Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IX

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/2

ICP–2

Secretary’s Notes of a Conference Held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1. on Friday, December 12, 1919, at 11:30 a.m.

Paris, December 12, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

• Present
  • British Empire
    • The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P., Prime Minister.
    • The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P., Lord Privy Seal, and Leader of the House of Commons.
    • The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P., Lord President of the Council.
    • The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K. G., G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the House of Lords.
  • United States of America
    • The Hon. J. W. Davis (Ambassador of the United States in London).
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau (President of the Council).
    • M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London).
    • M. Berthelot, French Foreign Office.
    • M. Fleuriau (Counsellor of the Embassy).
  • Italy
    • Signor Scialoja (Minister for Foreign Affairs.)
    • The Marquis Imperiali (Italian Ambassador in London).

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B.,

Secretary to the Cabinet.

Professor P. J. Mantoux (Interpreter).

(1) Mr. Lloyd-George proposed that the discussion should begin with the question of the Adriatic. A Joint Note had been prepared by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain, in Paris, with a view to its presentation to Signor Scialoja, and he understood that M. Clemenceau was prepared to hand the Note.¹ The Adriatic

M. Clemenceau handed Signor Scialoja the Note. He said he had already informed his colleague Signor Scialoja semi-officially of the existence of this Note, and had told him that it had been signed in complete agreement by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain. The object of the Note was to try and find a final settlement. The delay on this question had kept the Conference at bay for months. The same delay had brought Italy into a situation that was veritably revolution. There could be no peace in Europe till this question was settled. The United States Government, through President Wilson, had given an indication of the concessions to which it could agree and as to what it could not accept. On that basis Great Britain and France had always sought to find a text which would be acceptable to all parties. The difficulties had been increased owing to the occupation of Fiume by D’Annunzio and owing to the fact that a part of the Italian Army and Fleet had refused to obey the orders of the Italian Government. The British and French Governments had considered the question point by point, from the point of view both of the position of Italy and of President Wilson’s concessions, and had done their best to bring the views of all into accord. They knew that the Italian Government opposed resistance on certain points. They knew also that the Italian Government would accept the Note in the friendly spirit in which it was offered, but asked to be allowed to make a reply and to present observations and criticisms. In handing this Note to Signor Scialoja he asked him, as well as the Italian Government, to bear in mind that it constituted a supreme and, as they hoped, a final effort to secure a peaceful settlement. He implored the Italian Government to make an attempt to reach an agreement. No great concession on their part was required. If the Allies could succeed in settling this question it would remove one of the great obstacles to the pacification of the world.

Signor Scialoja said he would receive the Note with the same friendly sentiments as had been expressed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allies. He had learned from M. Clemenceau that this Note was to be presented, and he had afterwards learned certain further details from M. Polk and Lord Curzon, who had indicated to him the broad lines of the new proposal.² He doubted if Italy could accept it without certain alterations. What he attached great importance to was that the Note explained the reasons on each point. Up to now he thought that the reasons had not been sufficiently discussed in the consideration of this question, which had been treated too vaguely. The subject must be examined in close detail, with full regard to the realities of the situation. He thought if the reasons were examined on each point a solution could be found. He recognised that the Adriatic question was closely connected with the general European situation. Italy had suffered very much from the failure to settle the question of Fiume, and he recognised that Italy’s internal difficulties were closely connected with these external difficulties. He asked what would be the best procedure as regards the Italian reply? To whom should it be addressed, in order to pave the way for an agreement? Should this question be separated and considered by itself?

