Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IX

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/120

HD–120

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, December 31, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 31, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. Hugh Wallace,
  • Secretary
    • Mr. Harrison
  • Great Britain
    • Sir Eyre Crowe,
  • Secretary
    • Mr. Norman
  • France
    • M. Cambon.
  • Secretaries
    • Mr. Dutasta,
    • Mr. de Saint Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. de Martino
  • Secretary
    • M. Trombetti
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
Great Britain	Captain Lothian Small
France	Mr. de Percin.
Italy	Mr. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

• Great Britain
  • Capt. Fuller, R. N.
  • Cmdr. MacNamara, R. N.
  • Mr. Malkin
  • Mr. Carr
  • Lt. Col. Beadon
• France
  • Gen. Weygand
  • Gen. Le Rond
  • Adl. Le Vavasseur
  • Mr. Serruys
  • Mr. Fromageot
  • Mr. Tannery
  • Mr. Hermitte
  • Mr. de Montille
• Italy
  • Gen. Cavallero
  • Mr. Pilotti
• Japan
  • Mr. Shigemitsu
  • Mr. Nagaoka.

M. Dutasta told the Council that at five o’clock on the previous day he had had an interview with M. von Lersner and had communicated to him the draft letter that was to be addressed to the German Delegation by the President of the Conference.¹ The only thing left blank was the space for the figures relative to tonnage as estimated by the Allies on one hand and by the Germans on the other. Mr. von Lersner appeared on the whole satisfied with the letter. His only hesitation had been about the period of two years granted to the Germans for supplying the additional port material: he thought that period too short. He had told Mr. von Lersner that in his own opinion it might be possible to have the time extended to thirty months. Mr. von Lersner had gone away satisfied, and it was agreed between them that the afternoon of January 6th, might be taken as the date for signing the Protocol which would take place at the Quai d’Orsay, and would coincide with the coming into force of the Treaty. 1. Negotiations Relative to the Signing of the Protocol

Since that interview Captain Fuller had submitted the figures to be inserted in the blank spaces left in the draft letter. The estimate of the Allies was 624,275 tons and that of the Germans, 527,380 tons. These figures referred to the docks exclusively, and the difference between the two figures would, after verification, be deducted from the 400,000 tons originally claimed. He had then had the completed text presented to Mr. von Lersner by Mr. de St. Quentin. In acknowledging the document Mr. von Lersner told Mr. de St. Quentin that M. Loucheur had given, as the Allied figure, 700,000 tons and claimed that the situation was considerably modified if the estimate of the Allies was only 624,000 tons. Under the circumstances Mr. von Lersner said that he would be obliged to telegraph Berlin for instructions. What had occurred in reality was that M. Loucheur had suggested the estimate of 700,000 from memory and, no doubt, as an example for the sake of argument. The Germans were not justified in basing an argument on that estimate which was indicated merely in the course of conversation. And it ought further to be borne in mind that the figures submitted by Captain Fuller and which appear in the draft letter were more favorable to the Germans than those established by the French Admiralty, namely 612,000 tons.

M. de St. Quentin stated that Mr. von Lersner had claimed in his presence that the figure of 700,000 tons had been given in the course of the discussion that took place between the Allied and the German Experts. But, as a matter of fact, no trace of that figure having been given could be found in the procès-verbaux, and their Experts could not recall having heard it quoted. There was every ground for thinking that Mr. von Lersner’s affirmation was inexact.

Mr. Dutasta mentioned that, as he had already said, the figures referred to the floating docks alone. No statistics had been supplied on the number of tugs, cranes, etc., in the possession of Germany.

He did not think that the opposition thus created in extremis was very serious. If the Germans had given exact figures there was the assurance of their having 100,000 tons at least to hand over. Mr. von Lersner had on several occasions confided to him that the German Government was prepared by way of compromise to hand over a total of 260,000 tons. In any case putting the situation at its worst from the German point of view they would not demand from them more than 300,000 tons. He did not think that the Germans intended to withhold their signature for a difference not exceeding 50,000 tons at the most.

In the course of the interview Mr. von Lersner told him the anxiety caused to the German Government by the question of the actual handing over of the vessels that were to be delivered to the Allies. In a round about way he had led him to understand that the German Government had no great confidence in the officers and crews on board those vessels. He was afraid that if those ships had to leave for Allied ports with the crews who were actually on board they ran the risk of their being scuttled either when they set out or during the voyage. He had told Mr. von Lersner that such action would be extremely serious. Mr. von Lersner had agreed and added that the German Government acknowledged how serious the consequences might be. It was precisely for that reason and being himself powerless in the matter, that he wished to draw the attention of the Allied and Associated Powers to the situation. He had suggested that the German Government might assemble all the ships in question in one port, and take off the crews, and that the Allies might send their own crews to take possession of the ships and man them into their own ports. He had confined himself to telling Mr. von Lersner that he would report his statements to the Council.

Mr. Cambon summarized, saying that in Mr. Dutasta’s explanation the Council was confronted with two distinct questions. Would they discuss first of all the question of the figures given by the Allies on the one hand and by the Germans on the other?

Sir Eyre Crowe felt that there could be no question about changing their figures which were based upon statements of facts. The estimate of 700,000 tons was only a maximum figure.

Mr. de Martino did not think the difficulty serious and thought that the Allies had merely to maintain the figures they had already decided upon.

Mr. Dutasta said that they would therefore stand by the terms of their note and await the German reply.

Mr. Cambon said that the second question was rather important: he thought that they ought first of all to send it to the Naval Experts for examination.

Admiral Le Vavasseur recalled that he had already suggested that this question would come up when he had said that the Germans had professed that probably they would be unable to sail their boats into Allied ports. If it were not German crews who manned the vessels that were to be handed over in our ports, the precautionary measures they had taken, such as disarmament, became purposeless.

It was decided:

I. To extend to thirty months the period granted to Germany for handing over the tonnage in excess of the 192,000 tons whose immediate delivery the German Government proposed.

II. To refer to the Naval Experts for examination the measures to be taken in order to obviate the possibility of the ships that were to be surrendered to the Allies by Germany being scuttled by the German crews.

Mr. Wallace would refer the first paragraph of this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.

General Le Rond told the Council that the negotiations with the German Delegation presided over by Mr. von Simson concerning the application of the clauses of the Treaty to Plebiscite Areas had opened on the preceding day. The German Delegation had from the outset shown itself disinclined to accept any of the articles and inclined, rather, on several points to refer to the Government at Berlin on the grounds that it had not itself full powers to decide. 2. Negotiations Relative to the Transfer of Powers in Plebiscite Areas

The German Delegation advanced certain inadmissible claims such as maintaining the power of German Courts of Appeal or Supreme Courts outside of the Plebiscite areas, over the inhabitants of those territories in spite of the fact that the latter had been placed under Interallied Government. It had explicitly stated that it considered the inhabitants of those territories as remaining under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court at Leipzig before which they might be tried for high treason against the German Government.

The President von Simson had alluded in a threatening way to the possibility of German officials leaving the Plebiscite areas en masse. In a general way the Delegation had seemed inclined from the beginning to dispute the ground step by step and to take no personal responsibility for the decisions. Count Lerchenfeld had even declared that certain decisions could not be taken without reference to the Reichstag.

In the course of the Conference the attitude of the German Delegation became gradually more conciliatory when confronted by the firmness of the Allied position, and because it was made clear to it on several points that the rights conferred by the Treaty upon the Commissions were wider than those they meant to exercise in the beginning of their administration.

It remained certain, nevertheless, that the German Delegation would on certain important points, refuse to take decisions and would refer to Berlin, a fact which pointed to a slowing up of negotiations the more especially since telegraphic communication with Berlin was at the moment very unsatisfactory.

He felt obliged to tell the Council his very definite impression that the policy of the German Delegation was to have the Protocol² signed as soon as possible and consequently the Treaty come into force, in order that they might reject after its coming into force the conclusion of negotiations regarding the Plebiscite areas. In that way the Germans reckoned to have greater opportunity of rejecting the Allied Demands. The more Mr. von Lersner seemed anxious to bring matters to a close, the more Mr. von Simson seemed trying to drag the negotiations out. The negotiations would be resumed on the following day and one meeting would probably suffice to expound the Allied demands relative to the administration of Plebiscite areas. All the delays that might occur would be owing to the fact that the Germans would not have full power of decision.

He would remark however that on certain points the statements of the German Delegation had seemed to him worthy of attention. For example, Mr. von Simson had pointed out that Memel, which was to be definitely separated from Germany, was actually being administered by German officials, and that some understanding must be reached to give their administration security until a new one took over from them. That situation ought to be examined for it was obvious that they could not leave that territory indefinitely under the direction of one single Allied officer surrounded by a purely German administration, the more especially as those officials were perfectly free to withdraw if they liked.

