Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/111
HD–111
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers, Held at M. Clemenceau’s Residence, Paris, on Tuesday, December
16, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.
Paris, December 16, 1919, 10:30
a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Secretary
- British Empire
- Secretary
- France
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta
- M. Berthelot
- M. de Saint Quentin.
- Italy
- Secretary
- Japan
- Secretary
| Joint Secretariat |
| America, United States of |
Capt. B. Winthrop. |
| British Empire |
Capt. Lothian Small. |
| France |
M. Massigli. |
| Italy |
M. Zanchi. |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux |
The following were also present for items in which they were
concerned.
- France
- M. Loucheur.
- M. de Percin.
- Italy
- M. Vannutelli-Rey.
- M. Dell’Abbadessa.
1. M. Berthelot said that according to a note
which General Weygand had just submitted, the British Government would
not be in a position to send troops into the plebiscite regions before
January 15th. Because of delays which had taken place in the coming into
force of the Treaty that Government would have as a matter of fact to
send into those territories not the troops then under arms, but troops
of the regular army. Those contingents would not be ready to set out
before January 15th; until that time only small detachments could be
sent to the spot. Coming Into Force of the Treaty
With Germany
[Page 559]
2. Mr. Wallace stated that he wished to make a
declaration to the Council to the effect that his Government had
delegated him only to observe, and that he was not qualified to
participate in the discussions. He was only to communicate to Washington
what was going on. When decisions had to be taken he would have to refer
to Washington and would communicate to the Council the answers of his
Government. Powers of the American
Representative
M. Clemenceau said that the Council took note
of Mr. Wallace’s declaration. He would like to know whether Mr. Wallace
had powers to sign the protocol with Germany1 and to
approve the text of the reply which the Council would have to make to
the German Delegation.
Mr. Wallace replied that he had powers to sign
the Treaty with Hungary but had no powers to sign anything whatever with
Germany.
M. Berthelot said that he would make this
observation to Mr. Wallace—and it was a point which might well be
intimated to the Government at Washington—that the signature of the
protocol did not commit the American Government any further than did the
signing of the Treaty.
Mr. Clemenceau felt that a remark should also
be made that Mr. Polk had approved all the correspondence which the
Council had sent to the German Delegation concerning the protocol.
Mr. Wallace said he would refer the question
immediately by cable to Washington.
3. (The Council had before it, first, a note from the German Delegation
dated December 14, 1919 /See Appendix “A”/, second, a note from the
German Delegation /See Appendix “B” /third, a note from the Secretary
General of the Peace Conference reporting the declarations made by M.
von Lersner dated December 15, 1919 /See Appendix “C”/.) Note of the German Delegation in Reply to a Note From
the President of the Peace Conference Dated December 8,
1919
M. Berthelot gave a résumé of the German note
of the 14th December drawing the Council’s attention to the following
essentials: the first paragraph was important. The Germans declared in
effect that they would not raise any difficulty on account of the
absence of American Delegates on the Commissions. There were means, he
believed, for calling attention to this declaration in suitable form: he
had asked M. Fromageot and the Drafting Committee to be good enough to
consider the point. The second paragraph raised a delicate question: M.
von Lersner said that his Government took account of the interpretation
given by the Supreme Council to the last paragraph of the protocol of
the 1st November but in doing so M. von Lersner went a
[Page 560]
little further than the Council had done.
To go by the German note it would appear that the Council had declared
that its right, “to have recourse to measures of coercion, military or
other, would obtain no longer than the moment of the reestablishment of
the state of Peace by the coming into force of the Treaty”. That text
would seem to say that after the Treaty came into force the Allied and
Associated Powers could no longer have recourse to any military measures
without actually making a declaration of war. It seemed advisable in his
opinion, while noting that the German Government withdrew the objections
it had formulated, to indicate that measures of coercion remained
possible from the legal point of view even after the coming into force
of the Treaty. He had asked the legal experts to prepare a formula in
that sense.
M. Clemenceau considered that they ought to
make only a general formula and that it was very inopportune to speak of
measures of military coercion.
Sir Eyre Crowe stated that that was his opinion
also.
M. Berthelot said that was precisely what he
had wished to say. It was all the more necessary not to leave that
phrase unanswered since the German note said expressly, “measures of
coercion, military or other”. The only point in the remainder of the
Allied note to which the German Government raised objections was the
Scapa Flow incident. While accepting total reparation for the
destruction of the fleet it had announced for that purpose that new
proposals would be made by the experts coming from Berlin. The German
Delegation had asked that a meeting be held that afternoon at 4 o’clock.
The French Delegation on its part had no objection. The meeting would
take place at 3 rue François 1er. After that
conversation the Reparation Commission could meet to estimate the value
of the reparations that Germany offered. The German note made no
allusion to the handing over of light cruisers. They would, therefore,
conclude that the Germans accepted the point, but it would be well to
throw light upon this point. As to repatriation of the crews interned as
a result of the Scapa Flow affair, that was a question which concerned
the British Government and upon which they could not make a reply until
they had been told by the British Government of its point of view.
