Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IX

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/114

HD–114

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held at M. Pichon’s Room, Saturday, December 20, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, December 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. Hugh Wallace
  • Secretariat
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretariat
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
  • Secretariat
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Saint Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. de Martino
  • Secretariat
    • M. Trombetti
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretariat
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. B. Winthrop
British Empire	Capt. Lothian Small
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • M. Rathbone
• Great Britain
  • Capt. Fuller
  • Cdt. MacNamara
  • M. Malkin
• France
  • M. Leygues
  • Admiral Levavasseur
  • M. Fromageot
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Laroche
  • M. de Montille
  • M. Escoffier
• Italy
  • M. Ricci-Busatti
  • C. Admiral Grassi
  • Cdt. Fea
  • M. Bianchi
• Japan
  • M. Shigemitsu
  • M. Nagaoka
  • Cdt. Osumi

Sir Eyre Crowe said that, with regard to the Scapa Flow question, he had not yet received general instructions from his Government. In fact, he had only received instructions on two special points: 1, they were ready to repatriate prisoners from Scapa Flow as soon as the Germans had signed the protocol;¹2, on the other hand, his Government was opposed to any modification whatsoever of the protocol with regard to the surrender of the five light cruisers. To agree to the German claim would, as a matter of fact, be contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty, and they were of opinion that no modification could be made to the Treaty without the assent of all the signatory Powers, a course which obviously would carry them too far. He was still waiting, as he had already mentioned, for the instructions of his Government regarding the other questions. They had, on the other hand, received a note from the French Delegation on the question of the five light cruisers, which they had not yet had time to examine, but which would entail a modification of the protocol. 1. Compensation Claimed by the Supreme Council From the German Government for the Scapa Flow Affair

Mr. Leygues said that the French Delegation had indeed envisaged a different solution from that which had been originally proposed. It would be advantageous to accept in part the Germans’ request under the following conditions: They would begin by taking delivery of the five light cruisers of the Graudenz type which they had demanded from the Germans according to the terms of the protocol. They would, however, exchange those cruisers for new cruisers under construction as they were completed. That would involve no change in the principle laid down in the protocol. But they would get material advantages in this way, that if they only left to the Germans old cruisers which would very shortly be twenty years old, Germany would be free, according to the terms of the Treaty, to build new ones as soon as the 20-year period had been reached. With the solution they proposed, on the contrary, the Germans would not be able to build new warships for eleven years and their naval forces would be diminished accordingly. They were, therefore, of the opinion that their proposal was advantageous, not only for France and Italy, but in a general way for all the Allies.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he fully admitted the force of the arguments made by the Minister of Marine, but the fact remained that his solution implied a modification of the Treaty, which the British Government would not deem possible except with the assent of all the signatories.

Mr. Leygues replied that Sir Eyre Crowe’s remark was quite correct, but they should not conceal the fact that the situation created by the Treaty was abnormal and illogical. They were obliging the Germans to destroy their existing ships, and inside of a year they still might build new ones, certainly a paradoxical situation.

Mr. Clemenceau agreed, but said that they were confronted by the Treaty, and the British Government was opposed to any modification of the Treaty. It therefore seemed to him necessary to await, in order to discuss the Scapa Flow question in its entirety, until Sir Eyre Crowe received from London the general instructions he was expecting.

(The discussion was adjourned).

Mr. Clemenceau stated that they were not ready to draft a reply to the German Note until they had agreed on the questions which were still pending, such as the Scapa Flow affair. He therefore proposed to adjourn the discussion. 2. Reply to the German Note of December 14²

Mr. Wallace then stated that at the meeting of the Council last Tuesday he had been asked by the President whether he would sign the protocol on behalf of the United States.³ He undertook to obtain the views of his Government in the matter, and he had now to say that he had received instructions that the United States could not be a signatory to the Protocol.