Mr. Cambon felt that the idea at the back of the German mind could be clearly seen from General Le Rond’s account. He was convinced that, peace once established, the Germans would reject all the demands relative to those territories. They ought, he considered, to indicate clearly to the Germans that the negotiations then taking place must be completed before the signing of the Protocol. Monsieur Dutasta might be charged with making that declaration to Mr. von Lersner at their forthcoming interview. The methods adopted by the German Delegation to lengthen the negotiations made the Germans themselves responsible for any disadvantage accruing from the delay.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that they ought even to advise the Germans that it would be impossible for the Allies to adhere to the date of January 6th agreed upon for signing the Protocol if as a result of the obstructionist methods of the German Delegation the negotiations relative to the transfer of powers in the Plebiscite areas had not previously been concluded.

General Le Rond wished to add that the draft financial arrangements discussed on the previous day had so far not been met with any objections on the part of the Germans. There were grounds therefore for thinking that the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder would not impose on the Allies any final expense.

As for Upper Silesia, the question had already been settled with the Polish Government which was going to advance the necessary sums.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the question of the occupation of Allenstein had been raised.

General Le Rond said that it had not.

General Weygand stated that in agreement with the decision taken by the Council at its previous meeting³ he was communicating to the Germans on that day the Allied decision, to occupy Allenstein.

M. Cambon thought that they would all be agreed upon making the communication to the Germans that Sir Eyre Crowe had suggested.

M. de Martino agreed and said that they ought to demand from the Germans the undertaking that as the negotiations relative to Plebiscite areas had to be completed before the Treaty came into force, the measures of execution only be decided afterwards and step by step.

It was decided:

To entrust M. Dutasta with making it known verbally to M. von Lersner that the signing of the Protocol and the coming into force of the Treaty could not take place until after a satisfactory arrangement of the question relative to Plebiscite Areas, questions which were the subject of [at] that moment of negotiations between the Commission presided over by General Le Rond and the German Delegation presided over by M. von Simson.

General Le Rond suggested that considering the indefensible claims put forward by the Germans it seemed absolutely necessary to fix the conditions under which protection of nationals of the Plebiscite areas would be assured. 3. Protection of Nationals of Plebiscite Areas

General Le Rond then read the note which appears as Appendix “A”.

After a short discussion, it was decided:

1. that the nationals of the different Plebiscite areas be [as?] defined in the Treaty of Versailles, being entitled to vote in the Plebiscite, shall be placed for this purpose while outside of the said territory, under the protection of the Diplomatic and Consular agents of the allied power holding the presidency of the Commission in said territory and in all other respects shall receive that protection.

2. That foreign consular agents actually carrying out their duties shall be recognized by the Inter-Allied Commission; that foreign consular agents who shall be appointed during the period of the Commission’s administration shall be required to receive that recognition in advance; that the consular agents of the Principal Powers shall be considered to have full right to this recognition; that the present decision shall be made known to the interested powers.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Delegation had had a note circulated (Appendix “B”) explaining the point of view of His Majesty’s Government, namely, that the Allied forces occupying Plebiscite areas and Danzig and Memel ought to be considered troops of occupation within the meaning of Article 249 of the Treaty of Peace. The British Government considered that each of the states taking part in the occupation of Plebiscite areas ought, as was the case in the occupation of the Rhine, to make the necessary advances for the maintenance of its own troops. As for recovering the cost, that ought to be asked from the beneficiary states in proportions corresponding to the attribution of territories by the Plebiscite. 4. Conditions of the Advance of Funds To Meet the Expenses of Allied Troops in the Plebiscite Areas

General Cavallero considered that the explanation made by Sir Eyre Crowe did not coincide entirely in its latter part with the text of the British note to which he referred. That note said in effect that repayment of the expenses was to be a priority charge against Germany. If he had understood Sir Eyre Crowe it was his opinion that the beneficiary states were to make this repayment in proportion corresponding to the territories attributed to them. The French accepted Sir Eyre Crowe’s point of view; they could not, on the other hand, take the point of view set forth in the British note. As already explained in a note of the Italian Delegation dated 25th December,⁴ Article 249 applied in fact only to German territories and that was not the case with Danzig and Memel, which were no longer part of Germany. Now Article 87 of the Treaty relative to Upper Silesia said that the expenses of occupation were to be borne from local revenues. Since they might anticipate that part at least of the territories under consideration would return to Poland it would be going against the spirit of the Treaty to lay the whole of the cost upon Germany alone.

Sir Eyre Crowe accepted the point of view maintained by General Cavallero.

General Le Rond considered it well to be quite clear on the point that this was only a question of advances for the costs had to be reimbursed ultimately by the beneficiary states. They accepted the British proposal that each power advance the costs of maintenance of its own troops.

General Cavallero said that there remained one point to make clear. They had told the Germans that they still wished to occupy Allenstein. But that occupation was not provided for in the Treaty. Reimbursement of costs was provided for in the Treaty only in the case of Upper Silesia.

General Le Rond considered that it was easy to anticipate in the case of Allenstein and Marienwerder repayment of the costs by the states to which those territories would be attributed. The question on the other hand remained open in the case of Danzig since in that case there was no attribution of territories.

Sir Eyre Crowe explained that they had had in view in the case of Danzig only the establishment of a base; later if the Allied High Commissioner required it the troops entrusted with guarding that base could be employed for the maintenance of order in Danzig and the surrounding district.

M. de Martino said that he would let his Government know the decision that had been taken but he would have to reserve his decision since in financial matters he could not act without instructions.

Under reserve of the Italian Government’s approval it was decided:

1. —that each state taking part in the occupation of territories submitted to Plebiscite shall make the advances of funds necessary for the maintenance of its own troops.

2. —that the reimbursement of those advances shall be made for all the Plebiscite areas by the beneficiary states in proportions corresponding to the territories attributed to them.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government).

Mr. Fromageot said that the Supreme Council having been good enough to approve at the meeting before last the conclusions of the note presented to it by the Drafting Committee⁵ on the subject of the Swiss Note of the 18th December 1919,⁶ concerning the accession of the Swiss Confederation to the League of Nations, they had prepared a draft letter to the Federal Government in the sense of that note which they had been presented (Appendix “D”). 5. Draft Reply to the Swiss Note of 18th December’19 Concerning Switzerland’s Accession to the League of Nations

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he approved the note submitted to the Council. But they had decided that the reply to the Swiss Government ought to be made in the name of the Supreme Council and not only in the name of the French Government.

M. Fromageot explained that the Drafting Committee had prepared the reply in that way because it had not known whether the other Powers had been sent similar communications by the Swiss Government. But it would be easy to effect in the text the changes necessary to make it in accordance with the decisions recalled by Sir Eyre Crowe.

It was decided:

1. To adopt in principle the note prepared by the Drafting Committee, (Appendix “D”).

2. That the changes necessary be introduced in the text so that the reply be made not in the name of the French Government but in that of the Supreme Council to which the question had been referred by the French Government.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government).

The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference, dated 1st December (Appendix “E”) and a note of the Paris Inter-Allied Commission of Russian prisoners of War in Germany dated 6th December (Appendix “F”). 6. Winding Up of the Inter-Allied Commission of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany

General Weygand commented upon Marshal Foch’s note. He added that the agreement arrived at within the Commission on Prisoners of War had been unanimous, but for a reservation made by the Italian Delegate on the basis of the distribution of the costs of maintenance of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany.

M. Tannery explained that for the winding up of the Berlin Commission it had been agreed that the expenses would be divided into four between the four Great Powers there represented. But the share of the U. S. A. and of France already considerably exceeded a quarter. The remainder was therefore to be defrayed by Great Britain and Italy. The Italian Delegate had always made a reservation for the approval of his Government.

M. de Martino said that he must maintain the Italian Delegate’s reservation until his Government had given its decision.

General Weygand wished to point out that the question of the maintenance of refugees from Kiev had been reserved until further information could be obtained.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that in accordance with instructions from his Government he wished to raise a question which, although not exactly the same as that under discussion, was related to it. If he understood the matter rightly there existed at the moment no commission for Russian prisoners of war in Germany other than the Berlin one, and it was the Council’s intention to bring that one to an end without replacing it in any way whatever.

