Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/87


Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 8, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. F. L. Polk
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison
    • British Empire
      • Sir Eyre Crowe
    • Secretary
      • Mr. H. Norman
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau
      • M. Pichon
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta
      • M. Berthelot
      • M. de Saint Quentin
    • Italy
      • M. de Martino
    • Secretary
      • M. Barone Russo
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Capt. G. A. Gordon
British Empire Capt. G. Lothian Small
France M. Massigli
Italy M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

  • America, United States of
    • General Bliss
  • British Empire
    • General Sackville-West
    • Mr. Forbes-Adam
  • France
    • M. Gout
    • General Bunoust
  • Italy
    • M. Galli
    • Commandant Mazzolini
    • Prince Boncompagni
  • Japan
    • M. Shigemitsu

1. Sir Eyre Crowe stated that in the next to the last meeting the Council had had to pass upon a proposal made by General Walch on behalf of General Nollet. He had understood that it was a question of laying upon Germany the payment of the salaries of all the personnel of Military Commissions [Page 36] of Control in Germany. That proposition conformed to the point of view maintained by the British Government. He read, however, in the procès-verbal, that Germany was only being charged with the payment of the salaries of personnel not belonging to the regular military forces, that is to say, the civilian personnel. There was no civilian personnel in these Commissions, or at least among the military members there were many who were civilian technical experts put on the footing of officers. Rectification of procès-Verbal HD–85, Minute 31

M. Clemenceau thought that Sir Eyre Crowe’s rectification called for no objection.

(It was decided:

to modify resolution No. 3 of H. D. 85, so as to read as follows: “It was decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany should be assumed by Germany.”)

2. M. Clemenceau pointed out that the agenda brought up the discussion of the report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna (See Appendix “A”). M. Venizelos had asked to be heard. It seemed to him that there were two questions in to be asked of M. Venizelos. First, he should explain the massacres of which the Greek troops were accused. Moreover, he himself was much struck by reading in the Commission’s report that the Greeks would not be able to maintain themselves in Smyrna by their own efforts. The Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on the clear understanding that their occupation should not be taken as equivalent to a definite attribution of territory to them. He noted that the Greeks had gone beyond the limits of the Sandjak of Smyrna without the permission of the Council and had done so upon a telegram from M. Venizelos. He thought that it was necessary to remind them that the Turkish question was not settled and to ask them to state definitely if they could maintain themselves at Smyrna by their own efforts. The information received indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable, and that Turkey would never accept, unless obliged to by force, Greek occupation, or, to a certain extent, Italian occupation. As far as the Greeks were concerned, he thought this information was correct. The question would not have arisen if the Greek occupation had not given rise to certain incidents. It was not the Council’s fault if the question had to be raised. The Turkish problem was not settled. He felt that the Council would be more and more led to respecting the integrity of Turkish territory; under these circumstances it would be well to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as conquerors of Asia Minor. Report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna

M. de Martino wished to associate himself with what M. Clemenceau had just said: the military occupations in Asia Minor were [Page 37] clearly only provisional and should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question. This question could not be divorced from the more general question of the fate of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire which was of interest to all Mediterranean powers. Italian opinion was clearly favorable to the principle of respecting the integrity of these territories. Moreover, he wished to point out that the relations between the Italian troops and the Turkish population in Anatolia were excellent and that no conflicts had taken place between them; on the contrary, on many occasions the local populations and authorities had indulged in manifestations of gratitude.

Sir Eyre Crowe felt that the Council was entering upon a basic discussion of Greek occupation. He thought that the conclusions of the Commission went beyond the instructions received by it. The Commission had been formed, at the request of M. Venizelos himself, to investigate the massacres. Its report treated, in general terms, the whole problem of Greek occupation, and also questioned the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the Council, as the report suggested, asked the Greeks to leave Smyrna? Would they be replaced by Turks or was an Inter-Allied occupation contemplated? The affair of the Vilayet of Aidin had just shown how difficult of realization such an occupation was: the French Government had felt it impossible to send a battalion and, under these conditions, the British Government had not felt that it could assume this burden. If Inter-Allied occupation was impossible could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to retire when there was no one to replace them. Could it possibly think of evacuating the country before peace had even been concluded?

M. Clemenceau thought it clearly could not. He felt, with Sir Eyre Crowe, that it was impossible at the moment to ask the Greeks to retire but it would perhaps be well to have some officers on the spot who could inform the Council as to the situation at Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the Greeks unfortunately claimed that many of the difficulties arose from the fact that they did not have complete authority in that region. In any case it seemed impossible to agree with the conclusions of the Commission which proposed a regime under which the Greeks might perhaps occupy but the Turks would govern. Rather than create an organ of supervision it would be better to give the Greeks greater liberty of action and at the same time a larger and more definite share of responsibility.

M. Clemenceau observed that the danger was that the Greeks would take too much latitude.

Mr. Polk wished to know what the attitude of the Council was? It seemed to him that there was some thought of rejecting the conclusions of the report now before it. He was not so inclined. The [Page 38] Commission had thought its mission was to establish the responsibility for the events at Smyrna; it had pointed out these responsibilities as it saw them and had not hesitated to question the acts of the Council itself. The report contained serious matters. Did the Council intend or not to take them into consideration? For instance, paragraph 37 of the report pointed out that M. Venizelos himself had ordered the reoccupation of Aidin without taking the Entente into consideration. He felt that it was impossible not to repose confidence in the investigators whom the Council had chosen, or else another Commission should be sent.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the order given by M. Venizelos had already been discussed by the Council of Four.2

M. de Martino felt that it was impossible not to discuss the report inasmuch as it emanated from a Commission set up by the Supreme Council.

M. Clemenceau said that the report would be discussed after M. Venizelos had been heard. (At this point M. Venizelos entered the room.)

M. Venizelos hoped that the Council would permit him to give a brief historical summary of the conditions under which the investigation had been conducted; he felt that this recapitulation would show that he had good reason to ask that this investigation should be considered null and void and that another investigation should take place. On the 18th of July, after he had asked the British Government, as a result of a question which had been put in the House of Commons, to send an investigating officer to Smyrna, the Supreme Council had decided to create a Commission of Investigation.3 No Greek officer sat on that Commission. He had protested to the President of the Conference and had received the reply that a Greek Representative should follow the work of the Commission.4 On August 22d he had been obliged to inform the Supreme Council that his representative, Colonel Mazarakis, was not allowed to be present at the taking of testimony, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses.5 The Commission had declared that it would confine itself to communicating the depositions to him. He, Mr. Venizelos, had protested against that decision, which was contrary to elementary rules of justice. Later on the Commission had made it known that the Greek representative would be put upon the same footing as the Turkish representative who was permitted to follow its work. Such similar treatment, offensive to an Allied people, forced him to protest. [Page 39] On the 14th of September he had again been obliged to protest because the Commission had refused to call the witnesses which the Greek Delegate had proposed should be heard, and because it had refused to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the testimony which had been taken. The President of the Conference had replied to him that the Greek Delegate was not entitled to insist on being present at all deliberations of the Commission, but that the minutes, including the hearings of witnesses, would be delivered to Colonel Mazarakis who could then present his observations thereon to the Commission before the latter reached its conclusions.6 Nevertheless the Commission had not wished to communicate to the Greek Delegate the depositions made before it on the pretext that secrecy had been promised certain witnesses. In so acting it had violated the most elementary principles of justice and it put, unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false testimony. He had addressed himself to the Conference which had answered that it could not go behind a promise given by the Commission.7 He wished to press this point upon the Council; an investigation conducted under such conditions could not be trustworthy. It was impossible thus to pass judgment upon the honor of an army without having given that army the means of defending itself. He felt that he was entitled to satisfaction, since it was a question of a State which had always been faithful to its alliances and friendships, and since this request was formulated by a representative of that State who had always borne himself loyally towards the Conference.

M. Clemenceau asked if General Bunoust had any remarks to make as to the materiality of the facts in question.

General Bunoust said that he did have some remarks to make. The Commission had never decided to communicate the depositions taken; it had unanimously decided that the depositions would lack sincerity if the Greek representatives had to be informed of them. The Turks would not have opened their mouths in the presence of a Greek officer. In spite of that precaution the Commission had sometimes had difficulty in finding witnesses; thus at Aidin no Turkish witnesses had been found. When the Supreme Council’s telegram of September 30th reached the Commission it had not yet ended its labors; it had only concluded the summary of the established facts and it had transmitted this in full to Colonel Mazarakis. Colonel Mazarakis had presented observations on this subject which the Commission had taken into account on one point.

M. Clemenceau asked whether, after the Commission had received the telegram of September 30th, it had taken depositions which it had not communicated to M. Venizelos’ representative.

[Page 40]

General Bunoust thought that the Commission might, after that date, have taken the second deposition of Colonel Smith.

M. Venizelos did not wish to insist upon that point. He felt, however, that he might say, without offending anyone, that civil investigators would have been more anxious not to violate cardinal principles of justice, and that they would not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without being sworn. At Aidin the Commission might well have taken non-Turkish testimony and have been satisfied therewith. He felt finally that he might remark that the procedure adopted inevitably exposed the investigators to the danger of being carried away by false depositions and reaching unjust or inaccurate conclusions. The animosity between Turks and Greeks was an incontestable fact; moreover, it was certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuance of the Turkish regime which, with respect to strangers, was a regime of special privileges, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime, which was a regime of equality.

