Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/124

HD–124

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 9, 1920, at 11:30 a.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. Hugh Wallace
    • Secretary
      • Mr. Harrison.
    • Great Britain
      • Mr. Lloyd George
      • Lord Curzon
      • Mr. Bonar Law
    • Secretary
      • Sir M. P. A. Hankey
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta,
      • M. Berthelot,
      • Mr. Arnavon,
      • M. De Saint Quentin.
    • Italy
      • M. Nitti
      • M. Scialoja
    • Secretary
      • M. Trombetti
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Capt. B. Winthrop,
France M. Massigli,
Italy M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

  • Great Britain
    • Mr. Leeper
  • France
    • M. Loucheur,
    • M. Cambon,
    • Gen. Weygand,
    • Gen. Le Rond,
    • M. Laroche,
    • M. De Fleuriau,
    • M. Hermitte,
    • M. de Montille,
    • M. Fromageot,
  • Italy
    • Gen. Cavallero,
    • Vice-Adl. Grassi,
    • M. Mancioli,
  • Japan
    • M. Sawada.

[Page 819]

The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee, dated January 6, 1920 (See Appendix “A”), and a note from the British Delegation, dated January 8, 1920 (See Appendix “B”). 1. State of Negotiations With the German Delegation

Mr. Clemenceau stated that before dealing with the Agenda he wished to express his thanks to the distinguished representatives of Great Britain and Italy who had been kind enough to attend. They hoped that it would at last be possible, by a common effort, to settle with them the questions arising out of the war, which had not yet received a solution.

They intended to sign the protocol1 on the following day and to proceed to the deposit [of] the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles. There remained, however, a difficulty which Mr. Loucheur would explain to the Council.

Mr. Loucheur said that there was a dispute concerning a sentence of the letter2 which they had decided to deliver to the Head of the German Delegation after he had signed the protocol. The last sentence of the last paragraph but one of that letter noted that the reduction which might be made from the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, etc., should not exceed 125,000 tons. The Drafting Committee, however, feared ambiguity; it might well be understood that the maximum of 125,000 tons only applied to the reduction which would be proposed by the experts after verification of the existing materiel. If the Supreme Council meant to say that that maximum included all the reductions which might be proposed for whatsoever cause, the Drafting Committee considered that it would be necessary to modify the text. The British Delegation supported these observations, and Sir Eyre Crowe declared that in his opinion, the figure of 125,000 tons, as adopted by the Council, should include all reductions, whatsoever. He hastened to say that they were all in agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe’s interpretation. It was to be distinctly understood that in no case should the total of reductions to be made on the original demand of 400,000 tons exceed 125,000 tons. That point once established, it seemed to him dangerous to modify the terms of the letter which Mr. von Lersner had already accepted. Furthermore, was such a change necessary. They were the sole judges of reductions which might be consented to for economic reasons. It was therefore sufficient for the Allies to agree among themselves that in no case should the total of reductions, made for whatsoever cause, exceed 125,000 tons; but it was useless to notify their agreement to the Germans.

[Page 820]

It was decided:

(1)
that the total of the reductions allowed for whatsoever cause, on the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, cranes, etc., as reparation for the Scapa Flow affair, should not in any case exceed the figure of 125,000 tons;
(2)
that if the Council were agreed on that point, there would be no need to modify the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the letter to be delivered to Mr. von Lersner after the signature of the protocol.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

Mr. Clemenceau stated that the following ceremony would take place on the afternoon of the following day: They would first meet in M. Pichon’s room, Mr. von Lersner would be introduced and would sign the protocol alone. They would then proceed to the Clock Room where the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications would be signed by a representative of each of the Powers which had ratified. 2. Ceremony of the Signature of the Protocol and of the Procès-verbal of the Deposit of Ratifications

The Council had before it a memorandum of the German Delegation, dated January 3, 1920 (See Appendix “C”), a note of the German Delegation, dated January 8, 1920 (See Appendix “D”), and a draft letter to Mr. von Lersner, dated January 9, 1920 (See Appendix “E”). 3. Letter to the German Delegation in Reply to the First Paragraph of the German Memorandum Dated Jan. 3, 1920

