Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/124
HD–124
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 9,
1920, at 11:30 a.m.
Paris, January 9, 1920, 11:30 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Secretary
- Great Britain
- Mr. Lloyd George
- Lord Curzon
- Mr. Bonar Law
- Secretary
- France
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta,
- M. Berthelot,
- Mr. Arnavon,
- M. De Saint Quentin.
- Italy
- Secretary
- Japan
- Secretary
| Joint Secretariat |
| America, United States of |
Capt. B. Winthrop, |
| France |
M. Massigli, |
| Italy |
M. Zanchi. |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- Great Britain
- France
- M. Loucheur,
- M. Cambon,
- Gen. Weygand,
- Gen. Le Rond,
- M. Laroche,
- M. De Fleuriau,
- M. Hermitte,
- M. de Montille,
- M. Fromageot,
- Italy
- Gen. Cavallero,
- Vice-Adl. Grassi,
- M. Mancioli,
- Japan
[Page 819]
The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee, dated January
6, 1920 (See Appendix “A”), and a note from the British Delegation,
dated January 8, 1920 (See Appendix “B”). 1. State of
Negotiations With the German Delegation
Mr. Clemenceau stated that before dealing with
the Agenda he wished to express his thanks to the distinguished
representatives of Great Britain and Italy who had been kind enough to
attend. They hoped that it would at last be possible, by a common
effort, to settle with them the questions arising out of the war, which
had not yet received a solution.
They intended to sign the protocol1 on the
following day and to proceed to the deposit [of] the ratifications of
the Treaty of Versailles. There remained, however, a difficulty which
Mr. Loucheur would explain to the Council.
Mr. Loucheur said that there was a dispute
concerning a sentence of the letter2 which they
had decided to deliver to the Head of the German Delegation after he had
signed the protocol. The last sentence of the last paragraph but one of
that letter noted that the reduction which might be made from the
original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes,
etc., should not exceed 125,000 tons. The Drafting Committee, however,
feared ambiguity; it might well be understood that the maximum of
125,000 tons only applied to the reduction which would be proposed by
the experts after verification of the existing materiel. If the Supreme
Council meant to say that that maximum included all the reductions which
might be proposed for whatsoever cause, the Drafting Committee
considered that it would be necessary to modify the text. The British
Delegation supported these observations, and Sir Eyre Crowe declared
that in his opinion, the figure of 125,000 tons, as adopted by the
Council, should include all reductions, whatsoever. He hastened to say
that they were all in agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe’s interpretation. It
was to be distinctly understood that in no case should the total of
reductions to be made on the original demand of 400,000 tons exceed
125,000 tons. That point once established, it seemed to him dangerous to
modify the terms of the letter which Mr. von Lersner had already
accepted. Furthermore, was such a change necessary. They were the sole
judges of reductions which might be consented to for economic reasons.
It was therefore sufficient for the Allies to agree among themselves
that in no case should the total of reductions, made for whatsoever
cause, exceed 125,000 tons; but it was useless to notify their agreement
to the Germans.
[Page 820]
It was decided:
- (1)
- that the total of the reductions allowed for whatsoever cause,
on the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks,
cranes, etc., as reparation for the Scapa Flow affair, should
not in any case exceed the figure of 125,000 tons;
- (2)
- that if the Council were agreed on that point, there would be
no need to modify the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph
of the letter to be delivered to Mr. von Lersner after the
signature of the protocol.
Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the
instructions of his Government.
Mr. Clemenceau stated that the following
ceremony would take place on the afternoon of the following day: They
would first meet in M. Pichon’s room, Mr. von Lersner would be
introduced and would sign the protocol alone. They would then proceed to
the Clock Room where the procès-verbal of the
deposit of ratifications would be signed by a representative of each of
the Powers which had ratified. 2. Ceremony of the
Signature of the Protocol and of the Procès-verbal of the Deposit of
Ratifications
The Council had before it a memorandum of the German Delegation, dated
January 3, 1920 (See Appendix “C”), a note of the German Delegation,
dated January 8, 1920 (See Appendix “D”), and a draft letter to Mr. von
Lersner, dated January 9, 1920 (See Appendix “E”). 3.
Letter to the German Delegation in Reply to the First Paragraph of
the German Memorandum Dated Jan. 3, 1920
Mr. Fromageot said that the German Delegation
had addressed a memorandum to the Conference, the first paragraph of
which stated “until such time as it is known whether the United States
of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is
prepared to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on
the Commission provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced”.
