Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/119
HD–119
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, December 30, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. Hugh Wallace
- Secretary
- Mr. Harrison
- British Empire
- Sir Eyre Crowe
- Secretary
- Mr. Norman
- France
- M. Clemenceau
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta,
- M. Berthelot,
- M. Arnavon,
- M. de Saint Quentin
- Italy
- M. De Martino
- Secretary
- M. Trombetti
- Japan
- M. Matsui
- Secretary
- M. Kawai
- America, United States of
| Joint Secretariat | |
| British Empire | Captain Lothian Small, |
| France | M. Massigli, |
| Italy | M. Zanchi. |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux | |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- British Empire
- Capt. Fuller, R. N.
- Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.
- Mr. Malkin.
- France
- M. Loucheur
- M. Cambon
- Marshal Foch
- Gen. Weygand
- Gen. Le Rond
- M. Laroche
- M. Serruys
- M. Fromageot
- Capt. Roper
- Italy
- Gen. Cavallero
- C. Adl. Grassi
- M. Pilotti
- Japan
- M. Shigemitsu
- M. Nagaoka
Mr. Dutasta told the Council that in company with Mr. Loucheur he had had a visit on the previous day from Mr. von Lersner. From statements made to him by the President of the German Delegation it appeared that the Germans were ready to sign the protocol1 as it stood; the signature would coincide with the exchange of ratifications. Those instruments once signed, the Supreme Council would submit to Mr. von Lersner a letter declaring the undertaking given by the German Delegation to surrender without delay 192,000 tons of docks, and agreeing, for the surrender of the remainder over a period of from two to three years. Mr. von Lersner had tried to bargain about the handing over the five cruisers required by the procotol. Confronted by the categorical statements made by Mr. Loucheur and himself on the utter impossibility for the Allies of allowing any discussion of that subject, the President of the German Delegation had not insisted. He had, on the other hand, asked for certain precision on the method of calculating the tonnage still to be surrendered. On that point, a certain ambiguity seemed to remain in his mind, and then Mr. Loucheur took part in the discussion in order to remove it. 1. Conversation of 29th December Between Mr. Dutasta and Mr. von Lersner
Mr. Loucheur explained that in Mr. von Lersner’s telegram to his Government, the text of which he had communicated to Mr. Dutasta and himself, he had said in effect that if it were shown that there actually existed at Hamburg and at Dantzig a deficit of 180,000 tons as compared with the figure appearing on the lists of the Allied experts, the Allied demands would be reduced by that amount of tonnage. Such a formula might well have been a source of misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, while it was possible that Allied experts were mistaken to the extent of 130,000 tons they had on the other hand established in conformity with the figures submitted by the German Delegates the existence of 80,000 tons about which, apart from those figures, they had been ignorant. He had thought it well, therefore, to make clear the position taken by the Allies; the demand for 400,000 tons by the Allies had been based upon an inventory established by them according to which Germany possessed on the 1st November a total tonnage of x tons. The German experts had furnished a statement which are still to be verified and which represented a lower figure—y tons. From the 400,000 tons claimed by the Allies they would deduct the difference x–y or more exactly the difference really established after verification.
Mr. Dutasta stated that as a result of their conversation they had drafted a letter which after the exchange of signatures would be addressed to the President of the German Delegation and of which he would of course have previous acquaintance. The draft was as follows. [Page 704] (Mr. Dutasta then read the draft letter which appears as Appendix A.)
Sir Eyre Crowe saw some disadvantage in saying that there would be granted to the German Government for the surrender of the required tonnage a period of from two to three years: it would be better he thought to be a little more precise.
Mr. Loucheur agreed and said that the text he proposed was as follows:
There will be granted to the German Government for the delivery of the sum total tonnage a period not to exceed two years.
Sir Eyre Crowe accepted that text and suggested that it would be well not to leave the task of determining the tonnage to be surrendered to the Reparation Commission alone; would it not be well to specify that the Naval experts should be heard.
Mr. Loucheur thought indeed that the matter could be decided between these (and on the following day the Reparation Commission would be notified). But there would be no advantage whatever in stating that specifically in the letter to be addressed to Mr. von Lersner.
Sir Eyre Crowe concluded that the conversation just reported to the Council had had a result even more favourable than they had hoped for.
It was decided:
- (1)
- That after the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles and the signing by the Representatives of the German Government of the protocol of the 1st November, the President of the Peace Conference shall address to the President of the German Delegation in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers the letter the draft of which appears in Appendix B.
