Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/113


Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Thursday, December 18, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. Hugh Wallace.
    • Secretariat
      • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • British Empire
      • Sir Eyre Crowe
    • Secretary
      • Mr. H. Norman.
    • France
      • M. Cambon.
    • Secretaries
      • Mr. Dutasta.
      • M. Berthelot.
      • M. de Saint Quentin.
    • Italy
      • M. de Martino
    • Secretariat
      • M. Trombetti.
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui.
    • Secretariat
      • M. Kawai
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Captain Winthrop.
British Empire Captain Lothian Small.
France M. Massigli.
Italy M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

  • America, United States of
    • Mr. Rathbone,
    • Capt. Madison, U. S. N.
  • British Empire
    • Mr. Leeper,
    • Mr. Carr,
    • Lt. Col. Kisch,
    • Capt. Fuller, R. N.,
    • Cdt. MacDonald, R. N.,
    • Sir John Bradbury.
  • France
    • M. Leygues,
    • M. Loucheur,
    • Marshal Foch,
    • Gen. Weygand,
    • Gen. Le Rond,
    • M. Laroche,
    • C. Amiral Levavasseur,
    • M. Hermite,
    • M. de Montille.
  • Italy
    • M. Bertolini,
    • C. Amiral Grassi,
    • M. Stranieri,
    • Cdt. Fea.

[Page 594]

The Council had before it a note from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated December 14, 1919. (See Appendix A).

Marshal Foch summarized and commented upon the note of December 14th. 1. Situation in the Baltic Provinces

He added that it seemed difficult to disarm completely the anti-Bolshevist force represented by what was left of the Yudenitch Army. If the Esthonian Government, provisionally at least, did not wish to confer with the Bolshevists, it should utilize that force. But the possibility of utilizing it later and of agreement between Esthonia and Yudenitch presented a series of local questions which were difficult to judge from that distance. It was for that reason that he proposed to send General Niessel to examine on the spot whether it would be possible to arrange for an agreement between General Yudenitch and the Esthonians.

Mr. Wallace said that he could not give any opinion before he had received instructions from his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that the Council remembered that when the instructions for General Niessel had been drafted, the British Government had clearly indicated that Russian questions of a political nature would not be in the province of the mission.1 He was still bound by that reservation, all the more so as the situation in the Baltic provinces was more obscure, and he did not know what were the intentions of his Government. Under those circumstances he could not then agree to give General Niessel an interallied mission of a political character. That would be contrary to the principle which they had previously adopted. General Niessel, however, was a French officer, and he could not object in any way to his being sent to Esthonia in that capacity.

Marshal Foch said that he did not conceal the fact that he was indeed raising a new question, also that the mission under discussion was entirely independent of that which had been previously entrusted to the General. But he wished to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that, if the Allied and Associated Powers wished to act, there was not a moment to lose. If they delayed any longer, it would mean the complete dissolution of the Yudenitch Army and the development of a new center of anarchy. He also felt convinced that an interallied mission could alone have a chance to succeed: General Niessel could only be sent there in that quality. He repeated that there were in Esthonia remnants of forces which could still be utilized in the pursuit of a policy; but it was quite true that they should first decide upon that policy. They should especially foresee that the Esthonian Government, before listening to their advice, would begin [Page 595] by asking them to recognize it. At any rate, and if they did not wish to be faced once more by ruin, it was important to define their policy without delay.

M. Cambon asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe could not telegraph his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he would do so; at the moment he did not know how far the decisions which had been taken in London might have modified the situation.

M. de Martino said that he gathered, from all that had been said by Marshal Foch, first, that it was urgent to take certain measures, and on the other hand, that the mission which he proposed to have sent, should have an interallied character. He could not give a final opinion before knowing that of his colleagues; but he approved in principle the proposal which was submitted. He would like to take advantage of this occasion to ask the Marshal what was the exact situation of the Yudenitch Army at the present time.

General Weygand said it was difficult to give exact figures: one might say approximately that the Army was made up of from 20,000 to 30,000 men, a part of which had been treated by the Esthonians as civilian refugees who were now dispersed, while there still remained under arms from 5,000 to 15,000 men. A telegram addressed to Marshal Foch by their representative with that army, depicted the situation as being very critical. The French officer telegraphed on the 16th of December that the Yudenitch army could still fight for seven days against the Bolshevists, but that, if, after that period relations between it and the Esthonian Government had not improved, it meant a conflict with Esthonia. They already had been informed that Russian officers had been murdered at Narva.