Mr. Lloyd George said that he took a very strong view in regard to Signor Scialoja’s last question. He did not believe that this matter could ever be settled by Notes. It was no use for the Powers to sling documents at each other’s heads. This question would never be settled until people who had authority to sign a document could meet together. Personally he was so anxious for a settlement of the question of Fiume, that he would go anywhere and at all risks, and there were risks at a time when strikes were threatening. A point which strongly impressed him had been that the question would go from bad to worse if it was not settled soon. Already it constituted a danger to the internal peace of Italy, and it could not do this without affecting all the other countries. Moreover, it created doubts as to the unity of the Allies. He hoped, therefore, that there would be an end of Note-writing, and that persons with authority to settle would meet and come to an arrangement. He knew Signor Scialoja’s difficulties, and naturally he could not settle the question in the absence of the Italian President of the Council. He would propose, therefore, that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy, together with a representative of the United States, with full powers, if this could possibly be arranged (though he fully realised the difficulty of this) should meet together. Even in the very regrettable absence of a representative of the United States with full powers, he thought it should not be impossible to reach an agreement which he felt sure would carry great weight with the American Government. He therefore asked Signor Scialoja if the Italian President of the Council, with his Foreign Minister, could not meet his colleagues somewhere and settle the question? When he had been in Paris the question had been bad enough, but since then D’Annunzio’s coup and the trouble with the Italian Army and Navy had made it infinitely worse. It would be a great advantage, therefore, if Signor Nitti could meet his colleagues, together with the Foreign Ministers, and settle the question.

Signor Scialoja said that he would put this proposal before Signor Nitti. For the moment he feared it would be impossible for Signor Nitti to leave Rome, as the Chamber was engaged in difficult and, indeed, tumultuous debates. Signor Nitti could not leave the Chamber without a pilot. The session of the Chamber, however, would not last long, and, he thought, would be over about the 20th. Consequently, a meeting might be possible during the Christmas holidays.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested a meeting at San Remo.

M. Clemenceau said it was easier to find a place than to settle the question. It was important that everyone present should have full powers. There would be no difficulty about this in the case of Mr. Lloyd George and himself. He did not feel so sure, however, in regard to Signor Nitti. He feared that probably M. Davis would not receive full powers. In this event they might have a delightful journey to San Remo with deplorable results. The key to the whole question was the difference between Italy and President Wilson. He would ask the Italians to remember that they were all animated by the most friendly intentions towards them. He was afraid, however, that Italy approached the question exclusively from an Italian point of view, while their Allies were obliged to take into account the state of Europe and the peace of the world. The essential point was that all should come with full powers. It would be a great pleasure for him to meet Signor Nitti at San Remo, or anywhere else, but it would only mislead public opinion if the meeting took place between people who had not full powers. If Signor Nitti was willing to discuss the question from the general European point of view, as well as from that of Italian local considerations, there was every prospect of an agreement. He would ask Italy to give some signs of a desire to settle. Then, if agreement could be reached, an approach might be made to the Government of the United States.

Signor Scialoja said that if Signor Nitti and he came to a meeting, he would, of course, as Prime Minister, have full powers, and the two together would fully represent the Italian Government. Naturally, the possession of full powers did not involve an obligation to agree to any particular settlement.

(The Marquis Imperiali interposed that, of course, they would come with the full intention of settling, but they could not agree in advance to any particular settlement.)

In order to prepare for the discussion, it would be necessary for him to return to Rome in order to discuss all the points with Signor Nitti. If a meeting were arranged to take place in ten or twelve days’ time, this would give him ample time. While the Italian representatives would come with full powers and a desire to settle, he felt some doubt as to whether a United States representative would be given full powers.

Mr. Davis, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that he could not say much. He doubted as to whether the United States could send a delegate with full powers.

Mr. Lloyd George asked whether, supposing an agreement were reached between France, Great Britain and Italy, it would not carry great weight with the American Government?

Mr. Davis replied that so much might be taken for granted.

