Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IX

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/110

HD–110

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, December 9, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 9, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. Arnavon
    • M. De Saint Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
    • M. Trombetti
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. B. Winthrop
British Empire	Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Rear-Admiral McCully
  • Mr. Ellis L. Dresel
  • Dr. J. B. Scott
  • Dr. Bowman
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles
  • Capt. Madison, U. S. N.
  • Lt. Cdt. Koehler, U. S. N.
  • Colonel J. A. Logan
• British Empire
  • Capt. Fuller
  • Capt. MacNamara
  • Cdt. Dunne
  • Gen. Sackville-West
  • Gen. Mance
  • M. Leeper
  • M. Carr
  • Sir J. Bradbury
  • M. Malkin
• France
  • M. Leygues
  • M. Loucheur
  • M. Cambon
  • M. Henry Simon
  • Gen. Le Rond
  • M. Laroche
  • Cdt. Levavasseur
  • M. Kammerer
  • M. Fromageot
• Italy
  • M. Bertolini
  • Gen. Cavallero
  • Admiral Grassi
  • M. Rieci-Busatti
  • M. Dell’Abbadessa
  • M. Mancioli
  • Col. Bassetto
  • Cmdt. Fea
  • Col. Castoldi
  • M. Vannutelli-Rey
  • M. Stranieri
  • Cmdt. Ingianni
  • M. Antonucci
• Japan
  • M. Shigemitsu
  • M. Nagaoka

1. (The Council had before it a modified text dated December 9th [8th] of the British proposal of November 14th /See Appendix “A”/, as well as draft orders for the Inter Allied Naval Commission dated December 9th /See Appendix “B”/). Distribution of Enemy Warships (Surface and Submarines)

M. Leygues stated that the Naval Experts had asked the Council to define various resolutions taken by the Conference at its last meetings. Paragraph 1 of the resolution of November 29th (H. D. 102, Minute 1)¹ should have the following words added thereto: “Under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission”. The following paragraph should be substituted for paragraph 2 of the resolution of December 2d (H. D. 104, Minute 6 [9]):² “that the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of further attribution and should be allowed to remain in charge of those Powers now holding them but that those submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.”

M. Matsui said that the new text did not correspond exactly to the proposal he had made. He would, however, if all the Powers agreed to adopt the same, recommend its acceptance by his Government. For the time being he could only accept it whilst making that reservation.

M. Leygues said that in the first paragraph of the resolution of December 4th (H. D. 106, Minute 2)³ it would be advisable to delete the last part of the sentence: “such ships … for police work”. Belgium might therefore use in any way she saw fit the ships in question. Paragraph 2 of the same resolution should be modified as follows: “to allocate a certain number of small enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to Poland and to Yugo-Slavia, those vessels to be used for police purposes only.”

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether it would not be advisable to give the same privilege to Portugal which had suffered losses during the war. Portugal, as a matter of fact, had already made repeated efforts to that effect.

M. Leygues said that Portugal, like Greece and Roumania, had already received a warship in compensation of her losses at sea.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that Portugal had suffered losses at sea, which was not the case with Roumania. It therefore had good reason to ask for more.

M. Leygues said that if they granted the request of Portugal, Greece and Roumania would also ask for something, and it would be difficult not to give them satisfaction.

Mr. Polk asked whether a share could not be allocated to Brazil.

M. de Martino said that 22 Powers had asked for the attribution of warships.

M. Leygues said it was understood that those ships should be employed for the policing of the coast and that they should be delivered without armament. On the other hand some modifications had been made to the British proposal of November 14th⁴ which the Council had accepted in principle on November 29th.⁵ The British note proposed a distribution of the proceeds of the sale of materiel accruing from the breaking up of enemy warships. It was now agreed that the materiel itself should be distributed. On the other hand, new time limits had been accepted for the breaking up of surface warships allocated for propaganda purposes. The time limit for the breaking up had been lengthened to 5 years, but at the end of 18 months those ships should already be out of commission. The naval experts had decided upon 6 units as the number of ships to be allocated to Poland and Yugo-Slavia for naval policing; that figure was perhaps too small.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the proposal provided that the allocation should be open to reconsideration by the Powers: was it at that time necessary to fix final figures.

M. Clemenceau said that it would be too late to do so once these ships were broken up. A decision should be taken immediately.

M. Leygues said that he proposed to allocate 12 small vessels to Yugo-Slavia and 6 to Poland. Brazil, Portugal, Greece and Roumania would also receive 6 vessels.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the British proposal modified as contained in Appendix “A”, it being understood that the American reservations concerning paragraph 2 thereof remains; and to adopt Appendix “B” proposal;

(2) that paragraph one of the resolution of November 29, 1919 (H. D. 102, Minute 1) should be completed as follows: “Under the superintendence of the Interallied Naval Commission;” and Paragraph 2 should be modified as follows: “That every Power receiving enemy warships to be sunk or broken up should sink them or dismantle them within a period of 18 months; and every such Power should complete the breaking up of such ships within a period of 5 years after their arrival in one of its home ports”;

(3) that paragraph 2 of the resolution of December 2nd (H. D. 104, Minute 6 [9]) should be modified as follows: “with the reservation of Mr. Matsui’s acceptance;

“That the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of further attribution, but should be allowed to remain in charge of those Powers now holding them. But that these submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.”