On the other hand, the German Delegation raised anew the question of the
American representation in a short note concerning Memel and Dantzig,
which had been received on the preceding day. Under these conditions it
was advisable that there should not be a misunderstanding between the
Allies and Germany, the consequences of which might be serious. The
United States not having ratified the Peace Treaty, had no claim to
sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig: the Allied Powers did not,
therefore, represent the rights of the United States—rights which were
then nonexistent. It was important, on the other hand, that Germany
should not be able to maintain later on that she had only accepted the
Treaty temporarily and that, should the United States not ratify it, she
was justified in questioning its validity. That was an argument which
was directly contrary to the final stipulations of the
[Page 821]
Treaty. It had for that reason appeared
necessary to reply to the German memorandum by a note which he would
read to the Council. (Mr. Fromageot then read the draft note contained
in Appendix “E”).
Mr. Lloyd George said that he was in agreement
with what Mr. Fromageot had just said. It was understood that when three
of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and
Germany, on the other, had ratified the Treaty, it should then come into
force. That arrangement held good, irrespective of which of the Powers
had ratified, and the situation would be similar if Great Britain, for
example, had not ratified. Were this not so, there would be no peace;
the state of war could not be prolonged. It was impossible to wait until
America let them know whether she intended ratifying or not, before
putting the Treaty into force. The Treaty was not a provisional one: it
was a final Treaty which bound once and for all the Powers which had
ratified, and Germany. This being so, and whilst approving the note as a
whole, he wondered whether it would not be possible to suppress the
reference made to China on the second page.
Mr. Fromageot remarked that this was a good
argument.
Mr. Lloyd George said that it might be, but the
question was whether the use of that argument were opportune.
Mr. Fromageot remarked that they might simply
say “the absence of the signature of one Power would not prevent the
Treaty from existing … etc.”
Mr. Scialoja did not consider the argument a
good one. The question in substance was not whether the Treaty came into
force or not, but to decide how much of its clauses as dealt with
special action to be taken by the United States, or its representatives,
could be applied: For example, those which mentioned the participation
of the United States on such and such a Commission.
A case in point would be whether, in the absence of the American
representative, a Commission could exercise its functions. The problem
was not to decide whether the Treaty should be applied, but to decide
how it could be applied.
Mr. Clemenceau said that they were therefore
all agreed to omit that argument.
It was decided:
To send to the Head of the German Delegation the letter, of which
a draft was given in Appendix “E”, omitting in the last
paragraph of page 2 the argument drawn from the absence of
China’s signature of the Treaty.
The Council had before it a note from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of
the Allied Armies, dated January 6, 1920 (Appendix “F”), and a draft
verbal note to the German Delegation (Appendix “G”).
[Page 822]
General Weygand read and commented upon the
note of Marshal Foch.
Mr. Wallace asked whether the Germans had not
already agreed to withdraw their troops from those regions. 4. Draft of a Verbal Note to the German Delegation
(Concentration of Troops in Western Prussia)
General Weygand replied that the Germans had
concluded an agreement with the Poles which laid down the conditions of
the evacuation of the territories ceded to Poland. The Poles were now
anxious about the concentration of German forces in the territories to
be ceded, and especially of troops which came from the Baltikum: They
feared incidents at the time of the handing over of those districts to
the Polish authorities. For that reason they asked the Conference to
intervene.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he wondered whether
it would be advisable to send a note of that kind. The Germans were
responsible for the maintenance of order until such time as the Polish
and Allied troops would occupy those territories. Was it wise to send a
note of that kind before they felt sure that the Germans intended to
violate the Treaty? Up to that time there was no reason to suppose that
such was their intention. He would point out that the evacuation of the
German troops was only to begin on the seventh day. He feared a delay in
the evacuation by the Germans much less than a delay on the part of the
troops which were to replace them.
General Weygand replied that as the Council had
decided to bring the Treaty into force on the following day he would not
insist, as the question lost much of its interest.
It was decided:
that there was no need to send a verbal note to the Head of the
German Delegation on the subject of the concentration of troops
in the territories of Western Prussia.
General Weygand stated that on the preceding
day they had signed an agreement with the German representatives
concerning the transport of Allied contingents in the plebiscite areas.