Mr. Matsui said that if the other Powers were agreed to send an interallied mission, he would not be opposed to it. He would, however, remark that the Japanese officer who belonged to the Niessel mission was on the point of receiving another appointment; it would therefore be impossible for him to accompany the mission if it were sent into Esthonia.

Mr. Cambon said that they could apparently not think of taking any decision if they did not know the opinion of the British Government. He would urge Sir Eyre Crowe to make every effort to obtain a reply in as short a time as possible, and he hoped it would be a favorable one.

(The rest of the discussion was adjourned).

The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (See Appendix B.)

[Page 596]

Mr. Laroche read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation, and added that the frontier adopted on August 1st by the Supreme Council practically gave the whole of Bukovina to the Roumanians, as it only excluded from Roumanian territory a narrow strip which was crossed by the railway connecting two Galician towns.2 It was true, however, that the Roumanians were making unofficial efforts to have the original administrative frontier maintained as it stood. Now that the Roumanians had signed the Treaties of St. Germain and Neuilly it seemed opportune to notify them the decision taken on August 1st, the more so as the proposed frontier already figured in the treaty relative to Eastern Galicia.3 2. Notification to Roumania and Poland of the Frontier Between Roumania and Eastern Galicia in Bukovina

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he did not object to that proposal in principle; he wished, however, to know what exactly, at that time, their relations with Roumania were; what treaties General Coanda had signed, and whether a reply to their ultimatum4 had been received.

Mr. de Saint Quentin said that the Roumanian Delegation had signed the Minorities Treaty, had agreed to the Austrian Treaty and the Financial Arrangements, as well as to the Bulgarian Treaty. Roumania was, therefore, so far as her signature was concerned, on the same footing at that time as the other Allies. But so far as he knew, no reply had been made to the other questions raised in the note of the Supreme Council.

Mr. Laroche said there was no doubt that Roumania was in the throes of an internal crisis; the cabinet crisis was not, properly speaking, at an end. He was, however, of the opinion that the Council should not confuse Hungarian affairs with the question of Bukovina. One of the interested parties already knew the line of the new frontier; they ought to finish that question. It was quite true that Roumania had not yet entirely acceded to their demands, but on the other hand, her claims had not received entire satisfaction in Bukovina.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he was of the same opinion, and he thought they should strengthen the government of Mr. Vaida Voevod. On the other hand, he would urge that they insist upon a reply to their ultimatum from Roumania, and also that she conform to the injunctions she had received from the Supreme Council concerning the Hungarian affairs, further, that question could not be separated from that of the blockade of Roumania. They had already decided upon certain restrictive measures in regard to trade with that country.5 His Government considered that it would be well to suppress these measures: they were troublesome and served no purpose, for, [Page 597] according to information in their hands, goods were passing pretty freely across the land frontier, and maritime trade alone was held up. They did not think, however, notwithstanding the drawbacks for them of such a blockade, that it would be possible to suppress it entirely as long as the Government at Bucharest had not replied definitely to their demands. It would be necessary, he thought, to let the Roumanian Government know under the existing circumstances that the blockade could not be raised so long as it had not itself replied.

Mr. Cambon said that they might take a decision concerning the frontier of Bukovina, and ask Mr. Berthelot at the same time to use his influence with the Roumanian Delegation in order to hasten its reply.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that they should tell the Roumanians that they were ready to raise the blockade, but that Roumania must first accept the demands which had been formulated by the Council.

Mr. de Martino said that he approved the two decisions which were then proposed.

It was decided:

that the line of the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina, already approved by the Supreme Council on August 1st, should be notified to the Roumanian and Polish Delegations;
that the Roumanian Government should be requested to reply in as short a time as possible to the last note of the Supreme Council, and that it should at the same time be informed that, failing a satisfactory reply to the said note, it was impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to raise the blockade measures which had been taken toward Roumania on August 25, 1919.

The Council had before it a telegram from Colonel Haskell, dated December 1, 1919, transmitted by the American Delegation. (See Appendix C).