M. Clemenceau said he felt he ought to explain why he felt doubt as to the full powers of Signor Nitti. He was not speaking of full powers from a constitutional point of view. He had no doubt about that. But Italy was somewhat out of the constitutional track. Besides their regular full powers he thought that Ministers, in order to act with freedom, required irregular full powers. Italy was now suffering from the worst kind of revolution, namely, a military revolution. The danger was that the Italian representatives might come and say that they were in agreement with their Allies, and were ready to give the necessary orders, but they knew that the Army and the Fleet would not obey them. This would create a very grave situation, and extreme embarrassment. He knew well that Signor Nitti would come with the best desire to settle. But if the Army and Navy would not obey him, and if Italy was still bound to continue sending supplies to their troops at Fiume, no useful results would be achieved, and it would be a matter of extreme anxiety. It was most important that Signor Nitti should not be bound or tied by any agreement with D’Annunzio. This was not a matter that he would allude to in public; but this was a Secret Conference. He had seen a despatch which stated that D’Annunzio had offered to the Italian Government to come out of Fiume provided the Italian Government would not yield from the position which Signor Orlando had taken up. If Signor Nitti came to a Conference bound by such an agreement, he would place his friends in great difficulty. It was essential that Signor Nitti should come really free, and in possession of the fullest powers to settle.

Signor Scialoja said that he did not accept the statement that Italy was out of the constitutional track. He admitted that she was faced with very considerable and grave difficulties. These difficulties were one of the results of the Great War, and if we all looked in the mirror we would find that our faces had altered. The difficulties, however, had been founded on an exaltation of national sentiment. If D’Annunzio had not fundamentally been supported by public opinion he could not possibly have exerted any power. Naturally every Italian Statesman must take national sentiment into account. From this point of view the Italian Ministers could not deal with the question as an abstract one dependent on historical and geographical considerations. All States had to take into account the sentiments of their peoples. The question which the Italian Government had to consider was whether it could accept a settlement without creating a greater difficulty behind its back. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister together could determine the point to which Italy could yield. They did not wish to remain in a negative position, which would be a danger to all. But they could not ignore the nationalist feeling which represented an important part of public opinion, and which in particular represented the forces of law and order on which the Government might have to depend in the event of certain contingencies. They could not overlook the possibility of a situation in which the nationalist forces were those on which they would have to rely very largely.

M. Clemenceau said that, in a spirit of personal good will and of national good will towards Italy, he must repeat what he had said in regard to the Italian Government and its constitutional authority. The D’Annunzio incident had made the greatest impression in France, and, he thought, in Great Britain as well. The Italian Army had flouted the Italian Government by refusing to obey its orders. If Mr. Lloyd George undertook an engagement and gave an order to the British Army, everyone knew that it would be executed. Exactly the same applied in the case of France. But this was not the case in Italy, and we had already seen what might happen. As he had so often said to Signor Orlando when the latter was in office, the trouble had been begun by the Italian Government themselves. They had established themselves at Fiume, not as participants in an Allied action, but separately. They had eliminated their Allies and posted up notices with the Italian Royal Arms at the top. This had been the great mistake that had been the beginning of the revolution. This, of course, was now past. If, however, a reasonable settlement was to be reached, the Italian Army must be induced to obey the orders of the Italian Government and, through the Italian Government, of the Supreme Council, since Fiume was really at the disposition of the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole. What he had said about D’Annunzio was based on despatches, and Signor Scialoja had not attempted to answer him. The statement in the despatches was that D’Annunzio had demanded that the Italian Government should pledge itself not to make concessions. If such pledges were made, it would be useless to meet at San Remo or anywhere else. He urged strongly, therefore, that Signor Nitti should come to the Conference with his hands free, and he would ask Signor Scialoja to tell Signor Nitti that one member of the Conference, at any rate, had taken this question most seriously.