Mr. Fromageot said that the German Delegation had addressed a memorandum to the Conference, the first paragraph of which stated “until such time as it is known whether the United States of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is prepared to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on the Commission provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced”. On the other hand, the German Delegation raised anew the question of the American representation in a short note concerning Memel and Dantzig, which had been received on the preceding day. Under these conditions it was advisable that there should not be a misunderstanding between the Allies and Germany, the consequences of which might be serious. The United States not having ratified the Peace Treaty, had no claim to sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig: the Allied Powers did not, therefore, represent the rights of the United States—rights which were then nonexistent. It was important, on the other hand, that Germany should not be able to maintain later on that she had only accepted the Treaty temporarily and that, should the United States not ratify it, she was justified in questioning its validity. That was an argument which was directly contrary to the final stipulations of the [Page 821] Treaty. It had for that reason appeared necessary to reply to the German memorandum by a note which he would read to the Council. (Mr. Fromageot then read the draft note contained in Appendix “E”).

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was in agreement with what Mr. Fromageot had just said. It was understood that when three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, had ratified the Treaty, it should then come into force. That arrangement held good, irrespective of which of the Powers had ratified, and the situation would be similar if Great Britain, for example, had not ratified. Were this not so, there would be no peace; the state of war could not be prolonged. It was impossible to wait until America let them know whether she intended ratifying or not, before putting the Treaty into force. The Treaty was not a provisional one: it was a final Treaty which bound once and for all the Powers which had ratified, and Germany. This being so, and whilst approving the note as a whole, he wondered whether it would not be possible to suppress the reference made to China on the second page.

Mr. Fromageot remarked that this was a good argument.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it might be, but the question was whether the use of that argument were opportune.

Mr. Fromageot remarked that they might simply say “the absence of the signature of one Power would not prevent the Treaty from existing … etc.”

Mr. Scialoja did not consider the argument a good one. The question in substance was not whether the Treaty came into force or not, but to decide how much of its clauses as dealt with special action to be taken by the United States, or its representatives, could be applied: For example, those which mentioned the participation of the United States on such and such a Commission.

A case in point would be whether, in the absence of the American representative, a Commission could exercise its functions. The problem was not to decide whether the Treaty should be applied, but to decide how it could be applied.

Mr. Clemenceau said that they were therefore all agreed to omit that argument.

It was decided:

To send to the Head of the German Delegation the letter, of which a draft was given in Appendix “E”, omitting in the last paragraph of page 2 the argument drawn from the absence of China’s signature of the Treaty.

The Council had before it a note from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated January 6, 1920 (Appendix “F”), and a draft verbal note to the German Delegation (Appendix “G”).

[Page 822]

General Weygand read and commented upon the note of Marshal Foch.

Mr. Wallace asked whether the Germans had not already agreed to withdraw their troops from those regions. 4. Draft of a Verbal Note to the German Delegation (Concentration of Troops in Western Prussia)

General Weygand replied that the Germans had concluded an agreement with the Poles which laid down the conditions of the evacuation of the territories ceded to Poland. The Poles were now anxious about the concentration of German forces in the territories to be ceded, and especially of troops which came from the Baltikum: They feared incidents at the time of the handing over of those districts to the Polish authorities. For that reason they asked the Conference to intervene.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wondered whether it would be advisable to send a note of that kind. The Germans were responsible for the maintenance of order until such time as the Polish and Allied troops would occupy those territories. Was it wise to send a note of that kind before they felt sure that the Germans intended to violate the Treaty? Up to that time there was no reason to suppose that such was their intention. He would point out that the evacuation of the German troops was only to begin on the seventh day. He feared a delay in the evacuation by the Germans much less than a delay on the part of the troops which were to replace them.

General Weygand replied that as the Council had decided to bring the Treaty into force on the following day he would not insist, as the question lost much of its interest.

It was decided:

that there was no need to send a verbal note to the Head of the German Delegation on the subject of the concentration of troops in the territories of Western Prussia.