Mr. Cambon asked whether the American Delegation supported Colonel Haskell’s proposal. 3. Line of Demarcation Between the Government of General Denikin and the States of the Caucasus

Mr. Wallace replied that it did not, but was contented with transmitting it; Colonel Haskell, he would add, had acted in this matter as an Interallied representative.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he feared that if Colonel Haskell’s proposal were adopted, it would create serious difficulties. The zone assigned to General Denikin had been fixed a long time ago: he thought that if the line then fixed were changed, they would be raising a wasp’s nest. The present situation was very confused; they had no authority over General Denikin. How could they tell him that he must retire beyond a new line which would be fixed by them? If he refused to obey, how could the Council enforce its decisions? The whole problem of the Caucasus was involved, and, of that they [Page 598] knew very little and exercised over it no control. His opinion was very clear: they should leave things as they were; though of course, he was quite ready to draw the attention of his Government to that proposal.

Mr. de Martino said that the Haskell proposal had made an extremely favorable impression on him. It was calculated to protect from troubles and disorders of all kinds a region most important for them, economically speaking. They knew what guerilla warfare meant as practiced in those countries, and what ruins it accumulated. It would be to the advantage of those territories to fix a limit to the advance of the Denikin Army. Sir Eyre Crowe thought that a decision in that question was of considerable political importance; he agreed, but asked whether it would not be possible to say that the fixing of the new line of demarcation would not prejudice the final settlement of the problem.

Mr. Matsui said that he was not informed on the subject; he was, however, very much struck by Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that in his opinion the difficulties were greater than Mr. de Martino seemed to think. General Denikin actually occupied the territories in question; they would therefore have to drive him out.

Mr. Stranieri said that, according to information in their hands, Denikin had occupied the northern slopes of the Caucasus, “The Republic of the Mountaineers”, but had not occupied the Daghestan.

Mr. Cambon said that it seemed to him very difficult to take a decision in such a state of uncertainty.

Mr. de Martino admitted that they should first make out exactly what the situation was, and that the examination of the question might be then taken up.

Mr. Cambon said they would therefore adjourn the discussion until such time as they should have more complete information.

(The discussion was then adjourned).

The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation, dated December 17, 1919, relative to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war held by the Allies. (See Appendix D).

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Council had before it the note of the British Delegation. The repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war did not seem to offer great difficulties. The only question was to find how they should arrange for the repatriation of prisoners of war belonging to territories, formerly Bulgarian, but now outside the frontiers of Bulgaria; they proposed to give those prisoners the option of deciding upon being sent back to Bulgaria or to their country of origin. 4. Repatriation of Bulgarian Prisoners of War

After a short discussion,

[Page 599]

It was decided:

that there was no objection to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war;
that such prisoners of war belonging to territories formerly Bulgarian and now situated outside the frontiers of Bulgaria, should have the option of declaring whether they preferred to be sent back to Bulgaria or to their country of origin.

Mr. Matsui said that he was happy to inform the Council that he was authorized by his Government to withdraw the reservation which he had formulated on December 9th, concerning the distribution of enemy submarines.6 5. Distribution of Enemy Submarines

The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the conditions under which the German warships should be delivered to the Allies. (See Appendix E).

Mr. Leygues read and commented upon the note of the French Government. 6. Conditions Under Which the German Warships Should Be Delivered

Mr. Wallace stated that he could not give any opinion on the matter without the instructions of his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that if he understood the French proposal correctly, it meant requesting the Germans to surrender into the same ports as the warships, the armament materiel instead of destroying it.

Mr. Leygues agreed.

Sir Eyre Crowe feared that such a proposal would raise difficulties for it seemed to him that it was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty, a modification of the Treaty would be necessary, for which they would have to obtain the approval of all the signatory Powers. The same difficulty, however, did not exist for the five light cruisers whose surrender was demanded in the protocol of November 1:7 it was not impossible, as a matter of fact, to modify the protocol which had not yet been signed.

Admiral Grassi said that he shared the opinion just expressed by Mr. Leygues. It was not a question of modifying the Treaty, but only of interpreting Article 192. That article stipulated as follows:

“The warships in commission of the German fleet must have on board or in reserve only the allowance of arms, munitions and war material fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

The allowances of materiel in excess were to be surrendered to the Governments of such Powers at the places to be indicated by them. In that way, the surrender would take place in two periods: first the ships would be surrendered, then the materiel disembarked from them. Article 192 did not evidently apply to the materiel of warships which [Page 600] were to be, or which already had been, surrendered to the Allies. It only applied to the materiel of warships which remained German.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that Article 185 was however explicit: it stipulated that the ships which were to be surrendered to the Allies should be surrendered in a state of disarmament. Article 192, on the other hand, declared that the materiel remaining in Germany would be destroyed. He proposed that the question be referred back to the legal experts for examination.