He said it would be recalled that at the same meeting of the Council a draft of a declaration to Chancellor Renner was presented and approved by his colleagues. At the same time he informed the Council of his instructions and made it quite clear that he would refer such matters to his Government. The declaration in question was communicated to Chancellor Renner the day following the meeting, that was to say, last Wednesday, and he informed his Government to that effect. In reply, he had been informed that in view of the existing circumstances the Government of the United States was not in a position to take any action whatever, on account of the fact that the Austrian Treaty had not been presented to the United States Senate.

He said that, in this connection, and in order to make his position quite clear, he had been instructed to state that in view of the fact that his participation in the deliberations of the Council was merely one of an observer, it could not be presumed that the United States was a party to any action, declaration, or resolution of the Council unless the Government of the United States expressly declared its consent thereto.

Mr. Berthelot remarked that the situation did not present itself in the same manner in the two cases referred to by Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, the protocol had been signed by Mr. Polk on November 1st. No American signature was any longer necessary if the text of the protocol was not modified, and the signature of the Germans was the only one required.

Mr. Wallace said that M. Clemenceau had asked him on the preceding Tuesday whether he would be in a position to sign the protocol. He therefore assumed that the protocol would be modified, and consequently that new signatures would be necessary; and that is why he had asked for the instructions, the sense of which he had just communicated to the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that no member of the Council had yet signed the protocol. What had been signed was the note submitting to the Germans the draft protocol. He did not believe that that would do away with the signing the protocol itself, even in the case where no modifications were adopted.

M. Fromageot said that it did not seem necessary that the protocol should bear the signatures of the Allied Representatives. If they referred to precedents they found that the declaration relative to the non-application of Article 61 of the German Constitution^3a had only been signed by the German Representative. The delegates of the Allied Powers had simply witnessed the fact of the German signature. There was only in the protocol the question of a unilateral agreement which Germany should undertake. Therefore Germany’s signature was the only one required. The Allied Representatives, or some of them, might, however, witness the fact that the signature had been given.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the protocol presented itself in such a form that the procedure suggested by M. Fromageot would be applicable.

M. Fromageot said that it certainly did. It would only be necessary to omit the word “protocol” and to replace it by the term “declaration”, or some analogous expression.

M. Clemenceau said that as far as the declaration made to Chancellor Renner was concerned, Mr. Wallace was not authorized by his Government to subscribe to it at this time. On the other hand he did not believe that they should foresee any difficulty on the part of Austria, who had no interest in raising doubts on the validity of their declaration. As a matter of fact, the American Government had only declared war on Austria very late. They all understood the present difficulties of the situation in America and they naturally did not wish to do anything which might increase those difficulties. On the other hand, however, they had brought to a satisfactory conclusion the important questions which had been submitted to them. They could therefore only take note of the American Ambassador’s declaration and carry on the discussion in order to arrive either at a general signature; for it was likely that the situation might change in America, or to another solution which they would have to envisage at the proper time.

Mr. Wallace said he would be glad to act as soon as he received instructions allowing him to do so, and he hoped that it would not be long before he received satisfactory instructions.

M. Clemenceau remarked that as a matter of fact the declaration made to Mr. Renner did not necessitate the signatures of all the delegates; it had sufficed that he, as President of the Conference, sign the note by which that declaration had been communicated to the Chancellor.

Mr. Fromageot read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee as shown in Appendix “A”.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he had listened with much pleasure to the ingenious and subtle arguments of Mr. Fromageot. It had, however, seemed to him that the latter must admit that those arguments were more ingenious than convincing. Besides, their enemies could themselves also show ingenuity, and he considered it would be dangerous for them to start a controversy, the result of which would be doubtful. If they were to tell the Germans that Article 192 did not apply to the materiel disembarked in execution of the Armistice they would be giving them a pretext which they would not fail to grasp to avoid proceeding with the destruction of that materiel. The literal sense of Articles 185 and 192 seemed to him to be that the materiel which was disembarked should be destroyed under the same conditions as all the war materiel remaining in Germany. While he did not object to the grounds underlying M. Fromageot’s argument, he yet did not wish to do anything which implied a modification of the Treaty. Even supposing that M. Fromageot’s argument could triumph, it would not be for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to make good a lacuna in the Treaty. It would be necessary to get the consent of all the signatory Powers. Therefore, he thought it wiser to adhere to the most natural interpretation of the Treaty, notwithstanding the slight inconveniences which might be attached thereto and not to set out upon a course that was dangerous and full of pitfalls. He would add that the arguments which he had just put forward did not apply to the case of the five cruisers referred to in the protocol. As a matter of fact, the Treaty was not involved in that case and it would be sufficient to change a few words in the protocol in order to obtain the desired result. 3. Conditions Under Which the German Warships Should Be Surrendered