Sir Eyre Crowe said he would submit the
question to London but there was another point upon which he would very
much like to be enlightened. The Council had decided that pourparlers of a technical nature should take
place with the Germans before the coming into force of the Treaty in
order to settle the procedure to be adopted.2 Had the
German technical delegates returned?
[Page 561]
M. Berthelot said that it was obvious that the
Germans must be asked to send their technical delegates without delay,
but he thought there would be no difficulty on that point. Von Simson
had anticipated none and had even declared that agreement upon those
questions could be arrived at in the course of two or three days.
(The Council noted M. Berthelot’s statements: the meeting of Naval
Experts and of members of the Reparation Commission with the German
experts would take place that afternoon at 4 o’clock at 3 Rue François
1er.)
4. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated
December 12th, 1919, on the question of the Vorarlberg /See Appendix
“D”/ and a note from the same Delegation concerning “dangers of breaking
up of Austria”. /See Appendix “E”/.) Question of the
Vorarlberg
M. Clemenceau said that he had received a call
from Chancellor Renner who in his conversation had shown the most
conciliatory dispositions and had protested the good will of Austria
with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Saint Germain. The
Chancellor had appeared to be to him a simple and well meaning man.
There was no doubt that his Government was confronted by very serious
difficulties, and its situation would be compromised if he did not leave
Paris with satisfactory promises on the subject of the provisioning of
Vienna. He had deemed it advisable to assure him that at that time the
Council was considering the Austrian question in a spirit of good
will.
M. Berthelot read and commented upon the notes
which the Council had before it. He added that it was quite clear that
separatist activities could not be tolerated without the consent of the
League of Nations. Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint Germain was
emphatic on that question. Under these circumstances it might well be
opportune to transmit to Chancellor Renner a declaration which might be
worded thus:
“The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, anxious to ensure
the integrity of Austria within the frontiers assigned to it,
and agreed to have the provisions of the Treaty of
Saint-Germain-en-Laye observed, declare that they will oppose
every effort which tends to endanger the integrity of Austrian
territory, or which, contrary to the provisions of Article 88 of
the said Treaty, would result in compromising in whatever
manner, directly or indirectly, the political and economic
independence of Austria.”
Such a declaration would have as corollary the measures
which the Powers would take in favor of the provisioning of Austria.
M. de Martino said it was certain that from a
geographical standpoint the Vorarlberg occupied an eccentric position in
Austria and
[Page 562]
from that point of
view the union might be grounds for long discussions. But the Council
was confronted by a political question of the highest importance. If a
separatist movement got a footing in the Vorarlberg there was no doubt
that it would spread to Styria, Carinthia and to the Tyrol. It would,
therefore, be wise to stop immediately a movement of that nature. That
was the reason why he entirely approved of the proposed declaration
which was then before them.
Sir Eyre Crowe said he also approved.
Mr. Matsui said that he agreed.
It was decided:
That the following declaration be submitted to Chancellor Renner
in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers:
“that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, anxious
to ensure the integrity of Austria within the frontiers
assigned to it, and agreed to have the provisions of the
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye observed, declare that
they will oppose every effort which tends to endanger
the integrity of Austrian territory, or which, contrary
to the provisions of article 88 of the said Treaty,
would result in compromising in whatever manner,
directly or indirectly, the political and economic
independence of Austria.”
The American Ambassador undertook to refer the text of this declaration
to his Government.
5. M. Clemenceau stated that before hearing
Chancellor Renner it would be advisable to ask M. Loucheur to
communicate to the Council the proposals of the Reparation Commission.
Provisioning of Austria
M. Loucheur said that the Organization
Committee of the Reparation Commission had considered during a number of
meetings the situation in Austria. It had taken the following decisions:
- (1)
- An arrangement had been concluded with Italy in view of
sending immediately from Trieste to Vienna 30,000 tons of wheat.
That wheat would be paid for out of the balance of the credit of
48,000,000 of dollars, which had been opened for the
provisioning of Austria, and would insure Austria’s existence
until February 20.
- (2)
- The Reparation Commission requested France and Great Britain
to open a credit in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on
condition that such a credit be used for the provisioning of
Austria. France was ready to open immediately to that effect a
credit of 50,000,000 francs, the British Government was studying
the possibility of opening a similar credit, which would only be
done if the Serb-Croat-Slovene State actually furnished the
amount of food stuffs it was to deliver. It was certain that it
had not done so in the past. They were considering the sending
of a commission on the spot which would supervise the regularity
of deliveries. That credit of 100,000,000 of francs would enable
Austria to live from February 20 to the end of
[Page 563]
April. The difficulty was to
insure the provisioning of Austria from the end of April until
the end of September, the O. C. of the R. C. had agreed on the
necessity of opening a total credit of 100,000,000 of dollars,
it was, however, necessary in order to do this, first, that
guarantees should be had, and in the second place that dollars
should be obtained. Neither Great Britain nor France had any,
and there could be no doubt on the subject, nothing was possible
without America’s participation. If an agreement did not take
place between America, Great Britain, France and Italy, there
would be famine in Austria from the first of May; there was no
means in the world of preventing that fact.