- (2)
- That the Reparation Commission in fixing the tonnage of floating docks &c. to be handed over by the German Government as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident, and in fixing also the 192,000 tons of which the German Government proposed delivery, shall take the opinion of the Naval Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.
(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.)
The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation on the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission within the area occupied by American troops. (Appendix “C”).
Sir Eyre Crowe read and commented upon the British Note. 2. The Jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission
Mr. Clemenceau thought it quite impossible that the territories occupied by American troops should be without the jurisdiction of the High Commission.
[Page 705]Sir Eyre Crowe considered it probable that the American command would accept an arrangement by which it recognized the jurisdiction of the Commission, it being understood that America would have an unofficial place on that body.
Mr. Clemenceau said that in fact there were only two possible hypotheses: either the American troops were on the Rhine as a conquering army or they were there as a result of an Inter-Allied agreement and because America had its place in the concert of the Allies. It was obviously the second hypothesis which was the true one.
Marshal Foch said that a question of principle dominated the whole situation. So long as the armistice regime lasted, the whole of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine were placed under common jurisdiction. The day the peace treaty came into force and on which therefore the armistice regime ended that common jurisdiction disappeared, but that was only in order to give place to another jurisdiction which extended equally over the territories of the left bank.
Mr. Clemenceau thought that they ought to come to a decision. If their decision gave rise to objection on the part of the American Government, that Government would communicate their decision.
It was decided:
That on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission will extend over all the territories on the left bank including those at present occupied by the American troops.
(Mr. Wallace will refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)
General Weygand told the Council that on a previous day he had had a long meeting with the German Delegates in order to arrange the conditions of the transport of Allied troops in the territories submitted to plebiscite. At a previous meeting, the Council had indicated to him on what points concessions were possible and upon what others he ought to make none.2 On the matter of the number of trains that should be run each day he had, conforming to the Council’s instructions, demanded six. The German Delegates had declared that in principle they were willing to grant that number; they required, however approval from Berlin. On the matter of transport in Western Prussia, the German Delegation had likewise declared itself ready to examine their demands and he thought that it would agree to them. It had nevertheless pointed out that from [Page 706] the 12th day and as a result of special arrangements come to between Germany and Poland, the Poles would have taken possession of Western Prussia. The German Delegation considered therefore that the Polish Government ought to take its share in supplying the transports and stores necessary. There was obviously a complication since it would be necessary to appeal to the Polish experts, but that was a difficulty in detail which they could easily overcome. In the third place, Germany agreed to supply the passenger carriages necessary for the transport under the reserve that the Allies furnish part of the remainder of the material; they had come to an agreement about that condition. The German Delegation however had asked it to be recorded on the procès-verbal that they formulated reservations on the possibility of Germany’s furnishing the number of carriages demanded. There remained the question of the payment for the transport. On that point, he had not received a sufficiently satisfactory result, and the German Delegates had appeared to be decided not to yield; they alleged that a law of the Empire stipulated that in time of peace the military tariff could be applied only to the transport of German troops; a new law would therefore be necessary. He had replied that they had only to pass such a law. The Germans refused to say [pay?] anything whatever on the transport of troops going to Dantzig and Memel, territories purely and simply taken away from them. As for plebiscite areas they were ready to advance the cost of transport [;] if the plebiscite were favourable to Germany, the question would be by that very fact decided; if not, the administration of the German railways would demand from the beneficiary states repayment at full tariff of the cost of transport. 3. Allied Contingents in the Plebiscite Areas
Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether they could calculate approximately the difference between those two tariffs.
General Weygand gave the information that the proportion was as 4 or 5 to 1. On that point he required definite instructions from the Council. Should he adhere to his position or leave the matter over in favour of the Reparation Commission.
Sir Eyre Crowe doubted whether the Reparation Commission was competent; further the question affected rather Poland and Denmark.
General Weygand agreed; it was obvious (and that was what annoyed him) that they were playing with the finances of Denmark and Poland.
Marshal Foch considered that they might lay it down as a principle that Allied troops would be transported on the same terms as German troops since they were crossing Germany after agreement with the German Government.
Sir Eyre Crowe believed that the Marshal was right. No bargaining was possible on that point.
[Page 707]General Weygand considered that in those circumstances he would maintain his original demands, avoiding naturally anything which might embitter the discussion; he would give an account of the results obtained.