M. Clemenceau asked if M. Venizelos did not intend to discuss the facts brought out in the report.

M. Venizelos said that he did not want to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been brought to the knowledge of the Greek representative.

M. Clemenceau observed that it was a serious matter to make such a reply. The Council had expected from M. Venizelos precise answers on questions of fact. As head of the Government he must know if the alleged facts had really happened. He was astonished that M. Venizelos did not wish to discuss them.

M. Venizelos recognized that there had been excesses but he thought that they were readily to be explained. He admitted equally that the conditions under which the debarkation took place created an administrative responsibility of the Greek Command. The Greek Government moreover had inflicted heavy penalties. But the Council could not forget that the day before the occupation the Turkish population had assembled, and that protests against the occupation had been posted up.

General Bunoust said that these posters were not appeals to resistance. The Turks were only asked to assemble in order to prove that the Turkish element was in the majority; the crowd of Turks, moreover, was not armed.

M. Venizelos observed that in any event there was a tendency to resistance, inasmuch as the day before civil prisoners had been released.

General Bunoust explained that they had only been released during the night preceding the debarkation. The Commission’s report, [Page 41] moreover, had recognized the responsibility of the Turkish Governor in these circumstances.

M. Venizelos added that stores of arms had been looted by the crowd. Under these conditions the debarkation took place. The officer commanding the Greek troops had been guilty of imprudence. The Council knew how gunshots, coming from parts unknown, had provoked a reply on the part of the Greek troops. A panic followed and that was the beginning of the excesses. He thought he ought to point out that the next day or the day after a Court-Martial had been organized, that in the first five days of its sitting this Court-Martial had condemned three Greeks to death, one of them being a looting soldier, and that it had totalled seventy-four convictions, of which forty-eight were of Greeks. Nothing more could be asked of the most civilized country. As for the massacre of the prisoners who were being led on board vessels in the harbor, Colonel Mazarakis’ investigation, which had resulted in severe condemnation of the Lieutenant commanding the escort, had established that the excesses of which the prisoners had been the victims were largely due to the crowd, and that only about twenty prisoners had been killed. In any event, forty-eight hours after the debarkation of the troops, order had been reestablished. He wished to ask General Bunoust if since that time the city had not been perfectly calm.

General Bunoust replied that such was the case.

M. Venizelos stated that Colonel Mazarakis did not agree with the Commission on the affair of Menemem. According to the Colonel, a Greek battalion which had evacuated Pergamum, after having suffered serious losses, while entering Menemem had been attacked by Turkish fanatics. This attack had provoked excesses. The Commission, which did not consider that Turkish aggression had been established as a fact, had certainly been led into error by the witnesses which it had heard; it spoke of three hundred Turks killed; according to his information, only twenty had been killed. It was evident that on this point an investigation in the nature of a cross-examination would have been suitable.

General Bunoust observed that the Commission had attached very little importance to the figures furnished it; it was perfectly aware of their inexactness. In any event it had not based its conclusions on a Turkish report, according to which one thousand were killed, but on an investigation made the day after the uprising by a French officer.

M. Venizelos stated that in the affair of Nazilli the fault lay with the Greek officer who, threatened with attack, thought he could evacuate the town prior to the time ordered by the English Admiral. In any event, in that affair, it was the Greeks who had suffered most. As [Page 42] for Aidin, he maintained that twenty-five hundred Greeks perished and that the number of Turkish victims was far less.

General Bunoust explained that the Commission had relied upon a French investigation, according to which there were reported to be about twenty-five hundred Greek victims and fifteen hundred Turkish. The estimation of the number of Turkish dead was moreover difficult on account of the exodus of the population.

M. Venizelos acknowledged that Aidin, occupied by the Greeks and then evacuated, had been re-occupied on an order given by him, which order had had unfortunate results. He wished to give the reasons which had caused him to issue that order. The Greeks were in a state of war with the Turks. If the Turks could boast of having expelled the Greeks from Aidin, their situation at Smyrna would have become impossible; therefore he had given the order to re-occupy the town. Moreover, he had informed the Council of what he was doing. Already, prior to that time, he had instructed the Greek military authorities not to hesitate, in the event of attack by Turkish bands, to go beyond the limits of the zone of occupation in order to break up centers of hostile resistance. In any event these incontestable facts remained: the Greek section of Aidin was entirely destroyed, twenty-five hundred out of eight thousand Greeks had perished, the Greek element formed the richest and most civilized part of the population; and it was the Greeks who had suffered most. He regretted that the procedure adopted by the Commission had not allowed the Turkish losses to be ascertained. Finally, he felt obliged to protest against the passage of the Commission’s report which repeated an accusation of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the effect that the Greek Red Cross had introduced arms into Smyrna.

General Bunoust observed that the Commission had not considered this accusation well founded.

M. Venizelos said that it was true that prior to the Greek occupation the Greek Sanitary Officer had insisted that the boxes of the Red Cross which were unloaded at the customs be not inspected, and that the Turkish Governor had consented thereto; but he could not allow the Greek Red Cross to remain under the shadow of suspicion. The Sheik-ul-Islam also pretended that the Greeks had taken advantage of their occupation to bring about an influx of Grecian population in those regions. That was entirely false: since the events of May, 1914, there had been in Greece 300,000 refugees from Asia Minor. He had ordered them to be repatriated, but it had been pointed out to him that the dwellings they had left were being inhabited by Turks whose lodging would have to be insured, and that the question was a delicate one. Under those circumstances the repatriation had been [Page 43] postponed. There had only been isolated cases of repatriation and he did not think that there were more than 5,000 or 6,000 who had returned. He felt sure that the excesses, which he deplored, had not gone beyond what should have been expected under analogous circumstances on the part of any army. The affair had certainly been exaggerated; moreover General Bunoust did not deny that severe punishment had been meted out to those found guilty. The Greek army had not deserved ill of its Allies and the Greeks had ensured the maintenance of order. If certain fugitive Turks had not returned to Smyrna that fact could be attributed to the pressure brought to bear on them by the Turks in the interior.

General Bunoust remarked that it was quite possible.

M. Clemenceau asked what was the importance of the Turkish bands with whom the Greeks had to deal?

General Bunoust said that the Commissioners had spent a day with these bands; and they did not seem to have great cohesion and they had no offensive capacity. The Nationalist movement, however, was a serious matter and it could arrest all military progress in Asia Minor unless an operation on a large scale should be decided upon.

M. Venizelos said that there was no question of that.

M. Clemenceau observed that that, however, was just what M. Venizelos had done. Greece had had a Mandate from the Conference and had not kept within the limits of that Mandate. Some members of the Council were wondering what would happen if the Turkish attacks should increase in severity. Could Greece, without the support of her Allies, make the necessary military and financial effort until such a time as the country should be completely pacified? That was the troublesome point.

M. Venizelos replied that certainly the longer the question was dragged out the more financial difficulties would increase for a small country such as Greece. She had an army of 12 divisions of 325,000 men; an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. He felt assured that if the Conference should charge Greece with the task of defeating Turkey she would be able to do so.

M. Clemenceau said that he had put the question the other way.

M. Venizelos said that with 12 divisions he had nothing to fear. Mustapha Kemal only had 70,000 men. It was evident that if the present situation was unduly prolonged Greece would have financial difficulties, but he hoped that would not be the case.

M. Clemenceau thanked M. Venizelos in the name of the Council for his presentation of the case. (At this point M. Venizelos left the room.)

[Page 44]

M. Clemenceau suggested that the discussion be postponed until the following Monday. (This was agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourned).

Appendix A to HD–878


Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjacent Territories


History of the Commission

Statement of the Facts
  • Annex I. Letter to Colonel Mazarakis
  • Annex II. Observations of Colonel Mazarakis
Establishment of the Responsibilities
Conclusions presented by the Commission

Covering Letter to the President of the Peace Conference

We have the honor to transmit to you the dossier, containing all the documents, relative to the investigations made in Asia Minor in conformity with your decision of July 22 [18th?], 1919.10

Besides the Minutes of the meetings and their annexes, among which are the full texts of the testimony of the witnesses,10a the dossier includes, in conformity with the instructions given in your telegram of July 26th,11 the following:

1. A statement of the facts which have occurred since the occupation.

This statement, which follows a chronological order as far as is possible, sets forth all the facts which have seemed to us to have had a repercussion upon the events and in particular upon those which are related in the complaint addressed to the Peace Conference by the Sheik-ul-Islam.12

To this statement is attached the report drawn up by the Colonel designated by the Greek Government to follow the labors of the Commission.

This superior officer has received a copy of the statement of the facts established, but we have not felt called upon to communicate to him the sections on responsibilities and conclusions, believing that this [Page 45] mode of procedure was in conformity with the spirit of your instructions of July 22nd [18th?] and 26th mentioned above.

As we have informed you in our reply to your decision of September 30th, which was transmitted to you on October 3rd through the French High Commissioner in the Orient, we have not felt that we could communicate to the Greek representatives, without violating our promises, the testimony of the witnesses which were made to us under promise of secrecy.13

2. A section relative to the establishment of the responsibilities.

3. The conclusions presented by the Commission.

These conclusions were unanimously adopted.

The Members of the Commission:

  • R. H. Hare
  • Bunoust
  • A. Dall’Olio
  • Mark Bristol

History of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjacent Territories

The Commission of Inquiry was created as a result of a complaint addressed by the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Peace Conference dated July 15th.