Now his Government had just been in negotiation at Copenhagen with a representative of the Soviets over the question of the liberation of English prisoners in Russia. There were in Russia many British prisoners whose repatriation was extremely desirable. The other Powers doubtless were in the same situation. The Soviet representative in the Copenhagen negotiations had put forward one condition as a sine qua non for the continuation of those negotiations. He demanded that the Soviets be represented in the Berlin Commission charged with controlling the repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany. General Malcolm, consulted on the subject by the British Government, had answered that he could see no difficulty in the way of granting the demand formulated by the representative of the Bolshevik Government, the more especially as the Commission did not exist any longer. Apparently therefore the creation of a new commission was being considered and that was what he could not understand since if he had rightly interpreted the previous discussion the Council had wished to wind up the existing commission and not to replace it by any other at all. He would ask therefore, did there exist such a commission, different from the Berlin one, or, was it proposed to create a new one.

General Weygand explained that the difficulty was due to a subtlety of interpretation. The Inter-Allied Commission of Russian prisoners in Germany had recently been transformed into an international commission by the addition of a German delegate. That transformation had taken place at the moment when it had been decided to assume no further financial responsibility for the fate of Russian prisoners in Germany and to leave to the Commission only measures of control. But the German Government had considered that, the Allies rendering no more financial aid, the existence of that Commission interested them no longer and abstained from nominating a delegate and in those circumstances the Commission had not sat. It was in that sense that one might say with General Malcolm that the new Commission never having sat, did not in fact exist.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether at the moment when they had decided upon the suppression of the Inter-Allied Commission they had really intended to substitute for it an international commission or to recognize the existence of one. If he rightly remembered the last state of the question they had decided upon the suppression pure and simple of the commission which therefore was to dissolve as soon as certain questions still pending had been settled.⁷

Colonel Beadon said that it had been decided that they would stop sending money and that the Commission on which the Germans would be represented would have powers of control only, but because of the attitude of the Germans the plan could not be realized.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that anyhow his Government proposed that the Soviets should be represented on the Berlin International Commission. If this were the only means of releasing our prisoners, it would appear that this proposal should be seriously considered. One of Koltschak’s [Kolchak’s] representatives was, it transpired, already on the commission, and yet the Bolsheviks stated that their interests were not represented, and they had asked to be put on the Commission. His Government saw no reason why this demand of the Soviets should not be agreed to, provided it would facilitate the repatriation of allied prisoners.

Mr. Cambon stated that the proposal of the British Government was such as to render consultation with the other Governments necessary.

Sir Eyre Crowe insisted that the question was an urgent one.

If the negotiations with Copenhagen dragged on, they ran a great risk of achieving no results. Besides, it was now winter, and the sufferings of our prisoners in Russia were increasing from day to day.

General Weygand thought that the first question to be settled was establishing the Commission, which had been unable to get to work on account of the negative attitude of the Germans. It seemed difficult to reopen the discussion with them on the eve of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Germans had stated that if the Berlin Commission no longer controlled financial means, it was useless and that they preferred to deal with the question themselves. It must also be admitted that in this the Germans had right on their side.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that it was the Italian reservation on the distribution of expenses which had delayed our reply to the Germans.

General Weygand said that if it were decided that the Berlin International Commission had no longer any reason to exist, we should have found a graceful way out of the situation created by the Bolshevik request. It was obviously impossible to form part of a Commission which had ceased to exist:

Mr. Cambon asked each member of the Council to approach his Government with regard to the question raised by Sir Eyre Crowe.

The remainder of the discussion was put off until a later date.

The Council had before it:

1. —Two Notes from General Niessel to the President of the Council, dated the 11th and 13th December 1919 (Annexes “G” and “H”). 7. Violent Treatment of the Officers on the Niessel Mission

2. —A draft telegram from Marshal Foch to General Nudant giving instructions from the Supreme Council to the German Government. (Annex “I”).

General Weygand commented on the proposed telegram from Marshal Foch (Annex “I”). He added that instead of sending a telegram to the German Government, which, on the eve of the coming into force of the Treaty might run the risk of starting general discussion, he proposed, if Marshal Foch were in agreement, that this question should be dealt with in a verbal note which could be delivered to the German Delegation by the Secretary-General of the Conference.

After a short discussion it was decided to entrust to Mr. Dutasta the drawing up of a verbal note to be delivered to Mr. von Lersner, which would draw the attention of the German Government to the violent treatment of the officers belonging to General Niessel’s Mission.

General Weygand commented on a note dated the 30th December addressed by Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference regarding the military measures adopted by the Germans in Upper Silesia (Annex “J”). 8. German Military Measures in Upper Silesia

After a short discussion it was decided to ask Mr. Dutasta to submit to Mr. von Lersner a verbal note on the lines of the note attached to the report by Marshal Foch dated December 30th (See Annex “J”).

(That Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

M. de St. Quentin commented on a note from the French delegation on this subject (Annex “K”).

It was decided to ask the Allied Generals in Budapest to send with the least possible delay to the Comitadjas ceded to Austria by Hungary the Mission, the constitution of which had been agreed to by resolution of the Supreme Council on the 2nd October.⁸ 9. Position of the Comitadjas in Western Hungary

Mr. Serruys commented on a note from the Economic Commission on this question dated December 26th (Annex “L”). 10. Report of the Economic Commission on the Amendments to the Economic Clauses of the Treaty With Hungary Proposed by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation

After a short discussion it was agreed:

1. —To refer to the European Coal Commission the request of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation that in the case of the inserting of an article in the Hungarian Treaty of Peace similar to Article 224 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Czecho-Slovak Republic should not be cited as one of the States who would undertake to supply Hungary with coal.

2. —To adopt the recommendations of the Economic Commission rejecting the request put forward by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation for the deletion in the Peace Treaty with Hungary of Article 287 of the Treaty of St. Germain and to the corresponding modification on the Treaty with Hungary of Article 249 of the Treaty with Austria.

Mr. de Martino said that recently the question of putting the case of the Aaland Islands on the agenda had come forward. A Plebiscite had been held there as a result of which 90 per cent of the inhabitants had declared themselves in favor of Sweden. This question, therefore, would not appear to present any great difficulties and it could be agreed before the breaking up of the Conference. 11. The Question of the Aaland Islands

Sir Eyre Crowe was against raising this question in extremis. It appeared to be more the concern of the League of Nations.

M. de St. Quentin stated that it had indeed been proposed to leave this question to the League of Nations. At that time it was believed that the Supreme Council would not have been so long lived as it actually had been, and since then the proposal to bring this question up at the Council had been again considered.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that this might mean dragging on their work indefinitely. A commission would have to be formed which, of course, would not be able to reach an agreement and for which therefore, the Council would have to arbitrate. That could not be done immediately.

M. de Martino said that to him the question seemed quite clear and that the forming of a Commission was not a necessity.

Sir Eyre Crowe reminded the Council that the fate of the Aaland Islands was of interest to Finland and was related to the Russian question. It was rather a delicate matter.

M. Cambon was of the opinion that this matter should not at the moment be entered on the agenda. It would be time enough to add it when the necessity arose.

M. de Martino stated that he would not press the matter.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to HD–120

December 30, 1919.

Meeting of the Plebiscite Commissions

Protection of the Nationals of the Plebiscite Territories

1.—The transfer of the plebiscite territories to the government or the Administration of the Interallied Commissions, raises the two following questions of an international judicial nature:

a) Question of the protection of the nationals of those territories, outside those territories.

b) Question of the exequatur of the consuls in the said territories.

2.—Concerning the first question, if no special measure were taken, the nationals of the plebiscite territories, who, on the said territories, are no longer under the German law, but under that of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, would, as soon as they leave the territory, fall again under the German authority, which must not be. It is incumbent upon the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to maintain their protection in Germany, as well as in the territory of the other Powers, and in particular, it is necessary that they may eventually reclaim in Germany, before a Representative of an Allied Power, their right to proceed freely to the above-mentioned territories, in order to take part in the plebiscite, and to take their families and property with them.

Although this protection is incumbent upon all the Allied Powers, in fact, it seems impossible that they exercise it in common. The solution suggested to the Supreme Council, according to which, this protection should be entrusted for each territory, to the Power which has the authority over this territory, provides also for the apportionment of the rights and charges, pertaining to this protection.

3.—Concerning those two questions, the following resolution is submitted to the Supreme Council, for approval:

a) The nationals of the various plebiscite territories, indicated in the Treaty of Versailles, for each territory, as having a right to participate in the plebiscite, shall be, outside these territories, placed under the protection of the diplomatic agents of the Allied Power, to which the President of the Commission, of the said territory, belongs. (Pencil note: and in all other respects might receive? [shall receive that protection?]).

b) The delivery of the exequatur to the diplomatic or consular agents of the Powers, other than the Allied Powers, shall be incumbent in each territory, upon the Interallied Commission of this Territory.