General Weygand stated that on the preceding day they had signed an agreement with the German representatives concerning the transport of Allied contingents in the plebiscite areas. That agreement satisfied their demands regarding the number of wagons to be supplied by the Germans. The German representatives, however, had made reservations in the document which had been signed on the preceding day, with regard to the cost of this transport, stating that they had not received a reply from Berlin; they had therefore not agreed to grant the Allies military rates. 5. Transport of Allied Contingents in the Plebiscite Areas

The Council took note of General Weygand’s communication.

Mr. Dutasta said that they had received a telegram from the French Minister at Copenhagen, dated January 5th, stating that the representative of the German Government had not yet communicated [Page 823] in writing whether he was authorized to accept the arrangement which had been submitted to him by the International Commission concerning the occupation of the plebiscite area in Schieswig. Mr. Dutasta had seen Mr. von Lersner on the preceding day and had informed him that the Council must receive written approval of that agreement by the German Government by the following day. Mr. von Lersner thought that that approval must have been given since January 5th. In any case, he would obtain authority to give it himself, if need be. Relative to 6. Arrangement Schleswig

Mr. Berthelot said that in order to meet certain wishes and also to give a certain solemnity to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, they had agreed to postpone that ceremony for a few days. In any event it would be well to fix the exact date thereof without delay, and communicate it to President Wilson who would send out the official convocation. Mr. Bourgeois suggested January 19th. 7. First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations

Mr. Lloyd George said that the question was as follows: Did they wish the first meeting to be an official ceremony or not. Unless he were mistaken, that first meeting would only decide a practical question, i. e., the nomination of the Delimitation Commission of the Saar. Would it be necessary to have a highly ceremonial function for that. It seemed that a simple business meeting would be sufficient to attain that object. The inauguration, properly speaking, of the League could then take place, once all the delegates had been appointed and when it became possible to decide upon a more complete agenda.

Mr. Berthelot said that it was, however, rather difficult that the first meeting should take place without any ceremony; and it was natural enough that some speeches should be made on that occasion. Some time previous, Mr. Fromageot had found an ingenious solution which came very near to Mr. Lloyd George’s idea; to wit, to hold the second meeting before the first … He did not think that would be possible …

Mr. Lloyd George said that the fact nevertheless remained that that meeting would not do very much, and were it not for the necessity of appointing the Saar Commission, there would be no need to call the Council at the present time.

Mr. Berthelot replied that there were two distinct questions: the question of the Agenda upon which they were agreed, and that of the date of meeting. Sir Eric Drummond had asked that the first meeting be postponed. It was in order to meet his wish that they proposed a delay; but it was clear that there was no reason to surround that event with too much ceremony.

[Page 824]

Lord Curzon said that Mr. Bourgeois, who was to preside at the first meeting, intended to make a speech, and he wished him to make one likewise. As far as he was concerned, he was willing not to do so and he thought that Mr. Bourgeois would also consent to this.

After some discussion,

It was decided:

that Lord Curzon and Mr. Bourgeois should agree upon the date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

The Council had before it a note of the Chairman of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, dated January 5, 1920 (See Appendix “H”).

After a short discussion, 8. Expenses of the Rhineland Interallied high Commission

It was decided:

That the expenses of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission should be paid by Germany by priority, on the same basis as the expenses of the army of occupation, provided for in Articles 249 and 251–b of the Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

The meeting then adjourned.

(The Chiefs of Delegations met in camera.)2a

Appendix A to HD–124

Proposed Correction to Above Note to Baron von Lersner 3

The last phrase of the text to the last line seems to imply that the maximum of 125,000 tons refers only to the reduction proposed by the experts after verification.

If the intention of the Supreme Council is to have this maximum cover the reductions proposed for whatever the reason may be, that is to say, after valuation or for economic reasons, it would seem advisable to suppress this phrase, as the last phrase of the alinea, and to make a separate alinea reading as follows:

“In no case shall the total reduction exceed the amount of 125,000 tons.”

For the Drafting Committee
Henri Fromageot

[Page 825]

Appendix B to HD–124

british delegation

Note

The Secretariat of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the General Secretariat of January 6th, enclosing copy of a note4 drafted on the same date by the Drafting Committee, on the subject of the tonnage of floating docks, etc., to be delivered by Germany as reparation for the destruction of the German fleet at Scapa Flow.

