Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/121
HD–121
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Saturday, January 3, 1920, at 10:30 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon, Hugh Wallace
- Secretary
- Mr. Harrison
- Great Britain
- Sir Eyre Crowe
- Secretary
- Mr. Norman
- France
- M. Cambon
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta
- M. Berthelot
- M. de Saint Quentin
- Italy
- M. Scialoja
- Secretary
- M. Trombetti
- Japan
- M. Matsui
- Secretary
- M. Kawai
- America, United States of
| Joint Secretariat | |
| Great Britain | Capt. Lothian Small |
| France | M. Massigli |
| Italy | M. Zanchi |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux | |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- Great Britain
- Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.
- M. Malkin
- France
- General Weygand
- General Le Rond
- Admiral Le Vavasseur
- Colonel Requin
- M. Hermite
- M. Kammerer
- M. Alphand
- M. de Montille
- M. Fromageot
- Italy
- C. Admiral Grassi
- M. Stranieri
- Cdt. Gabetti
- M. Pilotti
The Council had before it a Note dated January 1, 1920, from the Chairman of the German Delegation to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference (Appendix “A”).
[Page 761]Vice-Admiral Le Vavasseur wished to draw the Council’s attention to one passage of the letter from Baron von Lersner. The Chairman of the German Delegation said that “the Allies, as Mr. Loucheur had recalled, must have reckoned on the existence in Germany of more than 700,000 tons of floating docks when drawing up their list.” This was a gratuitous suggestion on the part of Baron von Lersner. In the Allied negotiations with the Germans, no inclusive figure had ever been mentioned: the Germans had therefore no reason for saying that one had been fixed. When the naval experts decided to claim 400,000 tons of materiel of all kinds to be handed over by Germany as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident, the information at their disposal as to the material existing in German ports gave the approximate figure of 620,000 tons, and their claim was based on this figure. The difference between their calculation and those of the Germans was therefore due to the difference between 620,000 and 520,000 and not between 700,000 and 520,000. He repeated that no maximum figure was ever given during negotiations. 1. Negotiations With the German Delegation Concerning the Protocol1
Mr. Cambon agreed that the Allies must therefore maintain their figures. Baron von Lersner was ill: in order that blame for the delays in bringing the Treaty into force for which the Germans were really to blame, might not be imputed to the Allies, M. Dutasta was prepared to go and visit him with M. Loucheur and would inform him that the Allies maintained their figures. It was important that the ensuing conversation should be carefully noted.
M. Dutasta suggested leaving a memorandum with Baron von Lersner.
Vice-Admiral Le Vavasseur said Commander MacNamara had drafted a note which might serve as a basis for drafting the memorandum. Its essential points were as follows:
- 1.
- Baron von Lersner’s letter was inexact as far as floating dock tonnage was concerned.
- 2.
- No figure from the inventories prepared by the Allied naval experts was communicated to the Germans during the conversations between them and the Allied naval experts.
- 3.
- The chief subjects of discussion had been the 80,000 ton dock at Hamburg and the two 50,000 ton docks reported at Danzig: these were, indeed, the two most remarkable cases of disagreement between the inventories supplied by the Allied experts and the German documents; but it was never said that the Allies adopted as their own other information communicated by the German delegates. Finally, the figure of 700,000 tons mentioned by M. Loucheur was given only by way of example and for comparison with the figure of 600,000 tons which also the Germans had given by way of example: neither figure was exact.
M. Cambon thought that a document to this effect should be read to Baron von Lersner who would be asked to take note of it.
It was decided:
that in reply to the letter of January 1, 1920, from the Chairman of the German Delegation, the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform Baron von Lersner (who would be requested to take note of the fact) that, the Allies had never based their calculations upon the existence in Germany of 700,000 tons of floating docks, and that they maintained the figure of 624,000 tons.
The Council had before it a note dated January 2, 1920, (Appendix “B”).
