Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/100
HD–100
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 25, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. Henry White
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison
- British Empire
- Sir Eyre Crowe
- Secretary
- Mr. H. Norman
- France
- M. Cambon
- Secretaries
- M. Berthelot
- M. de Saint Quentin
- Italy
- M. de Martino
- Secretary
- M. Barone Russo
- Japan
- M. Matsui
- Secretary
- M. Kawai
- America, United States of
| Joint Secretariat | |
| America, United States of | Capt. G. A. Gordon |
| British Empire | Capt. G. Lothian Small |
| France | M. Massigli |
| Italy | M. Zanchi |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux | |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- America, United States of
- Mr. A. W. Dulles
- Capt. H. Pierce
- British Empire
- Lt.-Colonel Kisch
- Mr. A. Leeper
- Mr. E. H. Carr
- France
- Marshal Foch
- General Weygand
- General Le Rond
- M. Hermite
- M. Kammerer
- Italy
- M. Vannutelli-Rey
- M. Stranieri
- Japan
- M. Shigemitsu
1. Marshal Foch informed the Council that he had received a telegram from General Niessel, dated November 23rd (See Appendix [Page 329] “A”). According to this telegram the Germans were carrying out their evacuation by the Chavli-Tauroggen railroad. The Lithuanians, in spite of instructions received from General Niessel, had crossed that line at several points and attacked the Germans. In order to parry this attack General Niessel had dispatched Allied and German officers and hoped to succeed in checking the Lithuanians. In spite of this, the German Government had ordered troops to cross the frontier in order to protect the railroad, although they had been told not to send any additional troops to that district. One train had already passed through. General Niessel desired the Council to make strong representations to the German Government. He proposed to send a telegram to General Niessel telling him that he had full power to take whatever measures seemed to him fitting and that any action on the part of the Council seemed calculated only to retard a satisfactory solution. Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces
Sir Eyre Crowe asked if any news had been received from General Niessel regarding an armistice between the Germans and the Letts. He had received a somewhat obscure telegram from the Admiralty, evidently to the effect that there was such an armistice.
General Weygand said he did not think so. The last news received from General Niessel was that he had meant to go to Riga, but felt that his presence was necessary further south, especially as the Letts seemed able to hold their own against the Germans.
It was decided:
to approve the terms of the draft telegram prepared by Marshal Foch to be sent to General Niessel (See Appendix “B”).
2. Mr. White referred to the resolution adopted by the Council at its previous meeting (See H. D. 99, Minute 3),1 and announced that he accepted the proposals of the report in question. Allowances to Personnel of Administrative, Government, and Plebiscite Commissions
3. M. Berthelot informed the Council that the Roumanian answer had not yet actually arrived. General Coanda, who was bringing this answer was on his way to Paris. According to the Roumanian calculation the time within which their answer was to be delivered only expired at noon of that day. Although, according to the idea of the Council that time had expired on Sunday, it seemed expedient to wait until General Coanda arrived, an event which would take place at any moment. In the meantime, a strong speech from the Roumanian throne had indicated that [Page 330] under no conditions was Roumania willing to permit a rupture between herself and the Allied and Associated Powers. M. Antonescu had confirmed this information. Answer of the Government to the Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers2
Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that a real difficulty existed. He had heard from the British Representative at Bucharest that the Council’s note had not been presented by the 22nd of November. The Council in discussing the draft note had changed several words and decided that the Roumanians were to have eight days from the presentation of the note. If then it had not been presented on the 22nd November the time could not be considered to have expired.
M. Berthelot informed the Council that he had received a telegram from the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest dated November 21st to the effect that the latter had received the first and last parts of the Council’s note to the Roumanian Government. An important part was still lacking and was being awaited before the note was presented. M. Misu, however, already knew the substance of the note through General Coanda. The French Chargé d’Affaires had made urgent representations to the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs as to the gravity of the situation, which permitted of no delay, and had told him that the Roumanian Government must declare itself ready to sign the Minorities Treaty unreservedly in consideration always of the assurance given by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in their note of the 12th October that they would examine certain modifications as to form.3 M. Misu had replied to the French Chargé d’Affaires that he would prepare a reply of that tenor and would do his utmost to obtain a favorable consideration of the matter from the King and Council of Ministers.
Sir Eyre Crowe reminded the Council that the Roumanians had been told that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty.4
As they could not sign the Austrian Treaty within the two ensuing days he did not see how they could sign the Bulgarian Treaty on November 27th.
M. Berthelot suggested that a protocol could be signed, as had been the case at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty, giving the Roumanians additional time within which to sign the Bulgarian Treaty. That time might be fixed at a week.
M. de Martino agreed that the Council should take no further action towards Roumania until the Roumanian reply had been received.
