Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/10
ICP–23
Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 6:30 p.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. Hugh Wallace
- Secretaries
- Mr. Harrison,
- Mr. Winthrop.
- Great Britain
- Mr. Lloyd George,
- Lord Curzon.
- Secretaries
- Sir Maurice Hankey,
- Mr. Leeper.
- France
- Mr. Clemenceau,
- Mr. Millerand.
- Secretaries
- Mr. Dutasta,
- Mr. Berthelot,
- Mr. Massigli.
- Italy
- Mr. Nitti
- Secretary
- Mr. Trombetti.
- Japan
- Mr. Matsui
- Secretary
- Mr. Kawai.
- America, United States of
Interpreter: Mr. Mantoux
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- Great Britain
- Field-Marshal Wilson
- Mr. Wise.
- France
- Mr. Cambon,
- Marshal Foch,
- Gen. Weygand,
- Gen. Le Rond,
- Mr. Laroche,
- Mr. Hermite.
- Italy
- Mr. de Martino,
- Gen. Cavallero,
- Vice-Adl. Grassi,
- Col. Castoldi,
- Mr. della Torretta.
- Japan
- Mr. Sawada.
General Weygand read the report prepared by the Committee charged with examining anew the situation as regarded the troops to be sent to plebiscite areas. (See Appendix “A”). 1. Allied Contingents in plebiscite Areas
Mr. Clemenceau: I suggest that the best course would probably be to examine each article of the report in turn.
If I understood Mr. Berthelot aright, he explained to us this morning that at Teschen the plebiscite would be terminated within three months and that we might then send to Upper Silesia the two battalions, one French and one Italian, provided for Teschen. Would this not be a first satisfaction?
Marshal Foch: Yes, in three months.
[Page 930]Mr. Clemenceau: Mr. Berthelot also told us at the same time that during the next three months, and also because the plebiscite was still rather far off, there would perhaps be no need to reinforce the troops in Silesia, at least not as much as contemplated.
Mr. Berthelot: I still think that the greatest need for troops will present itself in the period when the plebiscite takes place, in order to prevent any pressure by the Germans. As a matter of fact, General Le Rond is more competent than I to reply on that point, as he is President of the Government Commission and will thus have all responsibility on the spot.
General Le Rond: From the information at hand concerning the German occupation, the German forces have varied from 60,000 to 100,000 men. At the present time the occupation is maintained by 35,000 men, all the reductions we demanded having been made. The plan of occupation of these 35,000 men corresponds with the holding of points which it is necessary to occupy with troops. By reducing the number of troops which are indispensable in order to hold all these points, we arrived at the quota of British, Italian and French troops contemplated, while taking into account the deduction that we had to make of four British battalions it was originally intended to send. Should, however, the three British battalions be in default, we shall not be able to occupy all the principal industrial centres, railroad crossings and cities which it is indispensable to hold.
From the political standpoint, according to information which we received yesterday, the Germans wish to be ready for any emergency. But I do not know whether they will try to rise now or later. At any rate, they have prepared to take advantage of the first opportunity offered: and they will find it in the reduction of our forces. Therefore, from the military, as well as from the political standpoint, a reduction of Allied troops in Upper Silesia is rather dangerous. I would add that the Germans have already learnt in the course of negotiations, which took place between December 20th and January 10th, the number of troops contemplated; any reduction of these numbers will therefore have certain repercussions in Upper Silesia.
My colleagues on the Commission have left, one for London, the other for Rome. I am now alone to represent them here, but I believe I can speak in their name and say that they consider, as I do, that it is advisable to maintain the number of troops provided for.
Mr. Lloyd George: It is obviously very unfortunate that, the first time a matter of execution of the Treaty occurs, we should be forced to abstain. I need not explain here why we are obliged to act as we are doing.
[Page 931]This being said, we believe that we shall be able to satisfy the proposals of Marshal Foch concerning the first point; we could send small Naval forces to Memel and Dantzig; I do not think that would offer any difficulty.
On the other hand, after a conversation on the subject with my Chief of Staff, I have arrived at the conclusion that it might be possible for Great Britain, by a special effort, to send two battalions into Germany; that will always help the situation a little.