General Le Rond reported that during recent conversations the attitude of the German delegates had obviously changed: they seemed to have understood that the Allies did not intend to make extravagant claims, but that, on the contrary they keenly desired to disturb as little as possible the life of those regions that were going to pass temporarily under their control. Nevertheless, the situation had hardly changed: The German Delegates had not full powers, they had to refer constantly to Berlin and could only express personal opinions. Fresh experts had been summoned to settle questions concerning the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories, and to deal with questions of a military nature arising out of the relief of German troops by Allied contingents. Mr. von Simson had also pointed out that a series of problems remained to be settled concerning Memel and Danzig as well as the working of boundary commissions, and that it was also necessary to conclude the German-Polish negotiations begun in Berlin; finally, he had drawn the attention of the Allies to the Slesvig questions. Mr. von Simson had also asked what procedure the Allies had in mind for the several Commissions taking over their functions—he meant the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions, and the Reparation Commission, did they intend merely to notify Germany that the authority of these Commissions had come into force or to negotiate with her on the matter. He must say that the German delegates seemed merely to expect notification on the part of the Allies. 2. Negotiations With the German Delegation Concerning the Putting Into Force of the Treaty
With regard to the organization of boundary commissions, he thought it would be sufficient to give M. von Simson the text of the instructions and note already approved by the Supreme Council.2 With the Council’s permission he would do this. The Chairman of the German Delegation had also asked him whether the Allies intended to summon the German members of these Commissions to Paris. That was a question which had still to be decided. As far as the settlement of Slesvig questions was concerned, there was a Commission on the [Page 763] spot to take all the necessary steps. Mr. von Simson was, however, not aware whether the German representatives had ratified the agreement prepared by it. In this connection he would point out to the Council that the Danish Minister had been very much disturbed by the news published in the press that the cost of upkeep of troops of occupation in plebiscite zones would be charged to the States to whom the territory was attributed. He pointed out that, as far as Slesvig was concerned, the Treaty expressly provided for the division of these expenses between Germany and Denmark. Obviously, a decision of the Supreme Council could not be carried out in contradiction of an article of the Treaty, and, moreover, the decision in question referred only to the plebiscite territories of eastern Germany.
With regard to Memel, Mr. von Simson pointed out that Germany would be justified in withdrawing her officials. This was true and might certainly cause an awkward state of affairs. He therefore thought it would be well to conclude an arrangement prepared on the Allied side by a special commission working on the following bases: (a) temporary retention of office by German officials with all their existing guarantees (b) retention of the existing and creation of a higher jurisdiction; (c) retention of German legislation; (d) delivery to the Allies of property belonging to the Reich or to Prussia; (e) provisional retention of the economic and financial status quo.
Similarly, it would be well to make arrangements concerning German officials and services in Danzig.
Mr. von Simson did not object in principle to the provisions making the German Government responsible for the upkeep of offices responsible for disbursement of public monies in plebiscite territories. The German delegates even seemed ready to advance the necessary funds for the troops of occupation.
He would be grateful if the Council would kindly give him instructions on the points still in dispute. He recalled the fact that, as far as Upper Silesia and the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories were concerned, negotiations were proceeding (replies from Berlin were awaited) and that the German-Polish negotiations were beginning that very day.
Mr. Wallace asked whether the questions enumerated by General Le Rond must be settled before the signature of the Protocol.
General Le Rond replied that they must be settled but that could be done in a very few days.
M. Cambon asked General Le Rond to be good enough to enumerate each of the questions still remaining to be settled: so that the Council might come to decisions upon them one by one.
General Le Rond said the first question was as follows: ought they merely to notify the German Government of the assumption of office of [Page 764] the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions and the Reparation Commission, or should they enter into negotiations on the subject.
General Weygand reminded the Council that this point had already been settled. Germany had already been informed that the Control Commissions would act officially from the coming into force of the Treaty and that from that time the delegations which those Commissions already had in Berlin would have power to act on behalf of the Commissions.
M. Cambon stated that in the opinion of the Council there was no need to enter into negotiations with the Germans concerning the assumption of office by the Commissions just enumerated; notification would be sufficient.
General Le Rond said that the second point was the transfer of sovereignty in Memel; should a special commission prepare a separate arrangement on this subject.
M. Cambon thought that the commission might at the same time prepare an arrangement for Danzig. He asked whether a special commission must be constituted.
M. Scialoja proposed that the task should be entrusted to the Commission on Polish Affairs.
General Le Rond agreed on condition that the Commission might co-opt any experts whose opinion it considered necessary.
M. Cambon accepted this solution on behalf of the Council.
As for arrangements which the Slesvig Commission might have made with the German authorities, there was nothing for them to decide; it was merely a matter of asking Copenhagen for information.
