Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/3
ICP–6
Secretary’s Notes of a Conference Held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1, on Saturday, December 13, 1919, at 4:30 p.m.
- Present
- British Empire
- The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P., Prime Minister.
- The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.
- The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Lord President of the Council.
- The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K. G., G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the House of Lords.
- The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M. P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
- United States of America
- The Hon. J. W. Davis (Ambassador of the United States in London).
- France
- M. Clemenceau (President of the Council).
- M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London).
- Italy
- The Marquis Imperiali (Italian Ambassador in London).
- Japan
- Viscount Sutemi Chinda (Japanese Ambassador in London).
- British Empire
| Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B., |
| Secretary of the Cabinet. |
| Brigadier-General S. J. Wilson, C. B., C. M. G., |
| Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet. |
| Professor P. J. Mantoux (Interpreter). |
(1) Mr. Lloyd George said that there were two questions which it was very desirable to discuss while M. Clemenceau was in London. The first was the Russian question, and the second was what arrangements should be made as regards the future of the Peace Conference. Russia
As regards Russia, the question to be decided was what was to be done in regard to giving more money; and, again, what was to be done if the Baltic States were attacked by the Bolsheviks. Further, there was the question of the Caucasian States, and what was to be done if these were attacked by General Denikin. There was yet again the question of Siberia, although this was much more the concern of the United States of America and Japan than of the other Powers. He understood that the Japanese had 30,000 men still in Siberia, and the Americans 8,000. In so far as Russia in Europe was concerned, the views of the British, French and Italian Governments were that no further commitments should be entered [Page 854] into. England had promised to do certain things, and the French the same; and after that it was intended that neither Power would be under any obligation, but that each Power should have discretion to leave on the spot, or not, their Political or other Missions which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevist elements or the despatch of which may have already been decided upon. The next question on which these Powers were agreed was that a strong Poland was desirable. The third point was that the Powers were agreed that the proposal to summon a general Conference of representatives of the anti-Bolshevist States must be rejected. The fourth point was in connection with the assistance to be given to the border communities, and it was agreed that the Allies should give them such assistance in defending their liberties as might be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arose. These were the principal points which it was desired to submit to the Conference for consideration.
The Marquis Imperiali said that he understood that it was not intended to encourage Poland to take offensive action, and that the extent of any assistance which might be given to her should be for the defence of her territories, and not for other purposes.
Mr. Lloyd George agreed that this was so, and the Conference approved of the addition to the wording of paragraph 2 of the words “to her for the defence of her territories”.1
Viscount Chinda referred to the sum of £15,000,000 which he understood the British Government were giving to the anti-Bolshevist forces. He would like to know whether that sum was earmarked to General Denikin, or whether some of it could be given to the anti-Bolshevists in Siberia. In his opinion the situation in Siberia was very critical, and without further financial or military assistance he did not see how it could be retrieved.
Mr. Lloyd George explained that the money allotted by the British Government for assistance to Russia was earmarked for General Denikin, and asked Mr. Davis if he knew whether America was prepared to give any further assistance to Admiral Koltchak.
Mr. Davis said that he did not know what the situation was in this connection.
Viscount Chinda said he understood that the United States and Japanese Governments were discussing the question at the moment. He would like to read to the Conference the views of the Viscount Uchida, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in connection with the Siberian situation. These, as explained by Viscount Chinda, were, briefly, that the Japanese Government view with very great concern [Page 855] the situation in Siberia. The retirement of Admiral Koltchak had encouraged the Bolsheviks, and if Admiral Koltchak’s retreat had to be continued the allied and associated troops might find themselves face to face with the Red Russian Army. In the opinion of the Viscount Uchida there were three alternative courses which might be taken:—
- (i)
- An attempt to crush the Red Russian Army by sending sufficient reinforcements to Siberia, and by acting in co-operation with the anti-Bolshevik forces.
- (ii)
- The carrying out of a partial withdrawal in order to avoid an encounter with the Red Russian Army:
- (iii)
- An attempt to stop the Red Russian Army by maintaining the status quo.
To adopt course (i) would entail sending reinforcements of considerable strength, and public opinion in Japan made this impossible, in so far as Japan was concerned, as the Opposition in the Japanese Parliament were even demanding withdrawal from Russia. As regards the second course, it was the opinion of the Japanese Government that any partial withdrawal would lead to the augmentation of the Bolshevist strength and would necessitate in the end a total withdrawal. Such a situation would create a serious menace of Bolshevists to Manchuria, Korea and even to Japan itself. Consequently, the only course of action appeared to be the third alternative, which was to maintain the status quo by sending such forces as were imperatively necessary in order to strengthen weak points on the front: and, in the opinion of the Japanese military authorities, 5,000 to 6,000 men would be required for this.
Mr. Lloyd George said that if the Japanese Government were contemplating the despatch of these reinforcements to Siberia it would be better, in drafting the Conclusions in regard to Russia,2 to introduce in the first paragraph, after the word “promised”, in the second line, the words “or decided upon”.
Viscount Chinda said he would like to explain that it was not the present intention of the Japanese Government to send all these reinforcements themselves, but that that was the estimate of the size of the force which, in the opinion of the Japanese military authorities, would be required.
After some further discussion it was agreed:—
That the first part of Paragraph 1 of the Conclusions in regard to Russia should be amended to read as follows:—
“not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised, or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided [Page 856] upon between the Governments of the United States of America and Japan as to furnishing …” etc.
It was also agreed:—
That Paragraph 3 should be amended to read as follows:—
“The Conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general Conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolshevist States at the present time.”
After some further discussion, the Conclusions in regard to Russia, as shown in Resolution “A” were agreed to.
(2) Mr. Lloyd George raised the question of the publication of some statement to show the policy agreed upon. There appeared to him to be two alternatives, viz., either Announcement of Russian Policy
- (a)
- For each Power to agree to make the same
Statement,
or - (b)
- To agree to the Conclusions, and that each Power should make its own statement, based on these Conclusions.
The Marquis Imperiali said that before any public statement was made as to policy he would like to consult his Government.
Mr. Davis similarly said that he would have to consult his Government before committing himself to any public statement on policy. He would also have to dissociate himself from any statement that might be made in the meantime as regards policy.
Viscount Chinda said that he was in the same position as Mr. Davis.
After some further discussion it was agreed:—
That each Government should be left to make what statement it thought fit, based on the Conclusions arrived at.
(3) Mr. Lloyd George said the next question was to decide what was to be the final text of the Conclusions in connection with the future of the Peace Conference. He would like to ask the Conference if they would agree to the draft which was before them and had been concurred in by himself and M. Clemenceau. Future of the Peace Conference
The United States and Italian Ambassadors both pointed out that it would be necessary for them to refer the Conclusions in this respect to their Governments. They presumed that they might understand that the British and French Governments were in agreement on the matter and invited their Governments to concur.
Mr. Lloyd George said that this was so.
[Page 857]Viscount Chinda said that he agreed to the terms of the Conclusions on behalf of the Japanese Government.
The terms of the Conclusion as agreed to by the French, British and Japanese Governments are given in Resolution “B”.3
(4) Mr. Lloyd George raised the question of the Conclusions which had been arrived at in connection with the breaches of the laws of war and the surrender of the ex-Kaiser.
The Marquis Imperiali said that he was afraid he had not come to the Conference prepared to discuss these questions which exceeded his competence and the matter was dropped. Breaches of the Laws of War