The Secretariat of the British Delegation is requested by Sir Eyre Crowe to state that he shares the views of the Drafting Committee regarding the interpretation which may be made of the passage in the draft letter under discussion, in its present form.

Sir Eyre Crowe certainly understood that it was [the] sense of the Supreme Council that the amount of 125,000 tons should include all possible reductions, granted according to the experts’ inquiry, or for economic reasons. Such being his own understanding he considers that the text of the letter should be modified to comply with the suggestion of the Drafting Committee.

Appendix C to HD–124

Memorandum From German Delegation of January 3rd Regarding Temporary Replacement of American Delegates on Commissions Provided for in the Treaty

1)
In order to facilitate the suppression of the difficulties caused by the non-participation of the United States of America in the establishment of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, the German Government wishes to continue to offer proof of its good faith. Until such times as it is known whether the United States of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is ready to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on the Commissions provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced.
2)
By the terms of the Note of December 22, the Allied and Associated Governments received information to the effect that, after November 3, the floating docks, floating cranes, and dredges which are not carried on the list submitted by the German Technical Commission, [Page 826] are to be sold abroad. An investigation ordered by the German Government shows that this information is incorrect. If, however, it were established that sales of this nature were being conducted by private individuals without the knowledge of the Government, the circumstance should be taken in consideration.
3)
The German Government, in the absence of more definite information from the Allies, is not in a position to assume a stand relative to the affirmation, according to which, among the crews interned consequent to the Scapa-Flow incident, there are individuals who are guilty of a violation of the laws and customs of war and concerning whom Article 228 of the Peace Treaty [is?] applicable. The German Government again protests against the fact that the crews which, with confidence in the terms of the Armistice Convention entered enemy waters, are retained by force.
4)
According to a passage in the Allied Note of December 22, relative to the delivery of the five cruisers mentioned in the Protocol, the Allied and Associated Governments esteem that the change desired by Germany in the Article in question in the Protocol of November 1 would be in contradiction with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The German Government is not in a position to judge to what extent this is exact, and would be grateful for more specific information in the matter.

According to Article 181 of the Treaty, the German Naval forces which are available include six small cruisers. According to Article 190, paragraph 3, the cruisers as well as the battle ships may be replaced by new constructions after a period of twenty years after their launching. This provision indicates, in the estimation of the German Government, that, when Germany was authorized to keep six cruisers, it was not intended to include ships whose launching dates so far back that they are susceptible to replacement after three or four years. In delivering the five cruisers exacted by the Protocol, there would remain eight cruisers from which to choose the six cruisers which are to be put into service. Now, among these eight cruisers there are only three which were built subsequent to 1900 or, to be exact, in 1902 and 1903. Moreover, the present condition of these eight ships is so bad that only two at most are available for military use, and this after a considerable outlay of money, repairs and time. In the mean time, it is absolutely necessary for Germany to dispose of militarily serviceable cruisers in the defense of her long coast line if she is to avoid being exposed to the attack of any naval forces, however feeble.

[Page 827]

Appendix D to HD–124

General Observations From the German Delegation Regarding the Negotiations as to the Territories of Memel and Dantzig

The German Government believes it its duty to remark that according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace Germany must renounce her rights and titles to the territories of Memel and Dantzig in favor of the Allied and Associated Powers collectively (articles 99 and 100). I suppose that as the United States of America have not yet ratified the Peace Treaty, the Four Principal Powers who have ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to the United States, and I presume that the Government of the United States will agree to this procedure.