That agreement satisfied their demands regarding the number of wagons to
be supplied by the Germans. The German representatives, however, had
made reservations in the document which had been signed on the preceding
day, with regard to the cost of this transport, stating that they had
not received a reply from Berlin; they had therefore not agreed to grant
the Allies military rates. 5. Transport of Allied
Contingents in the Plebiscite Areas
The Council took note of General Weygand’s communication.
Mr. Dutasta said that they had received a
telegram from the French Minister at Copenhagen, dated January 5th,
stating that the representative of the German Government had not yet
communicated
[Page 823]
in writing
whether he was authorized to accept the arrangement which had been
submitted to him by the International Commission concerning the
occupation of the plebiscite area in Schieswig. Mr. Dutasta had seen Mr.
von Lersner on the preceding day and had informed him that the Council
must receive written approval of that agreement by the German Government
by the following day. Mr. von Lersner thought that that approval must
have been given since January 5th. In any case, he would obtain
authority to give it himself, if need be. Relative to
6. Arrangement Schleswig
Mr. Berthelot said that in order to meet
certain wishes and also to give a certain solemnity to the first meeting
of the Council of the League of Nations, they had agreed to postpone
that ceremony for a few days. In any event it would be well to fix the
exact date thereof without delay, and communicate it to President Wilson
who would send out the official convocation. Mr. Bourgeois suggested
January 19th. 7. First Meeting of the Council of the
League of Nations
Mr. Lloyd George said that the question was as
follows: Did they wish the first meeting to be an official ceremony or
not. Unless he were mistaken, that first meeting would only decide a
practical question, i. e., the nomination of the Delimitation Commission
of the Saar. Would it be necessary to have a highly ceremonial function
for that. It seemed that a simple business meeting would be sufficient
to attain that object. The inauguration, properly speaking, of the
League could then take place, once all the delegates had been appointed
and when it became possible to decide upon a more complete agenda.
Mr. Berthelot said that it was, however, rather
difficult that the first meeting should take place without any ceremony;
and it was natural enough that some speeches should be made on that
occasion. Some time previous, Mr. Fromageot had found an ingenious
solution which came very near to Mr. Lloyd George’s idea; to wit, to
hold the second meeting before the first … He did not think that would
be possible …
Mr. Lloyd George said that the fact
nevertheless remained that that meeting would not do very much, and were
it not for the necessity of appointing the Saar Commission, there would
be no need to call the Council at the present time.
Mr. Berthelot replied that there were two
distinct questions: the question of the Agenda upon which they were
agreed, and that of the date of meeting. Sir Eric Drummond had asked
that the first meeting be postponed. It was in order to meet his wish
that they proposed a delay; but it was clear that there was no reason to
surround that event with too much ceremony.
[Page 824]
Lord Curzon said that Mr. Bourgeois, who was to
preside at the first meeting, intended to make a speech, and he wished
him to make one likewise. As far as he was concerned, he was willing not
to do so and he thought that Mr. Bourgeois would also consent to
this.
After some discussion,
It was decided:
that Lord Curzon and Mr. Bourgeois should agree upon the date of
the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.
The Council had before it a note of the Chairman of the Interallied
Rhineland High Commission, dated January 5, 1920 (See Appendix “H”).
After a short discussion, 8. Expenses of the Rhineland
Interallied high Commission
It was decided:
That the expenses of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission
should be paid by Germany by priority, on the same basis as the
expenses of the army of occupation, provided for in Articles 249
and 251–b of the Treaty of Peace.
Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the
instructions of his Government.
The meeting then adjourned.
(The Chiefs of Delegations met in camera.)2a
Appendix A to HD–124
Proposed Correction to Above Note to
Baron von Lersner3
The last phrase of the text to the last line seems to imply that the
maximum of 125,000 tons refers only to the reduction proposed by the
experts after verification.
If the intention of the Supreme Council is to have this maximum cover
the reductions proposed for whatever the reason may be, that is to
say, after valuation or for economic reasons, it would seem
advisable to suppress this phrase, as the last phrase of the alinea,
and to make a separate alinea reading as follows:
“In no case shall the total reduction exceed the amount of
125,000 tons.”
For the Drafting Committee
Henri Fromageot
January 6, 1920.
Appendix B to HD–124
british
delegation
January 8,
1920.