It was composed of the following members:

For America: Rear Admiral Bristol.
For France: Brigadier-General Bunoust.
For England: Brigadier-General Hare.
For Italy: Lieutenant-General Dall’Olio.

Lieutenant Luigi Villari was chosen Secretary General; the other officers attached to the Commission are the following:

  • For the United States of America: Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant Stewart (later replaced by Lieutenant Jones), Mr. Caessbrough (interpreter of Turkish).
  • For France: Lieutenant Rumerchène, Sub-Lieutenant Vitalis (interpreter of Greek) and Sub-Lieutenant Dugoureq.
  • For Great Britain: Commander Thomson (interpreter of Turkish), Captain Harris and Lieutenant Higham (during the stay of the Commission in Asia Minor).
  • For Italy: Lieutenant Villari and Lieutenant de Bosis.

The first meeting was held at the Italian Embassy at Constantinople on August 12th. At that time, it was unanimously decided that the Presidency would be held in turn by each member of the Commission, that if two meetings were held on the same day, they would be presided over by the same Commissioner, and that each meeting at Constantinople [Page 46] would be held at the Embassy of the country whose representative was President for the day.

Six meetings were held at Constantinople, the last on the 19th of August. The Commission then went to Smyrna, where it met for the first time on August 23rd, at the École Sultanieh, which had been placed at its disposal by the Turkish authorities. Twelve meetings were held at Smyrna; the last (the 18th) being on September 5th.

On September 6th, the Commission left for Aidin, where it remained until the 12th of the month. Three meetings were held at Aidin; on September 10th, the Commission went to Girova, in the Italian zone, to hear the testimony of Turkish refugees from Aidin. On the 11th, the Commission went to Nazilli, in the zone occupied by the forces of the Turkish National Movement, where they questioned, among others, Greek refugees who had also fled from Aidin.

On the 12th, the Commission returned to Smyrna, where it held nine more meetings; four others were held respectively at Odemisch, at Menemen, at Magnesia and at Aivali. The last meeting at Smyrna (the 35th) was held on September 26th. Having completed the taking of testimony, with the exception of that to be given by some witnesses who were to be found at Constantinople, the Commission returned to that city, where it met for the Thirty-Sixth Session on October 1st. Eleven more meetings were held there, the last being on October 15th.

The total number of meetings held was forty-six.

The number of witnesses heard was 175, belonging to all nationalities and to every social order.

The dossier is made up in the following manner:

At each meeting the testimony of witnesses, the decisions of the Commission and in the most important cases, even the discussions have been recorded. A short résumé of the minutes, indicating the questions which were discussed or decided and the names of the witnesses questioned is annexed thereto, as well as the letters, reports and other documents bearing particularly upon the meeting in question.

The other documents are compiled in a special dossier.

The final report of the Commission consists of three parts.

The established facts, forming a chronological statement of the events which the Commission considered;
A statement of the responsibilities which in the opinion of the Commission may be deduced from the established facts, and
The conclusions and recommendations which the Commission has felt useful to propose with a view towards remedying the abnormal conditions, as stated, in the territory’s present situation.
The Secretary General
Lieutenant Luigi Villari
[Page 47]

Statement of Facts Which Have Arisen Since the Occupation and Which Have Been Established During the Inquiry Between August 12 and October 6, 1919

1. Since the Armistice,14 the safety of the Christians in the Vilayet of Aidin has not been threatened.

The Greek population unquestionably was persecuted in 1914 and during the war and treated without any consideration during the first few months which followed the Armistice by the Vali Noureddin Pacha, but since the entering upon his duties of the present Vali, Izzet Bey, all the inhabitants, without distinction between races, have been treated with impartiality.

In spite of the presence of a few bands of brigands in the region, it is an assured fact that quiet has been restored.

Fears of massacres of Christians were not justified. Investigations prove that the proclamations calling the Moslems to a massacre of the Greeks, which a few weeks before the landing fell into the hands of the Greek authorities and which were sent to Athens, were not written by Turkish gendarmery officers whose signatures are attached to the proclamations. Those documents are certainly not authentic.

2. The conditions of security in the Vilayet of Aidin and at Smyrna, in particular, did not at all justify the occupation of the Smyrna forts by application of Article 7 of the Armistice conditions. (See the Minutes of the 37th meeting for the reservation made in this connection by General Dall’Olio, the Italian Commissioner.)15

The internal situation in the Vilayet did not call for the landing of Allied troops at Smyrna.

On the contrary, since the Greek landing, the situation is troubled because of the state of war existing between the Greek troops and the Turkish irregulars.

3. The Smyrna forts were occupied on May 14th, 1919, by the Allied forces (British, French, Italian and Greek) upon the order of Admiral Calthorpe, of the British Navy, one of the Allied High Commissioners in Turkey for the execution of the terms of the Armistice. The order of occupation stated that it was being carried out in execution of Article 7 of the Armistice between Turkey and the Allied powers.

4. During the night of May 14th-15th, as a result of a proclamation, a meeting of several thousand Turks took place in the Turkish quarter near the Jewish Cemetery, but this meeting did not have as an object [Page 48] the organization of a resistance by force to the Greek landing. Its object was merely to prove that the majority and predominating population was Turkish rather than foreign.

5. The occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops was ordered by the Peace Conference.16 The orders for the occupation were given by Admiral Calthorpe, representing this Conference.

The city of Smyrna was occupied on May 15th, 1919, by Greek forces, assisted by American, British, French, Greek and Italian naval forces.

The British, French, Italian and American naval forces landed small armed detachments to guard their respective consulates.

The Greek naval forces landed a detachment for the purpose of guarding the points of debarkation of the Greek troops. This unit was insufficient to preserve order and carry out its mission.

The Greek forces were composed of three regiments. The landing took place on the point and upon the quay opposite the Hotel Kramer. The troops began to land at 8:00 a.m.

6. No resistance to the landing was organized by the Turkish authorities; the shots fired by the Turks were only isolated cases.

7. Several hundred prisoners of all kinds escaped from the prisons in the neighborhood of the barracks a few hours before the occupation.

The Turkish authorities did not take effective measures to prevent or stop these escapes.

Some of these prisoners were able to procure arms from an arms-depot situated near the barracks.

8. The Greek Supreme Command took no previous measures to insure order during the march of the Greek troops through the city. Detachments of Greek marines were only placed in the immediate neighborhood of the two points chosen for the landing. In conformity with the orders of the Entente representative, the Turkish troops were kept in their barracks.

No liaison was established which would permit the Greek Command to have its orders transmitted to the Turkish authorities and in order to inform itself of the state of morale of the population.

9. The Greek military, civil and religious authorities did nothing to attempt to calm the crowd.

The ceremony performed by the Greek Metropolitan of blessing the troops upon their landing could only have had an unfortunate effect.

The crowd massed about the troops assumed an attitude of a kind to bring forth the anger of the Turkish inhabitants and to compel acts of violence on the part of isolated fanatics.

[Page 49]

10. The orders concerning the landing were not strictly carried out. They were modified, without the consent of the Command, as a result of the intervention of the Commander of the Averoff, who had been advised of the formation of numerous Turkish gatherings in the direction of Carantina.

The Evzone companies which were to land at Carantina in order to occupy the hills which dominate the city on the south were brought to the Custom’s quay where they were landed behind other units of the regiment. As for the itineraries followed, the commanders of the columns acted according to the directions in guides which were given them. They did not know that the Turkish troops were confined in their barracks near the Konak.

11. The first shots were fired near the corner of the Konak Square, at the entrance of the street which leads to Cocarialy.

It is impossible to establish with certainty by whom these first shots were fired. The Greek troops did not open fire and only replied to these first shots.

12. As a result of these first shots severe firing broke out. The Greek soldiers who were in the gardens of the Konak Square directed a violent fire against the windows of the barracks and the Konak.

It was impossible to ascertain exactly whether shots were fired from certain windows of the barracks after the beginning of the fusilade.

No traces of bullets were found upon the walls of the buildings opposite the barracks.

A few scattered shots appear also to have been fired by the Turks at certain points along the quays and in the city, in particular near the Greek Consulate, where according to Greek reports, the guard-detachment was obliged to protect itself by rifle shots against a Turkish attack.

13. On the road which they traversed between the Konak Square and the transport Patris, where they were imprisoned, the first convoys of prisoners, including officers and soldiers as well as the Vali and other officials, were made the object of acts of brutality by the crowd which accompanied them and even by some of the Greek soldiers who were escorting them.

All the prisoners were robbed. All of them were forced to shout: “Zito Venizelos” and to march with hands raised. Some of them were massacred.

With one or two exceptions, the Greek officers did not show any restraining influence upon their men to prevent these acts of violence.

14. On May 15th and on the following days, the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested about 2500 persons, among whom was a certain number of children under 14 years of age. The staffs and the students of [Page 50] some schools were also imprisoned on the Patris. A considerable number of these prisoners were maltreated, robbed, and detained for several days under hygienic conditions which were objectionable.

15. During May 15th and 16th, numerous acts of violence and pillage were carried out in the city against the Turkish people and their homes. Fezzes were torn off and Turks no longer dared to go out wearing them. Numerous women were violated. Some assassinations were committed. Most of the acts of violence and pillage were done by the Greek population of the city, but it has been established that the soldiers took part in them and that the military authorities were very late in taking proper measures to place a stop to them.