Appendix B to HD–120

Memorandum by the British Delegation To Be Submitted to the Supreme Council

Conditions of the Advance of Funds To Meet the Expenses of the Allied Troops in the Occupied Areas

On November 19th the Supreme Council considered certain questions in connection with the financing of the Plebiscite Commissions to be set up under the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and instructed a special committee to draft proposals to be submitted to the Supreme Council for approval.⁹ The report of this Committee was considered by the Supreme Council on November 24th and approved with the exception of a single point, which was reserved for the decision of the Allied Governments.¹⁰ This point concerned the advance of the necessary funds for the armies of occupation in the areas in question as well as in the districts of Danzig and Memel, regarding which two alternative suggestions had been put forward:

(a) That each of the States participating in the occupation should make the necessary advance for the maintenance of its own troops;

(b) That the cost of occupation of these areas should be pooled and divided between the States participating in the occupation.

The British Delegation have now received instructions to state that His Majesty’s Government consider that the Allied forces occupying the plebiscite areas of Upper Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder and Slesvig, as well as the districts of Danzig and [Memel] should be regarded as armies of occupation within the meaning of Article 249 of the Treaty of Peace and that their cost should be recoverable as the first charge on Germany. His Majesty’s Government further considered that each State should advance the necessary funds for the maintenance of its own troops in these areas and that this procedure is preferable to the establishment of a common pool for the purpose.

The cost of the troops occupying Teschen is, under the terms of the decision of September 27th,¹¹ to be recovered from the two interested Governments on the conclusion of the plebiscite, but in other respects the same principles will apply.

December 24, 1919.

Appendix C to HD–120

Paris, December 25, 1919.

Note From the Italian Delegation Relative to the Occupation Expenses of Plebiscite Zones

italian delegation to
the peace conference

Hotel Edouard VII

No. 4211

From: G. De Martino.

To: Clemenceau.

I have the honor to call the attention of your Excellency to the fact that the Peace Treaty with Germany does not clearly and precisely indicate by whom the occupation expenses of the plebiscite zones, and in particular the expenses which might eventually exceed the local revenues, are to be assumed.

Furthermore, the Treaty contains no provision concerning the question of advances.

Therefore, I have the honor to transmit the memorandum hereto annexed on the question to your Excellency, and request that you kindly submit same to the proper organization for examination.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

[Annex]

Advance and Reimbursement of the Expenses of the Troops of Occupation in the Plebiscite Zones

The Peace Treaty with Germany does not clearly and fully stipulate who shall assume the expenses of occupation in the plebiscite zones, or by whom the advances necessary shall be effected.

Relative to the reimbursement of these expenses it is shown that:

(a) The provisions of the Treaty concerning Upper Silesia are definite.

(b) The Teschen question was regulated by a special convention.

(c) As to the occupation of Marienwerder the Treaty provides only for the reimbursement of the expenses of the Interallied Commission.

(d) No military occupation in Allenstein is provided for.

Moreover, the Treaty makes no reference to a common question affecting all the plebiscite zones, that is: the question of advances.

During the last month a Special Technical Commission was instructed by the Supreme Council to study the question.¹² A concrete statement was formulated by that Commission concerning the expenses relative to the normal administration of the plebiscite territories, and the operations of the Commissions, but no conclusion was presented regarding the necessary expenses for the upkeep of the troops. These expenses represent ⅞ of the total expenses. The proposals submitted by the Technical Commission were approved by the Supreme Council during the Session of November 24,¹³ but the question relative to occupation expenses was not resolved.

The Italian Delegation proposed, on November 24, that this question be examined by the Supreme Council jointly with that of the civil administration expenses, and deems it expedient to insist upon this proposal in order that the nature and the extent of the financial obligations which will devolve upon each Government may be determined before the departure of the Interallied troops.

Consequently, it appears necessary:

1 —To definitely establish that the occupation expenses will be reimbursed even in cases where provision to that effect has not been made in the Treaty (Marienwerder and Allenstein zones).

2 —To establish that, in cases where, in a plebiscite zone, the local revenues would be insufficient, the excess expenses should be proportionately divided among the States to whom will be attributed the territories.

3 —To determine by whom the necessary advances are to be effected.

Appendix D to HD–120

Paris, December 29, 1919.

Draft of Reply to the Swiss Note of December 18, 1919, Relative to Adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations¹⁴

In a memorandum dated December 18, 1919, the Swiss Legation, in referring to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the date of which is set by the Legation as of April 28, 1919, informed the Government of the French Republic that the Swiss Federal Assembly, on November 21, 1919, decided in favor of the entry of Switzerland in the League of Nations, text of this decision being annexed to the memorandum.

The Swiss Government adds that a formal declaration of adherence will be forwarded in proper time, under reservation of the result of the popular vote, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. This popular vote is provided for by the Helvetic Constitution and it ought not, according to the Swiss Government, necessarily to take place within the period of two months referred to in Article 1 of the Covenant, for the reason that the realization of the League of Nations depends upon the adherence of all the States to whom a permanent representation in the Council of the League is accorded by the Covenant.

In short, in the opinion of the Swiss Government, a notification of the decision of the Federal Assembly presented within a period of two months after the entry into force of the Treaty should assure to Switzerland all the rights of a State invited to adhere as an original member, and at the same time it would not anticipate the final decision expressed by the Swiss people in the referendum required by the Helvetic Constitution.

In thanking the Swiss Legation for its memorandum, which as moreover, recognized by the Swiss Government, could not in any sense be considered as a declaration of adherence, the Government of the French Republic has the honor to present the following remarks:

1.—According to Article 1 of the Covenant, the declaration of adherence must be made without reservations, and within two months after the entry into force of the Covenant. A declaration of adherence which would be subject to the result of the referendum could not be considered as an adherence without reservations. Furthermore, the measures which are required by the Swiss Constitution in like matter concerned Switzerland only. As far as the other interested Powers are concerned a declaration of adherence made only in conformity with the terms of the Treaty can be taken into consideration.

2.—The Swiss Note refers to the date upon which the Government [Covenant] was adopted as April 28, 1919.

It is important to recall that the only official text is that which was signed by the Powers, and concerning which the date of April 28, 1919, does not apply.

3.—The basis of the Swiss Note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations depends upon ratification by the five Principal Powers, is not in conformity with the final clauses of the Treaty, as by these clauses, the Treaty, in all its parts, that is, inclusive of Part I Covenant of the League of Nations is applicable arga omnes in everything concerning the computation of delays, and will enter into force for all the Powers which will have ratified up to that time, upon the deposit of the ratifications of three of the Principal Powers and Germany.

4.—Finally, the measure of the Federal Council, copy of which was attached to the memorandum of the Swiss Government, contains several considerations in its preamble relative to the relation between the adherence of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Article 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

The Government of the Republic will hold this question for subsequent examination.

Appendix E to HD–120

commander-in-chief
of the allied armies
General Staff
3rd Section
No. 5540

General Headquarters, December 1, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,

To: The President of the Peace Conference, Secretariat General.

I have the honor to communicate to you herewith two drafts of resolutions concerning:

The first, the liquidation of the points pending since the dissolution of the Interallied Commission of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany.

The second, the reply to be made to the German note of November 6th last.

If these drafts were approved it is suggested that they be the object

The first, of a telegram to General Malcolm.

The second, of a notification to the German Government, through the intermediary of the I. P. A. C. [P. I. A. C]¹⁵ and of a communication to General Malcolm.

I deem it my duty to call your attention to the fact that it will be advantageous to communicate the first of these drafts to the Financial Experts of the interested powers before it is discussed by the Peace Conference.

By order: The Major General

Weygand

[Enclosure 1]

December 1, 1919.

Draft of Resolution

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after having taken note of the report of the special commission in Paris, entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, made, in its meeting of December . . . . . 1919, the following resolution, with respect to the questions pending since the dissolution of the Interallied Commission in Berlin:

1st.—Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission.

The 400,000 marks due to the British Red Cross will be reimbursed to the latter by the British Government.

2nd.—Reimbursement of the flour advanced by the German Government.

The flour advanced by the German Government will be reimbursed, not in kind, but in currency, that is to say, 7,680,000 marks.

The payment of this reimbursement will be effected by applying an equal sum to the credit of Germany in the reparations account; 100,000 marks being charged to the English account, and 7,580,000 marks to the Italian account.^*

The above provision is calculated to increase the shares of Great Britain and Italy to 7,580,000 marks. [Footnote in the original.]

3rd.—The employment of the 200,000,000 Russian rubles detained by the German Government, is postponed until a settlement is made of the financial questions connected with the employment of this sum.