Mr. Clemenceau said that they should be careful not to touch the protocol; the discussion which had just taken place should incline them to great prudence in that respect.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquired whether certain changes would not be indispensable in any event, considering they had already decided that they would grant certain concessions to the Germans. If they did not modify the protocol it would be necessary, at the very least, to have it followed by an interpretative note.

Mr. de Martino admitted that it would be dangerous to modify the Treaty in any fashion whatsoever. But as it was only a question of interpretation, could they not sound the Germans to find out if they would not consent to surrender that materiel, a course which would avoid them the trouble and expense of destroying it? As soon as the exchange of ratifications had taken place, the Commission of Control might be asked to give the Germans their interpretation of Articles 185 and 192.

Mr. Clemenceau remarked that in any case they were entitled to demand that the breeches of guns be put back in place as the Treaty provided that the war ships to be delivered should have their complete artillery on board.

Admiral Levavasseur said that it would likewise be important to have the materiel other than artillery, especially in the case of the destroyers, torpedoes and torpedo tubes.

Mr. Clemenceau agreed, but remarked that they were confronted by the Treaty; they could not run counter to its stipulations. He thought, however, that they might propose to the Germans the interpretation suggested by Mr. Fromageot without, however, insisting if the Germans should refuse to accept it.

Sir Eyre Crowe said if they proposed that interpretation, it was to be feared that the Germans would immediately accept it, and that they would avail themselves of it so as not to destroy any of the materiel which had been disembarked. If they were to give the Germans the example of interpreting the terms of the Treaty in a way not strictly impartial, they would be exposed to endless chicane on the part of the Germans.

Mr. Fromageot said that they might ask the Germans to surrender the torpedoes and torpedo tubes without furnishing any explanation. They could always wait and see whether the Germans accepted their demand.

Mr. Clemenceau inquired whether the term “Complete artillery” did not also imply the surrender of munitions.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that the English text had the words “guns” which did not seem to admit of such a broad interpretation.

M. Clemenceau said that they might anyhow try to obtain the accessory materiel, such as torpedoes, etc. If they met with a refusal there would always be time to take counsel.

Mr. Wallace inquired whether a verbal communication would be made, or a written note.

Mr. Clemenceau replied that a verbal communication would suffice.

It was decided:

(1) that the Germans would be asked verbally to deliver the warships which they were to surrender according to the terms of the Treaty and which were not meant to be destroyed, not only with all their artillery, but also with their munitions and accessory materiel, such as torpedoes, torpedo tubes, etc.

(2) that that demand, however, should not be made a condition sine qua non of the exchange of ratifications.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

M. Fromageot read and commented upon the report of the Organisation Commission of mixed Tribunals and also the reply of the Drafting Committee to certain questions put by that Commission (the two papers contained in Appendix B). He added that the question submitted to the Drafting Committee had some rather difficult aspects because acts involving violations of the laws of war could hardly have been committed on Polish territory in the course of hostilities, taking into account the fact that there had then been no organized and recognized Polish Army, and that Poland had not yet existed as a State. It would, however, seem unjust to reply to Poland’s request by an absolute refusal. It seemed that there might be grounds for giving different solutions according to the cases presented, and that the question was above all one of concrete fact. 4. List of Guilty Germans, Presented by the Polish Delegation

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that his legal experts had told him that that question presented certain difficulties which were technical but of considerable importance. On the British side, the question had been more especially examined by Sir Ernest Pollock. As the French and Belgian representatives on the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals, that is to say, Mr. Ignace and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns, were going to London, where they would meet Sir Ernest Pollock, he proposed to adjourn the discussion on that subject until they knew the results of the interviews that would have taken place.