Mr. Wallace asked whether Mr. Loucheur was
speaking in the name of the Reparations Commission; in that case Mr.
Rathbone might be heard.
Mr. Loucheur stated that the Commission was of
the unanimous opinion that a credit of 100,000,000 dollars was
necessary.
Mr. Wallace stated that if that question was to
be discussed in substance he would ask that Mr. Rathbone be heard by the
Council.
Mr. Loucheur said that it was not a question at
this time of discussing the point in substance. He was making a summary
statement which the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission
had asked him to make; but it was certain that they would have either
the next day or the day after, to discuss that grave problem with the
participation of the members of the Reparation Commission. His duty was
to tell the Council that famine was threatening.
M. Clemenceau said that the Council would hear
the Reparation Commission at its next meeting.
M. Loucheur said that the Austrian Delegates
had on the other hand told them that the Vienna Government had received
an offer from a Dutch group which was ready to advance 30,000,000
florins to Austria against the promise that, if at a later time the
Austrian Government was to grant to an industrial company the monopoly
of tobacco, it would enjoy a priority right for the concession of that
monopoly. Mr. Rathbone had alluded to that fact in saying that they were
eating the artichoke leaf by leaf: that was quite exact; but they had no
other solution. The Organization Commission of the Reparation Commission
therefore proposed to approve the contract between the Austrian
Government and the Dutch group on condition that within two or three
months, the Reparation Commission was able to work out, in order to
float Austria financially, a possible scheme, it would be able to
reimburse the Dutch group. From the information in their hands, that
group would accept such a scheme. To summarize briefly, they proposed
that the Council should reply to Chancellor Renner by giving him
immediately relief and by informing him that
[Page 564]
they were going on with the study of a
reorganization of the Austrian finances.
Chancellor Renner then entered the room.
6. M. Clemenceau asked Chancellor Renner to
speak. Hearing of Chancellor Renner
Chancellor Renner then read the declaration
contained in Appendix “F”.
M. Clemenceau said he would ask M. Loucheur to
inform the Chancellor of the decision taken by the Supreme Council and
the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission.
M. Loucheur said that the Organization
Committee of the Reparation Commission, following declarations made by
Chancellor Renner and by the members of the Austrian Delegation, had
taken a certain number of measures involving immediate application:
- (1)
- through the assistance of America, the good will of the
Italian Government and that of Great Britain, and with the aid
of France, 30,000 tons of wheat would be sent from Trieste into
Austria; that measure was already being executed.
- (2)
- France and Great Britain were studying the opening of a credit
in favor of Serbia against the latter’s delivery to Austria of
the wheat it had promised her. The credit would only be opened
in the measure where wheat would be delivered to Austria; an
Allied mission would supervise on the spot those
deliveries.
- (3)
- The Austrian Government had requested the release of a certain
number of foreign securities which it had loaned when the first
credit of forty-eight millions of dollars had been opened. They
were now studying that proposal, and would be able to reply to
it within eight days. They should, however, remark at once that
they did not think that the securities in question constituted
for Austria a means of finding within a short time the resources
which she needed. Lastly, with regard to the loan for a first
mortgage of the sum of thirty millions of florins, the
Reparation Commission agreed to authorize the signing of the
contract in question, with certain reservations which would be
communicated that evening to Chancellor Renner, but which were
not of a nature to prevent the execution of the proposed
loan.
They had thus insured the immediate future of Austria. As far as a much
more important program was concerned, which had been submitted to them
by Chancellor Renner, the Powers would examine it and would communicate
their opinion within a very short time, but they found it impossible to
give an answer on that day concerning the general question.
Chancellor Renner said that he first wished to
thank the Council and the Reparation Commission for the speed with which
the requests presented by them had been examined, and also for the
replies which had just been made known to them. With regard to the first
point, the assurances which were given them that 30,000 tons of wheat
would be sent immediately had caused them great relief; they did not
know
[Page 565]
a few days before whether
there would be bread in Vienna for Christmas. He took the liberty of
insisting before the Italian representative, so that the sending of that
wheat should not suffer any delay: they would thus have flour for the
holidays.
Mr. de Martino said that he believed that the
first trains were already on the way; if they were not, they would be
leaving right away.
M. Loucheur said that M. Bertolini, the Italian
representative on the Reparation Commission, had given them the day
before the most reassuring information on the subject.
Chancellor Renner said that with regard to the
opening of a credit to Serbia, he thought he should point out that they
had once before made a formal contract for food stuffs with the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State: under the provisions of that contract, and
notwithstanding the great difficulties which they had had in obtaining
them, they had deposited with the Serbian Government 140 millions of
Serbian crowns, and up to this time they had received nothing, or
practically nothing.
M. Loucheur said it was certain that
Jugo-Slavia had not kept its promises. For that reason he was to meet
the Serbian ministers the next day in order to take in accord with them
the necessary measures.