Mr. Clemenceau: That would make three battalions, counting the one which has already left.
Mr. Lloyd George: Quite so. If it is difficult to find troops to occupy and garrison those plebiscite areas, it would be well first of all to look to the most important areas.
I feel with General Le Rond that the most important point for the time being is Upper Silesia. We are going to have difficulties there not only from the Germans, but also, I believe, from the Poles whose feelings are running very high—an observation which only tends to strengthen General Le Rond’s argument.
On the other hand, there does not seem to be the same necessity for occupying the areas of Allenstein and Marienwerder; those are quiet districts, occupied by an agricultural population, and there will be no need there of strong measures to maintain order. I will even add that these territories are principally German and I have never very well understood the necessity of holding a plebiscite there.
To summarize, my proposal is as follows: Great Britain will furnish Naval forces asked for at Memel and Dantzig; she will furnish two battalions of infantry for the occupation of the plebiscite areas, thus raising the number of battalions from one to three. Lastly, should the Allies find it inconvenient to occupy all of these territories, they will abstain in the cases of Allenstein and Marienwerder.
Marshal Foch: A matter of principle is involved. According to the provisions of the Treaty, we take possession of these two districts, and I believe that we therefore must occupy them. The Germans are evacuating them as the Treaty obliges them to. How shall we take possession if we do not occupy them?
Mr. Lloyd George: Why not be satisfied, instead of sending a battalion to Allenstein and another to Marienwerder, with sending to those districts an Allied Commission?
Marshal Foch: Either we must execute the Treaty, or say that we do not intend to carry out its terms. But in order to carry out the occupation it is not possible to draw upon the other detachments which are already insufficient.
Yesterday Great Britain withdrew nearly all of her contribution in troops to this whole task of occupation: today she gives us two [Page 932] battalions, making three in all, and then tells us to do the best we can. I am quite willing, but when I met the Presidents of the Commissions, these declared that, of the nine battalions promised but not forthcoming, six would have to be found. Of these six here then are two; we have therefore, still to find four. I will ask whether Italy and France can themselves furnish these four battalions.
Mr. Clemenceau: We were nearly agreed this morning to make a great temporary effort for two battalions; I will now ask Mr. Nitti to be good enough also to give us two. I cannot believe that Italy does not recognize the necessity of this effort and that she is unable to lend us two thousand men. In this way the question would be solved, or very nearly.
Mr. Lloyd George: The Treaty does not state that the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder should be occupied by troops. A Commission must take possession of them, supported, if occasion demand, by detachments.
General Weygand: The Treaty clearly states—for Marienwerder—that the Commission shall be supported by troops if it is thought necessary; but there has certainly been an oversight in the case of Allenstein; there is no question of troops. But the Supreme Council itself has decided1 that where, under the provisions of the Treaty, German sovereignty in those territories disappears, and a Commission takes over the government, the latter should be supported by troops; it had been naturally thought that one could not send Allied Commissions into those territories without having them accompanied by contingents for the maintenance of order. Otherwise these Commissions would have to rely on German troops.
Mr. Clemenceau: The remark just made by General Weygand seems to me very important. We cannot send an Allied Commission to those territories and allow it to depend on German troops to maintain order.
I must then ask Mr. Nitti to be good enough to accede to my request. Great Britain has great need of her troops for reasons we know: she is giving two battalions, so are we, although we also are confronted with extreme difficulties. I ask Italy then to furnish two battalions also.
Mr. Nitti: We have before us a general question and a special one. From the general point of view, I believe it is necessary that all the Entente countries should be represented in the occupation of the plebiscite territories, were it only for the moral effect. On the special question of Italian participation, before I can accede to Mr. Clemenceau’s request I must ask him to wait until I have returned to Italy and studied the effectives at my disposal.
[Page 933]I would also point out that we have promised to send five battalions, and that an Italian contains more men than an Allied battalion. If, I am then able to make an effort, you may be convinced that I will do so; but I would beg of you to wait.
Mr. Clemenceau: When does Mr. Nitti think he can give us a reply?
Mr. Nitti: Friday, probably.
Mr. Clemenceau: What is Marshal Foch’s opinion?