Note
The Secretariat of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference has
the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the General
Secretariat of January 6th, enclosing copy of a note4 drafted on the same date by the Drafting
Committee, on the subject of the tonnage of floating docks, etc., to
be delivered by Germany as reparation for the destruction of the
German fleet at Scapa Flow.
The Secretariat of the British Delegation is requested by Sir Eyre
Crowe to state that he shares the views of the Drafting Committee
regarding the interpretation which may be made of the passage in the
draft letter under discussion, in its present form.
Sir Eyre Crowe certainly understood that it was [the] sense of the
Supreme Council that the amount of 125,000 tons should include all
possible reductions, granted according to the experts’ inquiry, or
for economic reasons. Such being his own understanding he considers
that the text of the letter should be modified to comply with the
suggestion of the Drafting Committee.
Appendix C to HD–124
Memorandum From German Delegation
of January 3rd Regarding Temporary Replacement of American
Delegates on Commissions Provided for in the Treaty
- 1)
- In order to facilitate the suppression of the difficulties
caused by the non-participation of the United States of America
in the establishment of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, the
German Government wishes to continue to offer proof of its good
faith. Until such times as it is known whether the United States
of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government
is ready to let the Allies decide how the American
representatives on the Commissions provided for by the Treaty
may be temporarily replaced.
- 2)
- By the terms of the Note of December 22, the Allied and
Associated Governments received information to the effect that,
after November 3, the floating docks, floating cranes, and
dredges which are not carried on the list submitted by the
German Technical Commission,
[Page 826]
are to be sold abroad. An investigation
ordered by the German Government shows that this information is
incorrect. If, however, it were established that sales of this
nature were being conducted by private individuals without the
knowledge of the Government, the circumstance should be taken in
consideration.
- 3)
- The German Government, in the absence of more definite
information from the Allies, is not in a position to assume a
stand relative to the affirmation, according to which, among the
crews interned consequent to the Scapa-Flow incident, there are
individuals who are guilty of a violation of the laws and
customs of war and concerning whom Article 228 of the Peace
Treaty [is?] applicable. The German Government again protests
against the fact that the crews which, with confidence in the
terms of the Armistice Convention entered enemy waters, are
retained by force.
- 4)
- According to a passage in the Allied Note of December 22,
relative to the delivery of the five cruisers mentioned in the
Protocol, the Allied and Associated Governments esteem that the
change desired by Germany in the Article in question in the
Protocol of November 1 would be in contradiction with the
provisions of the Peace Treaty. The German Government is not in
a position to judge to what extent this is exact, and would be
grateful for more specific information in the matter.
According to Article 181 of the Treaty, the German Naval forces which
are available include six small cruisers. According to Article 190,
paragraph 3, the cruisers as well as the battle ships may be
replaced by new constructions after a period of twenty years after
their launching. This provision indicates, in the estimation of the
German Government, that, when Germany was authorized to keep six
cruisers, it was not intended to include ships whose launching dates
so far back that they are susceptible to replacement after three or
four years. In delivering the five cruisers exacted by the Protocol,
there would remain eight cruisers from which to choose the six
cruisers which are to be put into service. Now, among these eight
cruisers there are only three which were built subsequent to 1900
or, to be exact, in 1902 and 1903. Moreover, the present condition
of these eight ships is so bad that only two at most are available
for military use, and this after a considerable outlay of money,
repairs and time. In the mean time, it is absolutely necessary for
Germany to dispose of militarily serviceable cruisers in the defense
of her long coast line if she is to avoid being exposed to the
attack of any naval forces, however feeble.
[Page 827]
Appendix D to HD–124
General Observations From the German
Delegation Regarding the Negotiations as to the Territories of
Memel and Dantzig
The German Government believes it its duty to remark that according
to the terms of the Treaty of Peace Germany must renounce her rights
and titles to the territories of Memel and Dantzig in favor of the
Allied and Associated Powers collectively (articles 99 and 100). I
suppose that as the United States of America have not yet ratified
the Peace Treaty, the Four Principal Powers who have ratified will
provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to
the United States, and I presume that the Government of the United
States will agree to this procedure.