16. The number of killed and wounded by the Greek troops on the day of the Smyrna occupation has been calculated in a different manner by the Turkish and Greek authorities. The number is approximately as follows:

  • Greeks: soldiers: 2 killed, 6 wounded; civilians: 20 killed, 20 drowned, 60 wounded.
  • Turks: 300 to 400 victims (killed or wounded).

17. As soon as the news of the landing of the Greek forces at Smyrna became known in the surrounding villages, the Greek inhabitants began to pillage Turkish homes and to steal Turkish live-stock; some Turks were likewise killed in the different villages.

18. The colonel commanding the Greek occupation forces received on May 21st the telegram sent from Paris on May 20th by M. Venizelos which regulated the occupation conditions for the San jack of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali as well as for certain regions situated outside of the San jack of Smyrna.

19. Commodore Fitz-Maurice, the representative of the Entente after May 28th, received only on June 1st, instructions describing his powers vis-à-vis the Greek authorities in regard to the extension of the zone of occupation.

From the time of the departure of Admiral Calthorpe (May 21st) up to May 28th, the Entente representative was the French Vice-Admiral, Sagoy du Vauroux.

20. The High Commissioner of the Greek Government, who arrived at Smyrna on May 21st, acted contrary to the orders contained in the telegram of May 20th, by authorizing the colonel commanding the troops to give on May 23rd an order of operation which included:

The occupation of Aidin.
Intervention in the regions of Magnesia and Cassaba without having previously asked permission from the Entente representative.

The Greek High Commissioner has admitted before the Commission his responsibility concerning this affair.

[Page 51]

21. In order to justify the extension of the Greek zone, the Greek High Commissioner supports himself with the following:

Unverified information received by the military authorities according to which public safety was threatened in the above mentioned districts.
The interpretation given by the military authorities to the interviews held with the British Colonel Smith who had no authority to replace the Entente representative.

Colonel Smith had no knowledge of the telegram sent on May 20th by Mr. Venizelos to Colonel Zafiriou. He never gave the latter any authorization, even verbal, to proceed to Aidin, Magnesia and Cassaba. He had only pointed out to Colonel Zafiriou the utility of sending some troops along the railway line as far as Trianda to protect the line in the event that Colonel Zafiriou should have authorization to advance his troops.

Colonel Smith added that any occupation beyond Trianda might bring about disorders.

He informed his superior of this conversation.

22. The forward march and the installation of the Greek troops in the direction of Magnesia as well as at Eudemich, Aidin, and as far as Nazilli were first carried out under satisfactory circumstances in spite of the emotion in these districts caused by the news of the Smyrna events. The Greek Command committed an error in tolerating the acts of armed Greek civilians who under pretext of aiding the Greek troops indulged in pillage and committed all kinds of excesses.

A Court-Martial formed at Smyrna on May 16th by the Greek Command had pronounced (up to August 15th) seventy-four convictions, of which three were death sentences for the events of May 15th and 16th. Among those convicted were:

48 Greeks
13 Turks
12 Armenians
1 Jew

23. The state of excitement in the country caused by the Smyrna events increased progressively for the following reasons:

A great uncertainty reigned in regard to the territorial limits to be occupied by the Greek forces up to June 2nd, on which date, Commodore Fitz-Maurice of the British Navy was instructed to fix the limits of the occupation.
The rapid advance into the interior of the country by the Greek troops increased the state of unrest of the populations. Turkish notables began to leave the occupied region. The Turkish regular troops and the gendarmery deserted. The Greek civilians openly armed themselves. The activities of the brigands increased at the same time as the number of acts of violence, robberies, and pillages.
The search for arms made in Turkish homes by Greek troops aided by armed civilians increased to a maximum the discontent of the population, because of the fact that it was a violation of a Moslem domicile which constitutes a particularly vexatious measure susceptible of provoking great irritation.

This state of excitement in the Vilayet of Aidin created the appearance of disorders which would seem to justify the extension of the limits of occupation by the Greek forces.

24. The arms which the Greek civilians carried were probably furnished them since the armistice by smugglers operating between the islands and the coast.

There is no way of proving the accusation made by the Turks against the Greek Red Cross on the subject of landing, at Smyrna, arms contained in cases bearing the marks of this institution.

It has been proved only that during the month of February, on several occasions, a great number of cases were discharged from the Greek ship Adriaticos and were not inspected by the customs. Turkish witnesses, who have been heard, swear that certain of these cases contained arms and ammunition.

The Greek authorities permitted inspection of these cases by the Turkish customs officials only during the first days of March.

25. Ayassoulouk was occupied on May 25th;

Deunendjid was occupied on May 25th;

Baladjik was occupied on May 25th;

Aidin was occupied on May 27th;

Eudemich was occupied on June 1st;

Nazilli was occupied on June 3rd.

26. Certain small attacks carried out against Greek outposts by Turkish bands or insurgents brought about reprisals by the Greeks, some of which may have been justified by the military situation. All these reprisals were carried out in brutal manner. Some assassinations were committed here and there.

27. The evacuation of Nazilli was executed during the night of June 19th-20th upon the initiative of the commander of the battalion of occupation. This evacuation was not carried out in conformity with the orders of the Entente representative given on June 14th, whereby the Turkish local authorities were to have been warned in advance of the departure of the Greek troops.

28. The Greek military authorities explain their move by stating that the battalion commander feared an attack and that, in order not to give the enemy an opportunity to be aware of his retreat, he did not inform the Turkish authorities of his departure. Orders relative to the evacuation of Nazilli were not given by the Greek Command until the 19th.

29. After this departure the Turkish authorities did not have time to create an organization to preserve order which would replace the [Page 53] gendarmery which had been disarmed and disorganized during the Greek occupation. They were therefore not able to prevent the pillaging and the massacring of certain Greek families by Turkish bands which entered Nazilli a few hours after its evacuation by the Greeks.

30. The inhabitants, numbering about thirty, arrested at Nazilli by the Greeks as suspects were taken with the retreating troops.

One of them was killed en route under the pretext that he was not able to walk.

Some of the others were able to escape, but the majority were killed at the village of Kiosk during a fight which took place while the troops were passing through this village and during which a Greek officer was killed.

31. After the evacuation of Nazilli by the Greek troops, attacks on the part of the Turks against Greek outposts and isolated soldiers increased.

In the entire region of Aidin the population, Turkish as well as Greek, was armed.

32. The Greek troops carried out armed reconnaissance parties in the vicinity of Aidin. In the course of these reconnaissances some villages were burned.

On June 27th, one of these reconnoitering parties was repulsed by bands which followed it up to the outskirts of Aidin. The fighting continued the 28th. Beginning on the 28th, the attackers used 105 cm. cannons.

The Greeks fell back.

The commander and Greek witnesses state that shots were fired by the Turkish inhabitants against units of retreating Greek troops at the time when they were passing through the Turkish quarter south of the railway line. Some of the fires which broke out in the Turkish quarter on the morning of the 29th began during the fighting.

Other fires also broke out in this quarter at different isolated spots.

A large number of Turks, men, women and children, who tried to escape from this quarter which was in flames were killed without cause by the Greek soldiers who were guarding all the roads and streets leading from this quarter towards the northern part of the city.

The Command and the Greek troops undoubtedly lost their tempers.

The Greeks evacuated the city during the night of June 29th–30th after having committed numerous outrages and crimes. A large number of Greek civilians who wished to flee and to accompany the troops on their retreat were prevented from doing so by the Command.

33. The fire in the Greek quarter was caused by the Turkish bands under chief Yuruk Ali which entered the town on the morning of June 30th and burned it entirely after having pillaged the houses, the occupants of which were killed.

[Page 54]

A large number of the Greek inhabitants met in the streets were, without distinction for sex or age, killed unmercifully by the bands.

The inhabitants, numbering from 2,000 to 3,000, who escaped death but not robbery, were those who took refuge, before the arrival of the bands, in the convent of the French nuns, whence they were taken to the Konak under the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commanding the Turkish 57th Division.

At the same time, some notables who were able to get to the Konak were able to save their lives, but on the other hand some of them were executed.

It was not possible to establish with certainty the number of Greek or Turkish victims.

The representative of the Greek Government heard by the Commission on September 7th estimates that the number of Greek victims was about 2,000; 900 bodies up to this time had already been found. An English witness estimates this number to be about 400.

A French officer who made an investigation on the spot a few days after the events calculates the number of victims to be as follows:

  • 1,500 to 2,000 Greeks;
  • 1,200 to 1,500 Turks;

recognizing, however, that it has been very difficult to make the estimate of Turkish victims.

34. The Greek troops, aided by re-enforcements sent by General Nider, retook Aidin on July 4th. They burned the Turkish quarter, situated on the west side of the city, where were also located some Greek factories.

35. All together the fires between June 29th and July 4th have certainly destroyed two-thirds of the city of Aidin, the population of which was about 20,000 including approximately 8,000 Greeks.

The houses that were not burned were all pillaged.

36. Before the return of the Greeks to Aidin, the greatest part of the Turkish population left the city and surroundings in order to take refuge in the Italian Zone or in the Nazilli-Denizli region, where they still remain.

A thousand Greeks were taken into the Turkish zone, where, at the time of the visit of the Commission to Nazilli on September 11th, they were in a very miserable state.

37. The re-occupation of Aidin was ordered by the Greek Command in spite of the strict orders to the contrary by the Entente representative.