Marshal Foch: I conclude that we have not got the number of men to have the Treaty executed. We are not meeting our obligations. I would ask Mr. Nitti whether he maintains the reservation made by Mr. de Martino by reason of Italy’s situation?
Mr. Nitti: I have just promised to reply next Friday.
Marshal Foch: Even concerning the battalions on which the agreement has been arrived at?
Mr. Nitti: We are agreed on the five battalions which have been promised; I am only speaking of the two additional battalions which we have been asked for.
Marshal Foch: When shall we have the British battalions?
Sir Henry Wilson: We shall agree on that.
Mr. Clemenceau: Is this solution satisfactory?
Marshal Foch: Practically, on condition that the hopes which have just been expressed shall be realized.
Mr. Clemenceau: We shall keep our word; so will Great Britain; and we hope we shall have a formal promise from Italy on Friday.
It was decided:
- (1)
- that Great Britain should furnish in order to occupy the plebiscite areas, two battalions besides one battalion intended for the occupation of Schleswig; also that she should send sufficient Naval forces to Dantzig and Memel;
- (2)
- in order to replace the seven other British battalions originally provided for, French should furnish two additional battalions, and Italy would make every effort to furnish two battalions;
- (3)
- that the distribution of these battalions in the areas to be occupied should be made by the Interallied Military Commission presided over by Marshal Foch.
Marshal Foch: I wish to call the attention of the Council to Mr. von Lersner’s note dated January 19, 1920 (See Appendix “B”). The head of the German Delegation declares that his Government throws on the Allies all responsibility for the damage which may follow any delay to take place in the transfer of Allied troops. Any modification in the dispositions already taken would involve our responsibility. 2. Functioning of Delimitation Commissions
[Page 934]Mr. Clemenceau: Are you of the opinion that we should take this responsibility? If we have troops there, we are responsible.
Marshal Foch: Yes, if those troops are there.
General Weygand: Then read the draft reply prepared by him as contained in Appendix “C”.
Mr. Lloyd George: I approve the draft.
Mr. Nitti: I agree.
It was decided:
that the President of the Peace Conference should send to the Head of the German Delegation the letter contained in Appendix “C”, in reply to his note of January 19, 1920.
Mr. Berthelot summarized the reply made by the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom to the proposals delivered on January 14, 1920. The text of this reply is contained in Appendix “D”. 3. Adriatic Question
Mr. Nitti: I have only a simple declaration to make.
As I have already stated, I am obliged to leave Paris tonight. As a matter of fact, I wish it to be clearly understood that my departure bears no relation whatsoever to the discussion of the Adriatic problem; it is question of a domestic nature which obliges me to return to Italy as soon as possible.
I have, however, nothing to add to what I have said. We have made every effort of which we were capable. I must thank Messrs. Clemenceau and Lloyd George for the good will they have shown in such a difficult question, in their effort to find a solution necessarily so complex, one satisfactory to everyone and especially one able to safeguard the peace of Europe.
I wish to state quite sincerely that I have done all in my power; I have given up everything I could, in order to find a solution acceptable to Yugo-Slavs and Italians. The compromise which we had arrived at did not seem to satisfy either the one or the other; for—I must repeat it—I have always regarded the Yugo-Slavs with a friendly feeling and I have taken into account the excited feeling of a people still in its political youth.
But having said so much, I can make no further concession on any single point in the conditions upon which we have agreed here; it would be impossible for me to defend further concessions in Italy.
I think it useless to enter into the detail of the Serbian reply; were I to do it, I should have to show the impossibility of separating the city from the commune of Zara; I should have to emphasize that the Serbian reply is a blunt refusal of any desire which the City of Zara itself might express to be represented diplomatically by a nation of its own choosing on the League of Nations—a conception which, to my mind, is still very hazy.
[Page 935]I therefore must emphasize what I said this morning: all the concessions which we granted in the Pact of London2 had a single aim, i. e., to find a solution acceptable by everyone. We are, however, not pledged, and I cannot myself accept anything I could not justify before the Italian Parliament. If the Yugo-Slavs accept our proposals, we shall agree; if they wish to have them modified, we cannot consent.
I also wish to be excused if after my departure I am unable to be represented here by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Scialoja. In case of need, Mr. de Martino will be at the disposal of the Conference.