Chancellor Renner stated that a few days before
he left Vienna they had signed with Serbia a new agreement.
Notwithstanding the great lack of rolling stock in their yards, they
were lending her fifty engines so as to insure the transportation of
that wheat. Unfortunately, however, on account of the late season which
made it difficult to navigate the Danube, he believed it would be
difficult to obtain it. He therefore feared that the happy solution
found by the Allied and Associated Powers would not be sufficient to
furnish them with the necessary food stuffs. He hoped, however, that the
mission which M. Loucheur announced was to be sent might achieve the
execution of the contracts.
On the other hand, they were well aware that the foreign securities which
they were asking the Council to release would not suffice to get them
out of trouble. It was only an expedient. They were, however, forced to
have recourse to it as practically Austria did not dispose of any more
foreign securities.
M. Loucheur said that the British and Italian
representatives were awaiting the reply of their respective governments
to the proposals of the Organization Committee of the Reparation
Commission. They hoped that in four or five days they would be enabled
to communicate their decision to the Chancellor.
Chancellor Renner said that with regard to the
monopoly of tobacco he was hopeful that the discussion which would take
place
[Page 566]
that afternoon before
the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission would have
favorable results for them.
Lastly, he was happy to hear that a prompt answer would be made to the
general proposals which they had presented. Already the concessions
which had been made to them guaranteed that they would be able to live
during the next few weeks. At that they would be receiving mostly wheat,
and they lacked everything. The fact should not be lost sight of,
however, that if they did not succeed in getting up a program on the
whole question which would carry them until the next crop, Austria would
go from bad to worse: they would remain condemned to live from day to
day. When they had left Vienna, their provisioning was only insured for
three days! It did not need much effort to understand that such a
situation embittered individuals, exasperated passions; and in order to
establish a normal situation little by little one should see clearly a
few months ahead. He therefore took the liberty of insisting before the
Supreme Council and the Reparation Commission in order that a methodical
organization might be got under way which would last for ten months. If
that result were obtained, he could guarantee that Austria and Vienna
would work. People came to Vienna from all Eastern countries to obtain
goods. As soon as they were enabled to work they would have no
difficulty in exporting their products and would thus be capable of
earning their bread and paying their debts.
M. Loucheur said that he would reply to
Chancellor Renner that they were studying the program which he had
submitted to them; they were quite aware that the measures which had
already been decided upon would only suffice for two or three months. He
wished, however, to point out that the possible loan of thirty million
florins would enable Austria to acquire other things besides wheat.
Chancellor Renner wished, before leaving, to
thank the Council and the Powers represented thereon for the assistance
which had been given them. He hoped that the message which they could
bring back to Vienna before Christmas would be a consolation for the
populations. But in any event he wished to state that immediately after
the holidays they would make efforts to better their relations with
Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia: they wished to forget the past and work
together on the foundations laid by the Treaty of St. Germain.
M. Clemenceau said that the Council thanked
Chancellor Renner for the assurances of good will which he had just
given. On their side they wished to express the firm hope that the
promises made on both sides would be held.
Chancellor Renner then withdrew.
(The meeting then adjourned).
[Page 567]
Appendix A to HD–111
Note From the German Peace Delegation
to the Supreme Council
(Presented in French, by M. von Lersner)
the representative of
the
german peace delegation
No. 58
Paris, December 14, 1919.
Monsieur le Président: In reply to the note
of December 8, I have the honor, at the order of my Government to
inform your Excellency of the following:
The German Government wishes to do away with the misunderstanding
which creates the impression that in compensation for the absence,
for the time being, of the Delegates of the United States, in the
Commissions provided for by the Treaty, Germany requests the right
to have the terms of the Treaty modified in regard to the
extradition of persons accused of infractions against the laws of
war, and the repatriation of prisoners of war. The repatriation of
prisoners of war has not been mentioned in this connection. In
regard to the extradition, the German Government, before receiving
the Allies’ note of November l,3 stated
the reasons which would seem to make it necessary to attenuate the
terms of the execution of the Treaty.4 These
reasons still deserve, to the same extent, the most serious
consideration by the Allied and Associated Powers. But, the German
Government has never made its consent to the going into force of the
Treaty dependent on previous agreement on this question.
The German Government takes note of the fact that according to the
intention of the Supreme Council, the right, as reserved in the last
paragraph of the Protocol of November 1,5 to
have recourse to measures of coercion, military or otherwise, will
only be effective until the state of peace shall have been
established by the coming into force of the Treaty, and that the
fulfilling of obligations, provided for by the Protocol, will not,
from that time on, be guaranteed by stipulation other than the
general stipulations of the Peace Treaty and the methods generally
recognized by the law of nations. Under those conditions, the German
Government does not maintain the objections made so far regarding
the last paragraph of the Protocol.
The German Government also takes note of the declaration according to
which it is the intention of the Allies to repatriate, from the time
of the deposit of ratifications, the prisoners of war whose
liberation,
[Page 568]
after the
conclusion of peace can no longer be subordinated to any but the
conditions referred to by Article 221—conditions which have already
been fulfilled.