(4) that paragraph one of the resolutions of December 4, 1919 (H. D. 106, Minute 2) be modified as follows: “To authorize Belgium to keep the small enemy warships which are in her ports.”

(5) that paragraph 2 of the same resolution should read as follows: “To allocate a certain number of enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to certain other Powers; those vessels to be used for police purposes only;”

that allocation should be made as follows:

Poland	6 enemy torpedo boats
Serb-Croat-Slovene State	12 enemy torpedo boats.

“The following States: Brazil, Greece, Portugal, Roumania should, if they should so desire, receive 6 similar enemy torpedo boats each;”

that no other enemy warship be allocated to another State with the exception of those above mentioned and those figuring in Appendices “A” and “B”.

2. M. Berthelot said that from the telegrams they had received from Bucharest, M. Vaida Voevod had given instructions to the Roumanian Delegation to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Treaty with Bulgaria. On the other hand General Coanda had shown him the text of the telegram which he had received from the Roumanian Government in which he was asked to obtain a delay for the signature of the Minorities Treaty⁶ until the arrival of new Delegates. He (M. Berthelot) had pointed out to General Coanda that such a thing was impossible and that the Roumanian Delegation would have to sign the three Treaties at the same time. General Coanda had admitted that he had instructions to do so. It was, nevertheless, true that their representatives at Bucharest thought that the Treaty should be modified and that the Council was to take without delay a final position in the matter. Treaty Between the Principal Powers and Roumania for the Protection of Minorities

M. Kammerer said he had the honor of explaining to the Council the changes proposed by the Commission which had prepared the Minorities Treaty. In the first place, the Commission was unanimous in proposing the omission in the preamble of all reference to the independence of Roumania. It was, however, of the opinion, with the exception of the American Delegation, that it would be necessary to omit in the same preamble any reference to the Treaty of Berlin.⁷ Lastly, it had been decided to insert in the preamble a sentence to the effect that Roumania had discussed the Treaty. That sentence was as follows: “… had, after a common examination come to an agreement in order to execute the present Treaty.” The Drafting Committee had already given final form to that preamble. The essential question remained, that is the Jewish question. With the exception of the American Delegates the members of the Commission were in favor of the omission of Articles 10 and 11 concerning the Jews: those were the articles which had raised in Roumania the most violent protests.

Mr. Polk asked whether it would not be sufficient to adopt for Articles 10 and 11, the text figuring in the Treaty with Greece.⁸

Sir Eyre Crowe said that it was certain that the articles in question of the Roumanian Treaty entered into a great deal of detail, especially on the Sabbath, when as a matter of fact the general principle, which alone was of importance, was recognized by the general clauses of the Treaty.

M. Kammerer said that another reason militated in favor of the omission of the articles concerning the Jews. The Commission had examined the “décret loi” which had been published in May last by the Roumanian Government. It was quite true, however, that that document was not entirely satisfactory. The fact, nevertheless, remained that they had given the Jews the option of nationality without condition, and what was more important to the Roumanian Jews was that they should not be treated as aliens. The American Delegation had not thought that it could adopt the opinion of the majority; it argued amongst other reasons that the Roumanians had not formulated any definite request on the subject.

Mr. Polk said that at the present time Mr. Paderewski’s Government was confronted in Poland by very great difficulties. The opposition reproached him especially with having granted too much to the Allies. If at this time they were to give the Roumanians more favorable conditions on the Jewish question than those which had been imposed upon Poland, Mr. Paderewski’s position would be made more difficult. He proposed that Articles 10 and 11 be omitted and replaced by Article 10 of the Greek Treaty.

M. Kammerer said that it was concerning Article 11 that the Roumanians were raising the strongest protest.

M. Berthelot said that the question was raised in quite different terms in Roumania and in Poland. The Poles held pogroms: the Roumanians merely refused to grant the Jews the rights of citizenship and the Roumanian Jews were protesting against that situation. He had received a call from the Grand Rabbi and from Mr. Edmund de Rothschild on the subject. Both had declared expressly to him what he had just told the Council. They had even added that the majority of the Roumanian Jews would prefer the omission of Articles 10 and 11 which, although they seemed to confer upon them a special status, seemed to place them outside the body of the nation.

Mr. Polk said he admitted that the situation of the Jews was not the same in Roumania as in Poland: but what troubled him most were the effects of their decision of [on?] the political situation of the Polish Government. He recognized, however, that a number of criticisms could well be formulated concerning the articles in question.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that the British Jews would also prefer that no mention be made in the Treaty of the Sabbath.

M. de Martino said that he had received similar indications. As, however, it was the pogroms which were especially to be feared in Poland, he asked whether there was in the Polish Treaty provisions which secured the Polish Jews from those dangers.

M. Kammerer said that for all these reasons the majority of the Commission had deemed it preferable to omit articles 10 and 11 and to insert in the considerations the following paragraph: “Lastly, considering that Roumania has declared her intention of recognizing as Roumanian subjects, with full rights and without any formality, Jews inhabiting all the territories of Roumania, and unable to claim other nationality.”

Mr. Polk asked if it would not be possible to turn that paragraph of the preamble into a special article of the Treaty.

Mr. Clemenceau stated that it seemed to him that it would indeed not be difficult to insert in the Treaty an article by which Roumania would declare that she recognized the Jews as Roumanian subjects.

