with the Polish authorities when the “Commission”
arrived, and he states that Major Crossfield said to him “We are
going to order them out”. Professor Kerner and Capt. Karmazin,
on receipt of this information, immediately left, with the
approval of Major Crossfield. It was very clear that this
“Allied Commission” had hoped to force the Poles to accept the
evacuation of this territory by the appearance of acting in the
name of the Entente. Posters signed by them, which must have
been previously printed, (Appendix E) were placed in districts
occupied by their troops, and announcements in the paper
(Appendix F) show that every effort was made to bring out the
fact that the manoeuvre was favored by the Entente powers. It
has been learned that on leaving Teschen after delivering their
ultimatum, the French Colonel sent a telegram to Mährisch-Ostrau
ordering the troops to advance within an hour, the statement
being made by Lieut. Voska to us that this telegram was sent en clair in the hopes of scaring the
Poles into accepting their conditions. From the various reports
we have not been able to ascertain the exact hour in which the
Czecho-Slovak troops crossed the frontier, but it is
sufficiently certain to state that they crossed the Polish
frontier into Eastern Silesia before the time stated in the
ultimatum of the “Allied Commission” to the Polish authorities.
On leaving Teschen Lieut. Voska joined the Czecho-Slovak troops
and took part in the command of them in the occupation of
Oderberg and other villages up as far and including Freistadt,
and showed to us two empty
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cartridges that he had fired against the
Polish troops. Figures as to the casualties on both sides have
not been accurately determined. The Poles also reported that at
9 o’clock on Thursday morning the telephone and telegraph
communications through Oderberg had been stopped by the
Czecho-Slovaks, which would indicate that preparatory steps were
being taken even before the appearance of the “Allied
Commission” at Teschen. The impression given to the Polish
authorities by this commission is clearly shown by the fact that
they telegraphed to Warsaw that an ultimatum for the evacuation
of Eastern Silesia had been presented to them by Czech officers
dressed in Allied uniforms; and the answer from Warsaw was that
“these would-be Allied officers” should be sent at once to
Warsaw, and to answer all violence with violence.
Capt. Karmazin, of the American Peace Commission, who happened to
be in Teschen at the time, was also put under arrest immediately
following the departure of the “Allied Commission”, but on
showing his papers to the Colonel of the Polish troops it was
quickly proved that he had no connection with these officers,
and he was released with apologies, and taken through the
streets in an automobile in company with the Polish Colonel.
This whole incident has placed the representatives of the Entente
in Poland in a very embarrassing position, and it has been
absolutely proved by statements of President Masaryk, the
English Minister and the French Minister in Prague, that no
authorization of the step by the Entente powers had been given,
and President Masaryk emphatically stated that the step had been
decided upon by the Czecho-Slovak Government, who acted with his
entire accord and approval.
