Paris Peace Conf. 180.03701/1
CM–1
Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Held at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, January 10, 1920, at Noon
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. Hugh Wallace
- Secretary
- Mr. Harrison
- British Empire
- Lord Curzon
- France
- Mr. Cambon
- Secretaries
- Mr. Berthelot
- M. de Saint-Quentin
- Italy
- Mr. Scialoja
- Japan
- Mr. Matsui
- Secretary
- Mr. Kawai.
- America, United States of
Joint Secretariat | |
United States of America | Captain Winthrop, |
Great Britain | Captain Lothian Small, |
France | Mr. Massigli, |
Italy | Mr. Zanchi. |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- Great Britain
- Mr. Norman.
- France
- Mr. Sergent,
- Gen. Desticker,
- Mr. de Fleuriau,
- Mr. Hermite,
- Mr. Serruys,
- Italy
- Gen. Cavallero,
- Mr. Mancioli,
- Japan
- Mr. Sawada
The Council had before it a report of January 7, 1920 by the Military representatives at Versailles upon modifications to the military clauses of the Hungarian Peace Treaty requested by the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slav Delegations. (Appendix “A”). 1. Conditions of Peace With Hungary. (a) Military Clauses
General Cavallero read and commented upon the military representatives’ reports as well as a draft reply to those delegations prepared by the military representatives.
After a short discussion,
It was decided:
to communicate to the Czecho-Slovak and to the Jugo-Slav Delegations in accordance with the recommendation of the military representatives [Page 956] at Versailles the letter, the draft of which appears in Appendix “A”.
The Council had before it a report of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, dated January 9, 1920 (See Appendix “B”). 2. Conditions of Peace With Hungary. (b) Exploitation of Mines of Pecs
Mr. Laroche said that the report which the Council had before it was drafted in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by those members of the Commission who were present at its last sitting, but it had not been approved in a special meeting of the Commission.
The British Delegation, however, had promised its approval, and he thought that the report was also in agreement with the views of the Italian and American Delegations.
Mr. Laroche then read and commented upon the report in question.
Mr. Cambon asked what they would do if the Hungarians refused to conclude with the Reparations Commission the arrangement proposed by the Commission.
Mr. Laroche replied that they would be justified in letting the Hungarian Delegation know that, should the Hungarians, pending the coming into force of the Treaty, refuse to supply coal to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, they would feel obliged to authorize the Serbs to prolong their occupation until the Treaty came into force.
It was decided:
to adopt the proposals of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, made in its report of January 9th, 1920, concerning the exploitation of the mines of Pecs and the distribution of the coal drawn from those mines until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.
The Council had before it a note from the Secretariat General of the Economic Commission, dated January 7, 1920. (Appendix “C”) 3. Conditions of Peace With Hungary. (c) Financial Sub-clauses
Mr. Sergent said that the Council would recall that the British Delegation put before it the case of Allied and Associated nationals who were adversely affected by measures which the government of Bela Kun adopted for the substitution of Hungarian “blue” bank notes by Bolshevist “white” notes, notes which, by an order of the new Hungarian Government, would be accepted at only one-fifth of their value.1 The Economic Commission, to which the matter had been referred, considered that the losses thus borne, entered within the category of “exceptional war measures”, as defined in Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary; but it thought it well to take the opinion of the Financial Commission upon the question. That Commission, [Page 957] which met that same morning, considered that the case was in fact covered by Section E, of Paragraph 1 of the appendix to Article 232 and that, should those nationals have difficulties on the point, they could submit their case to the mixed arbitration Tribunal provided for in that appendix. Under those circumstances, it seemed unnecessary to insert in the Hungarian Treaty special ad hoc provisions.
The Financial Commission had also been informed of the modifications which the Serbian Delegation wished to have introduced to the regulations concerning the liquidation of enemy property.2 The Serbian request had been already the subject of a report by the Economic Commission.3 The Financial Commission would be unable to consider that subject until its meeting on the following Monday.