Appendix E to HD–124

Note to the German Delegation of January 9th, Regarding the Provisioned Replacement of the United States Delegates, Particularly in Regard to Memel and Dantzig

Monsieur le Président: In an aide-mémoire of the 3rd of this month, you were kind enough to inform the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference that “as long as the question of whether the United States would ratify or not remained in suspense, the German Government was prepared to leave to the Allies the task of deciding how American representatives in the Commissions provided for by the Treaty should be temporarily replaced”.5

In “General Observations in Regard to the Negotiations as to the Territories of Memel and Dantzig” of January 8th, the German Delegation further remarks that according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace “Germany must renounce all rights and titles to these territories in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers collectively” and assumes that “the Four Principal Powers who have ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to the United States” as long as this last Power shall not have ratified.6

It is to be feared that the terms in which these communications have been drafted may lead to some misunderstanding, which Germany and the Allies have a mutual interest to obviate. In the first place, there can be no question of replacing even temporarily the American representatives in the Commissions, for such replacement would constitute a modification of the Treaty. Neither is it conceivable that the Four Principal Powers can represent the rights [Page 828] belonging to the United States to Memel and Dantzig, since these rights resulting from the Treaty cannot exist for the United States until they shall have ratified.

Therefore, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, are, at the present moment, the only Powers who according to the Treaty have the quality of Principal Allied and Associated Powers as provided for by the Treaty.

To these four Powers and to these Powers alone, for the time being, do the provisions regarding the “Principal Allied and Associated Powers” apply.

It is therefore to these four Powers only that the undivided sovereignty of Memel and Dantzig is transferred. When the United States ratify, the undivided sovereignty will belong to five Powers instead of four; but that does not concern Germany.

Finally, the German Government has no reason to consider the non-participation of the United States at the first deposit of ratifications to question any provision of the Treaty or to reserve its liberty of action in case the United States decide not to ratify the Treaty. [The absence of China’s signature has neither been considered by Germany nor by the other Contracting Powers of a nature to prevent the Treaty from existing between those who had signed; the absence of ratification by another Power could not be considered of greater consequence.]7

From the moment of the procès-verbal establishing the first deposit of ratification, the Treaty must receive from all the Powers participating in the deposit full and absolute application in all its provisions.

Besides, the Supreme Council cannot in this respect do anything else but refer to its note of December 22nd and maintain without change the conclusions which the first paragraph of this document formulated on strict conformity with the final clauses of the Treaty.

Please accept …

Appendix F to HD–124

commander-in-chief
of the allied armies

General Staff
Section Three
No. 28

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

According to information of Polish origin, copy of which is hereto annexed, it is shown that the Germans are maintaining important [Page 829] forces in Western Prussia, which is in no way justified by the internal situation of the country.

These troops are composed, in particular, of Baltic elements and are principally concentrated in the region of Thorn.

As a result of an interior intervention, General Dupont obtained the assurance of the German Government that the territories of Western Prussia, which are to be annexed to Poland, would be freed of all the elements which had arrived, or might arrive, from Courland.

It would appear, from the information above referred to, that these promises have not been adhered to.

In the meantime any concentration of German troops in the regions to be evacuated, and particularly of troops brought back from the Baltic, would tend to provoke conflicts which it is important to avoid.

Consequently, it is desirable to invite the German Government, before the entry into force of the Treaty, to:

a)
—reduce the forces in Western Prussia to a strength strictly necessary to assure the maintenance of order, and safe passage across the territory for the Polish troops;
b)
—send all the elements having belonged to the Baltic troops, at the present time located either in territory which is to be ceded to Poland or in plebiscite territory, to Central Germany.

These measures, which are similar to those applied in Upper-Silesia relative to the military situation, might, should it be deemed expedient, be carried out in the same manner, by means of a verbal communication to Mr. von Lersner.

F. Foch
[Annex]
polish military mission
in france

No. 172/B

From: General Rozwadowski, Head of the Polish Military Mission.

To: The Commander-in-Chief of the Interallied Armies.

I have the honor to inform the Marshal of France that, according to a reliable source, the Germans are concentrating important forces at the base of the Vistula.

These forces are composed as follows: the 33rd Reichswehr Brigade, near Insterburg; the Olita Brigade, near Elk; the 20th, 41st, and 37th E. Brigades, near Thorn, while only three brigades are covering the Posnania front. All these units have received reinforcements since December 1st. The Germans have concentrated the Freikorps Diebitsch; the Freikorps Plehwe; the Schauroth Detachment; the elements [Page 830] of the 17th R. Brigade, all except the elements of this Brigade, coming from Courland and Lithuania, in the neighborhood of Thorn.