Aside from the terms of the Protocol of November 1st regarding the
destruction of the German warships at Scapa Flow, and in view of the
relative unimportance of the undertakings in question, and in the
expectation that the deliveries effected in the meantime will
unquestionably be taken into account, the German Government will
raise no objections to the contents of the Protocol. The German
Government only wishes to record the fact that the delays and the
infractions of the Armistice, which, according to the Allies, have
taken place, are not to be ascribed to it.
As for the affair of Scapa Flow, the German Government renounces
replying in a detailed fashion to the separate note which the Allies
submitted on the subject.5a It limits itself to the following
observations:
The so-called contradiction between the memorandum of November
27th6 and the notes of June
28th and September 3rd, do not exist in reality. These notes do not
discuss the legal aspect of the question. The memorandum only
examines the legal side of the affair, and sets forth the arguments
that a court of arbitrage should take into consideration.
Through an inaccurate translation, the sense of the passage of the
letter of May 9th, from Admiral von Trotha, which was cited, is
completely altered. From the original text, as well as from the
passages preceding and following it, it appears that it refers to
instructions given to the Naval Delegates for the negotiations at
Versailles, and not, as the Allied note supposes, to an order given
Admiral von Reuter.
In the order sent by Admiral von Reuter, June 17th, to the commanders
of the warships, and which has just been published by the British
admiralty, it is stated that the Admiral should not destroy the
ships unless the enemy attempted to take them over, without the
assent of the German Government, but that the ships should, on the
contrary, be surrendered to the enemy if the German Government
accepted the Peace terms. This order proves, once more, that it is
only the mistaken impression that the Armistice had ceased and that
a state of war again existed which impelled Admiral von Reuter to
act as he did. He thought it his duty to act, under those
circumstances, according to the general order which, in case of war,
imposes on every naval officer the duty of not allowing his ship to
fall into the hands of the enemy. A similar order exists, besides,
in the British and French navies.
[Page 569]
The German Government maintains its opinion that the best way to
arrive at a just solution of the dispute would have been to submit
it to the International Court of Arbitrage at the Hague. This
measure would in no wise have delayed the going into force of the
Treaty nor the signature of the Protocol, modified accordingly.
The German Government can only regret that the Allies, on the
contrary, should have taken the standpoint that it is a question of
acts of war, the settlement of which rests with the victor.
Desirous, nevertheless of doing everything within its power to do
away with all obstacles which may oppose a prompt reestablishment of
peace, the German Government declares its willingness to make good
the damage caused to the Allied and Associated Governments by the
destruction of the ships. It cannot, however, carry out this
reparation in the manner provided for by the Protocol of November
1st, as a careful examination of the matter has shown that the
demands formulated in the protocol would compromise in an
irreparable way the economic life of Germany and would end by
excluding all possibility of fulfilling the other enormous
obligations which the Treaty imposes on Germany. It cannot be that
the Allies wish to demand that the German Government assume such a
new obligation. According to the note of December 8th they are,
themselves, disposed to avoid causing such a fatal injury to the
vital interests of German economic life. They have declared
themselves ready to examine the question as soon as the German port
material has been surrendered to them. The German Government
desires, immediately to submit its data to the Allies and the other
necessary data which will show to what an extent the fulfilment of
these demands will harm the economic capacity of Germany. It has
entrusted a commission of experts with the task of placing these
data before the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers
and to furnish them will [with?] all desired
explanations. It will formulate at the same time definite and
detailed propositions on a mode of reparation which, while creating
a new and heavy load for Germany in her present position will not be
incompatible with her vital interests.
After having, in this way, declared itself ready in principle to
afford reparation for the destruction of the ships in question, the
German Government believes it may expect that the crews held until
now on board will be repatriated without delay.
The German Government hopes in this way that it will be possible to
proceed with the signature of the Protocol immediately, and to
effect the coming into force of the Treaty, and the return of peace,
so ardently desired by the German people and the entire world.
Please accept, Mr. President, etc. etc.
[Page 570]
Appendix B to HD–111
president of
the
german peace delegation
Paris, December 15, 1919.
From: Von Lersner.
To: Dutasta.
I have the honor, pursuant to our conversation of this date, to
inform your Excellency that the Technical Commission, which should
arrive tomorrow, will be composed as follows:
- Dr. Seeliger, Privy Legation Adviser
- Mr. von Gagern, Navy Commander
- Mr. Schreiber, Privy Admiralty Adviser
- Mr. Loewer, Naval Construction Adviser
- Mr. Eich, Privy Adviser
- Mr. Blohm, Certified Engineer
- Mr. Prltzer, Director
- Mr. Muller, Labor Representative
Please accept, etc.