It was decided:

(1) to omit in the preamble in the Treaty with Roumania for the protection of minorities, all reference to the independence of Roumania, as well as to the Treaty of Berlin.

(2) to insert in that preamble a sentence indicating that the Treaty has been prepared after agreement with Roumania.

(3) to omit articles 10 and 11 concerning the status of Roumanian Jews, and to replace same by a new article in which Roumania should declare that she recognizes as Roumanian citizens with full rights, all Jews inhabiting the Roumanian territories and unable to establish citizenship of another nationality.

3. M. Clemenceau said they should adjourn the discussion of that question until Mr. Polk had been able to examine it with his Government and to communicate its opinion thereon. He, however, took the liberty of insisting that Mr. Polk be good enough to give an answer to the Council as soon as possible. Reorganization of the Supreme War Council at Versailles

Sir Eyre Crowe said that as far as he was concerned he had already shown that he thought that their military authorities were favorable to the proposal, but he had not yet received the formal authority to accept it.

Mr. Polk said that the recommendations he had made on the subject to Washington had not been approved, but that as soon as he knew that the Allied Governments were in agreement, he would insist once more with his Government and would communicate its decision without delay.

(This discussion was adjourned.)

4. (The Council had before it a note of December 8th, 1919 /See Appendix “C”/).

M. Kammerer read and commented upon the note submitted to the Council. Execution of Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he would accept the proposal.

M. de Martino said that he had not had time to consult his experts on the subject and that it was impossible for him to give an immediate decision.

M. Clemenceau said it was only a matter of requesting Germany to hand over a determined amount of gold. There was no question either of distributing or of allocating finally that gold.

M. de Martino said that under these circumstances he would accept the proposal.

It was decided:

(1) that Germany should be requested to transfer to Paris, under the same conditions as the Russian gold, by virtue of Article 19 of the Armistice Conventions of November 11, 1918,⁹ the gold deposited with the Reichsbank by the public Ottoman debt, referred to in Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) that the gold when transferred to Paris under the provisions of Article 259 should be delivered to whosoever would be entitled to it as soon as the decisions had been taken on the subject by the Allied and Associated Powers.

5. (The Council had before it a report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs dated December 8 [9], 1919 /See Appendix “D”/). Frontiers Between Hungary and Croatia

M. Loucheur read and commented upon the report.

M. de Martino said he did not wish to break the unanimous feeling of the Council and that he would agree with the opinion of the majority. He wished, however, to point out that the new delimitation which was proposed to them would be extremely sinuous.

It was decided:

(1) that the frontier of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, from the railroad one kilometre southwest of the station of Gyékényes until a point 9 kilometres approximately east of Miholjac-Dolnji, should follow the former administrative line between Hungary and Croatia;

(2) that the frontier should be modified in such a way as to leave the Gyékényes Bares railroad entirely in Hungarian territory, including the station of Gola;

(3) that the station of Gola should receive a mixed organization, allowing it to serve the locality of Gola;

(4) that the Article prepared by the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs in its report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, adopted by the Supreme Council,¹⁰ and which places the railroad from Kotor to Bares under international superintendence, should be inserted in the conditions of peace with Hungary;

(5) that the Drafting Committee be charged, after having consulted, if deemed necessary, the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways, with conforming the text of the conditions of Peace with the above decisions.

6. M. Henry Simon said that the question which he desired to submit to the Council had already been brought up on January 30th¹¹ at a time when the future of German colonies had been discussed. Two theses were then confronting each other: on the one hand that of France and the Dominion Government; on the other hand that of Great Britain and America. They had then agreed upon an intermediate text which had become article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations. It was stated in that article, that [in] certain territories (Togo and Camerouns were amongst them) that no military instructions should be given to natives, “except for purposes of police and the defense of the territory”. M. Clemenceau, at the meeting of January 30th, as expressed in the official minutes (I. C. 128) had requested that the latter formula should be, if not modified at least interpreted in such a way as to allow for the employment of those native contingents for the defense of the metropolitan territories as well as the colonial. President Wilson and M. Lloyd George had agreed with M. Clemenceau, and at the Commission on Mandates the Delegates, with the exception of the French Delegates, had wished to limit the employment of troops raised under those conditions to the defense of the Colony. The French Delegation insisted that the first interpretation be maintained. Employment of Contingents From Togo and Camerouns for the Defense of Metropolitan and Colonial Territories

M. Clemenceau said that the French Government had proven that it knew how to manage native populations. They had been able, while the war was in full swing, to raise 75,000 native troops without the least difficulty when it had been predicted that it would be impossible to raise over 30,000 without shedding blood. At the time of discussion in the month of January he had understood President Wilson to have some difficulty in granting to France what she asked for the reason that he feared to create a precedent which would oblige him to grant the same rights to other Powers but while he insisted upon keeping that text he had very clearly expressed and the minutes proved this, that he accepted the interpretation accepted by France to the text under discussion. They could evidently not admit that they should have the right to raise soldiers in their former colonies and that such a right should be refused any of the others. The natives would think, and their prestige would suffer by it, that the Powers were holding them in guardianship. He did not ask that the text be modified, but wished to ask that the text whilst remaining as it was, they might be however, able to raise troops without restriction.