The Greek authorities acted in conformity with the formal order sent from Paris by M. Venizelos on July 2nd. This order did not permit any intervention in this matter by the Entente representative.

38. Most of the villages situated along the railway line between Baladjik and Aidin were destroyed by the fires started during the [Page 55] course of the military operations which were carried out in this region.

39. Calm has now been practically re-established, with the exception of the zone close to the front where skirmishes between the advanced posts are still taking place which are causing losses and which require military measures from which the inhabitants are suffering.

It is the same in the region of Eudemich where the Greek occupation was made under good conditions.

40. The occupation of the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek forces has caused great material losses insofar as the crops and property are concerned.

The losses in crops, which are impossible to estimate, are due to pillaging and thefts and to the destruction of the live-stock, a part of which was taken for provisions by the Greek troops.

Destruction to property, of less importance, was the result of military operations and the combats which occurred between the Greek forces and the Turkish bands.

Other losses which were very considerable were due to the burning of houses, of villages and of the city of Aidin. It may be estimated that the losses resulting from the fire at Aidin represent an approximate value of 8,000,000 pounds sterling.

When the Turkish inhabitants abandoned their homes and fled from the districts occupied by the Greeks, they left their crops standing or abandoned them. The losses in beans, licorice root, and in figs may be estimated at 1,200,000 pounds.

The olive crop will suffer likewise, if conditions do not become better before the month of November.

41. Pergamos was occupied on June 12th. Since this city is in the northern part of the Smyrna Sanjack, the Greeks had the right to occupy it, in accordance with the orders of the Entente given in the telegram of May 20th.17

The Commission did not go to Pergamos.

From the information secured, which is worthy of consideration, it appears that the Turkish irregulars who retook Pergamos, killed the Turkish inhabitants who had welcomed the Greeks. They also massacred and frequently tortured all the Greek soldiers made prisoners during the course of this affair at Pergamos.

42. On June 17th, after the evacuation of Pergamos, the Greek troops who regathered at Menemen, without any real reason, indulged in a veritable massacre of unoffending Turks. The municipal authorities state that more than 1,000 Turkish inhabitants were killed, but this number seems to be exaggerated. According to an investigation [Page 56] made on the day following the event by a French officer, the number of Turkish victims was 200 dead and 200 wounded.

This massacre was not organized by the Greek Command. It was the result of a panic which ensued among the young troops, unseasoned and tired, who were still affected by the Pergamos events and whom their officers were not able to calm.

43. The Greek Military Command states that the Greek behavior was the result of an attack by Turks who, from a house near the station and from the Konak, fired shots at the Greek soldiers.

Numerous witnesses were heard on this subject. The Greeks were indefinite and on some occasions contradictory.

The Commission feels that the statements of the Greek Command cannot be considered correct.

44. The occupation of Magnesia, outside of the limits of the San-jack of Smyrna, took place on May 25th, without the authorization of the Entente representative, and without this high authority having been informed.

For military reasons, this occupation was extended and maintained as far as Ahmedli on the east and as far as Papazli to the northeast of Magnesia. The Greek troops even temporarily occupied AkHissar, but did not remain there.

The occupation of the Magnesia zone was carried out in the beginning without any difficulties. The relations between the population and the Greek troops became less cordial following the bad treatment to which some of the inhabitants were subjected in the way of looting and thefts committed on certain properties and because of searches made for the purpose of finding weapons.

The Turkish civil authorities have remained at Magnesia with the exception of the Mufti, who, called to Smyrna by the Greek authorities, fled to Constantinople.

The present situation is peaceful. Correct relations exist between the General commanding the division of occupation and the Turkish authorities.

45. After the Armistice, Greek bands from Mytilene made several raids in the vicinity of Aivali, stealing from and killing some Moslems. Reprisals were carried out by certain Turks of this district. These reciprocal acts of brigandage have not prevented the situation from being normal and satisfactory.

Beginning with the first day of the occupation of Aivali, the military authorities enrolled and armed Greek demobilized soldiers and civilians. They conducted themselves in a very bad manner and especially were accused of having burned two villages. A short time afterwards they were disarmed and dismissed.

[Page 57]

The Turkish population is very much in the minority at Aivali where at the present time, there are not more than 20 Moslems.

The district is quiet but commerce has almost entirely ceased.

46. The Turkish refugees who left the territories occupied by the Greeks appear to be detained far away from their domicile, either by a lack of confidence in the Greeks or by the Turkish irregulars who are holding them back, perhaps for political purposes.

The number of these refugees is very large. The Commission was not able to estimate it exactly.

In certain regions, such as in the Valley of the Meander, entire villages, even among those which have not been burned, have had to be abandoned.

47. With reference to the bringing of Greeks into the province of Smyrna described in the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam, Moustapha Sabir, to the Peace Conference, the investigation has shown that:

According to the telegram sent on May 7/20 by M. Venizelos the occupation had partly the object of making possible the repatriation of the refugees present in Greece to the Smyrna Sanjack and the Kaza of Aivali.
In certain districts and in particular at Pergamos and Phocée, the Greek refugees installed themselves and this was facilitated by an exodus on the part of the Turkish population.
Because of the trouble that accompanied the occupation, the Greek authorities gave the order to stop mass repatriation. A few families in good circumstances and whose means of existence were known were the only ones authorized to return.

Other refugees were without doubt able to return by landing outside of the ports where the Greek customs exercised their control, but their number could not be large.

The accusation brought by the Sheik-Ul-Islam is not therefore entirely justified.

The Members of the Commission of Inquiry:

Admiral Bristol

Delegate of the United States of America
General Hare

Delegate of Great Britain
General Bunoust

Delegate of France
General Dall ’Olio

Delegate of Italy

Annexes to the Statement of Facts

annex i. letter from the commission to colonel mazarakis, appointed by the greek government to follow the work of the commission

We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your report of October 11, 1919, which we requested in our letter of October 7, in [Page 58] order that the Peace Conference, after having taken cognizance of the statement of the facts established by the Commission, may at the same time take note of the observations which the reading of this document may have suggested to you.

Your report will be attached to the dossier on the investigation in the same place as the statement which brought it about.

The various papers which you have transmitted to the Commission during the investigation and to which you allude in your report will also be attached to the dossier.

The Commission has taken note of the observations which you have presented under No. 14 in regard to the occupation of Aivali and has modified the text of No. 45 of its statement. We are transmitting to you a corrected copy attached herewith.

As you were informed during the meeting of October 13th, there is no cause for you to be surprised when you learn that, upon certain points, the opinion of the Commission is not in accordance with yours in spite of the statements of witnesses which you have produced.

In fact, not only does the appreciation of the same fact differ according to the individuals, but also, in view of the contradictions, all too numerous, which have unfortunately been presented in the Greek and Turkish testimony, the Commission has sometimes felt obliged, in order to try to bring out the truth, to attach particular importance to the testimony or to the reports emanating from persons not belonging to nations too directly interested in the settlement of the Smyrna question.

In conclusion, after having deliberated, the Commission has felt that, with the exception of the change made in the drafting of No. 45, there is no occasion for modification of its original statement which was unanimously adopted.

  • R. H. Hare
  • Bunoust
  • A. Dall’Olio
  • Mark Bristol

annex ii.—observations * of colonel alexandre mazarakis on the statement of the interallied commission of inquiry

1. In paragraph No. 1, it is stated that since the Armistice, the security of Christians has not been threatened in the Vilayet of Aidin. Nevertheless, the Commission admits that not only since 1914 and during the war had the Greek population been incontestably persecuted, [Page 59] but also during the first months which followed the Armistice they were not treated with any consideration. The Commission also admits the presence of certain bands of brigands, but states that fears of massacres were not justified.

The Commission will allow me to be influenced by the fact that the study of history and the recent experiences in regard to the welfare of the Christian populations in Turkey does not justify this statement. All the massacres and all the persecutions which have many times provoked European intervention have not been foreseen, and consequently, this intervention always arrived too late, after the acts were committed. Let me call to the attention of the Commission that a list of murders, acts of brigandage, and persecutions of all kinds committed by the Turks between the Armistice and the occupation of Smyrna has been transmitted to it; that a large part of the Greek population during this period found itself and even now finds itself exiled in Greece, having abandoned all of its lands occupied by the Turks, whereas the rest returned from the interior of Asia Minor, where they had been transported, reduced in number to a half or a third, in a terrible state of misery and ill-health, deprived of all means of reestablishing themselves and living. Under these circumstances, I regret that I cannot agree with the Commission that peace had been restored and that the fears for a new outbreak of Moslem fanaticism had no foundations, particularly on the eve of the decisions of the Peace Conference which naturally could and would increase this fanaticism.

2. The Commission feels (No. 2) that the occupation of the forts and the city of Smyrna was not justified by the application of the Armistice. It is not for me to set forth the reasons why the Peace Conference ordered this occupation and specified that it should be carried out by Greek troops. Nevertheless, I take the liberty of observing that the execution of the Armistice was illusory; that the arms theoretically kept in the store-houses were, as facts have proved, at the disposal of the Turks; that the irregulars, tolerated if not encouraged by the Turkish authorities, were armed even with heavy artillery; that, without this occupation, the return, the installation in their seized homes, and the work of the Greek refugees would not have been possible; that finally, without entering into the plans of the Peace Conference concerning the fate of this region, which however should have played a role in the choice of the Army of Occupation, this choice was sufficiently justified by the fact that compact Greek populations have inhabited this region for centuries. As a matter of fact, alone in the San jack of Smyrna and the Caza of Aivali, before 1914, there were 495,174 Greeks and 219,583 Turks. If this population was reduced during the war by persecutions, famine and murders, there was all the more reason why the victorious Entente [Page 60] took measures for its full protection. I therefore believe that this occupation was not only justified but dictated by justice, public morality and ethnological reasons more than all other occupations carried out by the victorious Allies.