[No signature on file copy]
Appendix C to HD–111
Note From the Secretariat General of
the Peace Conference
In transmitting the German reply7 to the Secretary
General of the Conference, M. von Lersner stated that he had been
instructed with making the following point clear: The German
Government never considered it was its right to obtain a
modification of the Treaty on the ground that the United States have
not yet ratified and consequently will not be represented in the
Commissions for the time being. The German Government adheres to
Article 440, which stipulates that the Treaty will go into effect
immediately upon the ratification by three of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers.
Regarding the matter of Scapa Flow M. von Lersner stated that a
delegation of German technicians would arrive in the morning. The
Delegates would be supplied with all the necessary documents. The
German Government was desirous of having this Commission meet, if
possible as soon as to-morrow afternoon, a Commission of Allied
technicians. M. von Lersner assured that in this event the Allies by
to-morrow evening would be convinced of the absolute impossibility
for Germany to satisfy the demands of the Allies concerning the
400,000 tons requested.
M. von Lersner again insisted on Germany’s very great and sincere
desire for the re-establishment of a state of peace. But he added,
[Page 571]
begging that the
Secretary General should not misinterpret his words, that if the
Allies insisted on the actual surrender of the material described in
the Protocol, the German Government would find it impossible to
sign. But immediately thereafter he referred to the fact that not
only would the experts enlighten the Allies but would propose
compensations very acceptable to them. M. von Lersner brought out
the point that the German Government, in this matter, has set all
questions of pride completely aside since it agrees to reparation
for acts for which it continues to assert it is not responsible.
Appendix D to HD–111
From: French Delegation.
To: Secretariat General of the Delegation of the
United States of America.
Vorarlberg Question
From reports which reached the French Government, the Government of
Vienna and public opinion in Austria are very much concerned about
the separatist movement which is to be observed in Vorarlberg.
The Landtag of this region discussed on December 6, the question of
its union with Switzerland. On this subject, it has taken the four
following decisions:
- 1)
- It asks the Central Government to recognise the right of
self-determination for Vorarlberg, and to refer this
question to the Supreme Council at Paris, (League of
Nations).
- 2)
- These authorities are invited, in case of necessity, to
proclaim themselves the right of self-determination of the
country.
- 3)
- The communes are invited to prepare the electoral lists,
with a view to an eventual plebiscite.
- 4)
- The provincial authorities are invited to take the
necessary measures, in case they should have to exercise the
right of self-determination.
These decisions have been communicated by the Landtag to the
Chancellery of the State of Vienna, which has answered by the
following telegram:
“The Government will close no legal way to Vorarlberg, if the
Landtag presents to the Government in Vienna a proposition
authorising the negotiations of Vorarlberg concerning its
union with Switzerland; the proposition will be forwarded to
Paris; but the Government will, at the same time, reserve
the right to make the necessary declarations in the
interests of Austria. Vice-Chancellor Fink’s proposition,
presented Tuesday, will therefore be accepted by the
Government. The Government will, of course, be obliged to
oppose, by every means in its power, any action directed
against the Peace Treaties or the existing laws. It advises
legal methods.”
[Page 572]
The Allied and Associated Powers cannot remain indifferent to this
question. It is certain, as the Austrian Delegation says, in its
letter of December 2, that the separation of Vorarlberg from
Austria, would “lead sooner or later to a complete disintegration of
Austria”. The demonstrations of the Vorarlberg people and of their
Landtag have stimulated the ferments of dissolution throughout the
Republic. It is reported that the province of Salzburg demands its
reunion with Bavaria, and that a similar movement is growing in
Northern Tyrol. The agents of the Government of Budapest are
circulating through the Comitats of western Hungary, which were
attributed to Austria, organising an agitation in favor of a
plebiscite. It may be remarked, on this subject, that the Austrian
Government now realises the danger of the solution it had the
imprudence to request in its counter-propositions.
The decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the frontiers of
Austria, determined in the interest of Europe, which inspired it
with the desire to facilitate in every way the existence of this
State, should influence it to give the Austrian Government official
support in the question of Vorarlberg.
The Supreme Council might take advantage of Chancellor Renner’s
presence in Paris to transmit to him a declaration in which the
Allied and Associated Powers state that they adhere, and will
adhere, as far as concerns the territory of the Austrian Republic,
to the frontiers which have been fixed by the Treaty of St.
Germain.
The Chancellor might be authorised to publish the declaration of the
Supreme Council. This demonstration would strengthen the authority
of the Austrian Government in all the regions where separatist
tendencies exist. Concerning Vorarlberg in particular, it would
contribute to wipe out the movement which is gaining hold in certain
Swiss classes for the incorporation of Vorarlberg with the
Confederation. The partisans of the incorporation invoke the danger
for Switzerland if Vorarlberg were attached to Germany. Now, this
eventuality would be excluded, if the Allied and Associated Powers
would affirm their desire to see the integrity of the Austrian
Republic maintained.
Appendix E to HD–111
Dangers of the Disintegration of
Austria8
The deplorable situation now existing in Austria from an economic
point of view favors all efforts towards disintegration instigated
in the country by the pan-Germans who thus hope to annex the new
State piece by piece by evading the provisions of the St. Germain
[Page 573]
and Versailles
Treaties which prohibit the attachment of Austria to Germany.