General Le Rond, referring to the organization of boundary commissions, believed he was right in thinking that the Council had no objection to his transmitting a copy of the instructions approved on October 15 to Mr. von Simson; but ought they to summon the German members of those commissions to Paris.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked what was the object of holding the meeting in Paris. To him the question seemed essentially a technical one.
General Le Rond replied that it was a question of coming to an understanding as to working methods. It was for this reason and because the same methods must be universally applied that they had not granted the claim made by the Belgian Government that the members of the German-Belgian Boundary Commission should meet at Brussels.
Mr. Scialoja was of opinion that the German representatives should be summoned.
Sir Eyre Crowe agreed that this would be better.
[Page 765]General. Le Rond suggested alternative solutions; either the Allies should come to an agreement and when this was done, appoint a meeting place with the Germans, or they should summon the Germans to Paris.
M. Cambon offered a third solution: the Allies could come to an agreement at Paris and, once that was done, summon the Germans. It was most essential that they should be in agreement before the Germans took part in their discussions.
(The Council accepted this proposal)
General Le Rond said there remained the Saar question; Colonel Requin would lay it before the Council.
Colonel Requin recalled the fact that, in a letter dated December 28, Baron von Lersner had raised the question of the regime to be applied during the transition period preceding the formation of the Government Commission for the Saar. The German delegation thus admitted that there would be a transition period; but it was of opinion that the armistice regime could not be retained during that period. On this point they were in perfect agreement with the Germans. The French Government and Marshal Foch had never spoken of an armistice regime properly so-called; but they considered that the present regime though possibly relaxed to some extent must be retained. It would, indeed, be impossible to restore the government of the Saar territory to the Germans, since, as soon as the Treaty came into force, the French administration would take possession of the mines under the terms of the Treaty itself. Control by the military authority in occupation was therefore essential. It was nevertheless clear that the present regime could be relaxed to such extent as did not prejudice the safety of the troops and on condition that no undertaking was given calculated subsequently to impair the freedom of action of the governing Commission. Marshal Foch had already given instructions to that effect. It was none the less certain that questions of detail would have to be settled with the German authorities, since the bonds uniting the German Saar administration with the Treves and Spier authorities were severed with the coming into force of the Treaty. Baron von Lersner proposed that they should negotiate on the matter with the chief administrator of Coblenz. They thought it better to return to the first solution proposed by the Germans themselves, that the necessary powers for these negotiations should be given to a Saar official. At the beginning of occupation and indeed for several months, the French authorities, with the consent of the German authorities, had dealt with a Saar official entitled the Verwaltungsprasident. It had certainly been necessary to expel the official in question on account of the part he had played during [Page 766] the recent strikes, but there was nothing to prevent the retention of the same system. It would therefore be well to reply to Baron von Lersner explaining the Allied point of view on the question of principle and indicating that questions of detail would be settled with a Saar official properly accredited by the German authorities.
Sir Eyre Crowe had no objections to make to this proposal.
Mr. Wallace could make no statement without special instructions from his Government.
In this connection he wished to say that, in view of the present political situation in the United States, his Government was very anxious that the Minutes should leave no doubt as to the attitude adopted by the American delegate. On December 20, a resolution was adopted on which he had made a formal reservation. Nevertheless, the Note provided for in that resolution and despatched, embodying in the text the formula “the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”. He asked that that formula should not be used in any document to which the American Government had not given its explicit consent.
M. Cambon said that the observations made by Mr. Wallace would be noted in the Minutes.
Colonel Requin said that they must therefore define three points in the reply: 1. retention in principle of control of local administration by the military authority; 2. relaxation of the military regime as far as possible; 3. settlement of questions of detail by negotiations between the French authorities and a Saar official accredited by the German Government.
General Weygand wished to point out, in connection with the observation made by Mr. Wallace, that there was no question of innovation: the Council had already decided while Mr. Polk was sitting on it that the existing regime should be retained in the Saar territory after the coming into force of the Treaty and until the constitution of the Government Commission:3
It was decided:
- 1.
- —that there was no need to enter into negotiations with the German Government concerning the entry into office of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions and the Reparation Commission; the entry into force of these Commissions would merely be notified.
- 2.
- —that the Commission on Polish Affairs, which was authorized to co-opt any experts it might consider of use, should, as quickly as possible, prepare draft arrangements with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty in Memel and Danzig.
- 3.
