Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/91

HD–91

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 13, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. F. L. Polk
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison
    • British Empire
      • Sir Eyre Crowe
    • Secretary
      • Mr. H. Norman
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau
      • M. Pichon
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta
      • M. Berthelot
      • M. de Saint Quentin
    • Italy
      • M. de Martino
    • Secretary
      • M. Barone Russo
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Capt. B. Winthrop
British Empire Capt. G. Lothian Small
France M. de Percin
Italy M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

  • British Empire
    • General Sackville-West
    • General Groves
    • Lt.-Colonel Kisch
    • Commander Lucas
    • Mr. L. Leeper
    • Mr. Palairat
  • France
    • Colonel Roye
    • Captain Roper
    • M. Laroche
  • Italy
    • Lt.-Colonel Piccio
    • M. Vannutelli-Rey
  • Japan
    • M. Shigemitsu

M. Pichon stated that M. Clemenceau had asked him to apologize for being unable to be present at the opening of the meeting. He proposed to start with the second item on the agenda, viz; the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

[Page 142]

1. (The Council had before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe (See Appendix “A”).) Draft Telegram to Sir Clerk George

Sir Eyre Crowe called the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of the draft telegram. He had thought it necessary to call the attention of the Hungarian Government very specially to the necessity of its troops evacuating the Comitadjes of Western Hungary, which had been given to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.1

It was decided:

to approve the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk (See Appendix “A”).

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd (See Appendix “B”) and a note from the British Delegation dated November 11th (See Appendix “C”).) Instructions to Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that the Supreme Council at its meeting of November 1st1a had decided to obtain the advice of the Drafting Committee on the draft note prepared by the Aeronautical Representatives2 in answer to a communication of the German Government dated October 12th.3 The Drafting Committee, having alluded to the fact that the question was already covered by a paragraph of the protocol to be signed by the German Plenipotentiaries,4 had concluded that it was useless to send that note.5 Since then, the question had again been discussed by the Aeronautical experts and the Drafting Committee. They had come to the conclusion that the protocol did not cover all the violations which the Germans had committed under that heading. Under these conditions it appeared advisable to reply to the German note of October 12th, and he thought that it would be necessary to put the question once more before the Drafting Committee.

M. de Martino agreed that Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal was very opportune. It was a most important point which they should not leave in the air, and he insisted that the proposal of the British representative be taken into consideration.

Captain Roper said it was indeed extremely advisable that the views of the Supreme Council on that point should be made clear. There were, however, two ways of proceeding: they could either reply directly to the German Armistice Commission, or confine themselves to [Page 143]sending instructions to General Masterman.6 The draft instructions could be sent immediately, but the Drafting Committee was of the opinion that it would be advisable to await the coming into force of the Treaty before answering the Germans.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Drafting Committee might prepare at the same time draft instructions for General Masterman and a reply to the German Armistice Commission, which would be sent at a later date.

Mr. Polk wished to ask to what extent the Germans could dispose of their aeronautical materiel, balloons, Zeppelins, etc.

General Groves stated that the Germans could not dispose of anything which might be considered military or naval aeronautical materiel.

Mr. Polk inquired who was the court of appeal on the military or naval character of that materiel?

General Groves answered that it was the Aeronautical Commission of Control.

It was decided:

to entrust the Drafting Committee to prepare in agreement with the technical experts.

(1)
draft instructions for General Masterman;
(2)
a reply to the German note of October 12th, concerning German aeronautical materiel. (See Appendices “B” and “C”).

3. (The Council had before it a draft letter to the German Delegation regarding elections in Upper Silesia (See Appendix “D”).) Municipal Elections in Upper Silesia

Mr. Polk said that the elections which had just taken place in Upper Silesia were partly favorable to the Poles. Would it not be inadvisable under these circumstances, to oblige the Plebiscite Commission to hold these elections in all cases null and void.