3. The Commission states that since the landing of the Greeks the situation has been disturbed on account of the state of war. I should like to request that the Commission kindly recognize, as it has done in many of the following paragraphs, that in the zone occupied by the Greek Army peace and order has been re-established since the first days, whereas the situation is disturbed and even anarchy reigns in the neighboring non-occupied regions, and that the situation would be completely peaceful if this indecision ceased. The Greek authorities would be able to carry out their duties, and the attacks from outside and the hope of influencing the decisions of the Conference would not encourage the Turks to exhibit any outburst of national feeling, if, on the contrary, the Turks knew that the Army of Occupation sent by the Conference would respect their rights, but would not tolerate in a passive manner attacks against its security or its dignity. The history of all occupations of the past and of present times, much more eventful and longer, is here to prove that no army ever before found itself in a like situation and exhibited greater coolness, self-denial and discipline, and consequently it would be unfair to hold this Army responsible for certain isolated deeds, such as one may find even in time of peace and in the most civilized countries.

4. The Commission states (No. 4) that an assembling of several thousand Turks took place on the night before the occupation, but believes that this assembly did not have for its object the organizing of a resistance by force to the landing of the Greeks. It states also (No. 7) that several hundred prisoners of all sorts escaped from the prisons some hours before the occupation, that the Turkish authorities did not take effective measures to anticipate and prevent the escape, that some of these prisoners obtained arms from the nearby arms-depot, and finally, that the shots fired by the Turks (No. 6) were isolated acts.

The Commission will permit me to say that I am unable to assert with the same certainty that the object of the Turks in assembling was so peaceful after the provoking proclamations in the mosques, in the press and in public places, after the liberation and arming of prisoners and taking into consideration that it really matters little, from the point of view of responsibilities, if the shots fired against the Greek army were the result of an organization or the initiative of some individuals. The Greek Army at a time when it was attacked unexpectedly while marching in columns of fours with arms unloaded [Page 61] could not make this distinction; it was obliged, as any other army would be, to take severe steps to check the movement and to arrest the guilty and the suspected.

I must further observe with regret that while the assembling of Turks is judged with leniency, the religious ceremony and the expression of a natural feeling on the part of the Greek population are considered (No. 9) of a nature to provoke the anger of the Turkish inhabitants and to inspire acts of violence. If one wishes in the same manner to discover the underlying reason for the outburst of Turkish fanaticism it is much more natural to seek it in the presence of a victorious foe of despised Christians; yet it is difficult to avoid this agitation without leaving under the rule of a conquered enemy the Christian populations which have suffered so much for five centuries and whose feelings are at least as worthy of consideration as those of their oppressors.

Wherever after victory Allied troops occupied a country up to that time under the yoke of the enemy, the kindred peoples welcomed them with real joy. If by foresight the Greek command ought to have acted with greater circumspection, I would have been the first to say so openly in my report. There is no reason for attributing the Turkish attack to the expression of sentiments by the Greek population when it is incontestable that right up to the moment when the first shots were fired by the Turks not one hostile act against them had been made.

I must also observe (No. 9) that there were no Greek civil authorities and that the military authorities naturally absorbed for several hours with the military aspect—the crushing of the resistance—were not able immediately to insure order in a large city containing such a variety of elements and which the Turkish gendarmery had left without any means for maintaining order.

I recall also that it was not a matter of some scattered shots fired by the Turks, but of a fusillade kept up not only in the neighborhood of the Konak and the barracks but all along the road which the first contingents of troops had to pass over in order to reach their objective, the crest at Carantina.

5. The Commission states (No. 14) that on the 15th day of May and succeeding days the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested about 2500 people. In a country where the Army of Occupation is attacked, where everyone is armed, I do not see how order could have been reestablished unless the military authorities had proceeded to arrest the guilty or those suspected. The procedure of arrest of ordinary times could not have been followed under circumstances when in reality there existed a state of war. Immediately after the re-establishment of order a Commission of which the Mufti was a member visited the prisoners and liberated the greater number.

[Page 62]

If, during the first day, some acts of pillage or ill-treatment took place with regard to these prisoners and, in general, throughout the town, the military authorities were the first to suppress them. This was done with so much severity that order was almost completely reestablished by the following day.

The Commission, moreover, will allow me to believe that a number of these crimes, notably cases of rape, took place only in the imagination of those who have made the charges. While I was at Smyrna several complaints of this sort were acknowledged, after a careful inquiry, as originating from women of doubtful morals. Besides, I cannot understand why these acts of which the Turks complain so readily are not reported immediately to the Greek authorities, who have acted with extreme severity in the rare cases where the guilt was proved, and I regret that I cannot place any confidence in the words of the witnesses who knew that they would not be contradicted, since their accusations were made in secret.

6. As for the number of Turkish victims at Smyrna, (No. 16) at Aidin, or elsewhere, free scope was given for the most fantastic estimates, especially in view of the fact that a large number of the Turkish inhabitants, having fled from the occupied zones, might easily be recorded among the disappeared as victims of the Greeks.

7. As for the excitement caused in the Vilayet of Aidin (No. 23), permit me to believe that it would be quickly allayed if the Turkish population were held accountable by a firm decision of the Conference fixing definitely the future of the country. The proof of this is that for almost a month the occupation of the whole region actually taken possession of, Magnesia, Eudemich, Aidin and even Nazilli, has been accomplished, as the Commission knows, under satisfactory conditions. I add also that nearly 150 zéibek who were outlaws in the mountains delivered themselves up to the Greek military authorities, promised to live quietly, and have been set free. Also, in almost all of the occupied towns the Mussulman population has given a warm welcome to the Greek troops. Therefore I agree entirely with the Commission that the uncertainty which exists on the subject of the limits of the territory to be occupied by Greek forces has helped to create and to increase the excitement, adding that this uncertainty has existed for five months, and I am also convinced that all the agitation on the part of the Turks would be removed as if by a miracle on the day when they were to see themselves confronted with a definite decision from the Conference, when they could hope no longer for this agitation to influence this decision, and when they would know that the Greek army would have a free hand to defend the region which has been given her. I believe that the false situation in which the Greek army has been placed and still finds itself placed is the principal reason, if not the only reason, for the unrest of the Turks. [Page 63] Furthermore, in spite of all the complaints which they were able to present, we have sufficient proof that the Turkish inhabitants, who left their homes at the beginning, ask only to return, convinced that they could live quietly, but they are prevented from doing so by the bands. Several of these Turks, eluding the vigilance of the bands, have returned, notably in the regions of Pergamos and Magnesia.

The Commission in part attributes (No. 23) the unrest in the country to the searches made for the purpose of finding arms. These searches were the most legitimate and logical means which an Army of Occupation could take in a country where the Turkish population was armed and nearly all the magazines pillaged. Yet, except in isolated cases where the military authorities had found themselves obliged to enter houses from which shots were fired or where they were convinced that arms were hidden, the military command and the High Commissioner strongly insisted that these searches not be made, with the consequence that the entire Turkish population, particularly at Aidin, was armed, and Colonel Skinas, who was accused before a court-martial of not having taken measures to guard against the sad events which occurred in that town, defended himself by citing the formal orders which he had not to search Turkish houses. The Turks well knew of this defense and that is why all the proclamations of the military authorities calling upon the inhabitants to give up their arms were without any effect, and even today, we are certain that all the Turkish population is armed.

And so, I respectfully ask the Commission when it states that Greek civilians, who have lived for five years in terror, were carrying arms, to be kind enough at least to acknowledge that the Turkish populations were as well armed and to add that almost all the magazines were plundered in spite of the terms of the Armistice.

8. The Commission will be kind enough to recognize that the charges made by the Turks against the Greek Red Cross on the subject of arms contained in its boxes cannot be supported. It is stated, however, that these boxes were unloaded in the month of February and that several Turkish witnesses swore that they contained arms. Nothing is easier than to make charges without any proof. The Greek Red Cross was under no obligation to present its boxes of goods to the inspection of the Turkish authorities; if this was done voluntarily, it was to place an end to the slanderous charges of the Turkish press. I have already explained to the Commission that these boxes contained clothing for the refugees and that the boxes were shown in the hospital by the Director to Turkish functionaries and also to the Attorney-General. I note, incidentally, that these functionaries as well as the Turkish population poured into the hospital to be cared for and to receive medicines and that the Vali himself [Page 64] went there on Easter Day. The fine services which were rendered by this institution to all classes of the population, without distinction of race or religion, proved by statistics which have been given to you not only at Smyrna, but in all the surrounding countries, have been repaid by the Turks in the form of this slander as well as by the murder of Dr. Manolas, Director of the Bed Cross at Makri. Under these circumstances I beg the Commission to consider whether it is just to retain, even incidentally, an accusation which has not been proved.