It was decided:

To adjourn the discussion of questions raised by the Polish request relative to German subjects guilty of violating the laws and customs of war until they know the results of the interviews which Sir Ernest Pollock, Mr. Ignace and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns were to have in London on the subject.

Mr. Cheysson read and commented upon the Note of the Financial Commission (See Appendix C) on the memorandum of the British Delegation (See Appendix D) relative to bank notes issued by the Bolshevist Government of Hungary. 5. Rights of Allied and Associated Nationals, Holders of Bank Notes Issued by the Sovietist Hungarian Government

It was decided:

To approve the Note of the Financial Commission (See Appendix C).

Mr. Laroche read and commented upon the note of the Secretariat General, as shown in Appendix E, relative to that question. 6. Insertion in the Hungarian Treaty of Clauses Relative to Certain Railroads of Common Interest to Hungary and (a) Serb-Croat-Slovene State (b) Roumania

It was decided:

To accept the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary relative to certain railroads presenting a common interest for Hungary and neighboring States. Those clauses should be inserted in the form under which they figured in Appendix E (see Articles 302 and 303).

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

Mr. Berthelot read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation as shown in Appendix F.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he quite agreed that something should be done to prevent Germany from having a predominant diplomatic situation at Vienna; he thought it inadvisable, however, for the Allies to address themselves directly to Germany, all the more so as Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles did not seem to offer very strong grounds for action. He would prefer to use the second method suggested by the note before them, and to approach the Austrian Chancellor on the matter. If they considered the very favorable frame of mind actually evinced by him for the Allies, it was hardly likely that they would meet with a refusal. 7. Diplomatic Representation of Germany at Vienna

Mr. Wallace said that he would refer that question to his Government and would advise it of the resolution which seemed to be preferred by the Council; he would ask his Government to concur therein.

It was decided:

That the Chancellor of the Austrian Republic be advised that the Allied and Associated Governments would not view with approbation the sending by Germany to Vienna of a diplomatic representative having the rank of ambassador.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

Mr. Berthelot said that he had had an interview with General Weygand on the questions raised by the transportation of the Allied troops charged with the occupation of the plebiscite regions in Germany Certain material difficulties might arise by reason of the holiday period which was before them. General Weygand thought that in case the ratifications were exchanged on the following Tuesday or Wednesday, there would be grounds to specify that the measures of execution would only begin on January 5th. Such a solution would allow them to reach the time when the British troops could themselves be transported; that, according to the information in their hands, would not take place before approximately January 15. 8. Transportation of Troops in the Plebiscite Zones of Germany

Mr. de Martino inquired whether the transportation of British troops would be completed shortly after January 15th.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that the difficulty arose from the fact that they could not send the troops raised by conscription who would have to be relieved practically at once. They would have to have recourse to forces made up of volunteers, and these would not be ready for transportation until about January 15th. They might perhaps be able nevertheless to send off their advance guards a little sooner. It would be sufficient for the British contingents to be transported amongst the last.

The meeting then adjourned.

Appendix A to HD–114

Note From the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the Conditions for the Surrender of German Warships

1. The text of article 185 seems to provide that the ships shall be delivered in a state of disarmament, according to Article XXIII of the Armistice,^3b with exception of the guns which must all be on board.

It was in this state that they were first supposed to be sunk, a provision which was afterwards replaced by surrender. Nothing was then said, and nothing has since been said, concerning the material which had been disembarked.

2. All the material, besides the artillery, disembarked from the ships to be surrendered, appears as being part of the material referred to in Article 192 as material “actually in the hands of the German Government” and in this respect to be surrendered to be broken up.

3. Nevertheless, in case that the Allied and Associated Powers should agree with Germany that, besides the ships to be surrendered in a state of disarmament, according to Article 185, the material which was aboard should also be surrendered, such a special agreement might be considered.