Mr. Clemenceau: Could we not now let the representatives of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes come in, and, if we are agreed, tell them that we maintain our former proposals? Each question can doubtless be discussed by itself, but that is not how the problem stands before us. There is a pact of London, to which England and France wish to remain faithful. We have already told Mr. Pachitch and Mr. Trumbitch that they must choose between the compromise we have just outlined and the Pact of London. We can only repeat it once more and demand a reply, either “Yes” or “No”.
Mr. Lloyd George: As our Italian colleague, Mr. Nitti must return to Italy, allow me to interrupt for a moment the proceedings in order to express my very deep and grateful thanks to Mr. Clemenceau for the way he has presided over our discussions. I have sat on this Conference for months: Messrs. Nitti and Wallace have participated in its proceedings for a shorter time; if those who had preceded them were present, I feel certain that they would join in the homage that I would render to our President.
It will be the great honor of my life to have taken part in the work of this Conference, which has been presided over in such a wonderful way by a statesman so eminent as Mr. Clemenceau. He knows with what deep feelings of esteem and admiration he is regarded by my whole country, and I have greater regret than I can express at the thought that he will no longer be present with us in future. I wish the following declaration to be placed on record in the minutes:
“Mindful of the inestimable services which M. Clemenceau as President for more than one year of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, has rendered to the Cause of Peace, and grateful of the dignity, impartiality and sagacity with which he has conducted our proceedings, we, his colleagues, desire to convey to M. Clemenceau the expression of our unalterable esteem, and our hope that in a tranquil retirement he may live to see the fruits of his incomparable labours for the glory of France and the revived prosperity of the world.”
Mr. Wallace: Mr. President: It is a matter of deep regret for me to realize that we shall no longer have the benefit of your great wisdom and incomparable humor. It has been a great privilege for me to know you and therefore to love you. President Wilson spoke to me many times about his deep attachment for you and his admiration for your transcendent abilities. On behalf of the American Government and myself I wish you a long and happy life.
Mr. Nitti: I wish to associate myself with the sentiments so nobly expressed by Messrs. Lloyd George and Wallace. We have likewise admired the transcendent quality of your mind, and grandeur of your sentiments. We shall always remember all that you have done for the cause of humanity and for the Entente, and we shall always hold you in the kindest remembrance.
Mr. Matsui: Allow me, Mr. President, to add a few words in the name of the Japanese Delegation.
If the Head of our Delegation, Marquis Saionji, were still in Paris, he would have been the first to express his thanks and feelings of deep esteem. In his absence, I am happy to join the distinguished representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in expressing to you the cordial feelings of the Japanese people.
Mr. Millerand: In the name of the new Cabinet, I am happy to thank the representatives of the Great Powers, and particularly Mr. Lloyd George, for the homage which they have just rendered to the man who for over a year has represented the French Republic at the Peace Conference in the worthy way you have just recalled. France will be profoundly touched by this homage which her Allies have spontaneously rendered and which honors them as much as the man to whom it is addressed.
Mr. Clemenceau: Gentlemen, when people are leaving each other, it is usual—courtesy requires it—to exchange friendly words. I should like to believe that in the praises, certainly extravagant, which you have been kind enough to offer me, there is a little more than the courtesy of custom. I should be happy if there remained between us the deep feeling that the alliance of our countries ought indeed to inspire. If I have succeeded in letting enter our hearts some of those beautiful feelings that you have been so kind as to express, it is clear that it is my country, and your countries that are going to reap the benefit of our understanding.
We have all tried here to continue the work of our noble soldiers. The supreme event of the world has been the unexpectedness, the immensity of this war, suddenly terminating at a moment when we believed that an effort of many months would still be necessary and we arrived here, somewhat disconcerted sometimes, by the gravity [Page 937] of the problems presented and the difficulty of solving them. In fighting an enemy, all are necessarily in agreement; each gives his life gladly for the great cause of his fatherland, but it is by no means necessarily the same when the victors meet to calculate and realize the fruits of victory, to arrange what belongs to each, not the honour, which is each one’s share, for, were it a matter of honour, that has been shared in such quantity by our soldiers in that mighty battle that it is not ourselves who can increase it.