M. Berthelot pointed out that all indications were that the Roumanians were certainly going to sign. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government was prepared to sign the Treaty with Austria as well as the [Page 331] Minorities Treaty and the financial arrangements. The Drafting Committee had prepared a draft agreement of adhesion to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which would be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Saint Germain. With respect to the Roumanians the situation was different. The Minorities Treaty concerning Roumania had not yet been signed by anybody. Some modifications as to form would be made in this Minorities Treaty in order to meet certain views of the Roumanians. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers therefore could not sign this Treaty until the final terms thereof had been settled after consultation with the Roumanian Representatives.
Sir Eyre Crowe felt that the Roumanians must give an unequivocal agreement to sign the Minorities Treaty, taking into consideration the fact that certain modifications in their favor might be made therein.
M. Cambon suggested that after the receipt of the Roumanian reply the Roumanian Delegation be given a week from Nov. 27 within which to sign the Bulgarian Treaty, and that within that week the Minorities Treaty should be put into final form after conference with the Roumanian representatives; that said Treaty, as well as the Treaty of Saint Germain and the agreements related thereto, be signed by Roumania within that week.
M. Berthelot read the draft agreement of adhesion, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government (See Appendix “C”).
It was decided:
- (1)
- that in connection with the signing of the Treaty with Bulgaria on November 27th a protocol be prepared allowing the interested Powers to sign said Treaty with Bulgaria within one week from November 27th:
- (2)
- that within one week from November 27th Roumania should sign the Treaty with Austria, the Minorities Treaty, and the financial arrangements.
- (3)
- to accept the draft agreement of adhesion, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation;
- (4)
- that the agreement of adhesion when signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Saint Germain.
4. (The Council had before it a note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the Minorities Treaty (See Appendix “D”).) Note From the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation Regarding the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities
M. Kammerer commented upon the note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation and stated that, on the whole, this note was satisfactory. He pointed out that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had presented its interpretation of the clauses relative to freedom of [Page 332] transit and equitable treatment of commerce, which were involved in Article 51 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and had stated that in the absence of a contrary reply from the Council it would consider that its interpretation was correct. He thought that the Serbian interpretation was, in fact, correct and he therefore proposed that no reply be sent to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. The question could therefore be considered settled.
It was decided:
that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were in full agreement with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation as to the interpretation of the Minorities Treaty, and that said Treaty be at once presented to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation for signature. (See Appendix “D”).
5. (The Council had before it the Bulgarian reply regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria, dated November 23rd, (See Appendix “E”).) Reply to the Bulgarian Delegation Regarding the Treaty on Reciprocal Immigration
M. Kammerer commented upon this note from the Bulgarian Delegation and stated that it was entirely satisfactory. The Bulgarian Delegation has asked for explanations with respect to two points. The Committee on New States agreed with the Bulgarian interpretation of these points. A satisfactory answer consisting of a few lines could be sent to the Bulgarian Delegation. A more serious question was the form of the Treaty. The United States representative had raised some question as to his Government’s being able to sign, and the Japanese delegate had thereupon stated that in such an event, his Government might likewise be unable to sign. The Drafting Committee considered that the Treaty between Bulgaria and Greece relative to reciprocal immigration was in no way dependent upon the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In fact Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Bulgarian Treaty itself, made that point clear. In order to meet the difficulty the Drafting Committee proposed the following solution: the Supreme Council should reach a decision which would be inserted in the preamble of the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty; for technical reasons it was preferable that this decision be dated Thursday, November 27th. The wording of the proposed decision was as follows:
“In view of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers deem it fitting that the reciprocal and voluntary immigration of ethnical, religious and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should be settled by a convention concluded between these two Powers in the terms decided upon on this date.”
The foregoing solution represented the unanimous opinion of the Committee on New States, with the exception that the Italian representative [Page 333] had made the reservation that M. de Martino would have to give a final opinion on this point.
M. de Martino said that he had already expressed his opinion that for reasons of general interest it was advisable that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty. The decisions already taken by the Council relative to affairs in the Balkans seemed to him to have created many opportunities for trouble in the future. As a general thing he felt that those Powers who were directly interested in maintaining peace in the Balkans should participate more actively in Balkan affairs. However, as it was of great importance that the present question be settled without further delay, he was willing to withdraw his reservation on that occasion.
It was decided:
(1) that the Secretary General of the Conference reply to the Bulgarian Delegation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were in agreement with the Bulgarian interpretation of the Treaty regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria;
(2) to adopt the following resolution, to be dated as of November 27th, 1919, and to be inserted in the preamble of the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria regarding reciprocal immigration:
“In view of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers deem it fitting that the reciprocal and voluntary immigration of ethnical, religious and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should be settled by a convention concluded between these two Powers in the terms decided upon on this date.”
6. (The Council had before it a draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas (See Appendix “F”).) Report of the Drafting Committee on Maintenance of Demobilized German Soldiers in the Schleswig in the Plebiscite Areas
M. Cambon read the draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas.
It was decided:
to adopt the draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas. (See Appendix “F”).