M. Laroche said he had asked himself the same question. The Polish Press considered those elections a great success for the Polish cause. The German papers, however, brought out the fact that the Poles had not obtained half the votes recorded. From a legal point of view it seemed difficult to annul the elections only in part; he thought it better to stick to the principle of declaring all elections void. The Plebiscite Commission might take on the spot all necessary administrative measures to maintain, in extraordinary cases the election in certain municipalities.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that Mr. Polk’s observation might be satisfied by changing the last paragraph. They might use instead of saying, “That the Powers will consider as null and void”, the words, “That [Page 144]they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.” On the other hand, the Powers wished this note to put an end to the exchange of correspondence with the Germans on that question. He, therefore, thought it more advisable to omit the paragraph beginning with the words, “in this connection the observations, etc.”; as a matter of fact that paragraph contained allegations of fact which the Germans would be tempted to answer. If this omission were approved, the fifth paragraph beginning with the words, “It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.” might well be placed at the end of paragraph 2 which began with the words, “if the Versailles Treaty, etc.”

It was decided:

to approve the draft letter to the German Delegation concerning municipal elections in Upper Silesia, with the following changes:

(1)
omission of paragraph 4, beginning with the words, “In this connection, etc.”
(2)
paragraph 5, beginning with the words, “It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.” should be placed at the end of paragraph 2, which begins with the words, “If the Versailles Treaty, etc.”
(3)
in the last paragraph replace the words, “that they will consider as null and void” by the words, “That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.” (See Appendix “D”).

4. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet to the President of the Conference, dated November 1st, (See Appendix “E”). Allowances to General Officers Attached to Military Control Who Are Not Chairmen Either of Commissions or Subcommissions

Colonel Rote read and commented upon the letter from General Nollet.

Sir Eyre Crowe said this was an important question, and he wished to know if the proposal made by General Nollet had the approval of the French Government.

M. Pichon said that the French Government had confined itself to communicating the letter of General Nollet to the Council without taking any position in the matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the questions with reference to the organization of these Commissions had been discussed very thoroughly and the draft which had been finally arrived at was the result of a compromise. It had been decided that the allowances would only be given in virtue of the function exercised by the officers, without taking into account their rank or situation. This question was an important one because its solution affected the problem of Reparations. If they now decided to give special allowances to officers on the ground that they were General Officers or because they were the senior representatives of their country, they would be departing entirely from the principles followed up to this time. He would very much like to have the opinion of the French Government on that point, on the one hand because the [Page 145]French element was very strongly represented on the Commissions of Control operating in Germany, and because, on the other hand, it had seemed to him that the French Government was opposed in principle to any measure calculated to diminish the Separations fund. Should the Council be of the opinion that the request of General Nollet should be answered, he personally would not oppose it, but he wished to point out that they would be committing themselves to a new principle on a question which affected the problem of Reparations.

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the room.)

M. Clemenceau agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that it was advisable to adhere to the ruling which they had previously fixed. The arguments given by General Nollet did not seem very convincing. They had decided to remunerate, not the rank or situation, but the function, and he did not believe that there was any reason to change their attitude on that point.

Colonel Roye said that it was to be feared that, on account of the existing high cost of living in Germany, the allowances to officers mentioned in the letter of General Nollet might not be sufficient.

M. de Martino said it was understood that no negative conclusion would be arrived at on this day, and that the question should be referred back to General Nollet for further information.

M. Clemenceau said General Nollet’s proposal did not seem to him to have sufficient grounds; but if he gave the Council some better arguments in a further note, he personally would not object to examining the question anew.

It was decided:

to adjourn the question raised by the letter of General Nollet dated November 1st, pending further information to be furnished by him. (See Appendix “E”).

5. (The Council had before it a draft note to the Roumanian Government prepared by M. Berthelot, (See Appendix “F”) Draft Note to the Roumanian Government

M. Berthelot read the draft note, the Roumanian

M. Clemenceau wished to inform the Council that he had been asked to receive General Coanda and M. Antonescu; he would receive them that afternoon, and he intended to confine himself to advising them to accept without further delay all the demands which were formulated by the Conference.

Mr. Polk asked whether, in making reference in the second last paragraph of the letter to: “arrangements to be concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia” they did not seem to commit themselves to giving Bessarabia to Roumania, in the event of the latter country complying with the Council’s demands.

M. Berthelot did not think so; the question certainly had been discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the whole of Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had [Page 146]not taken any decision to that effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired.

M. Clemenceau stated they would wait before taking a final resolution until all the delegates had received their instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated he had already received his.

Mr. Polk thought that the instructions he already had gave him sufficient authority to accept the draft under discussion. He would, however, let the Council know his decision at the next meeting.