The Commission was confronted further by a much more delicate problem. The Serbian Delegation asked that in the preparation of the Hungarian Treaty, account be taken of the fact that Croatia was not an integral part of Hungary but a distinct State, united to Hungary under the Crown of St. Etienne. From that circumstance the Serbian Delegation made a series of deductions which had important consequences from the financial point of view. Between Hungary and Croatia there existed, the Serbians maintained, a financial understanding, just as one existed between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom; this last understanding had been taken into account in determining, for example, what part of the Austro-Hungarian debt would have to be met by Austria and what part by Hungary. Account ought therefore to be taken of the Hungarian understanding in settling the allocation of enemy liabilities and assets. They had carefully examined the documents supplied them, as indeed it deserved careful examination. They were of opinion, nevertheless, that they were not competent to decide whether, from the legal point of view, the Serbian proposition was just. On that point they would like to consult the legal advisors, all the more so, since the decision which would be taken might affect other parts of the Treaty. The question was certainly pregnant with consequences, not on account of the significance of the amount involved, for that indeed was very slight, but from the point of view of Croatian pride. The Serbian Delegation maintained that the Croats had always claimed that there was an independent Kingdom of Croatia; they could hardly then admit that the Treaty of Peace proclaimed that there was not.
Mr. Cambon said that the question would be adjourned until Tuesday.
[Page 958]It was decided:
that there was no reason for inserting in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary a special clause concerning the losses sustained by Allied and Associated nationals through the “substitution by the Government of Bela Kun of Bolshevist “white” notes for the Hungarian “blue” notes in circulation, and by the decision of the new Hungarian Government to accept those “white” notes in payment at only one-fifth of their value. Compensation for the losses that Allied and Associated nationals might have sustained thereby was ensured by Article 232 of the Hungarian Treaty.
Lord Curzon stated that, in company with Mr. de Fleuriau, he had seen Mr. Bourgeois on the preceding day, with the object of deciding with him the date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. They had agreed upon the 16th of January at half past ten. The agenda would be limited to the nomination of the Commission of the delimitation of the Saar. Mr. Bourgeois would give a short address and he would himself make some remarks. It was further Mr. Bourgeois’ intention that on the eve of the first meeting the representatives of the various Powers who were to sit on the Council, should meet at his house to decide upon the procedure to be followed. 4. First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations
Mr. Wallace said that if the Council ratified that decision, he would cable it to his Government.
It was decided:
- (1)
- that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations would be held at 10:30 A.M. on the 16th of January, 1920, at the Quai d’Orsay;
- (2)
- that Mr. Wallace would inform his Government of the date fixed upon in order that the President of the United States might issue the official convocation.
Lord Curzon said that Mr. Lloyd George had just raised the serious question of South Russia and the Caucasus. (H. D. 125).4 The Bolshevist victories had given rise to a grave military danger. The Versailles Council would take up that matter, but the problem had also a political aspect which he would like to put before the Council. The following were the considerations he had proposed to submit to the Heads of Governments: 5. Situation in the Caucasus
There were three States in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia. The fate of Armenia would be decided by the Peace Conference when it made its decision upon the Turkish problem. There remained, then, Georgia and Azerbaidjan whose independence for the past year and a half has been most precarious. These countries [Page 959] were exposed to a threefold danger: in the first place they lived in dread of the conquered army of Denikin which might perhaps come down upon them from the North; on the other hand, they were exposed to the Bolshevist peril, Bolshevist troops advancing upon them from two sides—along the Caspian and in pursuit of Denikin’s armies; finally, on the west and on the south, there was the Turkish danger—already in Azerbaidjan Enver Pasha and his brother Noury were at work. The military authorities would take the steps required by the situation; but, on the other hand, there was a political step which the British Government was very anxious to see taken, and from which it anticipated happy results; he meant the recognition of the “de facto” Governments of Georgia and Azerbaidjan. British troops had occupied those regions since the armistice and His Majesty’s Government had thus had, more than any other, the opportunity of manifesting its sympathy with those States. Later, they had evacuated those regions except Batoum; but they had consuls at Baku, Tiflis and elsewhere. The countries he mentioned had shown a firm desire to become real states. Their Governments were socialist but decidedly anti-Bolshevist. They were living in dread of a Bolshevist invasion, at once political and military. They turned, therefore, towards Europe as suppliants. They asked the Allies to accord their support; to recognize their “de facto” Governments would be equivalent to according them support. That was how they had acted towards the Baltic States.