In the course of the discussion with the President of the German Delegation, Counsellor of Embassy, Göppert, had asked what were the exact numbers of troops to be sent into the Plebiscite areas. He had said (and that indeed had determined the reply) that Mr. Berthelot in the previous conversation had not felt that he ought to give that information. The General had therefore not satisfied his curiosity. Ought he to do it.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the General himself saw any objection to doing so.
Marshal Foch thought it all the easier to give the information since the Germans knew the number of trains required of them, and consequently they would not find it difficult to calculate the numbers of the occupying troops.
General Weygand concluded that Mr. Göppert had raised finally a question of principle on the subject of the occupation of the territories of Allenstein: he had emphasized that the Treaty had not provided for sending Allied contingents into that zone and added that the German Government was in a position to assure the maintenance of order; his [he?] would not object, however, to a Government force of one battalion being sent there to ensure the safety of the Allied Commission.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked how many battalions they had anticipated sending for the occupation of Allenstein.
General Weygand answered that four battalions had been intended.
Sir Eyre Crowe felt that it was hardly permissible to allow the German Government to maintain troops in an area subject to plebiscite, and thought that the Council should adhere to its previous decisions.
General Weygand stated that he was of the same opinion.
It was decided:
- (1)
- that, in his negotiations with the German technical experts, the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, shall maintain his demand that the transport of Allied troops to plebiscite areas, as also to Dantzig and Memel, be on the conditions laid down in the German military tariff;
- (2)
- that the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, is authorized to make known to the German delegates, the number of troops provided for the occupation of plebiscite areas;
- (3)
- that he will notify those delegates the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers to have the Allenstein territory occupied by interallied contingents.
Mr. Clemenceau made the proposal to the Council to fix then the date of the coming into force of the Treaty; for his part, he thought of the 7th or 8th of January.
General Weygand remarked that, in any case, the transports would commence only on the 13th. 4. Date of the Coming Into Force of the Treaty of Versailles
Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the President had in mind sending an ultimatum to Germany about the date.
Mr. Clemenceau replied that he had not. Mr. Dutasta could propose to Mr. von Lersner the 8th of January for the exchange of ratifications; that having been agreed to, he would tell the German Delegation officially the date chosen.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that in those circumstances the earlier date should be chosen; they might as well decide on the 7th as on the 8th.
Mr. de Martino was of that opinion and said that it was understood that the treaty came into force on the day of the deposit of ratifications.
Mr. Clemenceau agreed and said that there was no objection to the date of the 5th being decided upon. If that was too early the 7th might be selected.
It was decided that the Secretary General of the Peace Conference should inquire of the President of the German Delegation whether he was prepared to sign the Minutes of the deposition of ratifications on the 5th of January.
In case that date were too early the depositions of ratifications would take place on the 7th or, at the latest, on the 8th of January.
At this point Mr. Clemenceau retired and Mr. Cambon took the chair.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that this question had been adjourned on the previous day owing to the absence of the President.3 As Monsieur Clemenceau had just left it seemed to him again difficult to discuss it then. Nevertheless he wished to state that he had inquired of his Government regarding the Agenda of the first meeting of the Council. The opinion in London was that only the nomination of the Delimitation Commission of the Saare should appear on the Agenda but perhaps the views of his Government had since changed in view of the imminent visit of British Cabinet Ministers to Paris. 5. Summoning of the First Meeting of the league of Nations
[Page 709]Mr. Berthelot believed that Sir Eric Drummond would prefer that the first meeting of the Council should not take place on the day after the entry into force of the Treaty. Sir Eric Drummond in fact wished to give this meeting a solemn character and desired that the Council should not meet until eight or ten days after the entry into force of the Treaty so that he might make due preparation.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether such delay would be in any way inconvenient.
Mr. Berthelot replied that this delay would not be inconvenient if the only item on the Agenda were to be the Delimitation Commission of the Saar though he regretted that it was not possible to nominate immediately the Government Commission.
Sir Eyre Crowe observed that, in any case, if the Treaty were to come into force on the 5th of January no time was to be lost and this question would have to be settled on the following day.
The Council had before it a Note of the German Delegation dated October 16, 1919, (Annex D) and a note of the Drafting Committee dated December 24, 1919 (Annex E).
Mr. Berthelot commented on the note of the German Delegation and on that of the Drafting Committee. He added that the Drafting Committee were unanimous in their opinion that the interpretation given to Article 109 of the Treaty of Peace by the Belgian General commanding the Fourth Zone, General Michel, was erroneous. 6. Voting Rights in Schleswig
Sir Eyre Crowe concurred in the opinion of the Drafting Committee, and thought that it should be communicated to the Military authorities concerned.