Mr. Leygues said that two cases should be distinguished: first, that of warships whose surrender was provided for in the protocol of November 1st. It was natural that the materiel belonging to those ships should be surrendered at the same time as the ships themselves. The second case was that of warships whose surrender was provided for in the Treaty of Peace. He admitted that there was a question of interpretation of the Treaty; which might be submitted to the legal experts.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that they should, however, observe, concerning the first point, that they had communicated to the Germans a draft protocol and that they would be proposing its modification. Would the Germans accept that modification? The Council should envisage the possibility of a refusal.

Mr. Leygues said that they did not ask for any modification of the protocol. They insisted, on the contrary, that it be signed as it stood. The protocol did not in any place state that they would not receive the armament materiel of the warships whose surrender they demanded.

Mr. Cambon said that the first question was, therefore, solved as Mr. Leygues had requested; the second was referred back to the legal experts for examination.

It was decided:

that the Interallied Naval Commission of Control should take the steps necessary in order that the materiel, belonging to the five light cruisers to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers under the provisions of the draft protocol of November 1st, should not be destroyed, but surrendered in the same places as the ships from which such materiel had been disembarked;
that the Drafting Committee be requested to examine whether, under the terms of Articles 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles, the materiel disembarked from the warships referred to in Article 185, in execution of the clauses of the Armistice, should be necessarily destroyed after it had been surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr. Loucheur said that they had met the German delegates on the preceding afternoon. It had been impossible to reach an agreement on the tonnage of the docks then in Germany. The Germans continued to insist with the greatest energy that there did not exist at [Page 601] Dantzig docks of 50,000 tons, and that the dock of 80,000 tons which figures on the Allied list was really a second entry of two docks—one of 43,000 tons and one of 37,000 tons, both of which also figured therein. They had therefore reserved the right of verifying those figures and the German delegates had agreed. There remained, therefore, a difference of 85,000 tons between their figures and those of the German delegation. Before submitting the rest of the discussion, he wished to state that if the Reparation Commission had been consulted at the time the protocol had been drafted, certain of its members would have been opposed to demanding from Germany a compensation for the Scapa Flow incident which would reduce its capacity of payment. They had asked the German delegates whether, outside of the 192,000 tons which they were ready to grant, they had some compensation to offer. After much hesitation they had declared that they could offer 50,000 tons of new docks to be built within a period of one and one-half years. They had taken note of that proposal, and the German delegation had withdrawn. 7. Report of the Conference Between the Allied and German Delegates Concerning the Reparation Demanded for the Scapa Flow Affair

He had then put the following questions to his colleagues:

Did they consider as sufficient, for the time being, the immediate surrender of 192,000 tons, taking into account the economic situation in Germany?
In the affirmative, were they of the opinion that it was advisable, notwithstanding, to demand a supplementary compensation to be furnished later?

The American delegate had answered the first question in the affirmative. He considered that the second raised a political problem, upon which he had no opinion to express. From the point of view of reparations he considered it was not advisable to make other demands of Germany.

The British Naval delegate had repeated the reservation made that morning by Sir Eyre Crowe. He was not convinced by the German explanations. As for Sir John Bradbury, the British representative on the Reparation Commission, he reserved his opinion: he considered especially that the Germans might compensate the loss of their floating docks by using for their merchant fleet the dry-docks of their naval arsenals. He thought that the question of reparations was for the Supreme Council to decide.

The Italian delegate had replied in the affirmative to the first point; and considered on the other hand, as Mr. Loucheur did, that it would be advisable to request the Germans to build 80,000 tons of new docks for the Allies.

The Japanese delegate deemed insufficient the German proposals. In his opinion, a compensation was necessary.

[Page 602]

The Belgian delegate had adopted the opinion of the French delegate. From the standpoint of reparations, he believed that they should ask Germany as little as possible in the way of supplementary compensation.