M. de Martino said that, as far as he was concerned, he expected to receive his instructions that very evening. He felt the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview which M. Clemenceau would have that afternoon with General Coanda and M. Antonescu. He expressed the hope that M. Clemenceau would speak to them with the firmness which he so well knew how to employ, and felt certain that he would obtain the results the Council desired. General Coanda was very intimate with M. Bratiano and capable of having a good influence upon him. He wondered whether it was wise to discuss, as they were doing in the draft before them, the behavior of Roumania during the war. They were running the risk of starting a polemic, for Roumania would certainly be sure to answer that she had herself been abandoned by Russia.

M. Clemenceau remarked that they also had been abandoned by Russia, which had not prevented their carrying on the war to an end. Three months before the Bucharest Peace6a he had warned M. Bratiano that he was committing his country to a disastrous policy. M. Bratiano had protested that he would never conclude a separate peace, a protest which had not prevented his doing so.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether a period of six days was not a little short.

M. Clemenceau replied he thought there was point in giving the Roumanians a rather short period; they would thus bring them to ask for a prolongation which the Council would grant. But the very fact of their having asked for a prolongation would, as a matter of fact, commit the Roumanians to an answer.

M. de Martino thought it would be necessary to impose upon the Roumanians a definite time for the evacuation of the Hungarian territory to the east of the Theiss.

M. Clemenceau wished to know whether the Council would give him authority to acquaint unofficially the Roumanian delegates he was to see that afternoon with the draft under discussion.

Mr. Polk said he would very willingly give this authority, especially as this document seemed to him remarkably well drafted.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked what their attitude would be should the Roumanian delegates, after having been unofficially acquainted with [Page 147]the draft note, ask for a postponement of the official communication of the note.

M. Clemenceau thought that they should in any case send the note as soon as it had been definitely approved.

It was decided:

to authorize M. Clemenceau to communicate unofficially to the Roumanian delegates the substance of the draft note to the Roumanian Government (See Appendix “F”).

6. Mr. Polk wished to ask, as a matter of information, whether the situation had been modified since the Luxemburg question had been discussed in the Council.7 He had been informed that the British Government had recognized the Government of the Grand Duchess. Recognition of Grand-Dual Government of Luxemburg

M. Clemenceau had not heard that there had been any such recognition on the part of the British Government. Great Britain had only sent a representative to the wedding of the Grand Duchess. He would, however, be glad if Sir Eyre Crowe would acquaint himself with the exact situation. The situation as between France and Luxemburg was as follows: The majority of the Luxemburgers was favorable to a “rapproachement” with France, but the French did not wish to commit themselves to a policy which might involve them in difficulties with Belgium. As for the present Government of Luxemburg, the Grand Duchess was German by birth, and he believed, by sympathy. She was, however, obliged at this time to appear very francophile. There were no present difficulties between France and Belgium on the general question. The only question in dispute was a certain railroad administered by the Alsace-Lorraine Railroads, which Bismarck had taken away from France in 1871. The Belgians were claiming this railroad, which the French could not give them. That was a very small difficulty, which furthermore, was on the point of being settled. It was essential that the Principal Powers should act in accord concerning the recognition of the present Luxemburg Government.

M. Berthelot said the Belgians had asked the French whether they intended to recognize the Grand Ducal Government. They had answered it was for the Belgians first to take a decision on that point. The Belgians had then said they preferred to abstain provisionally from recognizing the Government of the Grand Duchess, and the French has based their attitude upon the Belgian. The sending of a representative by the British Government to the wedding of the Grand Duchess had been a mere act of courtesy. Nevertheless from information they had received, it would appear that there had been at the [Page 148]same time recognition of the Luxemburg Government by Great Britain.

Sir Eyre Crowe said he would get information on the subject and communicate it to the Council.

(The question was then adjourned.)