Mr. Cambon said that the necessary instructions would be given.
It was decided that the Allied Authorities of the Territories of the left bank of the Rhine should be informed that persons born in Schleswig and domiciled outside the zone of the plebiscite could, according to the Treaty, claim a right to vote.
Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.
The Council had before it draft instructions for dispatch to General Mastermann, President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control at Berlin, dated December 24, 1919. (Appendix F). 7. Instructions to the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Berlin
After a short discussion it was decided to approve the draft instructions to be sent to the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Berlin. (Appendix F.)
[Page 710]The Council had before it a letter of the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated December 12, 1919 (Annex G) and of a letter of the Secretary General of the Economic Commission to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference dated December 27, 1919. (Annex H). 8. Modifications in the Economic Clauses of the Treaty With Hungary Requested by the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Delegation
Mr. Serruys read out and commented on the note of the Economic Commission. He added that since the note of December 27 now before the Council had been drafted, the Italian Delegation had withdrawn its adhesion to the conclusions in this note and had brought forward a serious objection thereto. The Italian Delegation drew attention to the fact that if the Articles in the Hungarian Treaty corresponding respectively to Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles and to Article 211 of the Treaty of St. Germain were to be modified, the Hungarian State might have to bear a heavy burden inasmuch as the repurchases of the entails (majorats) would apply equally to the territories ceded to Roumania. In those circumstances the Italian representatives thought that the question chiefly concerned the Reparation Commission because the solution proposed would be tantamount to granting to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State a real priority in the matter of reparations. The Economic Commission therefore thought that it ought to propose to the Supreme Council that the whole matter including the Commission’s own suggestions should be referred to the Reparation Commission for examination.
Sir Eyre Crowe inquired whether the proposals of the Economic Commission would have the effect of modifying in any way the Treaty with Germany or the Treaty with Austria.
Mr. Serruys replied in the negative.
Mr. de Martino said that if the matter were simply one of referring the whole question to the Reparation Commission, he was quite agreeable. But if it were necessary for him to express an opinion, he would have to reserve it on account of the absence of his technical advisers.
Mr. Cambon observed that there was no need to express any opinion.
It was decided to refer to the Reparation Commission, for examination and immediate report, the note of the Serbo-Croate-Slovene Delegation, dated December 12, concerning the liquidation of Hungarian properties situated in the territory transferred to the Serbo-Croate-Slovene State, together with the proposals of the Economic Commission contained in its note of December 27, 1919, to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference.
Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the question of the repayment of the cost of transport and maintenance of Russian prisoners of war in Germany should be brought before the Council at an early opportunity. The matter had been held over. 9. Determining of Agenda
[Page 711]Mr. Cambon replied that the question would be put on the Agenda for to-morrow.
Sir Eyre Crowe also desired to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the British Delegation had been requested to circulate a Note concerning the general methods of reparation to be applied to Hungary. His Government had suggested the adoption of a new system in the case of Hungary: but it had subsequently recognized that this proposal involved serious difficulties and he was now instructed to withdraw it.
Mr. de Saint Quentin pointed out that, according to a report of the Economic Commission, the British Government had obtained what they wished as regards one point: the arrangements already made forbade for a period of five years the establishment of Customs barriers by the neighbouring States who had acquired territory formerly Hungarian.
Mr. de Martino observed that the Council had decided on October 2 to send an Interallied Commission of Officers to the Comitadjis of Western Hungary ceded to Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain.4 But, as a matter of fact, that Commission had never proceeded to the spot. In view of the declaration recently communicated to the Chancellor Renner in the name of the Supreme Council,5 it would be advisable that effect should be given to the decision of October 2.
Mr. de Saint Quentin said that the French Delegation had had a meeting with the Italian Delegation and had just drafted a note on the subject which would be circulated to the members of the Council.
Mr. Cambon said that this question would be placed on the Agenda for the following day.
(The meeting then adjourned).
[Page 713]- Appendix O to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.↩
- HD–117, minute 2, p. 670.↩
- HD–118, minute 4, p. 690.↩
- HD–65, minute 8, vol. viii, p. 491.↩
- HD–111, minute 4, p. 561.↩
- Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.↩
- Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.↩
- Vol. ii, p. 1.↩
- Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.↩
- Vol. vi, pp. 926, 983.↩
- Appendix G, supra.↩