Signor Scialoja said that, like everyone else, he deplored the abnormal situation which had existed at Fiume since its occupation by D’Annunzio. The Italian Government had for a long time been struggling to find a solution. He did not know what was happening between Signor Nitti and D’Annunzio. He had telegraphed for information, but had received no positive answer. It was very important that he should be able to telegraph something definite to Signor Nitti as the result of this Conference, as Signor Nitti was at the moment treating with D’Annunzio.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, like M. Clemenceau, he hoped that Signor Nitti would not tie his hands in such a way as to render a Conference futile. If the Conference came after some agreement with D’Annunzio it would not be fair to ask M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, himself and Lord Curzon, to come to a Conference, and would create a critical position. They did not want to meet in order to receive D’Annunzio’s decision as to what the settlement was to be. Hence, it was essential that Signor Nitti’s hands should be free, and that he should not be merely a messenger from D’Annunzio. Subject to that, he was all in favour of holding a Conference. If it would be easier for Signor Nitti to come to some place in Italy, he was ready to meet him. He knew that Signor Nitti’s domestic difficulties in connection with this question were greater than his own. He knew also that they were not difficulties of his own creation, but inherited difficulties. Therefore, if it was easier to Signor Nitti to arrange the matter on Italian territory, either because it was difficult for him to leave Italy for several days or for any other reason, he was ready to come to Italy. It would be useless, however, if Signor Nitti was bound to D’Annunzio.

Signor Scialoja said that, as to the locality, he thought Signor Nitti would find no difficulty in coming to Paris. This would involve less travelling for M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Nitti was the youngest of the three.

M. Clemenceau said that he would make to Italy all the concessions admissible.

Mr. Lloyd George said he hoped Signor Scialoja, in communicating with Signor Nitti, would make clear the importance of Signor Nitti coming with a free hand, and not tied by any agreement with D’Annunzio.

M. Clemenceau recalled that Mr. Davis had said that if the three Powers were unanimous it could not fail to exercise the greatest influence on President Wilson. He would observe, however, that if President Wilson thought that one of the three Powers had bound itself in advance, and if he thought that the settlement merely followed the dictations of D’Annunzio, he would not be so favourably impressed.

(2) Mr. Lloyd George said that in the House of Commons he had ventured to say that at their next Conference the Allied and Associated Powers would consider the question of Russia. He felt that they ought to have a common policy. He had spoken to M. Clemenceau on the subject on the previous day, and M. Clemenceau’s views had been so much in accord with his own that he would ask him to recapitulate them. Russia

M. Clemenceau said that he had the more pleasure in reverting to his conversation with Mr. Lloyd George on the previous day in that that very morning he had received a visit from Mr. Churchill, who was reputed to hold very strong views on the question of Russia. He had found they agreed at almost every point. He thought that all were agreed that there could be no peace in Europe so long as Russia remained in her present state of anarchy, disorder, robbery, crime and revolt. This was a danger not only to Russia herself, but to the whole world. All were convinced of the truth of this. Intervention had been tried by every means—men, supplies and money—with the object of setting up a stable Government. Up to now no result had been achieved. The anti-Bolshevist elements had proved insufficient. He would not examine the reasons for this, which would bring him into the sphere of high political philosophy. This was not the occasion to discuss that. It was sufficient to face the facts. It was certain that up to now the Allied policy had not succeeded. They had tried to help Koltchak with material aid. They had sent him a Proclamation.³ That Proclamation had produced no result, and now Koltchak had retired to the middle of Siberia and his troops were in a deplorable condition. Then the Allies had believed in Denikin, and great efforts had been made in his support by Great Britain and, to some extent, also by France. Denikin, however, was now retiring. It therefore seemed useless to continue on these lines, and he would suggest making, as it were, a barbed wire entanglement round Russia in order to prevent her from creating trouble outside, and in order to stop Germany from entering into relations with Russia, whether of a political or military character. This was not such a difficult policy to carry out. The stories which had been circulated of an enormous army in Germany were, he believed, entirely fanciful. We knew that Germany had an army of 400,000 men. In addition, she had Sicherheitswehr and Einwohnerswehr which was equipped with machine-guns, flamenwerfen, etc., but was only trained for street warfare. They had arms in their depots, but he did not believe the present German Government could stand without them. There was some evidence that Germany was in danger of a civil war, which might be occasioned by the return of the German forces from the Baltic to Berlin. This might end in a revolution. He did not believe, however, that Germany would fight again, in view of the great desire of her population to avoid further war. We must not be bluffed, and would have to watch the situation carefully; and, further, we must take no risks. We had been told that Germany would resist in the Baltic and Upper Silesia, but now it seemed that she would obey. The Allies must have perseverance, fairness and patience. In his view the support of Poland was the best way to check Germany. Poland occupied a first-rate strategical position. She had an army of half a million good soldiers enured to hardships and animated by a strong patriotism. Politically she was well-disposed to the Allies, and sufficiently armed. She only asked the Allies for help. It would be a great mistake if we did not maintain Poland in order to dam up the Russian flood and to provide a check to Germany. Mr. Churchill had observed to him that Poland must be regarded as the left wing of Denikin’s army as against the Bolsheviks. He agreed that this ought to be carefully considered. He believed that Great Britain and Italy, and probably the United States of America, would agree with him on this matter. He would give up all idea of further direct intervention in Russia. All efforts in this direction would prove wasteful in the future as in the past. It merely led people to believe that we had an honest desire to resuscitate the ancient regime in Russia. Our policy rather ought to be to fortify Poland in order to keep Russia in check and to contain Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George said that on the previous day he had expressed his full agreement with M. Clemenceau. Great Britain had spent about £100,000,000 in Russia, partly on the Archangel Expedition, but mainly in support of General Denikin. This sum included the last “packet” of £15,000,000 to £16,000,000, which would be delivered by the end of March. She had not got much in return for it. The last news was that General Denikin had been driven back, and the Bolsheviks were now nearing Kharkoff. If Kieff, and especially Kharkoff, should fall, there would not be much left to Denikin, because of the difficulties occasioned by Maknoff, who had occupied Ekaterinoslav in his rear. The situation in South Russia did not look at all satisfactory. So far as the British House of Commons was concerned, and, he believed, so far as France was concerned, these two countries were not prepared to go on helping in a material manner the anti-Bolshevist forces. He did not know how Italy and America regarded the question.