The French delegates were divided; the naval representative had maintained that it would be wise to claim 400 [400,000] tons. He, personally, was of the opinion that they could be satisfied with the immediate surrender of 192,000 tons, but from the political point of view, a compensation was necessary. If the German figures were correct, their original demands should naturally be reduced from 400,000 to 315,000 tons. The deficit was therefore reduced to 123,000 tons. He observed that the Germans would be furnishing them with new docks, built according to their indications and specifications, which had a certain advantage. Fifty thousand tons was an insufficient figure, but 80,000 tons of new docks might be considered as the equivalent of 120,000 tons of used docks. He therefore concluded that they should accept the German proposal and that they should ask, in the way of supplementary compensation, for the building of 80,000 tons of new docks.

They should, at any rate, not lose sight of two different considerations: they should remember that from the political point of view, they had decided upon a definite figure, and they could not, under penalty of losing prestige in the opinion of the world, renounce purely and simply their demands. But at the same time they should not forget that they had the greatest interest not to weaken the Germans’ capacity for payment and if they wished to receive something they should raise that capacity to its maximum.

Mr. Leygues said that a misunderstanding existed between the Naval experts and the members of the Reparation Commission which it was important to clear up. They had asked Germany for 400,000 tons of docks on account of the scuttling at Scapa Flow of 430,000 tons out of 510,000 tons which were there interned. Thus had disappeared the pawn which the Allies had in their hands. It was in the way of a reparation and of a penalty that the Council had decided on October 24th [30th] to demand the surrender of port materiel.8 When the protocol of November 1st had been drawn up, that materiel had been estimated at 400,000 tons. There was a decision of the Conference, which should be carried out. It would be serious to give way, for the moral question was as important as the material one: if they yielded, Germany would be encouraged in starting once more. They should beware: and they had good reasons for doing so. The Allies themselves [Page 603] were acting in good faith; they would reduce their demands if it were proved that they were exaggerated. It would be a mistake to make a concession right away. They would be the first to yield if they had proof that their claims could not be satisfied without paralyzing the economic life of Germany and endangering her capacity for payment; but he pointed out that Germany possessed a great many dry-docks in her naval ports; and as she had no more warships she might therefore employ those dry-docks in the repair of her commercial fleet. As a matter of fact, under the provisions of the Treaty, she did not possess ships of over 1600 tons. They should therefore decide that the terms of the protocol be maintained, with the reservation that if, at a later time, it was proved that they had committed an error in their figures, such an error would be taken into account.

Mr. Loucheur said it was clear that no one thought of accepting with closed eyes the figures furnished by the Germans. He should, however, add that he did not share Mr. Leygues opinion. He could not approve of a policy which consisted in imposing penalties which militated against their reparations in money.

Sir Eyre Crowe believed that, as they must all reserve the opinion of their Governments, the discussion might well be adjourned. Meanwhile, however, what would happen to the conversations with the Germans? He admitted he was in no wise convinced by the German arguments. A telegram he had before him affirmed that four weeks ago there was at Dantzig a dock of 40,000 tons if not of 50,000. Somebody was therefore lying.

Mr. Loucheur replied that the German delegates had categorically told them on the preceding day that there did not exist large docks at Dantzig. They had asked them whether those docks had not been sold. The Germans had replied that all sold docks figured on the lists furnished to the Allies.

Mr. Cambon said that before the discussion was resumed by the Council, it would be wise for each Government to investigate the veracity of the documents furnished by the Germans.

Mr. Leygues said that the Armistice Commission had already been asked to shed light upon the question of the Dantzig docks.

Mr. Loucheur said that under those conditions all conversations between the Germans and themselves would actually be useless. The negotiations could only be resumed when they knew the opinion of the various Governments, and when the information asked of the Armistice Commission had been received.

(The discussion was then adjourned).

(The meeting adjourned.)

[Page 604]

Appendix A to HD–113

Note From Marshal Foch to the Supreme Council on the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

commander in chief
of the allied armies
General Staff
3rd Section

No. 5680

From information sent by General Niessel inclusive of December 11th, it appears that the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops may be considered as almost completed.

At this date there were, in the Baltic States, only light contingents marching towards the German frontier and at about a day’s march from this frontier, as follows:

  • 5,000 men of the German Legion marching towards Tilsitt,
  • 6,000 men of the Iron Division marching towards Memel.