- —that General Le Rond should communicate to Mr. von Simson the text of the instructions and of the Note for the boundary commissions [Page 767] as approved by the Supreme Council, and that the German members of those Commissions should be summoned to Paris when agreement had been reached between the Allied representatives to those Commissions on all questions to be settled.
- 4.
- —that, with regard to the regime of the Saar territory after the coming into force of the Treaty and before the nomination of the Government Commission, the Chairman of the German Delegation should be informed:—(a) that the control of local administration by the military authority was in principle retained; (b) that the regime of military occupation would be relaxed as far as possible; (c) that questions of detail would be settled by negotiations between the French authorities and a Saar official properly accredited by the German Government.
Mr. Wallace would refer the last paragraph of the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.
The Council had before it a note dated January 3, 1920, from the Prisoners of War Commission (Appendix “C”).
Mr. Alphand read and commented upon the text of the note from the Commission.
Mr. Wallace said that as there had been no American delegate on the Commission, he must reserve his his opinion. 3. Powers of the Prisoners of War Commission
After a short discussion it was decided:
- 1.
- That the Commission for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War established by Article 215 of the Treaty of Versailles should be authorized, on meeting the Germans, to settle with them various questions connected with repatriation, in particular those concerning the cost of repatriation, the search for missing men, the restoration of articles and valuables belonging to prisoners of war.
- 2.
- That those questions which were not inserted in the chapter on Reparations should be settled independently of the Reparations Commission. The various delegations to the Prisoners of War Commission should nevertheless keep in touch and act in agreement with delegates for relevant matters on the Reparation Commission.
Mr. Wallace would refer the last paragraph of the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.
Sir Eyre Crowe recalled the fact that at a previous meeting4 he had stated that Mr. Lloyd George’s coming visit to Paris might be such as would alter the views of the British Government concerning the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. At the present meeting he wished to inform the Supreme Council that this circumstance had in no way changed the opinion of his Government, which still thought that the nomination of the Saar Boundary Commission alone should appear in the agenda for the first [Page 768] meeting, the fixing of the agenda for the following meetings being left to the Council of the League. 4. Convocation of the League of Nations
Mr. Berthelot said that as nothing was changed in the previous decision of the Supreme Council,5 they had only still to decide the date of the convocation of the Council. Had Sir Eyre Crowe any information concerning the wish, said to have been expressed by Sir Eric Drummond, for the postponement of the first meeting for several days in order to give more solemnity to the occasion.
Sir Eyre Crowe knew nothing about this. In any case Sir Eric Drummond was not competent to express the views of the Government, he only represented the Secretariat.
Mr. Mantoux added that, on account of the political election to be held in France from January 11 to 17, Mr. Leon Bourgeois would also like the first meeting to be postponed.
Mr. Berthelot considered that there could obviously be no difficulty in holding the first meeting of the Council only several days after the coming into force of the Treaty.
Mr. Scialoja asked what day was arranged for the Treaty coming into force. He had been summoned for January 6.
Mr. Berthelot said that that was the date chosen at first, but the delay in the negotiations with the German delegates would necessitate postponing it for several days.
Mr. Wallace wished to inform the Council of the views of his Government on the matter. Mr. Wallace read the note which appears as Appendix “D”.
Sir Eyre Crowe considered that it was for them to find the most practical method. If he understood aright, the convocation would take place in two phases: the President of the United States would issue the official convocation when he knew the day and hour fixed for the meeting; but before that, it would be well to inform the Powers represented on the Council of the League unofficially that the meeting would take place at an early date to be definitely fixed later. It would be best for this unofficial notice to be sent to the Powers concerned by the President of the Conference or the Secretariat-General. An official invitation would then be given by telegraph in a form chosen by President Wilson.
Mr. Cambon promised to inform the Government of the United States as soon as the Council had decided on a date for the meeting.
It was decided:
that the Secretariat-General of the Conference should unofficially inform the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that the first meeting of the Council would take place a few days after the coming into force of the Treaty, and should indicate [Page 769] in his communication that the official convocation would be sent to those Powers by the President of the United States.
The Council had before it a telegram dated December 29, 1919, from General Franchet d’Esperey (Appendix “E”).
Mr. Kammerer read and commented upon the telegram from General Franchet d’Esperey.