4th.—As to the question of reimbursement to the German Government of the 2,000,000 marks representing the upkeep expenses of the Kiev refugees, its solution is postponed until the results of an investigation as to the conditions under which the representatives of the Entente made agreements in this matter, are known.

[Enclosure 2]

Draft of Resolution

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after having taken cognizance of the note of the German Government of November 6th, 1919 (5010 II/19 Wako), and of the proposals of the special commission on the Russian P. W., decided to address the following answer to the German Government.

“The Allied and Associated Powers confirm their resolution to incur no more expenses for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, except those necessary for the upkeep of their representatives to the International Commission on Russian P. W. in Berlin.

On the other hand, as this Commission—whose role is only to supervise the material situation of the Russian P. W., and to eventually lend its assistance to the German Government for the repatriation of these prisoners—is not provided for by the Peace Treaty with Germany it will cease operating as soon as the Treaty goes into force.[”]

Appendix F to HD–120

Paris, December 6, 1919.

[Note From M. Tannery of the Interallied Commission at Paris on Russian War Prisoners in Germany]

To: The Secretary General.

I have the honor to enclose herewith a note to the Supreme Council, which the Interallied Commission of Paris on Russian War Prisoners in Germany, during its Session of November 22 last, instructed me to prepare presenting the solution adopted by the Commission relative to the financial questions submitted for examination.

The draft of this note was approved by all the Allied Delegates, with the exception of the Italian Delegate, from whom despite repeated requests, I have been unable to obtain any response. In order to no longer delay the accomplishment of this nature, I enclose a text fully approved by the Delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan.

Please accept, etc.

J. Tannery

[Enclosure]

Note to the Supreme Council

The Special Paris Commission entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian War prisoners detained in Germany, has examined the following points, which were submitted to the Commission by the Supreme Council.

1) —Reimbursement for the flour advanced by the German Government prior to August 23, 1919.

2) —Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission; i. e., 400,000 marks.

3) —Reimbursement of the German Government for expenses incurred relative to the Kiew refugees.

4) —Employment of the Russian money now in the hands of the German Government (20 million rubles).

According to reports issued by the Berlin International Commission, the following obligation will devolve upon the Allied and Associated Governments:

Due the German Government:
For provisioning the Kiew refugees	2,000,000	[marks]
Values c. i. f. German Ports of 2,400 tons of wheat flour, or 3,700 tons of rye flour, furnished to the Russian War prisoners, the reimbursement of which is demanded in kind	7,680,000	“
Due the British Red Cross
Advances made by the British Red Cross, to be reimbursed in francs or in pounds Sterling	400,000	“
	10,080,000	“

After an examination of the data submitted by the Berlin International Commission, the Paris Commission expressed the opinion that the above statement is correct and legitimate and that the settlement of these expenses can be admitted. However, the British Delegation remarked that the advances made by the British Red Cross should be controlled in their details and the use made of the money.

Furthermore, the Italian Delegate, declines to present the opinion of his Government relative to the provisioning of the Kiew refugees, to an amount of 2,000,000 marks, until after inquiry into the conditions under which the engagement was contracted.

The British Delegate requests that the reimbursement of these two millions be delayed until proof is presented showing that the refugees were sheltered in Germany at the request of the Allies.

In distributing the liabilities in question between the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, the Commission used the following decision of the Supreme Council,¹⁶ relative to provisions, taken February 1, 1919, as a base:

Russian, Serbian and Russian [Rumanian] War Prisoners in Germany

“The Council approves the decision taken by the Permanent Committee in its Session of January 28.

“The French Government is directed, in the name of the four Associated Governments, with the provisioning of the Russian, Serbian, and Rumanian War prisoners in Germany.

“The distribution and control of the provisioning in Germany will be conducted by the Interallied Military Committee of Berlin, under the direction of General Dupont, in liaison with the Red Cross organizations of the different nations.

“The sums necessary will be advanced by France temporarily, the distribution of the expenses between the four Associated Governments to be settled later.”

This basis of distribution being admitted, subject to the approval of the Italian Government, each Delegate submitted the following elements of account, which total the supplies actually furnished by their respective Governments.

	Amount	Approximate value in marks*
France	11,000,000 francs (100 marks=38.25 frs)	28,770,000
Great Britain	80,000 pounds (1£=88.50 Mks)	7,080,000
U. S.	2,500,800 dollars ($1.00=20 marks) (This sum includes $1,727,800 which corresponds with the supplies furnished by the American Red Cross by virtue of a Special Agreement with the Government of the United States)	50,016,000
Italy	Memorandum
	Total	85,806,000

In order to determine the share of each of the four Powers and the total cost of the upkeep of the Russian War Prisoners, and of the Kiew refugees, it was decided that the present unpaid debt would be added to the cost of the supplies previously furnished and that the general total would be divided by four, the quotient representing the share of each Power.

Present debt	10,080,000	marks
Amount of previous expenses	85,806,000	“
Total	95,886,000	“
Share of each of the four Powers	23,971,500	“

From the above data, it appears that France and the United States have given more than their share to the common operations of the Allies. On the other hand, Italy and Great Britain did not assume their share of the liabilities. Consequently, it is incumbent on them to assume the present debt, in accordance with the following quota:

Great Britain	15,000,000
Italy	8,580,000

The peculiar position of the American Delegate was presented to the Supreme Council. He had received instructions, in fact, to officially indicate that the American Government is obliged to terminate all financial help tending to prolong the provisioning of the Russian War prisoners, or the Kiew refugees now in Germany. Consequently, the American Delegate has informed the Commission that it must be thoroughly understood that no representative or Agent of the American Government was authorized to engage his Government financially in the enterprise in question, and that he declares the amounts as presented in the present note, as far as unpaid debts are concerned, as representing the integral balance of the settlements to be made at this time.

The British, French and Italian and Japanese Delegates declared that, without being authorized to speak officially for their Governments, they were nevertheless convinced that their Treasuries would assume the same attitude as the American Treasury.

Consequently, the Commission requests that the International Commission at Berlin be informed that, in conformity with the principle already adopted by the Supreme Council,¹⁷ it is not authorized to financially engage the five Powers collectively in any enterprise whatsoever.

If the preceding proposals are approved by the Supreme Council, the questions submitted to the Special Paris Commission would be decided as follows:

The 400,000 marks due the British Red Cross (Question No. 2) would be reimbursed, by the English Government.

The flour advanced by the German Government (question No. 1) would be reimbursed, not in kind, but in money, for 7,680,000 marks. The price of the flour would be included with the 2,000,000 marks due for the upkeep of the Kiew refugees (question No. 3) and the amount of the total, 9,680,000 marks, would be credited to Germany in the Reparations account. The English account would be charged with 1,100,000 marks, and the Italian account with 8,580,000 marks. The disposition of the 20,000,000 Russian roubles now in the hands of the German Government (question No. 4) would be held for a solution in connection with more important questions pertaining thereto.

Appendix G to HD–120

interallied commission
in the baltic states
292 S/P

Tilsitt, December 11, 1919.

From: General Niessel, President of the Interallied Commission in the Baltic States

To: M. Clemenceau, Paris.

During the numerous, difficult, and delicate missions fulfilled by the Allied officers with courage and coolness, a great many incidents took place.

Such officers were frequently insulted and attacked, sometimes even ill-treated and struck at, and usually under the indifferent and sarcastic eyes of the very German officers, who had been instructed officially, to facilitate their task and to look after their security.

Whenever such an attack occurred penalties were claimed verbally and in writing, from Admiral Hopman, Chief of the German Delegation. The German Government has again been officially informed of these facts by a note, which set them forth in detail, remitted to Minister Noske himself, by Colonel Dosse, on Dec. 6, at Berlin.

Today again, another cowardly attack has just been committed, this time by a group of German officers, on an isolated French soldier (see report annexed).

No satisfaction having yet been granted, in regard to the numerous and earnest claims for penalties made by the Commission, I have the honor to ask the Supreme Council to kindly strengthen, through direct action in Berlin, the claims to reparations to which our officers and soldiers are entitled.

I am transmitting this report to the President of the German Delegation immediately.

The culprits are easy to find. Their brutal cowardice demands immediate punishment.

I request that excuses be made to my soldier. I take his case to heart, more than that of the officers, because he was alone, defenseless; no pretext can be invoked for the brutality to which he has been submitted.

The President of the Interallied Commission

Niessel

[Annex 1]

interallied commission
tilsitt branch
No. 290 S/P

Tilsitt, December 12, 1919.