All were to have crossed the boundary by December 13th according to the agreements made by General Eberhardt.

The German Delegation to the Baltic Commission has, besides, asserted that all the German detachments or isolated men remaining in Latvia or Lithuania after this date would be considered as outlaws and thereby abandoned to the Letts and the Lithuanians.

Once the evacuation is over, it remains for General Niessel to:

Make the Germans deliver, according to the decision of the Supreme Council, the rolling stock necessary for the functioning of the Latvian and Lithuanian railroads.9

Make sure that the Germans have strictly observed their agreements regarding the surrender of war material to Lithuania, as ransom for their free passage.

As for the penalties to be taken and the reparations due on account of exactions of the German troops in occupied territory, it has been telegraphed to General Niessel that he was not empowered to negotiate in regard to them without special instructions from the Supreme Council.

It may therefore be considered that General Niessel’s mission is almost completed, as far as the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces is concerned.


The Baltic Provinces thus being freed from German oppression, it is in the Entente’s interest to maintain the solid rampart which they formed against Bolshevism.

[Page 605]

From this standpoint, it is urgent to settle, as soon as possible, the disagreement between Youdenitch’s Army and the Esthonian Government, a disagreement which seriously compromises the military situation on the North Eastern front and which the Bolsheviks are cleverly taking advantage of by vigorous offensive actions.

Now the steps taken by the Allied Representatives, either on their own initiative or according to the decision of the Supreme Council of December 3 [1],10 to obtain from the Esthonian Government the measures necessary for the upkeep of Youdenitch’s army, as an organized Russian force, have not been successful.

The Esthonian Government, so far, has given only dilatory replies; it has continually delayed the date of its reply to the communication from the Supreme Council.

Detachments of the North Western Army penetrating on Esthonian territory therefore continue to be disarmed, dispersed, and the irremediable disintegration of this army will soon be completed.

The time seems therefore to have come to act in a more efficacious manner; to act, to try to find and to establish, between the Esthonian Government and Youdenitch’s Army, a community of views and means which are indispensable for the continuation of their joint action against Bolshevism.

But the Allied and Associated Governments will not be able to carry out such an understanding, practically, except by the intermediary of a qualified representative, who can judge the situation on the spot, who can bring about the necessary “rapprochements”, and, equipped with powers which will enable him to negotiate directly with the Esthonian Government and General Youdenitch according to the general sense of the instructions already sent by the Supreme Council.

General Niessel, whose qualities of force and decision have asserted themselves in the settling of a delicate question, will soon be in a position to fulfill this new mission.

Appendix B to HD–113

[Note From the French Delegation to the Supreme Council]

french delegation

By a note dated July 30, 1919,11 the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs proposed, regarding the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina, the following line:

“A line leaving the thalweg of the Dniester to a point about 2 kilometers below Zaleszczyki.

[Page 606]

“Thence South West to a point where the administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina joins the boundary between the districts of Horodenka and Sniatyn, at about 11 kilometers South East of Horodenka:

“A line to be determined on the ground, passing by the hills 317, 312 and 239.

“Thence, towards the South West, the old administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina to the point where it joins the former frontier between Hungary and Galicia.”

By a resolution of August 1st, the Supreme Council approved the proposal of the Commission, “on condition that Roumania proves her good will in regard to the Allies with respect to the signature of the Peace Treaty and the settlement of various other questions of interest to it.”12

The condition set by the Supreme Council having been fulfilled, the French delegation has the honor to ask that the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference be invited to inform the Roumanian and Polish Delegations of the frontier described above which interests Roumania and Eastern Galicia.

Appendix C to HD–113

Telegram Received From Colonel Haskell, December 1, 1919

“An Agreement has been signed between the Armenians and Tartars by Premiers Khatissian (Armenia) and Ussobbokoff (Azerbaidjan).

“The Agreement provides:

  • “(1) The Governments pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms.
  • “(2) They agree to open roads into Zangazour to peaceful traffic.
  • “(3) All controversies, including borders, are to be settled by peaceful agreement, or, failing this, are to be left to a neutral party as arbitrator, said party to be the High Commissioner.
  • “(4) An International Conference was called to discuss all questions causing dispute or friction, the delegates being given full authority to settle same by agreement or arbitration.
  • “(5) Agreements effective as of dates on which they are signed.