M. Berthelot inquired whether the Council would allow him to read an extract of the meeting of January 30th:

(Extract from H.D. [Council of Ten] Meeting (I. C. 128) January 30, 1919.)

“Mr. Lloyd George said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were: ‘for other than police purposes and the defense of territory’. He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organize great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th centuries in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India whilst they were fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defense of territory was provided for.

M. Clemenceau said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the natives and raising great armies.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right to raise troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.

Mr. Lloyd George said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies for the purposes of aggression, which was all the clause was intended to guard against, he was free to raise troops.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George’s interpretation was adopted.

President Wilson said that Mr. Lloyd George’s interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. Clemenceau said that he was quite satisfied.”

Sir Eyre Crowe said that under these conditions he wondered why the question should be raised anew.

M. Henry Simon said that it was raised because the Commission on Mandates whilst establishing the text of the “B” Mandates, that is to say the African Mandates, had disagreed on the subject of article 2 of those Mandates which provided for the employment of native troops: while the majority wished to limit the employment of those troops to the defense of the colony the French Delegation asked that it be specified that they might also be employed for the defense of the metropolitan territory.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that they might maintain the text as it appeared in Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations.

M. Clemenceau said that he accepted on condition that it be understood that for the interpretation of that text, they would refer to the Minutes of the Supreme Council meeting of January 30th. (I.C. 128)

Sir Eyre Crowe said he thought he remembered that in the conversations which had taken place in June and July on that question, Mr. Balfour had said that probably the word, “territory” was a little equivocal, but that it gave France all she wanted. The best would be as a matter of fact to maintain that text and to interpret it in the spirit of the discussion which had taken place on January 30th.

Mr. Polk said that that question had been discussed in London and he could not take a decision. He would recommend that solution to his Government and he felt pretty certain that it would not make any objection to it.

M. Matsui said that as they were discussing the question of Mandates, he wished to repeat that the Japanese Delegation on the Commission of Mandates had formulated a reservation on the subject of the “C” Mandates. They might discuss that point another day but it was well understood that their reservation of the “C” Mandates remained at the present time.

It was decided:

that under reserve of the American Government’s approval, the words, “defense of the territory” in Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations, and in the text of the “B” Mandates, should be interpreted in conformity with the discussion which had taken place on January 30th, 1919 (I. C. 128) before the Supreme Council.

7. M. Fromageot said that a certain number of questions relative to the Treaty with Hungary were still in suspense. The Drafting Committee would like to get a decision from the Supreme Council thereon. He would first wish to know whether the Council, as the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had requested, meant to give to the Yugo-Slav State a priority concerning reparations. Treaty with Hungary

M. Clemenceau said that was a grave question which he could not solve immediately. He proposed that it should be referred back to the Reparation Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe added that the Commission should make haste.

M. Fromageot said that in the second place, they had been charged with the insertion, with regard to labor, of the same articles as in the other Treaties. These articles had reference to a Conference at Washington, which as a matter of fact had already taken place but which certainly were not official as no Treaty of Peace was then in force. They asked to be authorized to say in the articles of the Treaty with Hungary that the first session of the Labor Conference would take place at date to be fixed later. Lastly, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in a letter of December 3rd had asked different modifications in the articles concerning Canals and Waterways. It would be advisable to bring this up before the competent Commission.

It was decided:

(1) to refer back to the Reparation Commission for immediate examination and report the request presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation concerning the attribution to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of a right of priority with regard to reparations;

(2) that the Drafting Committee insert in the Treaty with Hungary an article stipulating that the first session of the Labor Conference should take place at a date to be fixed later.

(3) to refer back to the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, for immediate examination and report, the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of the clauses of the Treaty with Hungary concerning canals and ways of communication.

8. M. Loucheur said that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had met that morning to settle the question of the payment in gold of customs duties. They had agreed substantially that they ought not to commit themselves to a definite future policy. The solution they proposed was as follows: Collection by Germany of Customs Duties in Gold Marks

The Allied and Associated Powers agree that Germany be immediately authorized to increase the amount of specific pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparation Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency;

The necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as the question of exports, should be opened or continued;

If such negotiations had not resulted within a period of three months in a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

M. Matsui said that as no Japanese expert had been present at the meeting held that morning he could not accept that text immediately.

It was decided:

under the reservation of Mr. Matsui’s acceptance:

(1) that Germany be immediately authorized to majorate the amount of specified pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparation Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency;

(2) that the necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as on the question of exports, should be opened or continued;

(3) that if such negotiations had not come within a period of three months to a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

9. M. Loucheur said that a sub-committee had been appointed to make an estimation of the cost of the Armies of Occupation during the Armistice. That sub-committee had very nearly finished its work but the question of principle still remained. Could each of the armies of occupation claim the complete reimbursement of its expenses, when as a matter of fact the cost of maintenance of the American soldier was nearly double that of the French soldier. Under those conditions they could only request Mr. Polk to examine anew with his Government the suggestion which he himself had proposed and which at a later time the American Delegation had withdrawn. Cost of the Armies of Occupation

Mr. Polk said that he held little hope of success.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that his Government also was not disposed to accept another solution.

M. Loucheur said that under these circumstances he felt he must say that the solution which would be taken would cause in France great astonishment.