7. Mr. Polk wished to say a few words to the Council on the question of German oil tank ships. On September 27th,8 the Supreme Council by a vote to which he was a party, had decided Tank ships to ask the Germans to deliver the 14 German oil tank ships which were lying at Hamburg. Since that date he had several times discussed the question with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Henry Berenger. There was a good deal of feeling in America on the question: for that reason he earnestly wished that, pending the outcome of negotiations, the ships under discussion should stay where they were. He thought his proposal would not raise any difficulties, as he hoped to arrive at a solution within three or four days. German Oil Tank Ships

M. Clemenceau asked what were his objections to these ships being taken to an Allied port?

Mr. Polk said that certain declarations Mr. Hoover had made had given the impression in America that the fate of these ships was already settled. Out of that arose the question which was the object of the negotiations then in progress.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that in the protocol submitted for the German signature the Council had confirmed the decision of September 27th by asking the delivery of all these ships, without specifying them by name. It did not seem possible to ask the Germans now to keep these ships; that would be to publish a difference of views between the Allies. It was to be hoped, however, that the Germans had not yet delivered the ships in question. If by chance they had already done so it would be sufficient to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission to retain these ships without doing anything with them for the moment. He hoped Mr. Polk would not see any objection to this procedure.

Mr. Polk said that the record of the meeting of September 27th showed that those ships were to be delivered to the Allies, but did not specify under what conditions the temporary operation of these ships should be regulated. He feared that if these ships were to be delivered by the Germans in the Firth of Forth a wrong interpretation of this measure would spread in America.

M. Clemenceau asked that the discussion be adjourned to the following day.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel de Crillon, Paris, November 13, 1919.

[Page 149]

Appendix A to HD–91

Telegram From the Supreme Council to Sir George Clerk

The Supreme Council have this morning considered your telegram No. 6 of November 9th.9 They desire to express their satisfaction at the success with which your efforts to unite different parties in a temporary coalition government are meeting. The Supreme Council are gratified to learn that in your opinion Admiral Horthy’s assurances that the troops under his command will submit themselves to the wishes of the Peace Conference may be regarded as inspiring confidence. You will no doubt continue to bear in mind and to impress on all parties concerned that whatever political arrangements are now arrived at, they must afford no opportunity for aiding or favoring the return, whether by overt or covert methods, of the Hapsburg dynasty, an event which the Allied and Associated Powers would regard as a disaster and would in no case permit.

You will by this time have received the communications of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments, dated November 7th calling on them to evacuate such parts of Hungary as are at present occupied by their forces.9a Satisfactory assurances have already been received from the Czecho-Slovak Government. In a note from the Roumanian Government received yesterday,10 an undertaking is given of immediate evacuation of Hungary, but only as far as the Theiss. The Supreme Council have already, as you know, informed the Roumanian Government that they are required to evacuate the whole of Hungary at present occupied by them.11 The Roumanian note is unsatisfactory in every respect and the Supreme Council are now considering what attitude they should adopt to make their authority respected. As soon as a decision is reached, you shall be duly informed.

The Supreme Council have also considered your proposal that the Allies should despatch twenty officers with the rank of major and captain for the Hungarian gendarmerie. They are favorably disposed to this proposal, but a reference to the several Governments is necessary before it can be definitely approved. The expenditure involved would no doubt be borne on the budget of the gendarmerie and be at the charge of the Hungarian Government.

[Page 150]

*The Supreme Council continue to receive from Vienna complaints that the troops of General Horthy refuse to evacuate the districts of Western Hungary assigned to the Austrian Republic by the treaty of St. Germain. They ask you to call the attention of the Hungarian military authorities to the necessity of agreeing to the territorial frontiers fixed by the peace conference as a preliminary to any measures of recognition or support.

Appendix B to HD–91

drafting committee
of the conference

Note for the General Secretariat

In view of the clauses of the Protocol addressed to Germany,12 it did not appear, in accord with the Inter-Allied High Command, opportune to reply to the German Note of October 12,13 relative to aeronautical material, at the present time.

In case, however, that the Inter-Allied Aviation Service would deem it necessary to not leave the said German note without response, it would be advisable to wait until the entry into force of the Treaty, as the stipulations of the Treaty could be more forcefully supported by the Aeronautic Control Mission which at that time will be definitely qualified to act officially.

For the Drafting Committee,
Henri Fromageot

Appendix C to HD–91

[The British Delegation to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]

My Dear Ambassador: Your Excellency will no doubt remember that the Supreme Council, at its meeting on the morning of November 1st,14 decided to refer to the Legal Advisers a draft note prepared by the Aeronautical representatives15 in reply to the communication of the German Government of the 12th October relative to the sale of German [Page 151]Aeronautical material to foreign countries.16 The Council instructed the Legal Advisers to report on the question whether it would be necessary to despatch this note in view of the fact that the matter formed the subject of a paragraph in the Protocol17 which it is proposed to oblige the German plenipotentiaries to sign as a condition of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

At the meeting of the Council held on the same afternoon,18 the Legal Advisers reported that, in their opinion, the paragraph in question rendered the despatch of a separate note unnecessary and the Council accordingly decided that no note should be sent.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, since this decision was taken, the French and British aeronautical experts and the French and British Legal Advisers have again discussed the question and have arrived at the conclusion that the paragraph in the Protocol referred to above does not adequately deal with all the offences committed by the Germans in connection with this matter and that notably the following resolutions passed by the Supreme Council are not covered by the paragraph:

“That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

“That the German Government shall be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. (August 6th).