Certain members of the Drafting Committee are of the opinion that such an agreement would be facilitated by the following arguments: Article 185 in speaking of material in the hands of Germany, to be surrendered for breaking up, does not refer to the material disembarked according to the provisions of the Armistice, remaining under the supervision of the Allied and Associated Powers as provided by Article XXIII of the Armistice. The text provides nothing in regard to this material and there is, therefore, an omission which, by mutual agreement, it is desirable to complete.

December 19, 1919.

Appendix B to HD–114

December 17, 1919.

List of Germans Accused of Crimes Contrary to Laws of War—Submitted by the Polish Delegation

organization commission
of mixed tribunals
(and of revision of lists)

The list of German nationals demanded by Poland includes 361 names.^*

The Polish Government asks to bring before its tribunals, and eventually before mixed tribunals, German nationals guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war, these violations having been committed since the time that the territory which was to become Polish was the theatre of atrocities and exactions (August 1914), until a time later than the Armistice (sometime in 1919).

The Polish Delegation remarks that the cases maintained by it refer only to acts committed on territory formerly Polish-Russian, excluding violations committed on the territories formerly Polish-Austrian or Polish-German.

From what date on is the Polish Government entitled to claim German nationals for prosecution before its military tribunals?

The Organization Commission of mixed tribunals (and of revision of lists) did not consider itself able to determine this date and has the honor of asking the Supreme Council to take a decision in this respect.

The Polish Army was recognized as belligerent by the great Powers in September–October, 1918. (Recognition, by France, September 28, 1918; by England October 11, 1918; by Italy October 12, 1918; by the United States of America, November 1, 1918.)

If this date of September–October were maintained, Poland would, in reality, be able to claim very few Germans.

She would have still less if the date when Poland was recognized as an autonomous state were considered. In spite of the participation of Polish Delegates at the Peace Conference, it remains nevertheless that Germany only recognized Poland by the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, and the Allies can only oppose to Germany the date of ratification of the above Treaty (July 10, 1919) if Germany does not contend that the Treaty is not yet in effect [sic].

On the other hand, the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals is of the opinion that the Supreme Council could act in accordance with the spirit of the drafting of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles. The object which is proposed by this Treaty is to punish crimes committed in violation of laws and customs of war.

The doctrine of the Commission may be summarized as follows:

“The basis of the Allies’ action is the prosecution of crimes which are not excusable because of demands of a military nature. Whatever is true in this regard of belligerent countries is equally true in regard to countries which, although they may not have been in war, have been the victims of atrocities committed by Germans. The horrors that took place in Poland wounds every human sentiment, and from the standpoint of penalties to be imposed, these cases should be considered as having been committed in the course of a period of war.”

It may also be advanced that at the time when these crimes were committed the accused were subject to the decisions of the German, Austrian and Russian military tribunals because of the nationality of the victims and of the territory where they were committed.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the case of Poles in Germany will be the same as that of Czecho-Slovaks in Austria, Roumanians in Hungary, Yugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary.

As memorandum and for reference, certain dates are given below, which in regard to Poland, may eventually be taken as a starting point for the incriminations:

1) Decree (French) creating an autonomous Polish Army in France, on the date of June 4, 1919;

2) Recognition of the Polish National Committee.
(By France, June 20, 1917; by England, October 15, 1917; by Italy, October 30, 1917; by the United States of America, December 1, 1917).

3) Decree (French) organizing the military justice of the Polish Army.

4) Recognition of the Polish Army as autonomous Allied and belligerent Army, September–October, 1918.

Reply of the Drafting Committee

December 18, 1919.

To the question asked by the Organization Commission of the Mixed Tribunals, i. e.

“From what date on is the Polish Government justified in claiming, for judgment by its own military tribunals, German nationals?”

The Drafting Committee makes the following reply:

From August 2, 1914, on condition that it is a question of violations of the laws and customs of war which injures a person classed as a Polish national according to the Treaty.

The question as to whether the charges constitute a violation of the laws and customs of war or not, is a question to be decided according to the circumstances of the matter and from the standpoint of the law of nations.