Mr. Polk asked whether the question had not been solved by raising the rate of allowance granted to French officers and soldiers.

M. Loucheur agreed that was so for the future: but the future counted for little in that question for the army of occupation would not be very large. It was only a question of the past and the brutal fact was that France, which had maintained an army double that of the British and of the Americans together, would not get a larger amount.

Mr. Polk said that he proposed that Mr. Rathbone and the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission examine the question anew. Mr. Rathbone would then make a proposal to the American Government.

M. de Martino said he was in accord with that proposal but in principle he associated himself with the observations presented by the French Delegation.

(The question was referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for further examination).

10. M. Loucheur said that since he had conferred with General Mance he had acquired the conviction that there existed a complete misunderstanding on the attributions of that Commission between the British and French Delegations. From the explanations given by General Mance the Commission would be organized voluntarily by the interested States, that is to say, by the States inheriting the former Monarchy to settle between themselves the movements of the rolling stock. Those States, so as to facilitate the discussions, were hoping to have as Chairman an independent personality who would not be a party to the question. Under these circumstances it was clear that the Reparation Commission did not have to interfere but the question of choosing the President was a delicate one inasmuch as Sir Francis Dent was too occupied at the present time to be able to assume that function. He had suggested to General Mance that France and Great Britain might agree on the choice. Commission for the Distribution of Rolling Stock and Material Belonging to the Former Austro-Hungarian Empire

M. de Martino said that he wished to be allowed to participate in that choice.

General Mance said that it was a question of the choice of a person, and that the Powers did not interfere.

M. de Martino agreed but asked to participate in the choice under these circumstances.

M. Loucheur said he had no objection.

It was decided:

to accept the principle of the British proposal concerning the meeting at Vienna of a commission composed of delegates from the States acquiring territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to regulate the exchange of cars between those states, on condition that the French, British and Italian delegates agree on the choice of a president who shall not belong to any of the interested States.

11. (The Council had before it a telegram from the. Military Interallied Mission dated December 3rd, 1919 (See Appendix “E”,) and a telegram of the Hungarian Government dated December 4th, 1919 (See Appendix “F”). Hungarian Peace Delegation

M. Berthelot read the two telegrams and added that the Hungarian Government seemed to attempt a sort of blackmail upon the Council by asking for the freedom of Souabe and Magyar agitators. He did not think that the Allies ought to be drawn into the controversy, [into] which the Hungarians were trying to draw them.

M. Clemenceau said it was clear that they could not ask the Roumanians to set at liberty people, the reasons for their arrest, which they were ignorant of. He proposed that they reply that it was none of their business.

It was decided:

to reply to the Hungarian Government to the effect that the Supreme Council did not have to intervene to obtain the freedom of agitators whom Roumanian authorities might have deemed it necessary to arrest.

12. M. Clemenceau said that before adjourning the meeting he wished, in the name of the Council to express to Mr. Polk all the sincere regrets caused by his departure and at the same time the hope that they would always have in him, better than an Ally, he meant, a friend.^11a Departure of Mr. Polk

(Approval).

(The meeting then adjourned).

Paris, France, December 10, 1919.

Appendix [A] to HD–110

The three [sic] memoranda herewith comprise:

(a) Resolutions of Supreme Council H.D. 102 (1), H.D. 104 (VI [IX]) and H.D. 106 (II), as unanimously understood by the Naval Advisers.

(b) Proposals regarding the distribution of Enemy Surface Warships, as amended by the Resolutions of the Supreme Council on the British Memorandum of November 14th, 1919.¹²

(c) Draft Orders for the Inter-Allied Naval Commission charged by the Supreme Council with superintending the disposal of the surrendered enemy warships.¹³

(d) Copies of Supreme Council Resolutions:—

H.D. 101 (1)	28/11/1914
H.D. 102 (1)	29/11/1915
H.D. 104 (VI[IX])
H.D. 106 (II)	4/12/1917

8 December 1919.

Resolutions of Supreme Council, HD–102 (1), HD–104 (VI [IX]), HD–106 (II)

At a meeting of Naval Advisers held this afternoon, Monday, December 8th, 1919 at Ministry of Marine, Paris, with reference to the above resolutions of the Supreme Council, it was unanimously decided that:—

H.D. 102 (1) Paragraph 1. The sense of the resolution of the Supreme Council would be better expressed by adding the following words at the end of paragraph (1):—

“Under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.” (INC)

H.D. 104 (VI [IX]). Subject to the approval of the Japanese Delegate it was decided that the sense of the Supreme Council would be better expressed if the following paragraph were substituted for paragraph (2):

“That the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes cannot be made the subject of further attribution and shall be allowed to remain in the charge of those Powers now holding them. But that these submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission”. (INC)

Paragraph 6. That this resolution was inaccurate and should be deleted.

H.D. 106 (II) Paragraph 1. That the sense of the Supreme Council would be better expressed if the last part of the sentence were deleted and the resolution were to read:—“It was decided to authorize Belgium to keep the small enemy warships which are in her ports.”

Paragraph 2. That the resolution taken by the Supreme Council should read:—

“To allocate a certain number of small enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to Poland and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, these vessels to be used for Police purposes only.[”]

_______United States of America.
_______France.
_______Great Britain.
_______Italy.
_______Japan.

8 December 1919.

Proposal Regarding the Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships

All changes from the British Proposal of 11/11 [14]/19 are underlined in the following text.