“Most particularly, Germany may neither sell, give away or export any aeronautical material (aircraft, motors, spare parts) including motors captured from the Allies, or converted aircraft known as civil aircraft, which are in fact war material. (August 22nd).

“That all aeronautical material existing in Germany shall be considered as war material and may in consequence be neither transported, removed, lent, used nor destroyed, but shall be stored until such time as the Inter-Allied Supervisory Air Commission shall have made a pronouncement with regard thereto. (September 29th).[”]

The propriety of some of these resolutions is indeed even questioned in the German note of October 12th, to which the draft, suppressed by the Council, was intended to be the reply.

It appears most desirable that these resolutions, which have been transmitted to the German Government, should if possible be rigorously enforced, and it would appear that this can be done by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control as [Page 152]soon as ratifications of the Treaty have been deposited and the Commission begins to work.

If this is the case, it would seem advisable that the Supreme Council should address a communication to that effect to the Chairman of the Commission who, if he attempted to enforce the resolutions in present circumstances, would doubtless lay himself open to the retort that the German authorities have received no answer to the communication which they have addressed to the Supreme Council questioning its right to pass these resolutions.

It should further be noted that the German note referred to also raises certain points regarding the interpretation of the Treaty which require decisions of the Council for the guidance of General Master-man, to whom the German Aeronautical authorities have communicated to the substance of the note.

I would accordingly venture to suggest that the Legal Advisers should be requested to examine the German note of October 12th in connection with the resolutions above-quoted and to draft a communication to General Masterman on the subject for submission to the Supreme Council.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador,

Yours sincerely,

[No signature on file copy]

His Excellency Monsieur P. Dutasta, Ambassador,
Secretary General of the Peace Conference,
Paris.

Appendix D to HD–91

Proposed Letter to the German Delegation

To Baron von Lersner, President of the German Delegation.

In response to the question asked on October 30 last by the Allied and Associated Powers,19 the German Delegation replied, on November 7, that the municipal elections in Upper-Silesia would take place on the 9th instant.20 At the same time, it explained the motives for which the Prussian Government thought it could disregard the observations of the Allied and Associated Powers.

If the literal meaning of the Treaty of Versailles be strictly adhered to, there can be no question but that the Prussian State has the right, up to the coming into force of the Treaty, to administer the territory of Upper-Silesia to be submitted to a plebiscite.

In fact, there is no doubt but that the results of the municipal elections conducted under these circumstances, being the first popular [Page 153]vote since the signing of the Treaty, would be interpreted by the national parties in opposition as an indication of their respective strengths, which indication might be falsified in such a manner as to prejudice the result of the plebiscite. It would therefore seem probable that these elections are to serve as pretext to an agitation destined to influence the future vote relative to the destiny of the country, although the conditions under which the balloting is taking place at the present time are far from resembling those which are to govern the operations of the plebiscite.

In this respect, the statements contained in your letter of November 7 relative to voting facilities to the Poles, and even to refugees, could not even be alluded to. Everybody knows that a large number of Poles had to leave Upper-Silesia on account of recent troubles. As to those who remained, the Allied and Associated Powers have good reasons to fear that they are not in the proper condition to express their vote with all the desired freedom.

Moreover, it is surprising that the Prussian Government, in order to proceed to these elections, has awaited the moment when the coming into force of the Treaty, it cannot deny this, is near.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Powers are obliged to inform the German Government that they consider the municipal elections which have been held by Germany in Upper-Silesia before the coming into force of the Treaty, and against their motivated advice, null and void. The International Commission will therefore be invited to take the proper measures in this respect immediately upon its going into operation.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix E to HD–91

Contents

Letter, dated Nov. 1, from General Nollet relative to allowances for officers on Commissions of Control who are presidents neither of Commissions nor of Sub-Commissions.

delegation of the inter-allied
military control commission
presidency

From: General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

To: The President of the Peace Conference, Versailles.