The Marquis Imperiali thought that Italy was of the same view.

Mr. Davis said that he could only express his personal opinion, but he thought the United States were not willing to give further assistance.

Mr. Lloyd George said that on the previous day a proposal had been discussed for a Federation of the anti-Bolshevist States. This was of no use unless the Allies were prepared to support the Federation, and such support meant money, guns and equipment. He and M. Clemenceau had come to the conclusion that this was not a very helpful expedient. As regards Poland, in his view this depended upon whether Poland was expected to attack the Bolsheviks.

M. Clemenceau said that nothing was further from his mind.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had mentioned the matter because, when he was in Paris in September, M. Paderewski had stated that he was prepared to march on Moscow if supported and equipped.⁴ Even Marshal Foch, who was most strongly anti-Bolshevist, had not supported this view, as he had considered that the traditional feeling in Russia against the Poles was so strong that it would only consolidate the resistance. The same would apply to the Finns. It would have much the same effect as the attacks of the Prussians and Austrians had had on the Jacobins in France. Hence, if the Polish Army were re-equipped, it must not be for an attack on Russia, but rather for future contingencies. He was so much in agreement with the rest of M. Clemenceau’s observations that he would say no more.

Signor Scialoja said he agreed entirely with Mr. Lloyd George.

Mr. Lloyd George said he understood it was agreed that the Conference of anti-Bolshevist States and organisations should not be undertaken. He asked if Mr. Davis had anything to say.

Mr. Davis said he spoke with hesitation and embarrassment, insomuch as he not only had no authority, but not even instructions from his Government. He believed, however, that the United States Government would be in accord with what Mr. Lloyd George had said. He knew that from the first they had been opposed to military intervention in Russia, and had gone as far as they were willing to go in rendering financial assistance.

Lord Curzon summed up M. Clemenceau’s proposals as follows:—

(i) A barbed wire fence, as it were, round Russia, within which the Allies should not interfere:

(ii) To put an end to contributions of supplies and money for the purpose of upholding or reestablishing order in Russia:

(iii) To build up Poland as a barrier against Russia and a check on Germany.