In accordance with the preamble to the naval, military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with the general spirit of that Treaty and of those concluded with the other enemy powers, all surface warships surrendered by enemy powers shall, with the exception of the few noted in paragraphs 2 (b), 5 and 6 below, also paragraph (5) (II) and (5) (III) of Draft orders to I. N. C.^17a be broken up or sunk under the superintendence of an Interallied Naval Commission.

2. (a) Enemy Tonnage of Surface Warships, shall be divided up between the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the following computation of losses of surface warships sustained by these powers during the war:—

The U. S. A. reserve the portion of this paragraph between the brackets shown^17b

Great Britain	70%
France	10%
Italy	18%
Japan	8%
U. S. A	2%

(b) Other Allied Powers which lost surface warships during the war shall have these losses replaced by an enemy ship of a type similar to that lost. These ships may be used for any purpose to which these powers may desire to put them. The distribution under this head shall be as follows:

Greece	1 T B D
Roumania	1 T B
Portugal	1 Gunboat

3. (a) Enemy tonnage in the above proportions is to be allocated to each country for breaking up or sinking, under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission. Should any country be unable to break up its share, it may place it in another country for breaking up, subject to conditions detailed below, preference being given to Allied Countries.

(b) The ships are to be Sunk or rendered incapable of any further service as Naval War vessels, in the judgment of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission, within a period of 18 months and to be completely broken up within 5 years from the date when they arrive in a port of the power to whom they are allocated.

4. As regards the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow Great Britain has stated her willingness to bear the loss arising from that incident; but now that it is probable that compensation will be forthcoming from Germany in material which is not naval construction, Great Britain agrees that such compensation should be divided in a similar proportion to that adopted for the enemy surface warships. (Para. 2 (a) above).

5. In view of France and Italy being unable to build surface warships during the war, owing to their preoccupation with the war on land, it is proposed that they should be granted the following compensation in war ships surrendered from the enemy fleets for use in their fleets or for any other purpose they may desire.

France	5 light cruisers & 10 T. B. D.
Italy	“ “ “ “ “

6. It is further proposed that the Naval Inter-Allied Commission shall loan to each of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers:—

• 1 Battleship
• 1 light cruiser
• 3 T. B. D.

This loan will be for one year and during this time these ships may be used for any purpose whatsoever provided that they are not incorporated into the navies of these Powers. At the end of a year after these ships have arrived in a port to the power to which they have been allotted they shall be broken up under the supervision of the I. N. C. or sunk in deep water, under conditions identical to those which were set forth in paragraph 3 (b) above.

The material from the breaking up of these ships will belong to the Powers to which they were allotted.

Appendix B to HD–110

9/12/19.

Draft Orders for Inter-Allied Naval Commission for Superintending the Disposal of Enemy Warships (Supreme Council. H. D. 102 (1))

1. (a) The Inter-Allied Naval Commission for superintending the disposal of enemy warships will be referred to as the I. N. C. and will consist of a British Flag Officer as President and a flag officer or captain from the U. S., France, Italy and Japan.

(b) Technical Advisers will be attached to the Commission as each member may desire.

(c) The I. N. C. may delegate such of its duties as it may consider desirable to the Naval Attaché in any of the countries concerned.

(d) Any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which may not have ratified the Treaty of Peace with Germany when the I. N. C. first meet, may, pending ratification of the Treaty of such power, have a representative at the meetings, who may take part in the discussions, but will not be empowered to vote on decisions.

2. The I. N. C. is to assemble in London at as early a date as practicable without necessarily waiting for the Treaties of Peace to come into force.

3. The pay of the officers as allowed by their Governments, also their actual and necessary expenses will be paid by each Government concerned. The general expenses of the I. N. C. will be shared by the various Governments concerned in the same proportion as the percentages decided on for the division of the enemy surface warships.

4. Surrendered Enemy Warships.

(a) The Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Control (A. N. A. C.) will supervise the transfer of ships from German to Allied Ports, where they will be held in trust for the I. N. C. by the Powers in whose ports they are until they are definitely allocated to the Powers concerned.

(b) The I. N. C. will make agreements with the Naval Authorities of the countries concerned to have the ships sunk or rendered incapable of any further service as Naval War Vessels, in the judgment of the I. N. C, within a period of 18 months, and to be completely broken up within 5 years from the date they are handed over to the said authorities in their ports.

(c) The I. N. C. will arrange with the interested Naval Authorities as to their visiting the yards, where the breaking up of the enemy vessels is in progress.

(d) The I. N. C. are to render half-yearly reports to the Allied and Associated Powers as to the progress of demolition of the Enemy warships.

5. Ex-Enemy Warships and Submarines which need not be broken up.

Ex-enemy ships are allotted to the following Powers and are exempted from being broken up or sunk:—

(i) Vessels to be employed as the Government to which they are allotted may desire:—

France	5 light cruisers
	10 Destroyers
	10 Submarines.
Italy	5 light cruisers
	10 destroyers.
Greece	1 Destroyer 6 T. B.
Portugal	1 Gunboat 6 T. B.
Roumania	1 Torpedo Boat 6 T. B.
Brazil	6 T. B.