“In view of above developments believe peace can be kept in the Caucasus if the menace of military operations against Transcaucasia by volunteer army is removed.

“Denikin has recalled his Missions from both Georgia and Azerbaidjan. The possibility of his attacking Azerbaidjan through Daghestan virtually forces Azerbaidjan to seek Turkish aid. It is recommended, [Page 607] if it is believed advisable, after considering this matter from other standpoints, that the Peace Conference define the boundaries of Denikin’s activities with reference to the Caucasus, at least until the final decision of the Caucasus question is reached. The limits recommended to such activities should follow those previously described by the British, namely: from the Caspian Sea five miles south of Petrovsk, west to the border of Daghestan, thence following the boundaries of the former Russian Governments Terek and Rouban and Mekadir River to the Black Sea at Gagri Gatelogate.”


Appendix D to HD–113

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

Repatriation of Bulgarian Prisoners of War in Allied Hands

In the opinion of the British War Office there is no longer any objection from a military point of view to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war in Allied hands provided that the necessary means of transport are available. The following are the numbers of Bulgarian prisoners of war in British hands:

Egypt 86
Malta 22
Salonica 1,823
Canada 11
Australia 6
Total 1,948

A further question which arises in this connection is that of the repatriation of prisoners belonging to territories formerly Bulgarian but now outside the frontiers of Bulgaria as fixed by the Treaty of Peace.

Appendix E to HD–113

Memorandum From the General Secretariat on the Conditions Under Which the German Warships Must Be Delivered to the Allies

1. Article 185 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany prescribes that within a delay of two months, from the coming into force of the Treaty, 8 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 50 torpedo boats shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Allied ports to be indicated by the said Powers.

[Page 608]

These warships shall be disarmed as prescribed in Article XXIII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918,13 and they must have all their guns on board.

2. The Interallied Naval Commission determined, December 4, 1918, the conditions of disarming to be the following:

All the essential parts of the artillery and the “appareils de reglage de tir”, munitions and explosives, war material and spare parts, torpedoes, wireless apparatus, etc., shall be landed.

3. The above measures, taken with regard to the warships brought to Scapa Flow and to those remaining in German ports, were measures of precaution.

They have been maintained in regard to the warships figuring in Article 185 of the Treaty, and in regard to the 5 light cruisers which are to be surrendered according to the Protocol of November 1, 1919,13a because these ships are to be brought to Allied ports by German crews.

4. In order to leave Germany only the material and munitions necessary for arming the number of battleships determined by the Treaty, Article 192 prescribes that all the material in excess of these quantities shall be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and is to be broken up or rendered useless.

In this material, therefore, might be included that taken off the ships as measures of precaution and now deposited in the arsenals. Such a measure is inexplicable, granted the decisions taken recently by the Supreme Council on November 28th and 29th authorizing each Power to dispose as it sees fit of the material and ships which it is to break up.14

Still less justifiable is this measure in regard to the light cruisers and destroyers allotted to France and Italy which they may incorporate in their fleets. If deprived of the material described above, these ships are useless from a military point of view.

5. For this reason it is proposed:

that the material landed from the ships surrendered or to be surrendered by Germany be delivered in the same place as the ships from which it was taken:
that this material be selected at the request of the interested Powers, by the Interallied Naval Commission of Control:
that only such arms, munitions and war material as remain witnin the hands of the German Government, in excess, after delivery of the material indicated under “a” and “b” be broken up or rendered useless.

  1. HD–84, minute 4, and appendix D, vol. viii, pp. 955 and 961.
  2. HD–21, minute 9, vol. vii, p. 455.
  3. Appendix F to HD–97, p. 271.
  4. Appendix A to HD–93, p. 182.
  5. HD–38, minute 3, vol. vii, p. 836.
  6. HD–110, minute 1, p. 535.
  7. Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.
  8. See HD–79, minute 2, vol. viii, p. 834; see also HD–81, minute 4, ibid., p. 878.
  9. HD–83, minute 5, vol. viii, p. 944.
  10. HD–103, minute 3, p. 389.
  11. Appendix I to HD–21, vol. vii, p. 474.
  12. HD–21, minute 9, vol. vii, p. 455.
  13. Vol. ii, p. 1.
  14. Appendix C to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 865.
  15. HD–101, minute 1, p. 345; HD–102, minute 1, p. 360.