And yet we have tried to accomplish that difficult task. In reality, I might say that I have never presided over your meetings. They have not really been presided over. We have exchanged ideas, we have never, properly speaking, had difficulties in our discussions and the President has never had to exercise his powers. We have been friends entrusted with a great duty—to make the peace, to conclude a peace stable in the first instance between ourselves, while increasing the chances of peace for humanity.
Mr. Lloyd George, who so kindly took the initiative in this tribute, must have smiled on recalling the great fights that we have sometimes waged. He said, when in the adjoining room he proposed me for the Presidency: “we have fought each other vigorously already.” Then he added: “We are both of us Celts and yet we have not controlled our expressions.” That is quite true and we have continued like that.
We have all of us uncompromisingly defended what we believed to be the interest of our countries; but I think I can say that with Mr. Lloyd George as with all of us, we have never lost sight of the necessity of a common understanding. I think too that we are at one today in affirming that if the particular interests of each nationality must be husbanded and respected, there yet cannot be a peaceful Europe unless the rights of all are recognized. We have put above all the need of the Entente. If Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan, France, remain united, we have there a guarantee of peace worth more than all those that can be written on paper. If one day those nations were to become disunited, I dare not think what misfortunes might result.
Sometimes in the course of our discussions, I have been accused of having made too many concessions. The same charge has been levelled at the other Heads of Governments. That is a question that may usefully be discussed in the days to come, but at a time when the verdict will hardly interest me more. Yet my conscience is easy, I am sure that yours is too; in the expression of our opinions, as in the decisions we have taken, we have been guided by one sole principle. The nations that have spilled so much of their blood deserved [Page 938] first of all national satisfaction; but thereafter it was necessary to harmonize all the national satisfactions so that there should result a great common peace to all.
Gentlemen, I do not wish to speak longer. From the bottom of my heart I am grateful to each of you for the feelings of kind sympathy expressed. In his mind’s eye Mr. Lloyd George sees me in a retirement which indeed begins today; he expressed the hope that I shall yet see our labours bear all their fruit. He may at least be certain that I shall never take my eyes off the peace we are now concluding and that I shall continue to follow its progress; till my last breath I shall endeavor, with my earnest desires at least, to contribute to the full extent of my powers to the solidarity of that peace. If certain elements of discord should unhappily arise between us, how terrible would it be to think that the finest blood of the civilized world—the blood of our soldiers—had been shed in vain for hopes not to be realized.
I cannot believe in such a catastrophe; I know well the feelings that inspire my friend Mr. Millerand. He is convinced, as I am, that an alliance, a lasting entente, must be maintained between the peoples represented here. That is the feeling that I have found in Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Wallace, Mr. Nitti, Mr. Matsui and the feeling which animates all of us, animates him too. That I can vouch for and it is essential that you too, now that we are separating, should be convinced of it.
For myself, I shall ever cherish among my most precious memories the remembrance of those friendly conversations, sometimes stormy, by which we have carried on the effort of the great war. We have learnt to know each other, to love each other. This fraternal friendship must be passed on from the statesmen to the peoples themselves. Let me offer you all the sincere wishes from the bottom of my heart for the prosperity of Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Japan. Let us wish for the work to which we have given the best of ourselves that the results already obtained and those of the future will bring, will be such that the peoples will feel for all of us without distinction, a gratitude which, in that happy event, we shall have well deserved. Gentlemen, I thank you once again from the bottom of my heart.
(The Italian representatives withdrew.)
Messrs. Pachitch and Trumbitch then entered the room.
Mr. Clemenceau: Gentlemen, the members of the Council have read the reply which you have submitted; the Council is of opinion that discussion of the different points you raise is henceforth useless.
As far as I am personally concerned, I feel that your thesis can be justified theoretically and logically on many points; but the [Page 939] question does not thus present itself at this time. This Adriatic question has been pending for months, nearly years, it must be settled. As you know, we have for a year tried all sorts of plans without being able to solve it and reach an agreement.
Allow me at this point to tell you that your protests arrived a little late, for, during all the time we discussed with the Italians we have had made known to us no Yugo-Slav counter-proposals.