9. The Commission states (No. 29) that at Nazilli, after the retreat of the Greek Battalion, the Turks massacred Greek families and pillaged their houses, and attributes these acts to the disorganization and to the lack of time on the part of the Turkish authorities. I may be permitted to believe, after the experience of Pergamos, where the Kaimakam and the Turkish officers directed the massacres, of Aidin, where the Division Commander was in the town while wholesale massacres were carried out, that in reality there is not any distinction between the Turkish authorities and the irregulars. Indeed, it is curious that the Turkish accounts published in the press state that the brigands were master of the situation at Nazilli.

I beg the Commission to be kind enough to state also that these massacres took place not only in the town of Nazilli, but also in the surrounding villages. At Aktché 47 Greeks were killed and the priest burned alive. At Kiosk 47 were killed, one of whom was a doctor and another the priest, who had their noses and ears cut off and eyes gouged out beforehand. At Sultan Hissar, 3 were killed and 7 wounded. At Omourlou more than 90 Greeks were killed, and since the reoccupation 70 bodies have been found.

10. In recounting the events at Aidin, the Commission states (No. 32, page 6) that a large number of Turks, men, women, and children who tried to go out of the burning quarter, were wantonly slain by the Greek soldiers who evacuated the city during the night of the 29th and 30th, after having committed many assaults and crimes.

I can only express my surprise at such a statement. I have followed the numerous inquiries which were made regarding these events, and where Mussulmen, Armenians, etc., have testified, I have myself with persistence tried to find out by interrogating all the soldiers and civilians present, if such acts had really been committed. The conclusion which I have drawn from all this inquiry is that the Turks, whether irregulars or inhabitants of the town, fired upon the army, that the army replied, and that naturally there were victims on both sides during this combat which lasted almost two days. And so I feel justified in not giving credence to the statements of witnesses who have described these events according to this point of view. I wonder also how it would be possible to estimate the number of Turkish victims, since almost the entire Turkish population, conscious of its guilt, followed the irregulars before the reoccupation of the city.

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I am also unable to admit that the Greek survivors were at the Konak under the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commander of the 57th Ottoman Division. I believe on the contrary that this officer, who enter Aidin with the bands, is also responsible for the cruelties committed and all the more so since it is proved that several of the Greek notables were led from the Konak and executed without the protection of this superior officer being in evidence.

If one wants to find the underlying cause for the misfortune of Aidin, it may be found in the strictness in spirit with which the Command executed the orders which he had not to pass to the south of the city, which he interpreted as forbidding even the most elementary measures of security for his troops and forbidding him to proceed to disarming, all of which permitted the Turkish inhabitants to attack the troops in concert with the irregulars. Granted that their execution was unfortunate, these orders, showing the loyalty of the Greek commander and the profit which the enemy derived from them, are worthy of attracting the attention of the Commission.

11. The Commission states (No. 40) that the occupation of the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek forces has caused great material losses. I may be permitted to consider that these losses, of which indeed the Greeks, particularly at Aidin, have suffered the greatest part, are not due to the Greek occupation which for almost one month caused practically no material loss, but to the irregular Turks who were the aggressors at Pergamos, Nazilli, and Aidin.

12. The Commission considers (Nos. 42 and 43) as inexact the statement of Greek witnesses concerning the shots fired by the Turks at Menemen against the Greek soldiers and which provoked the trouble in that town. Yet, the inquiry which was made the following day on these events by the military judge, M. Papageorges, and the former Mussulman prefect of Drama, M. Naib Zade Bey, as well as that made by Captain Apostolakis and the statements of more than twenty witnesses which I have personally examined are unanimous in agreement on this subject, and particularly regarding the murder of a Greek corporal and the shots fired from the house of Hassan Azap and from the Konak, as well as the number of victims, which is estimated at 40.

I am not in a position to know the reasons for which the Commission has arrived at this conclusion and which have outweighed the importance and veracity of the testimony heard, and consequently, I can only call attention to this disparity which perhaps would never have existed if the procedure had been that which was originally proposed by the Greek Government.

13. The Commission states (No. 44) that the occupation of the region of Magnesia was made without difficulty and that later the relations [Page 66] between the Turkish population and the Greek troops grew worse in consequence of ill-treatment, searching of houses, etc.

I am sorry, but I must protest against the charge always made exclusively against the Army of Occupation as a consequence of complaints on the part of the Turks. From the very beginning, I have submitted to the Commission a long list which contained the names of 115 Greek victims of Turkish bands in the region of Magnesia; in the same report were described the wholesale massacres of Greeks at Yorktchékioi, Papazli, Yakakioi, etc.

I therefore would request the Commission, once it has determined it suitable to state the grievances of the Turks, to be kind enough to record also in its report the massacres of Greeks in this region, whose lives are surely of a value equal to any damages mentioned, and without the recording of which the reading of the summary would give an impression that does not correspond to the actual facts.

I do not know whether the Commission learned, during its visit to Magnesia, that many Turkish inhabitants, having escaped from the surveillance of the bands, are returning to their homes. This is a fact which proves more than any statement or complaint, prepared with a political motive, how great is the confidence of the Mussulman population in the justice and order which now exists in the occupied zone in contrast to the lawlessness and repression exercised by the bands in the unoccupied zone.

14. The Commission expressed an opinion with regard to the sentiments of half the Greek population of Aivali (No. 45, page 4) which has caused me great surprise. I do not understand how the Commission can pretend that it learned the sentiments of the Greek population in Aivali, since in the few hours it remained there, it did not have time to hear, with the exception of the military and religious authorities, a single one of the many residents who were waiting to be heard, a list of whom I had submitted. Even in the event that any one person had been able to furnish this opinion, I believe that it should not be given a place in the form of a categorical statement by the Commission itself, without its having been confirmed by a much more general and more profound investigation among the people.

If the Commission thought for a single moment of the years of suffering which the Greeks in Asia Minor had undergone, of the war of extermination which they have endured during the last five years and which, far from crushing their spirit, has on the contrary only intensified their national feeling, it would certainly be careful not to give out this opinion which is of a nature to wound deeply the national sentiment of the Greek people and against which I protest in a most strong and categorical manner.

[15.] The Turkish refugees who have left the territories occupied by the Greeks (No. 46) are kept away from their homes by the irregulars [Page 67] or rather by that Turkish organization which—it is a secret to no one—is cooperating with the Turkish Government. The political aim of this is clear. It is to influence the Conference during this period of waiting and indecision with regard to the political fate of this part of the Ottoman Empire.

The fact that many Turks have returned to their homes, particularly in the region about Pergamos and Magnesia, is proof of the confidence which the Greek administration has inspired in them despite the many difficulties against which it has had to struggle, for example, the presence of Turkish authorities who receive their instructions from the Ottoman Government, the inability to act freely in the different branches of the administration caused by the hybrid condition of the country, the continual worry about the security of the area threatened by the bands from without, etc. I am firmly convinced as a result of a close examination of recent history in the Near East and as a result of a minute study of the character of the Turkish people that we are in a position to know better than any other, having lived side by side for centuries, that if the people saw that so and so was the decision of the Conference, they would remain in or return to their happy homes, with the exception of a few professional agitators or exploiters, and be able to live after all in peace and to escape from an administration as criminal, as oppressive, as backward, and as indifferent for Turks as for Christians.

16. Regarding the sending of Greeks into the province of Smyrna as charged in the complaint of Sheik-ul-Islam (No. 47), I state that I have not had any acquaintance with this document in order to know exactly upon what facts the complaint is based. I judge nevertheless that the question is not that of “the transportation of Greeks” but rather of the repatriation of Greeks who formerly lived in Asia Minor and who were driven out by the Turks after 1914.

This repatriation, so logical and so just, would naturally preoccupy the Greek Government, which for years has been paying out considerable sums for their support.

I have given to the Commission the correspondence exchanged on this subject between the Greek Commissioner at Smyrna, since his installation, and the royal authorities, as a result of which, severe orders have been given and carried out to prevent this repatriation.

Personally, I think that this measure, inspired by a sincere desire to avoid the creation of difficulties as long as the property of the expelled Greeks had been seized and occupied by the Turks, and by the desire not to create further estrangement between the two elements, was too severe. From the point of view of absolute justice, I wonder which has the most right, the landowner driven out and desiring to re-establish his home, or he who has arbitrarily taken possession of it, and what would be the judgment of a court in such a case. From a [Page 68] political point of view this measure has not been appreciated, for not only do the Turks also base their complaints on this matter, but even take advantage of it to pretend and to try to persuade the entire world that they have a numerical superiority in this region, and they are perhaps believed by those who, crossing the country, see Greek villages, the residents of which are still in exile or have perished in the interior of Asia Minor, inhabited by the Turks.

17. I beg the Commission alongside the established facts contained in its statement, to state also the numerous murders committed by the Turks against the Greek population not only in those places where it has held its inquiry, but also in those regions where the Greek Army has never set foot, and where, consequently, the responsibilities cannot be confused; for example, 47 at Philadelfia and surrounding districts; 110 to 115 to the South of the Meander, 14 at Makri, etc., which are included with the names and dates in the documents which I had the honor to submit to the Commission on the first day.

In conclusion:

The military occupation was made to reestablish order, to save the remnants of the Christian population, which has been persecuted, exiled, and massacred for five years, and to prevent a new outburst of Turkish fanaticism.
That all events which have had regrettable consequences took place following an attack by the Turks upon the Greek Army.
That the Greek authorities have not only acted promptly everywhere in trying to restore order, but even, I dare say, have shown and are showing kindness toward the Mussulman population.
That even the lack of foresight on the part of the Greek command at Smyrna may be explained up to a certain point if one considers that neither the Greek representative nor those of the Entente at Smyrna expected an attack by the Turks and that they took no effective measures to remove the Turkish troops and to prevent assemblies and the free movement of the people.
Perfect order exists in the zone occupied by the Greek Army, while outside of this zone there is complete anarchy.