Sir Eyre Crowe was not in a position to express an opinion on the question. He doubted whether the British Government would be prepared to authorize an Allied authority to take charge of the evacuation and to have the Allies themselves bear the costs of evacuation. He thought this a dangerous step to take. 5. Evacuation of Civilian Population From Districts Abandoned by Denikin’s Army
Mr. Kammerer suggested in that case giving powers of direction to the Allied agents on the spot. The Bolsheviks advanced on Odessa six months ago, and everybody was convinced that the occupation of the town would only be temporary: departure was therefore rendered easy. At present things were different and there was no advantage to be gained by encouraging emigration; it was nevertheless certain that thousands would embark [debark] at Constantinople and they could not be left to die of hunger.
Mr. Cambon pointed out that the Western Powers had also very important material interests in those districts and the large quantities of military and naval materiel which risked falling into Bolshevist hands must also be taken into account.
Mr. Kammerer thought that there was no need for special instructions on this point. General Denikin or the Allied military authorities would do what was necessary. Their concern was with individuals. It must be explained to General Denikin that there was no need to evacuate many people; but it was hard to be indifferent to the laws of humanity.
Sir Eyre Crowe recalled the fact that at the time of the evacuation of northern Russia, Russians were not allowed to embark for Europe.
Mr. Kammerer agreed, but thought the situation in the present case somewhat different. They had had several months in which to prepare the evacuation; also, as events had proved, the northern districts were not really threatened by the Bolshevist armies. At Odessa they would have to anticipate vengeance on the part of the Bolsheviks; many people would flee, but the whole question was, what was to become of them.
Sir Eyre Crowe would have to consult his Government.
The rest of the discussion was adjourned.
A Report dated December 31, 1919, from the Central Territorial Committee was laid before the Council (Appendix “F”). 6. Occupation of the Buk District by Greek Troops
[Page 770]After a short discussion it was decided:
- 1.
- that Greece should be authorized immediately to occupy the Buk bridgehead allocated to her by Article 27 of the Treaty of Neuilly.
- 2.
- General Franchet d’Esperey would be informed of this decision and would take the necessary executive measures.
(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government).
The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated January 2, 1920. (Appendix “G”).
M. Cambon pointed out that the Drafting Committee was an offshoot of the Conference. There might therefore be disadvantages in allowing it to give directly opinions on questions of interpretation. Dealings should all be through the Supreme Council. 7. Requests for the Opinion of the Drafting Committee on Interpretation of the Treaty
Sir Eyre Crowe added that otherwise the Council might find itself committed to interpretations to which it did not agree.
Mr. Scialoja agreed, especially as a special Committee had been established for the execution of the Treaty of Versailles. Still less could the Drafting Committee take an initiative for an unratified Treaty.
Mr. Matsui thought that in case of emergency the Drafting Committee might be applied to, but not as a standing arrangement.
Mr. Wallace reserved his opinion, as America was not then represented on the Drafting Committee.
It was decided:
that without ad hoc permission from the Supreme Council the Drafting Committee was not authorized to give to Delegations which might apply to it, interpretations of clauses of the Treaties.
Sir Eyre Crowe recalled to the Council that Marshal Foch had suggested sending General Niessel to Esthonia on behalf of the Allied Powers to negotiate an arrangement between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch.6 He has asked the opinion of his Government on this suggestion. The British Government thought that the Niessel mission could hardly be of great utility. Yudenitch’s army was gradually being absorbed by the Esthonian Army. That was a quite natural development in which it was better not to interfere. If the Allies approved of this progressive absorption there was no need to send a special mission. It would be enough, if the Allied representatives at Reval informed the Esthonian Government that the Allied Powers were not opposed to its thus engaging in its service elements of Yudenitch’s [Page 771] Army: non-commissioned ranks would be absorbed first of all, but the same thing might well happen in the case of the officers. 8. Situation of Yudenitch’s Army
Mr. Cambon said that Marshal Foch had informed the Council that he was recalling General Niessel to Paris to await fresh instructions from the Supreme Council. Under those circumstances and as the matter did not seem urgent, he proposed that it should be adjourned until Monday.
The rest of the discussion was adjourned.
The meeting then adjourned.
- Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.↩
- HD–70, minute 5, and appendices C and D, vol. viii, pp. 643 and 651.↩
- HD–84, minute 2, vol. viii, p. 954.↩
- HD–119, minute 5, p. 708.↩
- HD–88, minute 6, and appendix D, pp. 85 and 91.↩
- HD–113, minute 1, and appendix A, pp. 594 and 604.↩
- Appendix B to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 863.↩
- HD–88, minute 6, p. 85.↩