Under date of October 20th, 1919,21 the Supreme Council decided to again submit for supplementary information, the question of functional allowances to be allotted to general officers who are members [Page 154]of the Control Commissions in Germany, and are neither Presidents of Commissions nor of Sub-Commissions.

I have the honor to expose herein reasons tending to justify that the Generals above referred to be considered as of similar standing as the Presidents of sub-Commissions. This similarity of status was requested in my letter, No. 86, of October 9th.22

There are two of these Generals on the Military Commission: General Calcagno, and General De Guffroy, respective heads of the Italian and Belgian Delegations; they have, for this reason, expenses resulting, not only from the command which they exercise in this capacity, but from their obligations towards the military of their nationality who, although not under their orders, stay in or pass through Berlin. Furthermore, their particular position as heads of delegations, which gives them an important consultative role in the Councils of the Military Mission, involves, of necessity, certain appearances, which incur considerable expense, owing to the conditions in Berlin. Therefore, it seems only just that General Calcagno and General De Guffroy be placed on the same status as the Presidents of sub-Commissions.

The same measures, it appears to me, should be applied concerning Colonel Furuya, Head of the Japanese Delegation, whose situation, in spite of the difference of rank, which should not enter into consideration in particular cases, is identical with that of the two generals referred to.

Finally, it should also be applied concerning General Walsh, Assistant to the President of the Military Commission. This general, in fact, will have frequent missions to perform in Germany in the course of which repeated contact with the various organs of the Commission will necessitate certain appearances, the cost of which should not be exclusively incumbent on him.

In conclusion, I have the honor to ask, for the above reasons, that the functional allowances granted to Presidents of sub-Commissions be also allowed to the Heads of the Belgian, Italian and Japanese Delegations, and to the General, Assistant to the President of the Military Commission.

Nollet

Appendix F to HD–91

Draft of a Note to the Rumanian Government

The Supreme Council has fully noted the Rumanian reply dated November 2nd and signed by General Vaitoianu.23 The Council is [Page 155]obliged to affirm that this note is entirely unsatisfactory to the Allied and Associated Powers, and very seriously compromises relations between Rumania and the Allies. The Allies must request the Rumanian Government to make an unconditional answer.

Since the commencement of August, that is, from the time of the Rumanian occupation of Budapest, the Peace Conference has unceasingly requested Rumania to adopt an attitude in Hungary consistent with the principles of the Allies in common, and the engagements by which they are bound.

With indefatigable patience, and animated by the respect of the Allies for one another, and with the hope that the Rumanian Government would finally realize that it cannot with impunity, disregard these principles, and escape the reciprocal engagements of the Allies, the Peace Conference has made every effort to maintain the ties which unite the Allies with Rumania and to obtain Rumania’s compliance with the decisions of the Supreme Council: on August 4,24 August 5,25 August 6,26 August 7,27 August 14,28 August 23,29 August 25,30 September 5 [4]31 October 12,32 November 3,33 and November 7 urgent requests were communicated to that end to the Government at Bucarest.

All these patient efforts resulted only in the reply of November 2, appeasing in words, but negative in fact: concerning the three questions asked, acceptance of the frontiers fixed by the Supreme Council; signing of the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty; arrangement of the Hungarian situation; the note disregards the first two and replies only to the third.

Even on the third, none of the demands have been satisfactorily agreed to. The principle of discontinuing requisitions in Hungary is admitted, it is true, and also the institution of an Inter-Allied Commission at Budapest for the application of these principles, but Rumania, in making this latter concession, does not agree that the Commission have authority to unload the merchandise which has accumulated in Hungarian cars on account of being held up for verification at the bridges, at this time, or that the Commission be qualified to receive complaints or to conduct inquiries into the abuses [Page 156]committed by the Rumanian military authorities. The retreat of the Rumanian troops is agreed to only as far as the Theiss, which does not comply with the decision of the Powers which specifies the evacuation of all Hungarian territory and their retreat to beyond the frontiers definitely fixed by them, a decision which was immediately agreed to by the other neighboring States, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia.