Mr. Berthelot said that he had already discussed this subject with Lord Curzon in London. He had given Mr. Clemenceau an account of that conversation and he knew that he was willing to accord that “de facto” recognition subject to the reserve that the recognition of Georgia and Azerbaidjan in no wise prejudiced the future frontiers of Armenia.
Lord Curzon said that he agreed with him on that point.
Mr. Scialoja said that he was equally inclined to grant that “de facto” recognition on the same conditions as for the Baltic States.
Mr. Matsui remarked that, on a question of that nature, he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.
Mr. Wallace said that he was in the same situation.
Mr. Berthelot added that the Powers who were already disposed to recognize those “de facto” Governments would take such a step together.
It was decided:
that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognize the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaidjan as “de facto” governments, subject to the reserve that the representatives of the United States and the representative of Japan would request instructions from their Governments on the question.
Mr. Berthelot said that he had received from Mr. Adatci a letter in which he asked to be informed of the day on which the Commission appointed to examine the question of handing over William II would meet. That problem would arise immediately; they were awaiting British proposals. 6. Handing Over of Wilhelm II
Lord Curzon asked whether he meant that the British Government should lay a special proposition before the Council.
Mr. Berthelot said that he merely wished to know whether the Commission that had met the preceding day under the Presidency of the Lord Chancellor was to examine the question.
Lord Curzon said he did not think so. That Commission was concerned only with reducing the list of criminals whose surrender was to be demanded from the Germans, for the reason that it would be easier to obtain the surrender of 500 of these, than 1,000.
Mr. Scialoja stated that a special commission was indeed useless: the Treaty itself stipulated that the surrender of William II be demanded. It was merely a matter of finding the formula in which the demand should be made. The formula should be as legal as possible. The task of drafting it should be left to the Drafting Committee.
Mr. Berthelot said that he would like simply to put the following question: the Peace Treaty provided for the handing over of William II to the Allies. Were they going to ask for it? In what form and at what moment?
Mr. Cambon remarked that it would appear that it was for the President of the Conference to formulate that demand. It was for him therefore to entrust the legal experts with drafting it and consequently it would be sufficient for them to refer it to the Drafting Committee.
Mr. Matsui said that Mr. Adatci’s question had been called by a sentence of Mr. Lloyd George uttered on the preceding day. He had understood that the Commission over which the Lord Chancellor presided would also deal with the question of the surrender of William II. They were not interested in the handing over of criminals but only in the surrender of William II.
It was decided:
to ask the Drafting Committee to submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft note asking the Dutch Government to hand over the ex-German Emperor.4a
The meeting then adjourned.
[Page 961]- Appendix D to HD–114, p. 621.↩
- Appendix G to HD–119, p. 717.↩
- Appendix H to HD–119, p. 719.↩
- Minute 3, p. 837.↩
- See ICP–20, minute 2, and appendix B, pp. 886 and 887.↩
- HD–34, minute 5, and appendix E, vol. vii, pp. 736 and 747.↩
- The French Military Representative esteems that it would be advisable to clearly specify that Hungary is forbidden to organize the military forces accorded her by the Peace Treaty, into Mixed Brigades, as such organizations are particularly adaptable to rapid mobilization by transferring the Mixed Brigades into as many Infantry Divisions. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- HD–107, minute 6, and appendix F, pp. 477 and 499.↩
- See HD–85, minute 1, p. 2.↩