Report

On Dec. 11, at 4 o’clock p.m., I entered the Restaurant of the “Preussischerhof Hotel”, where I live, to give my key before beginning my duty. Some German officers who were in the Restaurant got up and pounced on me, forcing me to leave the restaurant and the hotel, kicking and striking me into the street.

Having been able to make them understand that I lived in the hotel, two officers came out to fetch me and took me inside, where an officer calling himself a Captain, apologized and asked me to shake hands with him, which I absolutely refused to do. I was again brutalized and thrown into the street, amidst blows and kicks, and under the threat of revolvers, which they held in their hands.

Three times I was knocked down.

The Captain spoke French very well, and I believe he lives in the hotel.

The hotel-keeper tried to protect me, but was also knocked about.

R. Monnier

Seen and transmitted by the Chief
of the Tilsitt Branch (Signed) Du
Chouchet.

Seen and transmitted:
It will not be difficult to find the
culprits this time; a severe penalty is
indispensable. The General Commanding
the Mission of Control. (Signed) Vincent.

[Annex 2]

Statement

of the Attacks Made by the German Troops in the Baltic Provinces on the Persons of Officers of the Interallied Commission of Control

Date and Place	Designation of the Allied Officers	Designation of the Military Germans responsible	Statement of the Incident
11/23 Prekuln Station	Captain Bot	Soldiers of the Plhewe Branch Captain Plhewe	Daily threats and insults against officers of Control.
11/25 Station of Poschervny	Captain Lewinson (French) of the Control of Poschervny	German military authorities of the station of Poschervny, on duty 11/25, Ltd. Bidefeld, officer of the Station Control.	At midnight a grenade is thrown into the window of the lodgings occupied by the Control Officers. No measure was taken by the German authorities to safeguard these officers.
11/25 Station of Kwrchany	Major Leveque	Captain Iordann, Chief of the Iordane Company	Window panes of the Control Officers’ car, broken by stones and apples. Captain Iordane refuses to intervene.
11/26 Station of Bayoren	Captain Chipponi	Captain Shock, Commanding a battalion of the Plehve Corps. Afeldwebel of his battalion.	At 6:30 p.m. a detachment of the Plheve Corps arrived at the station to embark. The men spread over the station, shouting and threatening. The officers take refuge in the Control office, where they are immediately surrounded and threatened with rifles and grenades. Shock excites his men and insults the German station officers, who try in vain to keep order. A Feldwebel threatens our officers with his revolver.
11/26 Station of Eydekrug	Captain Henry	Captain Plhewe Lieut. Mausch of the Plhewe Corps	The men of train 8240 coming from Memel storm the office of the Control Officers, singing and howling. The manifestations clearly organized by Lieut. Mausch lasts half an hour.
11/28 Memel	Major Loustalot Captain Chipponi Captain Vink Lieut. Guarensan	Captain Plhewe. A soldier of the battalion of Shock.	Manifestations against our officers in a room of the Hotel Victoria. The soldiers of Shock battalion say: “We are going for reinforcements and tonight we will get rid of all those foreigners.” The German Colonel Thauvenay having declared that he is powerless to assure the security of the Allied officers at Memel, as long as Shock’s battalion remains there, the Allied officers, under the Command of Major U. S. Loustlot, go on board the French ships, in the Memel harbor.
11/29 Station of Tilsitt	Lieut. Valadon Lieut. Mannaz	Lt. Arnold, Control officer of Tilsitt Station. CaptainPlatnen, Chief of the Squadron of Lt. Cavalry, No. 18 of the Diebitch Corps.	At 16:45, German troops threaten our troops from a train, with blows and grenades. Shots are fired. Captain Platnen urges on his men. The German officer accompanying Col. von Luck, intervening, encourages the soldiers with a smile.
12/1 Station of Schavli	Major Giraud	Lt. Schepper of the Voluntary Corps, Petersdorf	Major Giraud while proceeding to the Control Bureau, is attacked by 30 German soldiers, commanded by an officer; he is surrounded by| soldiers and menaced with fixed bayonets. Pushed about, and kicked, and thrown into the Kommandantur Bureau, amid howling and threats of death. He is received by a young officer who listens to his declarations sneering[ly] Capt. von Gordon, after trying in vain to calm the soldiers and Lt. Schepper, finally brings Major Giraud to his own residence.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Colonel Dosse Major Jocard Major Coriou Major Giraud Major Vanlande Major Keenen (A. B.) Capt. Jozan Lt. Messik (U. S.) Lt. Forster (A. B.) Lt. Martin-Prevel.	Gen. von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch	Nothing serious is done by Gen. von Eberhardt to assure the security of the Delegation. In the evening, the Delegation’s train is fired upon by machine guns.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Major Coriou Major Pouvreau Major Giraud Capt. Chirossel Lt. Janvier Lt. Gladien	Lt. Hertmann Control Assistant.	On detached service with the Allied Officers, deserted his post. Has never done anything to assure the protection of the Allied officers, constantly menaced.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Gen. Jukovski Col. Dosse Major Keenen (A. B.) Major Jocard Major Giraud Major Coriou Major Vanlande Capt. Chirossel Capt. Jozan Lt. Forster (A. B.) Lt. Martin-Prevel	Escadrille 34. Lt. Kredel	Gen. Jukovski and several Allied officers, having approached the train containing the material of the Escadrille 34, are immediately menaced by rifles and machine guns. The control of the material, thus being rendered impossible, Admiral Hopmann suggests that the train should be convoyed by an Allied officer. The Commanding Officer of the Escadrille warned him that this officer would certainly be killed. The train started in spite of the orders given by the Control Officers.
12/3 Station of Tilsitt	Lt. Lloyd-Wilson	Escadrille 34 Lt. Kredel	Lt. Lloyd-Wilson having approached the train, transporting the Escadrille, is coarsely insulted by Lt. Kredel, who orders him away. Lt. Lloyd-Wilson goes to fetch the German Control officer, and is followed by Lt. Kredel and his men, who insult him. Kredel seizes Lt. Lloyed-Wilson by the shoulders, tries to expel him and spits on him. He places the machine-guns in position. Lt. Lloyd-Wilson having ordered Kredel, in the absence of a German Control Officer, to abandon the machine guns because they are included in the regulation issued to the Escadrille is again insulted, and Kredel [?]
12/3 Station of Schilany	English Lt. Sandels, of Kovno Mission	German soldiers	Passing through the station of Schilany Lt. Sandels receives a grenade, within a range of 15 meters, thrown by German soldiers, who cannot be identified.
12/3 Station of Schavli	Colonel Dosse Major Keenen Major Jocard Major Giraud Major Jozan Lt. Forster (AB) Lt. Martin-Prevel Lt. Messik (US)	General von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch	Before the departure of the Delegation’s train for Tilsitt, some German soldiers arrived with grenades, and are seen prowling around the train. General von Eberhardt, having taken no police measures, the officers of the Delegation organized their own defense by means of arms which the German Delegation in accompanying them, had ordered to be transmitted to them. These measures of security prevented incidents from occurring, at the departure.
12/4 Station of Schavli	Major Coriou Major Leveque Capt. Chirossel Capt. Buisson Lt. Gigonguilheme Lt. Gladien Lt. Janvier	General von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch	General von Eberhardt had agreed in writing to protect the Control Officers of Schavli. The car occupied by these officers had been attached to the Eberhardt train. About one o’clock in the morning, this car is detached, taken six hundred meters away from the Eberhardt train, and attacked by several soldiers, with grenades. Most of the windows are broken, and it is only through luck that the grenades do not burst in the cars. Major Coriou having gone to protest and ask for protection, an officer on duty answers him that the General and his Chief of Staff (Major von Tritsch) are sleeping and that it is impossible to wake them up. On the insistence of the German Delegation the posts of Control of Schavli and Kurchany were withdrawn.
12/6 Station of Insterburg	French Captain Angelli 2nd Lt. Jacquemet of the Control Bureau of Insterburg.	Capt. Killac Lt. Schumann of the Kommandantur	About 9 o’clock p.m. a train of troops entered the station, the soldiers gather in front of the rooms of the Control Offices. They threaten the latter with their arms. As the German officers of the Kommandantur do not intervene to calm the soldiers, the Control Officers are obliged to leave the station Insterburg.

Appendix H to HD–120

interallied commission
to the baltic states
203 s/e

Tilsitt, December 13, 1919.

From: General Niessel.

To: President of the Supreme Council.

I have the honor to enclose herewith translated copy of a letter which was addressed to me by a Delegation of Lithuanians of the territory of Memel.