Appendix E to HD–124
Note to the German Delegation of
January 9th, Regarding the Provisioned Replacement of the United
States Delegates, Particularly in Regard to Memel and
Dantzig
Monsieur le Président: In an aide-mémoire of the 3rd of this month, you
were kind enough to inform the Secretary-General of the Peace
Conference that “as long as the question of whether the United
States would ratify or not remained in suspense, the German
Government was prepared to leave to the Allies the task of deciding
how American representatives in the Commissions provided for by the
Treaty should be temporarily replaced”.5
In “General Observations in Regard to the Negotiations as to the
Territories of Memel and Dantzig” of January 8th, the German
Delegation further remarks that according to the terms of the Treaty
of Peace “Germany must renounce all rights and titles to these
territories in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
collectively” and assumes that “the Four Principal Powers who have
ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this
respect belong to the United States” as long as this last Power
shall not have ratified.6
It is to be feared that the terms in which these communications have
been drafted may lead to some misunderstanding, which Germany and
the Allies have a mutual interest to obviate. In the first place,
there can be no question of replacing even temporarily the American
representatives in the Commissions, for such replacement would
constitute a modification of the Treaty. Neither is it conceivable
that the Four Principal Powers can represent the rights
[Page 828]
belonging to the United
States to Memel and Dantzig, since these rights resulting from the
Treaty cannot exist for the United States until they shall have
ratified.
Therefore, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, are, at the
present moment, the only Powers who according to the Treaty have the
quality of Principal Allied and Associated Powers as provided for by
the Treaty.
To these four Powers and to these Powers alone, for the time being,
do the provisions regarding the “Principal Allied and Associated
Powers” apply.
It is therefore to these four Powers only that the undivided
sovereignty of Memel and Dantzig is transferred. When the United
States ratify, the undivided sovereignty will belong to five Powers
instead of four; but that does not concern Germany.
Finally, the German Government has no reason to consider the
non-participation of the United States at the first deposit of
ratifications to question any provision of the Treaty or to reserve
its liberty of action in case the United States decide not to ratify
the Treaty. [The absence of China’s signature has neither been
considered by Germany nor by the other Contracting Powers of a
nature to prevent the Treaty from existing between those who had
signed; the absence of ratification by another Power could not be
considered of greater consequence.]7
From the moment of the procès-verbal
establishing the first deposit of ratification, the Treaty must
receive from all the Powers participating in the deposit full and
absolute application in all its provisions.
Besides, the Supreme Council cannot in this respect do anything else
but refer to its note of December 22nd and maintain without change
the conclusions which the first paragraph of this document
formulated on strict conformity with the final clauses of the
Treaty.
Please accept …
Appendix F to HD–124
commander-in-chief
of the allied armies
General Staff
Section Three
No. 28
G. H. Q., January 6,
1920.
From: Marshal Foch.
To: President of the Council, President of the Peace
Conference.
According to information of Polish origin, copy of which is hereto
annexed, it is shown that the Germans are maintaining important
[Page 829]
forces in Western Prussia,
which is in no way justified by the internal situation of the
country.
These troops are composed, in particular, of Baltic elements and are
principally concentrated in the region of Thorn.
As a result of an interior intervention, General Dupont obtained the
assurance of the German Government that the territories of Western
Prussia, which are to be annexed to Poland, would be freed of all
the elements which had arrived, or might arrive, from Courland.
It would appear, from the information above referred to, that these
promises have not been adhered to.
In the meantime any concentration of German troops in the regions to
be evacuated, and particularly of troops brought back from the
Baltic, would tend to provoke conflicts which it is important to
avoid.
Consequently, it is desirable to invite the German Government, before
the entry into force of the Treaty, to:
- a)
- —reduce the forces in Western Prussia to a strength
strictly necessary to assure the maintenance of order, and
safe passage across the territory for the Polish
troops;
- b)
- —send all the elements having belonged to the Baltic
troops, at the present time located either in territory
which is to be ceded to Poland or in plebiscite territory,
to Central Germany.
These measures, which are similar to those applied in Upper-Silesia
relative to the military situation, might, should it be deemed
expedient, be carried out in the same manner, by means of a verbal
communication to Mr. von Lersner.
[Annex]
polish military
mission
in france
No. 172/B
Paris, January 4, 1920.
From: General Rozwadowski, Head of the Polish
Military Mission.
To: The Commander-in-Chief of the Interallied
Armies.
I have the honor to inform the Marshal of France that, according to a
reliable source, the Germans are concentrating important forces at
the base of the Vistula.