(ii) To be disarmed with the exception of one gun and used for police duties.

Poland	6 torpedo boats.
Serb-Croat-Slovene	12 torpedo boats (These vessels will not be employed until the maritime frontiers] of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State are defined.)

(iii) The following States to have the option of receiving similar vessels if they desire them: Greece 6 T. B., Portugal 6 T. B., Roumania 6 T. B., Brazil 6 T. B.

6. Surrendered German ships.

(a) With a view to facilitating the selection of the ships for the French and Italian Navies, vide paragraph 5, the 13 light cruisers and also 20 Destroyers to be surrendered by Germany will proceed to a French port in the first instance. The French Government being responsible for these ships until the final allocation concerning them has been made.

(b) With regard to the remaining German ships, those allotted to the United States and Japan will proceed in the first instance to a British port and those for France and Italy to a French port. The United States, Italy and Japan should take over their responsibilities regarding the ships allotted to them, as soon as such ships arrive in a British or French port.

7. The following ex-enemy ships are to be loaned to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of propaganda and experiments, in accordance with H. D. 102 (1).

Capital Ships
Great Britain	Baden
United States	Oldenburg Class one vessel or Hindenburg if U. S. desire to salve her.
France	Baden, Goeben, or Oldenburg Class one vessel.
Japan	Oldenburg Class one vessel.
Italy	Tegetthoff.
Light Cruisers.
Great Britain	Nurnberg
United States	Frankfurt or one of the latest type L. C’s which may be available after the 10 L. C’s referred to in par. 5 (1) have been allocated.
France	Emden.
Italy	Sankt Georg
Japan	Strassburg or one of the latest type L. C’s which may be available after the 10 L. C’s referred to in par. 5 (1) have been allocated.

T. B. D’s. The U. S. A., Great Britain and Japan are entitled to choose 3 T. B. D’s each from those saved at Scapa Flow.

The allocation of the remaining T. B. D.’s is deferred until the T. B. D’s referred to in par 5(1) have been selected.

In connection with the above the following vessels are provisionally selected:—

Great Britain	V. 46
	G. 102
	S. 137
United States	V. 100 (1 1,300 ton 1916–17 class).
	1 1000 ton 1916–17 class.
	1 750 ton 1916–17 class.
France
Italy
Japan	(1 1300 ton 1916–17 class)
	1 1000 ton 1916–17 class
	1 750 ton 1916–17 class.

8. (a) All ex-enemy submarines will be dealt with in accordance with H. D. 104 (VI [IX]) of 2nd December and the general principles denoted above.

(b) The I. N. C. will select the 10 submarines referred to in H. D. 104 (VI [IX]) par:4.

9. The I. N. C. is charged with taking all [steps?] necessary for carrying out the decision of the Supreme Council in accordance with the following provisions to which the Council have given their approval.¹⁸

Appendix C to HD–110

Paris, December 8, 1919.

Note for the Supreme Council

Execution of Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles

According to article 259 Germany must transfer, within one month from the going into force of the Treaty, to such authorities as determined by the Allied and Associated Powers, the sum in gold deposited in the Reichsbank in the name of the Administrative Council of the Public Ottoman Debt as guarantee for the first issue of the Turkish Government’s paper money, as well as the gold deposit constituted in Germany as counter part to the gold advance accorded in 1915 by the Public Ottoman Debt to the Imperial Ottoman Government.

Although the delay of one month imposed for the transfer does not imply foreclosure if the request for transfer is subsequent to it, it would seem best to designate, now, the authorities to whom this gold should be transferred. This choice cannot be made within the given time by the Reparations Commission which is not yet ready to function. On the other hand, the question of division or attribution of the gold is not under discussion.

The French proposed to invite Germany to transfer this gold to Paris in the same way that the Russian gold was delivered by virtue of Article 19 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918.¹⁹

The gold transferred to Paris by virtue of Article 259 would be transferred to whom it should finally go to as soon as the decision shall have been made by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Appendix D to HD–110

Paris, December 9, 1919.

Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs to the Supreme Council

I. Claims Advanced by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation

Article 27 of the Conditions of Peace with Hungary determine that the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State shall follow the course of the Drave from the point where this river joins the Mur to a point situated about 9 kilometers east of Miholjac-Dolnji.

By a letter dated November 27th 1919 the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State asked the Conference to maintain, in this section, the former administrative boundary between Croatia and Hungary. This boundary which corresponds to a former bed of the Drave, passes, sometimes North, sometimes South of the present bed but does not differ essentially from it except in the region of Gola where it attaches to Croatia a population of about 5,000 people living North of the river.

II. Opinion of the Commission

The Commission of Roumanian and Yugo-Slav affairs examined the Serb-Croat-Slovene claim in its sittings of December 1st and 8th.

Opinion of the American, British and French Delegations:

a) That there is a definite advantage in maintaining an administrative frontier which has existed for several centuries and which is rigorously determined.

b) That the Drave, not being embanked in this section, the frontier would be continually displaced from one point to another, and if, to do away with this obstacle, the present course were staked out, the line thus traced would soon cease to correspond to the bed of the river.

c) The disadvantages, from an economic point of view, of the administrative boundary which cuts and again cuts across the windings of the river would be equal for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and for Hungary; the two States, to whom the Internationalization of the waterway of the Upper Danube guarantees the free navigation of the Drave, would be obliged to come to a direct understanding to carry out the necessary works.

d) The administrative frontier, making the Hungarian railway from Gykényés to Bares pass under Serb-Croat-Slovene control for a few kilometers only, would create a difficult situation; nevertheless, measures must be taken to ensure that the Hungarian railroad station of Gola continues to supply the Croatian village of the same name.