The Vorarlberg Landtag decided, on December 6, to request the
Government at Vienna to recognize a right of self-determination to
the province, and to submit the question to the Supreme Council at
Paris and to the League of Nations. Preparatory measures for an
eventual plebiscite were taken, as well as provisions with a view to
the separation from Austria.
In Switzerland public opinion is considerably stirred up, but is
divided.
In certain circles, especially in the Germanic districts, a
propaganda for the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland is being
conducted, while another current of opinion is hostile to such
annexation through fear of seeing the religious or linguistic
proportion displaced in the Confederation.
However, the Swiss Government has taken the following position, viz.,
that it will not favor the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland
as long as the integrity of Austria is maintained. It is only in the
event that Austria would become disintegrated and the annexation of
Vorarlberg to Germany a possibility, that Switzerland would support
the independence of Vorarlberg and even consider its annexation, to
prevent such an eventuality.
It is also agreed in Switzerland to submit the question to the League
of Nations if need be.
On the other hand, an annexationist movement is being manifested in
the Limburg district favoring Bavaria, and a similar movement is
also evident in the Tyrol where it has assumed the form of a request
for economic annexation with Germany.
Finally, the Hungarians announce that they will claim a plebiscite
for the districts of Western Hungary, which were annexed to Austria
by the St. Germain Treaty. The Government at Vienna, greatly
alarmed, appeals to the Powers to obtain the solemn assurance that
they will not permit a like destruction of the work of the St.
Germain Treaty.
Article 88 of this Treaty is formal, and is drawn up as follows:
“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than
with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the
consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which
might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever
compromise her independence, particularly, and until her
admission to membership of the League of Nations, by
participation in the affairs of another Power.”
These provisions were taken with a view to protecting European
interests which exist more than ever and which should create a
desire to favor the Austrian State by every means.
[Page 574]
It is therefore proposed to accord the Austrian Government public
support in the form of a declaration which might be drawn up as
follows and delivered to Chancellor Renner:
“The Allied and Associated Powers, desirous of assuring the
existence of Austria within the frontiers as assigned, and
determined to have the provisions of the Treaty of St.
Germain-en-Laye respected, declare that they will oppose
every effort of a nature to infringe upon the integrity of
Austrian territory or which, contrary to the stipulations of
Article 88 of the said Treaty would result in compromising
in any manner, whether directly or indirectly, the political
or economic independence of Austria.”
It is understood that in order to give full force to this public
declaration, the Supreme Council should offer at the same time full
security to Austria relative to her provisioning, and also take all
measures necessary to insure her economic life.
Appendix F to HD–111
[Declaration by the Chancellor of
Austria (Renner)]
Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Supreme
Council: In a moment of most distressful plight [of?] the
people of Austria, in behalf of which we appear before you, in
taking refuge with the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated
Powers, we are well aware of the fact that here in Paris not only
the political fate of countries but also the economic existence of
nations are decided on. Our Mission is not a political one. In St.
Germain our political future has been settled and our people,
represented by the National Assembly, a body elected in general
suffrage, has accepted with a majority of five-sixths of all men and
women in Austria the terms of the St. Germain Treaty as a basis for
their political existence and future, and thus adopted with
confidence the system established in St. Germain.
Since that time our people have come into a desperate situation;
seven millions of people are literally on the point of perishing by
hunger and cold. In the name of humanity we implore the powers
ruling the world to put an end to these atrocious sufferances
unworthy of modern civilization; to put an end to this destruction
of all working power, to the fearful mortality of children, to the
physical and moral infirmity of the future generation!
May I be spared to picture to you the present state of our country
and the suffering of our people. I know that the exhaustive and
conscientious reports of the Missions did not leave the Governments
of the Great Powers in doubt as to our present situation. The daily
rations, which hard working people have contented themselves to live
[Page 575]
on, are so small that
the more fortunate nations of the west could hardly conceive how a
household could be kept on them. Today we are not able to deal out
but a portion of said rations, and even that not to all of our
people.
In Vienna we could only distribute 100 gr. of bread and flour a day
and head, these last few weeks; at some other places outside of
Vienna there was no bread at all. Nevertheless our people maintained
peace and order up to the last moment. There is hardly a foreigner
who did not admire them for this heroism. For this patience has been
shown by our people now for years. With painful regret I have to
confess that acts of violence and pillage have occurred these last
few days. We condemn and punish such deeds, but the judges’ verdict
is influenced by pity. Unspeakable care has brought us here, we fear
that we do not possess the strength to leave this place if this care
is not taken from us.
For even these small and irregularly dealt out rations could only
last till about the middle of January, at which time we will be left
without any food. The Austrian Government could not remain in office
up to the very moment when the last kg. of flour, the last deka of
fat has been given out, and the six million people are facing
complete exhaustion of all their supplies. The Government bears
before its own country and the entire world the responsibility that
mankind shall not be surprised by such a catastrophe, which is bound
to deal a heavy blow on the conscience of the civilized world.