Appendix C to HD–114

peace conference
financial commission

December 19, 1919.

Note for the Supreme Council

A decision of the Supreme Council of Dec. 17, 1919,⁴ has sent to the Financial Commission, a note from the British Delegation, concerning the prejudice suffered by the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, who possess bonds issued by the Hungarian Bolshevist Government.

The Financial Commission, after having examined the question is of the opinion that, the information which it at present possesses does not enable it to judge whether the Allied and Associated nationals have been affected by “an exceptional war measure” taken either by the Government of Bela Kun enforcing the circulation of the “white banknotes” and substituting them for the “blue banknotes” previously in the possession of the Allied and Associated nationals, or by the Hungarian Government which fixed the value of these “white banknotes”, at the fifth of their value.

The Commission is of the opinion that complementary information should be asked for from the British Delegation, concerning the conditions under which were made:

1. The operations of withdrawal and exchange of the white and blue banknotes, possessed by Allied and Associated nationals.

2. and concerning the means of establishing and controlling the importance of the prejudice suffered by Allied and Associated nationals.

Moreover, the Commission thinks that, after having received from the British Delegation the above information, it will be necessary to ask the Economic Commission, which prepared the draft of Article 232 of the Treaty with Hungary whether the measures taken by Bela Kun and the Hungarian Government may be considered as “exceptional war measures” such as referred to in Annex to Article 232.

Appendix D to HD–114

Note From the British Delegation re Banknotes Issued by the Bolshevist Government in Hungary Held by Nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers

In connection with the Hungarian Treaty a question has arisen with regard to the position of Allied and Associated nationals in Hungary who hold notes issued by Bela Kun. These notes, called “white” notes, were issued by the Bolshevist Government, who compelled their acceptance, declaring them to be of equal value to “blue” notes, and withdrawing the latter from the banks at the same time. These “white” notes are now practically valueless as the Hungarian Government recently ordered that they should be accepted at one-fifth of their face value only. Allied and Associated nationals, therefore, who acquired them upon constraint from the Bolshevist Government will be heavy losers.

As it seems doubtful whether Article 232–A of the draft treaty with Hungary affords sufficient protection for the interests of Allied and Associated nationals in this matter, it is suggested that an addition should be made to the annex to the Reparations Clauses, for the purposes of safeguarding the interests of Allied and Associated nationals who became possessed of the Bolshevist notes in the above-mentioned circumstances.

16 December 1919.

Appendix E to HD–114

Clauses To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary in Regard to Certain Railways Which Have an Interest Both for Hungary and the Neighboring States

I. Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State

In its meeting of December 9, 1919, (Resolution HD–110–IV [V]),⁵ the Supreme Council decided:

1st: that the station of Gola, situated in Hungarian territory would be given a mixed organization enabling it to serve the locality of the same name situated in Serb-Croat-Slovene territory.

2nd: that the article prepared by the Commission of Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, in its report No. 2 of April 5 [6], 1919, adopted by the Supreme Council⁶ providing for the placing under international control of the railway line from Kotor to Bares, will be inserted in the conditions of peace with Hungary. The experts in regard to railways who have been consulted by the Drafting Committee found that the text proposed by the Territorial Committee could not be maintained as they stood, but would have to be changed to harmonize with the general provisions of Articles 301–302 which gives the settling of all general disputes regarding the Hungarian railways to a Commission of Experts chosen by the Allied and Associated Powers and in which Hungary would be represented. They have drafted a proposed article which solves in this sense the two questions which have been asked by the Supreme Council. This article would take the place of No. 303 (See Annex I).

II. Hungary and Roumania

On the other hand the several members of the Roumania and Jugo-Slav Affairs have reminded the Drafting Committee that the Supreme Council has adopted the article proposed by the Commission in its report No. I of April 6, 1919, in order to place under international control the railway line from Nagy-Szalonta to Arad via Gyula and Békéscsaba.⁷

The railway experts have at the request of the Drafting Committee composed a draft clause which corresponds to the decision of the Supreme Council as far as it is compatible with Article 301. This clause would be the third paragraph of Article 302 (See Annex II).