The American, British and French Delegations have, therefore, the honor to propose to the Supreme Council:

a) That the frontier between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Hungary, from the railroad bridge to one kilometre to the Southwest of the station of Gykényés, to a point about 9 kilometres to the East of Miholjac-Dolnji, follow the former administrative boundary between Hungary and Croatia.

b) That the line be straightened so as to leave the railroad from Gykényés to Bares, including the station of Gola entirely in Hungarian territory.

c) That this station receive a mixed organization which will enable it to serve the town of Gola.

d) That the article, placing under international control the railroad of Kotor to Bares, prepared by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav affairs in its report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, and adopted by the Supreme Council,²⁰ be inserted in the Conditions of Peace with Hungary.

e) That the Drafting Committee, after having consulted, if it considers it necessary, the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways, be charged with making the text of the conditions of peace conform to the above decisions.

Opinion of the Italian Delegation.

“A” The Italian Delegation, while appreciating the value of the geographical and economic arguments advanced by the other Delegations, finds: (a) That the administrative frontier between Hungary and Croatia, who were part of the same State, no longer corresponds to the conditions which should be met by a political boundary between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

(b) That there is every reason for a political frontier to follow geographical lines, and from a military point of view especially, the course of the Drave, constituting the only important natural obstacle in this region, gives, for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State as well as for Hungary, the best frontier possible.

“B” Desirous, however, of not breaking the unanimity of the Commission, it agrees to the propositions of the other delegations as far as the Gola region is concerned, from the bridge of the railroad at Gykényés to Belavar.

c) As for that part of the frontier which is included between the last point of Miholjac-Dolnji it declares that it has not received instructions and reserves the opinion of the Italian representative on the Supreme Council.

Appendix E to HD–110

Budapest, December 3, 1919.

Telegram Sent by the Interallied Military Mission to the Peace Conference

979

The Hungarian Government asks that the persons whose names follow be attached as technical delegates to the delegates called to Paris: M. Emile Grandpierre, Commissary of the Comitat of Kolozs, expert for Transylvania; Mr. Gaspard Muth, for the Minorities of Southern Hungary; M. Louis Servatius, subpref ect of the Comitat of Brasso for the Saxon minorities of Transylvania. These gentlemen have a broad knowledge of the political and economic conditions of the territories mentioned, which is indispensable for the Delegation.

The Hungarian Government asks the Supreme Council to have the Roumanian Government set free Muth who is interned at Fogaras, and Servatius who is a prisoner at Brasso, and furnish passports and sauf conduits for the three delegates to Budapest as well as guarantee the security of their families and property in the territory occupied by the Roumanians.

Interallied Military Mission

Appendix F to HD–110

Budapest, December 4, 1919.

Telegram Transmitted by the American Delegation

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference,
Paris.

No. 225

The Hungarian Government has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the telegram dated December 1 by which the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have had the kindness to invite it to send delegates to conclude peace.²¹ The Hungarian Government will make every effort to act on this invitation within the shortest time possible. It desires, however, to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to a note previously sent to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest,^21a in which it sets forth that a certain number of people intended to form part of the Peace Delegation must be set free and furnished with the necessary passports to go to Budapest.

These persons are, particularly, M. Emile Grandpierre, Commissary of the Government of the Comitat Kolozs at Kolozsvar, Mr. Louis Servatius, sub prefect of the Comitat Brasso at Brasso and of M. Gaspard Muth, at Fogaras. Of these, the two first are imprisoned and the last mentioned, Mr. Muth, interned.

The Hungarian Government takes the liberty of asking the Supreme Council to have the Roumanians guarantee the security of the families and property of the above mentioned delegates.

• Huszar
• Bandholtz

1. Ante, p. 360.
2. Ante, p. 435.
3. Ante, p. 469.
4. Appendix C to HD–94, p. 201.
5. HD–102, minute 1, p. 360.
6. Appendix D to HD–25, vol. vii, p. 579.
7. Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895.
8. Appendix F to HD–82, vol. viii, p. 922.
9. Vol. ii, p. 1.
10. On May 12, 1919; see BC–61, vol. iv, p. 501.
11. BC–18 (IC–128), vol. iii, p. 797.
12. Following Mr. Polk’s departure with the American Commission on December 9, the United States was represented by an observer, Hugh Campbell Wallace, Ambassador to France, 1919–1921.
12. Appendix C to HD–94, p. 201; HD–102, minute 1, p. 360.
13. Appendix B to HD–110, p. 551.
14. Ante, p. 345.
15. Ante, p. 360.
17. Ante, p. 469.
18. Infra.
19. Brackets not indicated in original.
18. These provisions do not accompany the file copy of this document. Presumably the reference is to the decisions of the Heads of Delegations on November 29, p. 360.
19. Vol. ii, p. 1.
20. On May 12, 1919; see BC–61, vol. iv, p. 501.
21. Appendix B to HD–103, p. 404.
22. See supra.