These forces are composed as follows: the 33rd Reichswehr Brigade,
near Insterburg; the Olita Brigade, near Elk; the 20th, 41st, and
37th E. Brigades, near Thorn, while only three brigades are covering
the Posnania front. All these units have received reinforcements
since December 1st. The Germans have concentrated the Freikorps
Diebitsch; the Freikorps Plehwe; the Schauroth Detachment; the
elements
[Page 830]
of the 17th R.
Brigade, all except the elements of this Brigade, coming from
Courland and Lithuania, in the neighborhood of Thorn.
The Courland troops, noted for their brutality and hostility towards
the Poles and their lack of discipline, have evidently been brought
to these regions to provoke the Polish population, and in that way,
impede the turning over of these regions to Poland.
I have the honor to request that the Marshal of France cause the
necessary measures to be taken to insure the evacuation of these
territories by the heavy German fighting units before their cession
to Poland, and especially, the removal of the undisciplined
detachments from Courland before the commencement of the Polish
occupation.
If such measures are not taken serious troubles might take place
between the Germans and occupying troops, while, on the contrary,
greatly inferior forces would be wholly sufficient to maintain order
and assure the correct rendition of the territories in question.
Appendix G to HD–124
[Draft of a Verbal Note to the German
Delegation]
Verbal Note
According to information which has reached the Supreme Council it is
shown that the German Government is maintaining important forces, in
no wise justified by the internal situation of the country, in
Western Prussia.
Elements from the Baltic forces, in particular, are found among these
units, which are principally concentrated in the Thorn region. Their
presence is contrary to promises which were made by the German
Government to General Dupont, who was formally assured that the
territories of Western Prussia attributed to Poland would be
liberated of all elements coming, or to come, from Courland.
Moreover, from a general point of view, any concentration of German
troops and, in particular, the troops returning from the Baltic,
would be of a nature to provoke conflicts which the German
Government, primarily, has a special interest in avoiding.
The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to bring
this situation to the attention of the President of the German
Delegation, with the information that the Supreme Council requests
the German Government:
- 1.
- —to reduce the force in Western Prussia to the strength
strictly necessary to insure the maintenance of order, and
the safe passage of Polish troops across this
territory;
- 2.
- —to send to Central Germany all the elements of the Baltic
troops, at the present time located either in territory
which is to be ceded to Poland, or in plebiscite
territory.
Appendix H to HD–124
interallied rhineland
commission
the president
Coblenz, January 5, 1920.
The President of the Interallied Rhineland Commission has the honor
to transmit, annexed hereto, to His Excellency the Ambassador of
France, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, the text of a
resolution adopted by the Interallied Rhineland Commission in its
meeting of December 18, 1919, as to priority in the reimbursement of
the expenses of the High Commission.
The Interallied Rhineland Commission requests the Supreme Council to
kindly decide that the expenses of the High Commission, which, by
the terms of Article 6 of the Arrangement of June 28, 1919,8 are incumbent on Germany, be reimbursed on
priority, before the Reparations, on a same footing with the
expenses of the Army of Occupation, covered by Articles 249 and
251–b of the Peace Treaty.
The High Commissioner of the French
Republic
President of the Interallied Rhineland
Commission
Monnier
[Annex]
interallied rhineland
commission
Extract From the Minutes of the 42nd
Session of the Interallied Rhineland Commission, December 18,
1919
VI.
666
Priority in the Reimbursement of
the Expenses of the Commission
The Commission, after having examined the draft notes on the expenses
of the High Commission, submitted by the American, Belgian, British
and French Juridical Advisers, decided to adopt the plan proposed by
the Belgian Commissioner. This note, which represents the views of
the Commission, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Council with a
request for a decision.
[Page 832]
interallied rhineland
commission
Coblenz, December 17, 1919.
Note Prepared by Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns
Relative to the Expenses of the High Commission
Article 6, alinea 3 of the Arrangement signed June 28, 1919, in
conjunction with the Treaty of Versailles, states that “The German
Government shall continue to be responsible for the cost of
maintenance of the troops of occupation under the conditions fixed
by the Treaty,” and it also adds “That the German Government shall
also be responsible for the costs and expenses of the High
Commission—”
It appears, therefore, in accordance with the intentions of the
Powers signatories of the Arrangement, that the expenses of the High
Commission are to be charged to Germany on the same footing as those
of the armies of occupation.