Annex I

Article 303

In order to assure to the city and the district of Gola in Serb-Croat-Slovene territory the use of the station of Gola in Hungarian territory as well as the railway line which serves this city and this district, and in order to assure the Serb-Croat-Slovene state of the free use of direct communication by rail between Csaktornya-Nagy-Kanisza and the line of Zágráb-Gyékenyés during the period necessary for the completion of the direct railway line in Serb-Croat-Slovene territory between the lines mentioned above, the conditions for the exploitation of the railway station of Gola and the railway line Kotor-Barcs will be determined by a convention to be made between the interested administrations of the Hungarian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene railways. If these administrations cannot agree on the terms of this convention the points of dispute will be settled by the Commission of Experts provided for in Article 301 of the present treaty.

Annex II

Article 302 (3d paragraph).

In the same way the arrangement for the exploitation of the section situated in Hungarian territory and the line cutting Nagyszalonta to Arad and to Kisjenö by Békéscsaba will guarantee direct passage in every way across Hungarian territory to Roumanian trains having Roumanian traction and crews. Nevertheless, unless it should be otherwise determined this passage right will cease on the completion of a direct junction situated entirely in Roumanian territory between the lines Nagyszalonta–Békéscsaba and Kisjenö-Békéscsaba at the expiration of ten years after the coming into force of the present treaty.

Appendix F to HD–114

From: French Delegation regarding Diplomatic Representation of Germany at Vienna.

To: The Supreme Council.

The Allied and Associated Powers have shown their intention of being represented at Vienna by agents having the rank and quality of ministers plenipotentiary. The new Austrian State has not the importance which would justify the sending of ambassadors, which would be, besides, discourteous to the new Allied States who are all much more populated than Austria.

According to concurring information, the German Government had decided to send an Ambassador to Vienna. Its representative would, therefore, have a preponderant influence, and the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers would, in a way, be relegated to a rank incompatible to the dignity of their Governments.

The object which the German Government has in view is evident. We are in the presence of a manoeuvre which is contrary to the object of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which is only in appearance respected by Germany but which is violated in spirit. To admit that the representatives of Germany at Vienna should be in a special position above all would be to give a tacit assent to the annexationist propaganda and to favor a characterized tentative [sic] against Austria’s independence. The Allied and Associated Powers are, therefore, justified in opposing the realization of this plan.

In order to arrive at this, two procedures may be employed at the same time: First, a note should be sent to the German Delegation at the Conference to inform it that the Allied and Associated Governments have been advised of the German Government’s intention to maintain an embassy at Vienna. That they feel bound to inform it that they will only have legations, and that under those conditions the presence of an embassy from Germany would be interpreted as being contrary to the spirit of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, and of a nature to create difficulties in the relations between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers; that the latter, consequently, would wish to receive from the German Government the assurance that it would be represented at Vienna by an agent who would not have rank superior to minister plenipotentiary and who should be accredited as such.

Second, Chancellor Renner should be advised by a note transmitted to the Austrian Delegation of the communication sent to the German Government. He should also be told that the Allied and Associated Governments will not send any ministers to Vienna if the German Government is represented by an ambassador. The Austrian Government could, in this way, fall back on this conception to refuse to recognize a German ambassador.

article 80 of the treaty of versailles

Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the independence of Austria within the frontiers established by the present Treaty, as inalienable, except by the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

1. Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.
2. Appendix A to HD–111, p. 567.
3. HD–111, minute 2, p. 559.
4. For draft text of declaration, see enclosure to appendix B to HD–52, vol. viii, p. 193.
5. Vol. ii, p. 1.
6. The Polish Delegation states that this list has been reduced 50%. [Footnote in the original.]
4. HD–112, minute 5, p. 590.
5. Ante, p. 541.
6. On May 12, 1919; see BC–61, vol. iv, p. 501.
7. See BC–61, vol. iv, p. 501.