These were accepted by Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Scialoja, and, so far as he had authority to speak, by Mr. Davis. He doubted, however, if the question could be solved in such precise terms. The Prime Minister had mentioned an alternative suggestion, namely, to call a Conference of the anti-Bolshevist States and organisations. He had rightly said that this was only a continuation of what had hitherto been attempted, except that perhaps it meant giving supplies to one set of men instead of to another. That seemed to condemn the proposal. But we must not leave the impression that we took no interest in Russia. Our interest depended on what was happening immediately outside the barbed wire fence. We must remember that all the States round Russia were struggling for freedom. This applied equally to Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Denikin and the Caucasus. Each of these was struggling for a national existence. He hoped, however, that if we withdrew our material support we should not also withdraw our moral support and take our representatives away. A second point was that we could not precisely draw a line as to when the new policy would begin. For example, the British Government had promised aid to the extent of a further £15,000,000 for Denikin, and this would take some time to send. It had been pointed out that Koltchak’s Government was falling, and this was true. For some time past we had ceased to supply him with any material help. He hoped, however, that everything would not be withdrawn as a result of this Conference; for such action would mean the collapse of Koltchak and the over-running of Siberia by the Bolsheviks. The result would probably be that the Japanese would go in and establish a powerful force in Eastern Siberia. He hoped, therefore, that the policy would not be adopted with too great precision, and that every latitude would be allowed.

M. Clemenceau said he was in complete accord with Lord Curzon.

Mr. Balfour raised the question of the Baltic States. He felt much embarrassed as to where we stood in regard to this question, although, owing to the chaos, the present position was perhaps inevitable. We had acknowledged the independence of Finland and Poland, but he did not know where we were as regards the States lying between them. He understood that we had refused to acknowledge their independence, but we had recognised them as de facto Governments. Was our intention to give them no help, or were they to be included in the general decision?

Lord Curzon said that we had not for a long time given them any assistance, although we had allowed them to raise loans, so far as they were able to do so.

Mr. Lloyd George asked if we were to recognise their independence?

Mr. Balfour hoped that we should not do so. He asked if we were to acquiesce in their making peace with the Bolsheviks? We ought not to encourage them not to do so unless we could give them some support and assistance. If we were to surround Russia, as it were, with a barbed wire fence, could we leave so big a gap as lay between Poland and Finland? This would be to cut off Finland from Poland, and to give the Bolsheviks access to the sea. If we did not acquiesce in their making peace with the Bolsheviks, what steps were we to take?

M. Clemenceau said he was of opinion that we could not disinterest ourselves from the Baltic States. We could lend them aid and give them assistance, but the nature of this need not be discussed today. Each case was different and would have to be considered on its merits. How to prevent them making peace was a proper subject for diplomatic communications between Paris, Rome and London, but was not one that need be considered now.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he understood that the populations of these States were very formidable people. They seemed to have made up their minds not to attack the Bolsheviks. He had had a letter from Sir Esme Howard, who was formerly much concerned in our policy towards these States, and he regarded the Esthonians and the Letts as a very formidable people. He did not believe that the Bolsheviks would attack them further. The Esthonians and Letts had already driven out the Bolsheviks and were rapidly driving out the Germans. If the Bolsheviks were to attack again, the question could be re-considered. As regards their making peace with the Bolsheviks, he agreed that we could not give advice unless we were prepared to support them. As a matter of fact they had some time ago asked us to let them have £10,000,000 for the purpose of resisting the Bolsheviks. At present the responsibility was theirs. He did not think they intended to make peace, but they were suspending active military operations against the Bolsheviks.

Mr. Balfour said he would be very sorry to see any peace which gave Russia access to the Baltic.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Baltic States might offer a means of peaceful penetration into Russia. The Bolsheviks had talked much of propaganda, but he thought that civilisation might also undertake its peaceful penetration.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1, December 12, 1919.

1. For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 3.
2. See Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 9.
3. Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.
4. See HD–53, minutes 4 (b), 6, and 8, vol. viii, pp. 204, 208, and 211.