The Courland troops, noted for their brutality and hostility towards the Poles and their lack of discipline, have evidently been brought to these regions to provoke the Polish population, and in that way, impede the turning over of these regions to Poland.

I have the honor to request that the Marshal of France cause the necessary measures to be taken to insure the evacuation of these territories by the heavy German fighting units before their cession to Poland, and especially, the removal of the undisciplined detachments from Courland before the commencement of the Polish occupation.

If such measures are not taken serious troubles might take place between the Germans and occupying troops, while, on the contrary, greatly inferior forces would be wholly sufficient to maintain order and assure the correct rendition of the territories in question.

Rozwadowski

Appendix G to HD–124

[Draft of a Verbal Note to the German Delegation]

Verbal Note

According to information which has reached the Supreme Council it is shown that the German Government is maintaining important forces, in no wise justified by the internal situation of the country, in Western Prussia.

Elements from the Baltic forces, in particular, are found among these units, which are principally concentrated in the Thorn region. Their presence is contrary to promises which were made by the German Government to General Dupont, who was formally assured that the territories of Western Prussia attributed to Poland would be liberated of all elements coming, or to come, from Courland. Moreover, from a general point of view, any concentration of German troops and, in particular, the troops returning from the Baltic, would be of a nature to provoke conflicts which the German Government, primarily, has a special interest in avoiding.

The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to bring this situation to the attention of the President of the German Delegation, with the information that the Supreme Council requests the German Government:

1.
—to reduce the force in Western Prussia to the strength strictly necessary to insure the maintenance of order, and the safe passage of Polish troops across this territory;
2.
—to send to Central Germany all the elements of the Baltic troops, at the present time located either in territory which is to be ceded to Poland, or in plebiscite territory.

Appendix H to HD–124

interallied rhineland commission
the president

The President of the Interallied Rhineland Commission has the honor to transmit, annexed hereto, to His Excellency the Ambassador of France, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, the text of a resolution adopted by the Interallied Rhineland Commission in its meeting of December 18, 1919, as to priority in the reimbursement of the expenses of the High Commission.

The Interallied Rhineland Commission requests the Supreme Council to kindly decide that the expenses of the High Commission, which, by the terms of Article 6 of the Arrangement of June 28, 1919,8 are incumbent on Germany, be reimbursed on priority, before the Reparations, on a same footing with the expenses of the Army of Occupation, covered by Articles 249 and 251–b of the Peace Treaty.

The High Commissioner of the French Republic
President of the Interallied Rhineland Commission
Monnier
[Annex]

interallied rhineland commission

Extract From the Minutes of the 42nd Session of the Interallied Rhineland Commission, December 18, 1919

VI.

666

Priority in the Reimbursement of the Expenses of the Commission

The Commission, after having examined the draft notes on the expenses of the High Commission, submitted by the American, Belgian, British and French Juridical Advisers, decided to adopt the plan proposed by the Belgian Commissioner. This note, which represents the views of the Commission, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Council with a request for a decision.

[Page 832]
interallied rhineland commission

Note Prepared by Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns Relative to the Expenses of the High Commission

Article 6, alinea 3 of the Arrangement signed June 28, 1919, in conjunction with the Treaty of Versailles, states that “The German Government shall continue to be responsible for the cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation under the conditions fixed by the Treaty,” and it also adds “That the German Government shall also be responsible for the costs and expenses of the High Commission—”

It appears, therefore, in accordance with the intentions of the Powers signatories of the Arrangement, that the expenses of the High Commission are to be charged to Germany on the same footing as those of the armies of occupation.

Now Article 249 of the Treaty of Versailles, which charges the expenses of the armies of occupation to Germany, is completed by Article 251, which establishes, relative to the reimbursement of these expenses, a priority in relation to the reparations and other obligations incumbent on Germany.

The question has been brought up as to whether this priority reimbursement, established in favor of the expenses of the armies of occupation, includes the expenses of the High Commission as well?