These documents indicate the terror felt by the unhappy Lithuanian population as a result of the troops of the Baltic districts being maintained at Memel contrary to promises made officially. The German military authorities have done everything possible to prevent any knowledge of the atrocities committed in Lithuania and Latvia becoming public. In the meantime the Lithuanians of Memel are becoming daily more aware of what they must expect from troops who are accustomed to live by looting and to spread terror in their path. For that matter, the soldiers themselves declare that they prefer not to return to Prussia as “the life there is much less agreeable”.

The justified alarm of the Lithuanian inhabitants is easily explained by the arrival of troops whose hatred has become still more intense over the fury they feel for having been obliged to evacuate Lithuanian territory.

The Lithuanians of Memel who drafted the letter referred to are Messrs. Jokub Stiklorus, Jonas Griga, Kristus Lemszas, and Giorgis Jagomastas, who were obliged to avoid giving their names through fear of reprisals. They informed me verbally that they are desirous of sending a Delegation to Paris if the Supreme Council would deign to receive them.

In the event it is decided that one alone should have a hearing, it would be advisable to designate Mr. Jokub Stiklorus for the mission.

Niessel

[Enclosure]

Tilsitt, December 13, 1919.

Excellency: In the name of the Delegation of the Lithuanian territory of Memel I take the liberty to express our warmest thanks for your intervention which resulted in the evacuation of the Baltic countries by the German troops, and the liberation of Greater Lithuania which is at last accomplished.

These Legions, as was recognized by Minister of War, Noske, are made up of very dangerous elements who, for years, have been practising extortions in Lithuania.

Instead of sending these troops back to their homes in Germany, they are allowed to occupy the territory on Memel. (Which they will inevitably put to sack as they did greater Lithuania).

For a long period already we have been awaiting in anguish for the time when the territory of Memel would be occupied by the Entente, thus putting an end to the German terror, but instead of this emancipation so long looked forward to we are now the victims of undisciplined hordes. We are subjected to the regime of a state of siege, and every movement in favor of our legitimate liberation is violently suppressed either by imprisonment or threats of death. (Doctor Guigelat).

In our distress we appeal to your Excellency, as Representative of the Entente, with the following supplication:

“Do the needful to cause an immediate evacuation of Smaller Lithuania by the Baltic troops, in order that we may not be abolished through terror and helplessness.”

May we be allowed to recall to Your Excellency that we are forced to remain Prussian Lithuanians against our wishes (we are nevertheless grateful that a small portion of our country to the north of Memel is at last officially liberated) because by far the greater part of the former territory of Lithuania, to the south of Memel, remains separated from us. In fact, not only the region to the north of Memel, but all the country included between Kurisches Haff, the Deime and the Pregel, with Darkehmen, Goldap, Komenten [Gumbinnen?], are a part of the former territory of Lithuania. The names of all the villages, cities, streams and lakes, as well as the mountains and hills, forests and districts are Lithuanian, and testify that they were a part of antique Lithuania, and consequently should in all justice be returned to Lithuania as Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France.

Not only is it to the interest of Lithuania, but also to the entire Entente and the peace of the whole world, that Eastern Prussia as “head” of the monstrous “Prussian Militarism”, be sliced and cut to pieces in such a way that the Ermeland and Mazuria may go to Poland, and all the territory of former Lithuania to Lithuania, and that the remaining territory around Konigsberg be placed under the administration of the Entente.

Appendix I to HD–120

December 30, 1919.

Note From the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies Relative to Action of Germans Toward Officers of Allied Mission of Control

commander-in-chief
of the allied armies

Headquarters

3rd Section.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: General Nudant, President, I. P. A. C. [P. I. A. C.], Cologne.

Please transmit to the German Government the following communication from the Supreme Council:

Frequently, officers and soldiers of the Interallied Commission, presided over by General Niessel, while exercising their mission of control, have been insulted and even attacked by German officers and soldiers.

These outrages have been viewed with indifference and have sometimes even been committed in complicity with certain German authorities, to whom the task of assuring the security of the Allied Personnel of Control had been confided.

Although they have already been the subject of verbal and written complaints addressed by General Niessel to Vice-Admiral Hopman, and although the German Government has been officially informed by a joint note, remitted December 6, to the Minister Noske, Berlin, by Colonel Dosse, Chief of Staff of General Niessel, they have, nevertheless, remained unpunished to this day.

The German Government which might claim itself powerless in regard to undisciplined troops in the Baltic outside its frontiers, cannot, at a time when these troops are in its own territory, argue its powerlessness to cover impardonable acts for which it is responsible.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers demand that it impose without delay the necessary penalties on the culprits, and inform the Interallied Commission of Control, of the execution of the measures prescribed on this subject.

Appendix J to HD–120

commander-in-chief
of the allied armies
General Staff
No. 5848

General Allied Headquarters,
December 30, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: M. Clemenceau.

Concording reports emanating from the French Military Mission in Berlin, and from various sources, point out, in Upper Silesia, a most disquieting situation created by the doings of the military party, with the toleration, if not under the secret protection of the German Government.

This situation, looked at from a military point of view, may be characterized as follows:

1. Concentrating in Upper Silesia of regular, important and efficient military forces.

The effective of these forces^* largely exceeds the needs of the military situation and of the interior police.

Their spirit, which is most ardent, is resolutely inclined towards resistance to the execution of the Treaty, by active propaganda in which Ludendorf himself seems to participate. Certain unities [units], such as the Marine Brigade, are particularly feared by the populations, on account of their sentiments of hatred and violence.

These forces, already too numerous, would be joined later by elements coming from the “Baltikum” and whose bad character and want of discipline are well known,^†

2. Abnormal development of the Police Forces.

Besides these regular troops, the Germans extend the organization of their “police forces” in a proportion which is in no way justified by the interior situation of the country.

In fact, these police formations, becoming more numerous under different denominations (Sicherheitswehr, Burgerwehr, Reichswehrpolizei, etc.,^‡ are recruited among the demobilized soldiers, and can constitute, at the first sign, real unities [units] of reinforcement of regular troops.

3. Influx of demobilized men from the “Baltikum.”

Lastly, numerous demobilized men from the “Baltikum”, particularly from the Iron Division—and not natives of Upper Silesia, are reported in the country, where they increase every day, the ranks of the agitators.

This situation calls for the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments:

The concentration of such important forces, the presence of such active elements of agitation, the exalted sentiments by which they are agitated, may be the cause, at any moment, of serious incidents.

In particular, it is to be feared that violence be exercised against the inhabitants during the evacuation pursuant to the going into force of the Treaty, that armed conflicts burst out with the Allied troops of occupation, and that the International Commission be thus, from the very beginning, placed before inextricable difficulties.

In consequence, I deem it advisable to take this situation into account, as it involves the responsibility of Germany, and to invite the German Government to reduce without delay the force of their regular troops in Upper Silesia, as far as is consistent with the maintenance of interior [internal] order.

If you share this point of view, the Ambassador, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, might be directed to make to Mr. von Lersner, Chief of the German Delegation, a communication on this subject, based on the annexed Note.

[Annex]

Note Concerning the Situation in Upper Silesia

The Allied and Associated Powers carefully observed the continual reinforcement of the regular forces of the so-called “police forces”, in Upper Silesia.

The importance of those forces is justified neither by the needs of the military situation nor by the maintenance of order.

Such a situation is inconsistent with the desire expressed by the German Government to loyally execute the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

On the other hand, the difficulties which occurred in Courland give reasons to fear that the German Government will be again powerless to control the events in Upper Silesia, after having permitted the elements of disorder to accumulate there.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Governments take note of the situation created in Upper Silesia, and wish to make clear to the German Government the responsibilities which are incumbent upon it, on that account.

They deem that the following measures should be taken without delay in order to remedy this situation:

1. —Reduce the strength of the regular troops and police forces, at present in Upper Silesia, within the strict limit consistent with the maintenance of order and the safeguard of public and private property.

2. —Eliminate from the regular troops and police forces all the elements having been part of the “Baltikum” forces in 1919.

3. —Include, within the troops to be evacuated from Upper Silesia before the going into force of the Treaty, the Marine Brigade, the attitude of which is contrary to the pacification of the country.

4. —Take all necessary measures to put a stop to the appeals to resistance addressed to the troops of occupation by certain parties.

5. —Oppose the influx, in Upper Silesia, of the demobilized men not native of this country.

The above various measures should be carried out as soon as possible, so that they may become fully effective as soon as the Peace Treaty is put into force.

Appendix K to HD–120

December 30, 1919.