I hardly need to cite the reasons, which have brought matters so far.
There are chiefly two reasons: our own country in its present shape
was only able to produce even in good times of peace a third or
fourth of the year’s demand in breadstuffs. Therefore self-aid is of
no avail to us. The second reason is that the agriculture of the
neighboring countries and of Eastern Europe is run down to such an
extent that it yields only a small or no surplus at all. Our next
neighbors are mostly showing the best intentions, but we could
convince ourselves that partly their soil, partly their railroads
are giving out. The Austrian Government has in conformity with its
duty and with the aid of the Great Powers made all efforts to assure
our demand through agreements, but to our great distress we had to
convince ourselves during these last few weeks, that it is
impossible to build up our provision-system on an exchange of goods
with our neighbors, and that the East could at the best supply
additional contributions only. This disappointment prompted us to
look towards the West, and this was the source of our second more
fateful embarrassment.
Even in case a credit for the purchase of foodstuffs should be
granted in the West to the Austrian Government, the provisions could
only then be started moving and therefore could not arrive in time,
but at the best in two months.
[Page 576]
Through our disappointment in the East turned towards the West we see
to our own great dismay, that the time is too short. We cannot wait
until the provisions are shipped across the Atlantic Ocean. Our
first prayer therefore is, that the quantities needed for the taking
care of the minimal rations for the next two months be advanced us
out of the stocks available in Europe.
The breakdown of our currency-system, an event which has not its
equal and could not be foreseen in its actual extent by anyone,
makes it impossible for us to pay in our own money. We therefore
must pray that the food supplies conceded out of the European Stocks
be credited to us “in natura”, and that we obtain at the same time a
credit, which would enable us to buy immediately, that is to say in
this very hour, in countries across the Ocean, in order that the
grain shipped from over there not only could replenish the said
stocks, but also reach our country as soon as possible, to be
distributed there. Not until then can a regular provisioning-service
be taken up.
This, however, requires on the other part that our people are placed
in a position to have continuous work. We must work in order that we
ourselves may provide for our living and meet the obligations
imposed on us by the Treaty of St. Germain. In our country employers
and employes have after months of deep depression following the
catastrophe of war shown the best intentions to resume work, but
lack of food and above all of coal rendered it impossible to revive
industrial activity. For unfortunately nature has denied to the
territory awarded to us by the Treaty of St. Germain any coal-field
worth while mentioning. We can only obtain the necessary minimum of
food and raw materials, if the leading Allied Powers grant us a
credit sufficient for said purpose. The Austrian Republic as created
by the Peace of St. Germain does not possess at present foreign
currency, contains incoherent parts of the whole productive
machinery of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and requires a
transition period in order that its people could rearrange their
activity in conformity with the changed conditions.
Such credits are provided for in the peace terms. The provisions
contain moreover all guarantees which Austria has to offer and all
means of control to which Austria has to submit itself in order to
assure repayment of said credits and reparation. We realize that it
will require a length of time until a complete plan for the
execution of these peace terms is worked out and carried into
effect. The Austrian Government and people therefore appreciated it
greatly that the Sub-Committee of the Organization Committee of the
Reparation Commission was sent to Vienna several weeks ago, where
its members devoted themselves with great zeal and pain to their
difficult task. But I want to call the attention of the Supreme
Council to the fact that this aid may come too late, if we are left
in this uncertain
[Page 577]
state of
affairs for months to come and are prevented from resuming activity,
living through all this time from hand to mouth. Under the present
circumstances no conscientious man could remain in a responsible
public position knowing that it is impossible for him to help, so
that without the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers our
country would be delivered to full anarchy. The existence and social
order of our population being in greatest danger we have full
confidence that our appeal will be favourably understood and be
followed by an immediate intervention. Our life after being assured
by your assistance we shall make all efforts to help ourselves as
far as our strengths go.
It would be our greatest satisfaction to reach the point where we do
not have to come for help any more as every state has to overcome
its difficulties by itself.
The Austrian Government is fully conscious of the responsibility
which it carries for the existence of the Austrian people and the
maintenance of order in their own country. And—to be sure—we are
pleading here above all the cause of the people. But we have the
frankness to declare that we do not carry this responsibility alone,
but that we are standing under higher duty while we are taking care
of our people’s welfare. Europe is still far from a state of
political steadiness of organized economic affairs and of social
security, which state to attain must be the aim of all fair-minded
people. We have the feeling that our country is the centre of the
actual economic depression and the spot where the social suffering
has reached its highest point. Our breakdown is bound to affect the
whole system of the new states created by the Treaty of St. Germain
and of entire Central Europe, it is bound to shake up the economic
conditions of the entire world, so that no country, no part on our
earth could get away from it. Therefore we comprise all we need in
this one prayer:
Give kindly to our state, which in full confidence adopted the system
established by the Great Powers, by your support a chance to save
itself in order that it may fulfill its duty at its proper post and
in the same time in the service of the entire world.