We first discussed the subject with President Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George and myself sent him a memorandum proposing our solutions: that did not have any better success. We then tried a way which consists in bringing together the two parties by proposals acceptable by all.
If the question be examined separately, your theory, as I said before, might very easily be defended: but we looked at the question from another point of view. A great war breaks out; a Yugo-Slav State, Serbia, fights by our side and reaps a harvest of glory and honor which history will not deny to it; but, on the other side, we find the Yugo-Slavs kept in the ranks of the Austrians, fighting against us until the very last minute. Of course some divisions fought in our ranks when it became possible to organize them from amongst the prisoners we had taken, but these men were only made prisoners because they had fought against the Entente.
The situation must be faced courageously, and we must see, what, under these circumstances, it is possible for you to obtain.
I tell you in a friendly spirit, but firmly, that you must choose between the present proposals we are making—I say “we” because it is not Italy which is offering them but the Entente—and the application of the Pact of London, the execution of which has already been claimed this morning by Mr. Nitti. The signatures of France and Great Britain appear at the foot of this treaty. Mr. Lloyd George and I have declared that we could not repudiate it. You must therefore realize the attitude you have obliged us to adopt.
I have the honor—much as I regret it—to say this to you: you must choose between the proposals made to you by France and Great Britain, and the application of the Pact of London on the Adriatic coast. We desire an answer to this question. Italy has arrived at a point where it is impossible for us to start new discussions. We therefore turn to you. If you do not wish to accept the great advantages which are offered you, Mr. Nitti has announced that he would immediately ask for the execution of the Pact of London. Neither Mr. Lloyd George nor myself will be able to refuse.
Mr. Pachitch: We have received from our Government the reply which we have communicated to the Supreme Council; our Government gave us permission to make the concessions shown in that reply, [Page 940] but it has also given us the order not to go any further: we are not authorized to make other concessions than those mentioned in the reply of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.
Mr. Clemenceau: If that is the final reply of your Government, we then know what remains for us to do. If, on the contrary, it can yet be modified, do you intend to ask it of your Government?
Mr. Pachitch: We are ready to ask our Government immediately for another reply.
Mr. Clemenceau: When can we expect to receive it?
Mr. Pachitch: We shall get in communication with our Government this very evening and we hope to get the reply within three days.
Mr. Clemenceau: Let us say one extra day, and that we shall have a final reply within four days.
Mr. Lloyd George: Make it quite clear to your Government that the only question before it is whether it accepts our proposals. It must either accept or refuse. If it accepts, as I am leaving for London, there will be no need for the Conference to meet further to discuss the Adriatic question; if it does not accept, our representatives here will take note of this refusal and the Pact of London will then be applied.
Mr. Trumbitch: We shall ask our Government to reply by “yes” or “no”.
Mr. Clemenceau: Exactly.
Mr. Trumbitch: You have just said, Mr. President, that we came at the last minute to state our claims …
Mr. Clemenceau: That was not meant as a reproach.
Mr. Trumbitch: We were only asked once to appear before the Supreme Council, in February.3 We submitted the question as it appeared at the time and communicated a memorandum containing our whole programme.
Mr. Clemenceau: I am not trying to reproach you: I simply wish to explain to you our embarrassment. I beg of you to believe in the universal sympathy which you find here.
Mr. Trumbitch: I thank you.
Mr. Clemenceau: A new State has been created: we want it to live in the glory which the Serbian Army has won for it; we would like to give it better conditions. But everyone must make concessions; France also has not obtained all the satisfaction she desired. Other countries in the Entente are in the same position. I therefore beg of you to make a sacrifice, as we have done, to necessity; that sacrifice will be amply repaid by the sympathetic friendship and the generous aid which will be given you by the Entente.
(The meeting then adjourned.)
[Page 941]- See HD–69, minute 5, vol. viii, p. 604.↩
- Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.↩
- BC–35, minute 1, vol. iv, p. 44.↩
- Supra.↩
- For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 3.↩
- The map does not accompany the minutes in the Department’s files.↩
- HD–97, minute 2, and appendix C, pp. 237 and 252.↩
- HD–106, minute 2, p. 469.↩
- HD–110, minute 1, p. 535.↩
- Ante, p. 947.↩
- Supra.↩