Logically it would appear natural to place the expenses of the High Commission and those of the armies of occupation on the same footing since the High Commission and the Army are the result of the same cause and pursue the same object, that is the occupation of certain German territories as guarantee of the execution of the Treaty by Germany (Article 1 of the Arrangement).

It can also be added that the High Commission and the Army are, by virtue of the Treaty, inseparable and so far as Germany and all the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Versailles are concerned, form an indivisible whole.

The personnel of both are entitled to free lodging (Article 6, 7 and 8); both enjoy the benefits on the same footing of exemption from customs duties and imposts. Consequently, why suppose, in opposition to this regime of equality, that the expenses of the High Commission be met according to rules other than those relating to the armies of occupation?

It is obvious to those who have followed the negotiations of Paris and Versailles that the representatives of the Powers signatories of the Arrangement, which was drafted at the last moment, that is, much later than the Treaty, did not expect that any difference was [Page 833] intended concerning the reimbursement of the expenses of the High Commission and those of the armies of occupation.

However, it may be contended that the Arrangement, signed at Versailles on the same day as the Peace Treaty, although the result of the Treaty and especially of Article 432, cannot be accorded priority in opposition to any provision of the Treaty, as it is signed by only a few of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles.

We are therefore led to an examination of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and, first of all, to determine whether there is any provision in the Treaty which would prevent placing the expenses of the High Commission on the same footing as those of the armies of occupation, whether this is sufficiently specified in the text of the Arrangement or should be so specified in a special decision taken later.

It is primarily desirable to consider Article 249 of the Treaty, which expressly states that the maintenance cost of the armies of occupation, accorded the benefits of a special priority reimbursement, as is stated in Article 251, comprises “in general the cost of all administrative and technical services the working of which is necessary for the training of troops, and for keeping their numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.” The Arrangement of June 28, in Article 3, however, stipulates that the High Commission “shall secure the maintenance, safety and requirements” of the military forces occupying the Rhenish territory. Does this not amount to the same thing as again affirming that the High Commission is included in the ensemble of the armies of occupation and therefore on a same footing relative to the reimbursement of the expenses pertaining thereto?

On this same question, the Juridical Advisor of the English High Commission, made a very just remark in connection with the definition of Article 249, which he considers as in no way limitative, as is shown by the words “included therein” written at the head of the enumeration of a series of objects included in the cost of the armies of occupation. It is permissible, therefore, to complete the enumeration by including therein the expenses of the High Commission since it is inseparable from the armies of occupation.

If such is the case, the text of Article 251 of the Treaty, which places the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation before the Reparations, offers no opposition to an extension of this privilege to cover the expenses of the High Commission.

The question, however, is too important, especially from the point of view of the harmonious functioning of the services of the High Commission, to delay its permanent regulation by competent authority.

[Page 834]

It does not seem that the Commission itself is competent to act in this respect, as such authority is not granted to it by any text. Moreover, it would not appear desirable to have the High Commission legislate in its own case. Therefore the competent authority should be found to decide whether the expenses of the High Commission are or will be levied on priority, equally with the costs of occupation, and before the reparations, in compliance with Article 431 [249] or 451 [251] of the Treaty.

Obviously, such authority is the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, which has already had occasion to pronounce on these questions in a series of analogous cases.

Moreover, it is desirable to submit the question to the Supreme Council as promptly as possible, in order that a decision may be taken before the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.

I am convinced that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, informed of the question of the High Commissioners to Rhenish Territories, will not fail to decide that, in principle, the expenses pertaining to the surveillance of occupied territory should be paid prior to the debt, which is guaranteed by this very occupation, and that, consequently, the expenses of the High Commission should be reimbursed on priority, before the reparations, and on a same footing as the direct costs of the armies of occupation.

  1. Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.
  2. Appendix A to HD–122, p. 793.
  3. See ICP–9, p. 859.
  4. Appendix A to HD–122, p. 793.
  5. Appendix A to HD–122, p. 793.
  6. Appendix C, p. 825.
  7. Supra.
  8. The sentence enclosed in brackets is omitted from the English translation in the Department’s files. It appears, however, in the French text.
  9. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3524.