To sum up, the Rumanian Government has continued for three months and a half to negotiate with the Conference, from Power to Power, and has not taken into account any other rights or interests than her own, and by refusing to accept the responsibilities of solidarity, although wishing to benefit from any advantages resulting therefrom.

The Conference makes a last appeal to the wisdom of the Government and of the Rumanian people before deciding the serious resolution of severing all relations with Rumania. The right of the Conference to be heard is based essentially upon the fact that Rumania owes to the Allied victory the incalculable service of having reconstituted her national unity by doubling her territory and her population. Without the immense sacrifices of the Allies, Rumania would be decimated, ruined and in bondage, and without any possible hope at the present time. Rumania entered the struggle for her own freedom at the end of the second year of the war, and by dictation her own conditions; it is true she made great sacrifices, and suffered hard trials, but she finally agreed to treat separately with the enemy and to submit to his law at a time when she still had under arms an army of more than 400,000 men; her liberty and her victory, as well as her future, she owes to the Allies.

How can such a situation be lost sight of, and so soon forgotten by Rumanian Statesmen?

In any event, the Supreme Council can wait no longer; Rumania is therefore invited to comply, without discussion, reservations or conditions, with the following resolutions:

1st)
to entirely evacuate Hungarian territory by withdrawing to beyond the frontiers definitely fixed by the Conference.
2d)
to agree to the constitution of an Inter-Allied Commission for deciding, controlling and judging the requisitions made in Hungary from the commencement of Rumanian occupation.
3d)
to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.

The Supreme Council will wait six days for an affirmative or a negative reply by the Rumanian Government.

If this reply is not satisfactory to the Supreme Council of the Allies the Allies have decided to inform Rumania that she has become separated [Page 157]from them. They shall invite Rumania to immediately recall her Delegates to the Peace Conference, and will withdraw their diplomatic missions at Bucarest.

As to the fixing of frontiers still undetermined, the Peace Conference shall cease to sustain the territorial claims of Rumania.

It would be with the deepest regret that the Supreme Council of the Allies would be forced to break with Rumania, but the Council feels that it has been patient to the extreme limit.

  1. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3149.
  2. HD–80, minute 4, vol. viii, p. 855.
  3. Draft note was prepared by the French delegation and not by the aeronautical representatives. For text, see appendix D to HD–80, ibid., p. 868.
  4. Appendix A to HD–78, ibid., pp. 811, 816.
  5. Appendix C to HD–80, ibid., p. 865.
  6. HD–81, minute 5, ibid., p. 880.
  7. President of the Interallied Aeronautical Control Commission in Germany.
  8. Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 771.
  9. HD–85, minute 11, p. 8.
  10. HD–62, minute 1, vol. viii, p. 403.
  11. Appendix E to HD–90, p. 138.
  12. See appendix E to HD–85, p. 11.
  13. Appendix D to HD–90, p. 136.
  14. Appendix B to HD–68, vol. viii, p. 583.
  15. Note by the British Delegation. This paragraph has been added as it seems opportune to settle this question at the same time as the evacuation of the Hungarian territory. [Footnote in the original.]
  16. Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.
  17. Appendix A to HD–78, ibid., pp. 811, 816.
  18. HD–80, minute 4, ibid., p. 855.
  19. Draft note was prepared by the French delegation. For text, see appendix D to HD–80, ibid., p. 868.
  20. Appendix A to HD–78, ibid., pp. 811, 816.
  21. Appendix C to HD–80, ibid., p. 865.
  22. HD–81, minute 5, ibid., p. 880.
  23. HD–78, minute 5, and appendix F, vol. viii, pp. 808 and 824.
  24. Appendix A to HD–88, p. 88.
  25. HD–73, minute 9, vol. viii, p. 716.
  26. Appendix H to HD–73, vol. viii, p. 728.
  27. Appendix D to HD–90, p. 136.
  28. Appendix C to HD–23, vol. vii, p. 517.
  29. Appendix A to HD–24, ibid., p. 541.
  30. HD–25, minute 2, ibid., p. 548.
  31. See appendix B to HD–26, ibid., p. 615.
  32. Appendix C to HD–31, ibid., p. 691.
  33. Appendix A to HD–37, ibid., p. 819.
  34. Appendix C to HD–38, ibid., p. 857.
  35. Appendix E to HD–47, vol. viii, p. 111.
  36. See appendix B to HD–68, ibid., p. 583.
  37. Appendix D to HD–82, ibid., p. 920.