Colonel Alexander Mazarakis

Delegate of the Greek Government

II.—Establishment of Responsibilities

1. The investigation has proved that since the Armistice, the general situation of Christians in the Vilayet of Aidin has been satisfactory. Their safety has not been threatened.

[Page 69]

If the order to occupy Smyrna was given by the Peace Conference as a result of inexact information, the initial responsibility for the events falls upon the individuals or upon the governments who, without verifying it, established or transmitted information of this kind such as that referred to in No. 1 of the points established. (The general representing Italy renews with regard to this subject the reservation inserted in the minutes of the 37th Meeting.18)

2. The initial cause of the events may be charged to religious hatred. The Greeks did nothing to prevent the demonstrations. Their occupation, far from presenting itself as the carrying out of a civilizing mission, at once took the form of a conquest and crusade.

3. The responsibility for the deeds which took place at Smyrna on May 15th and 16th, as well as in the immediate surroundings of the city during the first few days which followed the landing, falls upon the Greek Military High Command as well as upon certain officers who failed in their duty.

The Greek Government has recognized this responsibility by the sanctions which it has imposed.

Part of the responsibility, however, falls upon the Turkish authorities in Smyrna who before the arrival of the Greeks did not take any steps to prevent the escape and arming of common-law prisoners.

4. In the person of the High Civil Authority, which represents it at Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the grave disorders which stained with blood the interior zone of the country during the advance of the Greek troops because:

The above mentioned authority did not act in conformity with the instructions of the Supreme Council set forth in the telegram of M. Venizelos, dated May 7/20. Without having requested any authorization from the Entente representative, it permitted the military command to give the order, May 10/23, to send troops to Aidin, Magnesia and Cassaba, outside of the limits of the San jack of Smyrna.
The same authority voluntarily kept the population in a state of ignorance as to the extent of the occupation. It thus contributed to increasing the state of excessive excitement of the Moslem inhabitants and consequently the disorders.

5. The Greek superior authorities are responsible because of the fact that they permitted the circulation in the country of armed civilians.

In some of their military or police operations, they even tolerated the employment of these armed civilians at the same time as that of regular troops.

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6. The initial cause of the disorders which were brought about in the Meander Valley also originated in this occupation, carried out without any justification.

The regrettable deeds which accompanied the march and the installation of the Greek troops are the consequence of the state of war in which the country found itself when these troops advanced.

The hatred which has existed for centuries between the Turks and the Greeks has incontestably increased the frequency of barbarous acts.

In all justice, the Greeks should not alone be held responsible.

The same considerations should be applied to the events which took place in the district of Pergamos and those about Magnesia and Eudemisch.

7. On the other hand, the Greeks are alone responsible for the massacre at Menemen. This massacre was not prearranged. But the Greek Commander knew the state of excessive excitement of his troops as a result of the Pergamos incident and should have taken steps to keep under control the troops who, due to weakened morale, fatigue, and fear, committed, without any provocation, a veritable massacre of defenseless Turkish civilians.

The Greek officers present at Menemen completely failed in their duty.

8. Even though the present situation is better, order has not yet been re-established in the Vilayet of Aidin.

Practically all commercial transactions with the interior of Anatolia have ceased.

This situation is incontestably the result of the occupation and the state of war existing between the Turkish irregulars and the Greek troops, even though the latter now are not further extending their zone of occupation.

The heads of the Turkish national movement, who have cooperated with the former bandit chiefs, have not always had sufficient authority over their forces to prevent them from sometimes carrying out raids. Therefore, a part of the responsibility falls upon them insofar as present conditions in the country are concerned.

Behind their responsibility lies that of the Turkish Government, which, up to the present time, has had no authority whatsoever over the leaders of the Nationalist Movement.

The Members of the Commission:

  • Mark Bristol
  • Bunoust
  • A. Dall’Olio
  • R. H. Hare
[Page 71]

[Reservation to the Minutes of the] Thirty-seventh Meeting

General Dall’Olio presented the following communication:

The Commission of Inquiry should examine the facts which accompanied and followed the occupation by the Greek troops of the districts of Smyrna, Aidin and Aivali, indicated in particular in the protest addressed to the Paris Conference by the Sheik-ul-Islam. Therefore, and because of the fact that these instructions are strengthened by the suggestion that the period to be examined is included between the Greek occupation and July 26th or 29th, I am of the opinion that we should not discuss the reasons which called for the landing and the occupation of the forts. This matter is not under the jurisdiction of the Commission of Inquiry, but of the Conference, and consequently I believe it my duty to maintain my viewpoint, and I urgently request my colleagues to recognize the reasons set forth by me on this subject. In any case, I request that this declaration, which has a general character of reservation, be included in the minutes.

Conclusions Presented by the Commission

The situation created at Smyrna and in the Vilayet of Aidin by the Greek occupation is strained because:
The occupation, which had as its principal purpose merely the maintenance of order, has in reality assumed all the forms of an annexation.
The Greek High Commissioner alone exercises an efficacious authority.
The Turkish authorities who have continued to carry on their functions no longer have any real power. They no longer receive orders from Constantinople and, on account of the almost complete disappearance of the Turkish police and gendarmery forces, they no longer have the means necessary for the execution of their decisions.
The occupation imposes extensive military sacrifices upon Greece which are out of proportion with the mission to be fulfilled if this mission is temporary and should have only maintenance of order as its purpose.
It is incompatible in its present form with the return of order and of peace for which the populations, threatened with famine, have great need.
The Commission deems:
That if the military occupation of the country is to have as its sole purpose the maintenance of security and public welfare, this occupation should not be intrusted to Greek troops, but to Allied troops, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Asia Minor.
That the occupation by the Greeks alone should not be maintained unless the Peace Conference is resolved to announce the complete and definite annexation of the country to Greece.
In such a case freedom of action should be left to the Greek Commander vis-à-vis the Turkish forces.
That the pure and simple annexation as above stated would be contrary to the principle proclaiming the respect for nationalities, because in the occupied regions, outside of the cities of Smyrna and Aivali, the predominance of the Turkish element over the Greek is incontestable.
It is the duty of the Commission to observe the fact that the Turkish national sentiment, which has already manifested its resistance, will never accept this annexation. It will submit only to force, that is to say, before a military expedition which Greece alone could not carry out with any chance of success.
In view of these conditions, the Commission proposes the following measures:
To replace as soon as possible all or part of the Greek troops by Allied troops much fewer in number.
If, in order to safeguard Greek self-respect, it is decided that a part of the Greek troops may cooperate in the occupation, distribute these troops in the interior of the occupied regions in order to prevent them from coming in direct contact with the Turkish national forces.
As soon as the occupation by the Allies has been completed, require the Turkish Government to reorganize its gendarmery under the direction and command of Interallied officers.
This gendarmery should be constituted as soon as possible to assure order in the entire region with the purpose of replacing the Allied detachments.
At the same time as the reorganization of the gendarmery, the Turkish Government should be required to restore its civil administration.
The heads of the national movement having on many occasions stated that their opposition was only directed against the Greeks, the measures proposed should dispose of all grounds for armed resistance on their part and return to the central government of Constantinople the authority which it no longer has.

Nothing should then prevent the disbanding of the irregular troops.

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In case of the contrary, the Entente will finally be able to know what faith it can place in the protestations of loyalty made by the Turks, both by the leaders of the national movement and by members of the Government.

The Members of the Commission:

Admiral Bristol

Delegate of the United States of America
General Hare

Delegate of Great Britain
General Bunoust

Delegate of France
General Dall’Olio

Delegate of Italy
  1. Ante, p. 5.
  2. The order by M. Venizelos for the reoccupation of Aidin was not given until July 2, 1919, and therefore could not have been discussed by the Council of Four.
  3. See HD–10, minute 1, and HD–11, minute 4, vol. vii, pp. 191 and 207.
  4. See HD–12, minute 5, and appendix E, ibid., pp. 238 and 249.
  5. Appendix F to HD–64, vol. viii, p. 476.
  6. See HD–64, minute 6, ibid., p. 463.
  7. See HD–71, minute 3, ibid., p. 675.
  8. Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.8302/3.
  9. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  10. HD–11, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 207.
  11. Minutes of meetings and annexes not printed (Paris Peace Conference 181.8301/1–46).
  12. See HD–13, minute 12, ibid., p. 264.
  13. Appendix A to HD–10, ibid., p. 200.
  14. See HD–64, minute 6, vol. viii, p. 463, and HD–71, minute 3, ibid., p. 675.
  15. For text of the Armistice with Turkey, October 30, 1918, see Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 441.
  16. Post, p. 71.
  17. See IC–181C, minute 17, vol. v, p. 484.
  18. CF–19, minute 2, vol. v, p. 721.
  19. This report was accompanied by the following letter:

    Constantinople, [Sept.] 29/October 12, 1919.

    Mr. President: I have the honor of submitting to the Commission several observations which have been suggested to me by the statement of the results of the inquiry which you were kind enough to send me.

    Be assured of my highest regards,

    Colonel Alexandre Mazarakis

    [Footnote in the original.]

  20. Post, p. 71.