Now Article 249 of the Treaty of Versailles, which charges the
expenses of the armies of occupation to Germany, is completed by
Article 251, which establishes, relative to the reimbursement of
these expenses, a priority in relation to the reparations and other
obligations incumbent on Germany.
The question has been brought up as to whether this priority
reimbursement, established in favor of the expenses of the armies of
occupation, includes the expenses of the High Commission as
well?
Logically it would appear natural to place the expenses of the High
Commission and those of the armies of occupation on the same footing
since the High Commission and the Army are the result of the same
cause and pursue the same object, that is the occupation of certain
German territories as guarantee of the execution of the Treaty by
Germany (Article 1 of the Arrangement).
It can also be added that the High Commission and the Army are, by
virtue of the Treaty, inseparable and so far as Germany and all the
Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Versailles are concerned,
form an indivisible whole.
The personnel of both are entitled to free lodging (Article 6, 7 and
8); both enjoy the benefits on the same footing of exemption from
customs duties and imposts. Consequently, why suppose, in opposition
to this regime of equality, that the expenses of the High Commission
be met according to rules other than those relating to the armies of
occupation?
It is obvious to those who have followed the negotiations of Paris
and Versailles that the representatives of the Powers signatories of
the Arrangement, which was drafted at the last moment, that is, much
later than the Treaty, did not expect that any difference was
[Page 833]
intended concerning the
reimbursement of the expenses of the High Commission and those of
the armies of occupation.
However, it may be contended that the Arrangement, signed at
Versailles on the same day as the Peace Treaty, although the result
of the Treaty and especially of Article 432, cannot be accorded
priority in opposition to any provision of the Treaty, as it is
signed by only a few of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of
Versailles.
We are therefore led to an examination of the provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles and, first of all, to determine whether there
is any provision in the Treaty which would prevent placing the
expenses of the High Commission on the same footing as those of the
armies of occupation, whether this is sufficiently specified in the
text of the Arrangement or should be so specified in a special
decision taken later.
It is primarily desirable to consider Article 249 of the Treaty,
which expressly states that the maintenance cost of the armies of
occupation, accorded the benefits of a special priority
reimbursement, as is stated in Article 251, comprises “in general
the cost of all administrative and technical services the working of
which is necessary for the training of troops, and for keeping their
numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.”
The Arrangement of June 28, in Article 3, however, stipulates that
the High Commission “shall secure the maintenance, safety and
requirements” of the military forces occupying the Rhenish
territory. Does this not amount to the same thing as again affirming
that the High Commission is included in the ensemble of the armies
of occupation and therefore on a same footing relative to the
reimbursement of the expenses pertaining thereto?
On this same question, the Juridical Advisor of the English High
Commission, made a very just remark in connection with the
definition of Article 249, which he considers as in no way
limitative, as is shown by the words “included therein” written at
the head of the enumeration of a series of objects included in the
cost of the armies of occupation. It is permissible, therefore, to
complete the enumeration by including therein the expenses of the
High Commission since it is inseparable from the armies of
occupation.
If such is the case, the text of Article 251 of the Treaty, which
places the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation before
the Reparations, offers no opposition to an extension of this
privilege to cover the expenses of the High Commission.
The question, however, is too important, especially from the point of
view of the harmonious functioning of the services of the High
Commission, to delay its permanent regulation by competent
authority.
[Page 834]
It does not seem that the Commission itself is competent to act in
this respect, as such authority is not granted to it by any text.
Moreover, it would not appear desirable to have the High Commission
legislate in its own case. Therefore the competent authority should
be found to decide whether the expenses of the High Commission are
or will be levied on priority, equally with the costs of occupation,
and before the reparations, in compliance with Article 431 [249] or 451 [251] of
the Treaty.
Obviously, such authority is the Supreme Council of the Peace
Conference, which has already had occasion to pronounce on these
questions in a series of analogous cases.
Moreover, it is desirable to submit the question to the Supreme
Council as promptly as possible, in order that a decision may be
taken before the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.
I am convinced that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference,
informed of the question of the High Commissioners to Rhenish
Territories, will not fail to decide that, in principle, the
expenses pertaining to the surveillance of occupied territory should
be paid prior to the debt, which is guaranteed by this very
occupation, and that, consequently, the expenses of the High
Commission should be reimbursed on priority, before the reparations,
and on a same footing as the direct costs of the armies of
occupation.