Note From the French Delegation on the Situation in the Comitats of Western Hungary

At the request of the Austrian Delegation, and in order to protect the population in the Comitats of Western Hungary ceded to Austria by virtue of the Treaty of Saint-Germain from the violences of Magyar troops, the Supreme Council, on October 2,¹⁸ decided:

“that an Interallied Military Mission, formed of officers chosen from among the members of the Vienna and Budapest Military Missions, would be sent into the Comitats of Western Hungary to cooperate in the maintenance of order in the territories transferred to Austria, by virtue of the Treaty of Saint-Germain;

that this Mission would be placed under the orders of the Allied Generals at Budapest;

that the outline of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, such as it is fixed by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, would be officially communicated to the Allied Generals at Budapest.”

According to information received from the French Representative at Vienna, and despite the fact that the Allied Generals at Budapest were notified of the resolution of the Supreme Council, the Mission whose formation was decided upon has never been constituted, and the Magyar authorities have continued to exercise uncontrolled authority in the Comitats attributed to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

A continuation of this situation may entail serious drawbacks, as it favors the spreading of false news in the Hungarian Press tending to pretend that the Entente has not made a final decision in the matter. This situation also encourages the development of a propaganda in Hungary in favor of maintaining these Comitats under Magyar sovereignty, and it has been announced in Budapest that a “League of Western Hungary” to organize this propaganda has been formed. There are even reasons to indicate that the Hungarian Delegation may attempt to present a proposal to the Peace Conference asking for a revision of the Saint-Germain Treaty. If, on the contrary, the Interallied Military Mission were sent to the territories in question it would show that the Allied and Associated Powers do not intend to have the provisions of a Treaty, signed scarcely three months, brought up again for discussion.

Under these circumstances, it would be desirable to invite the Allied Generals at Budapest to immediately send the Military Mission, decided upon on October 2, to the Comitats attributed to Austria.

Appendix L to HD–120

Paris, December 26, 1919.

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Czecho-Slovakian Delegation has sent directly to the President of the Economic Commission, the two proposals, copies of which are hereto annexed.

On account of the technical difficulties raised by those two proposals, the Commission was of the opinion that, the first, concerning the exportation of Czecho-Slovakian coal to Austria, should be submitted to the Commission dealing with this supply.

The second suggests that, “in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, the same advantages should be recognized to Czecho-Slovakia as to the other Allied and Associated Powers, participating in the reparations, as far as concerns the proceeds of the liquidations of enemy properties in the new States”. For this purpose, the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation proposes the suppression, in the Treaty with Hungary, of Article 267 of the Treaty of St. Germain, and the corresponding modification of Article 249. The Economic Commission is of the opinion that the attention of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation should be called to the fact that, even if the modifications requested were granted, Czecho-Slovakia would not be, for this reason, entitled to utilize the proceeds of the liquidation, for the settlement of its reparations, as these proceeds can only be charged with indemnities pertaining to Czecho-Slovakian property and credits in Hungary.

The Secretary Gen’l of the Economic Commission to the Peace Conference:

D. Serruys

[Annex 1]

part x

Section I.

Commercial Relations.

Chapter I.—Regulation, Taxes, and Customs Restrictions

consideration

Article 224 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain pledges Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to maintain, during a certain period, a favorable duty regime for the exportation of coal to Austria, and even, until such times as a permanent settlement is reached, to take positive measures with a view to the provisioning of Austria with coal.

As it appears that the Treaty with Hungary is to be, in general, drawn up according to the same principles as were applied in the drafting of the Saint-Germain Treaty, it seems probable that the Supreme Council will insert an analogous article in the Peace Conditions with Hungary.

Now, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation wishes to call the following facts, pertaining to this question, to the attention of the Peace Conference:

The coal consumption throughout all Hungary, before the war, amounted to about 15 million tons per year. The Hungarian mines furnished 10,200,000 tons towards this consumption; 2,800 tons were imported from Germany, especially from Upper-Silesia, and about 1,500,000 was received from the Ostrau-Karvin Basin. A considerable proportion, at least 3,500,000 tons, of the total consumption, was destined for the needs of the former Hungarian territories, which now form part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. More than 50 per cent of the coal imported from Germany, and 75 per cent of the importations from the Ostrau-Karvin Basin remained in Slovakia. The lignite required by this region was received at the rate of about 480,000 tons from Salgo-Tarjan, and 300,000 tons from Handlova.

Under the present circumstances there only remains the Handlova mines in the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, as the Salgo-Tarjan mines are included in the Hungarian territory. Now, these latter mines furnished about 480,000 tons of lignite per year to Slovakia, while the Ostrau-Karvin Basin exported only about 200,000 tons of coal out of Czecho-Slovakia as it is now bounded. By considering the difference in the caloric value of these two kinds of coal it is shown that, judging by the pre-war figures, the territories of former Hungary located outside of Czecho-Slovakia were at a considerable advantage in comparison with the latter. This exposé shows clearly that Czecho-Slovakia should not be expected to furnish the coal provision for Hungary.

For these reasons the Czecho-Slovak Delegation takes the liberty of presenting the following

Proposal:

In the event that the insertion of an Article in the Peace Treaty with Hungary analogous with Article 224 in the Treaty of Saint-Germain, would be provided for, the Czecho-Slovak Republic should not be included in the States that are to adopt measures with a view to facilitating the provisioning of Hungary with coal.

[Annex 2]

part x

Economic Clauses

Section IV.—Possessions, rights and interests

consideration

By terms of Article 249, lit. i of the Saint-Germain Treaty, the proceeds of the liquidations effected in the new states, signatories of the said Treaties as Allied and Associated Powers, should be paid directly to the proprietors. Article 267 of the same Treaty stipulates that the possessions, rights and interests of the Austrian nationals located on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are not to be subject to seizure or liquidation.

The reason for these two exceptional provisions is obvious; the Saint-Germain Treaty supposes that the new States will not participate in the reparations to be paid by Austria except for certain insignificant sums and that, in consequence, there is not sufficient motive to have the rights provided for in paragraph b, of the said Article recognized in their case.

Now, concerning Hungary, the Reparation Commission formally recognized that the Czecho-Slovak Republic was entitled to claim integral indemnities for the damages caused by the Magyar invasion of Slovakia, in the months of May and June last. As the amount of the claims coming under this head will reach several billion kronen, it appears just that, in the Treaty with Hungary, the same conditions be recognized to Czecho-Slovakia as are recognized to the other Allied and Associated Powers participating in the Reparations.

The Czecho-Slovak Delegation, therefore, takes the liberty of presenting the following Proposal:

1) —Omit, in the Treaty with Hungary, Article 267 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

2) —Insert, in the Treaty with Hungary, Article 249 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, but with the following modification:

“i) Relative to the liquidations effected in the States which are not to participate in the Reparations to be paid by Hungary, the proceeds of the liquidations, etc.”

1. Appendix B to HD–119, p. 713.
2. Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.
3. HD–119, minute a, p. 705.
4. Appendix C, p. 735.
5. HD–117, minute 5, and appendix E, pp. 675 and 683.
6. Appendix D to HD–117, p. 681.
7. HD–102, minute 6, p. 371.
8. HD–65, minute 8, vol. viii, p. 491.
9. HD–96, minute 5, p. 225.
10. HD–99, minute 2, p. 305.
11. HD–62, minute 8, vol. viii, p. 412.
12. HD–96, minute 5, p. 225.
13. HD–99, minute 2, p. 305.
14. Appendix D to HD–117, p. 681.
15. Permanent International Armistice Commission.

16. The share of each power in the upkeep of the Russian P. W. is as [so] far as follows:

    For France	28,710,000	marks
    For Great Britain	7,080,000	“
    For America	50,015,000	“
    For Italy	0	“

16. i. e., Supreme Council of Supply and Relief; for other divergences in text, see another version of this note, appendix F to HD–102, p. 379.
17. The Commission, having no data concerning the dates upon which the supplies estimated above were furnished, has taken as a basis, in the conversion of marks, the rates of exchange prevalent on August 26. The figures above indicated should, therefore, be examined before their final acceptance. Each Delegate has, moreover, expressly reserved the right for his Government to modify the total of the amounts representing its contributions towards the supplies if further recognized expense items which should be included, are presented subsequently. [Footnote in the original.]
17. HD–68, minute 4, vol. viii, p. 579.
18. This effective, estimated by certain information, at 200,000 men, is not inferior, according to the most moderate calculations, to 80,000 men (effective provided for the Allied troops of Occupation: 12,000 men). [Footnote in the original.]
19. It is to be noted that, according to the promises of the German Government, these elements were to be sent to Central Germany. [Footnote in the original.]
20. Not less than twelve different organizations are mentioned. [Footnote in the original.]
18. HD–65, minute 8, vol. viii, p. 491.