7. M. Cambon read the resolution adopted by the Council at its preceding meeting (H. D. 99, Minute 5).5 The resolution had provided that the Council reserved to itself the final approval thereof until a further examination.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he accepted the text as read.
[Page 334]Mr. White proposed that paragraph 3 of the resolution be modified to read as follows:
“that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preliminary studies by a special technical committee shall be made at This committee shall be composed of representatives of both Poland and Dantzig with the addition of the Allied representative at Dantzig. These technical studies, which may serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for under paragraph 2, shall be forwarded to Paris by this committee not later than one month after the coming into force of the Treaty.”
Sir Eyre Crowe asked what the object was in the change suggested by Mr. White. He wished to know if the word technical was intended to exclude anyone. Resolution Recording the Seat of Negotiations having To Do With the Relationship Between Poland and the Free City of Dantzig
Mr. White replied that it was not.
M. Cambon said that he likewise was unable to understand the proposed change.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked if that excluded the preparation of a draft Treaty.
Mr. White said that the object of the proposed change was merely to make it clear that only preliminary studies should take place at Dantzig.
Mr. Dulles called attention to the fact that preliminary discussions had already taken place at Warsaw. If the resolution provided that preliminary discussions should take place at Dantzig it might imply the removal of the discussions from Warsaw to Dantzig. The Poles and the inhabitants of Dantzig both recognized that technical studies must take place at Dantzig. He also called attention to the fact that in the change proposed by Mr. White a time limit of one month after the coming into force of the Treaty was specified.
Sir Eyre Crowe observed that it had been proposed to hold these preliminary discussions at Warsaw. That proposition had been rejected and a request had been made on the previous day that these discussions be transferred to Paris. He had then proposed that the preliminary discussions be held at Dantzig. He further added that the change proposed by the American Delegation contemplated that the Committee engaged in preliminary studies should report direct to the Supreme Council. He felt that this procedure was not correct and that as a matter of form it was the Allied Representative at Dantzig who should address the Supreme Council. He also felt that one month might prove to be too short a time within which to submit the report in question.
Mr. Dulles remarked that discussions had already begun. Therefore by the time the Treaty came into force a further delay of one month might well prove sufficient. He quite agreed that the Representative [Page 335] of the Allies could and should address himself directly to the Supreme Council but he thought that the Committee charged with the preliminary studies should also be able to do so.
M. Cambon suggested that paragraph 3 be modified to read as follows:
“that prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzig should be a party, take place at Dantzig. Within a maximum delay of two months after the coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.”
Mr. White agreed to that modification if it were satisfactory to the Poles.
Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that under the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany that was a matter for the decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers only.
M. Cambon said that the Poles were interested in making preliminary studies and in participating in discussions, but they were not entitled to decide finally the question involved.
Mr. White wondered what the result would be if the Poles should refuse to accept the plan proposed.
M. Cambon inquired whether Mr. White really expected such a refusal on their part. He pointed out that the Poles had asked to have the negotiations transferred to Paris, and their request had been granted. All that was necessary was to tell the Poles that it had been decided to grant their request.
M. Berthelot observed that certain questions necessarily had to be studied on the spot. He thought however, that the Council could reach a decision on that day and if necessary communicate it to the Poles. If the Poles had any observations to present, the Council could, he thought, decide on the following day whether or not to take them into account.
Mr. White said that Dantzig had been taken away from Germany and made a free city not so much for the good of the inhabitants of Dantzig as for the benefit of the population of Poland.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked Mr. White what action he thought should be taken in case the Poles did not accept the plan proposed. Was it his intention that the Council should yield to the Poles.
Mr. White thought that the matter could then be discussed again.
Sir Eyre Crowe thought that there was no point in that as the Council alone was charged with the duty of deciding.
M. de Martino pointed out that in all probability the Poles would willingly accept this plan.
[Page 336]Mr. White felt that he could only accept the resolution proposed after hearing the view of the Poles.
Sir Eyre Crowe thought that meant not coming to a decision.
(After some further discussion,
It was decided:
(1) to accept textually the first two paragraphs of the resolution taken at the preceding meeting of the Council (H. D. 99, Minute 5, November 24th, 1919);
(2) that the third paragraph of said resolution be modified to read as follows:
“that prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzig should be a party, take place at Dantzig. Within a maximum delay of two months after the coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.”
(3) that the entire resolution be communicated on that day to the Polish Delegation, and that if said Delegation had any observations to present the Council would examine them at an early meeting.
8. (The Council had before it a letter dated November 15th from General Tcherbatcheff6 regarding Russian war material and supplies left in Roumania (See Appendix “G”).)
M. Berthelot pointed out that General Tcherbatcheff’s note alluded to a joint letter of the Ministers Plenipotentiary of France, England, the United States and Italy, dated March 3rd, 1918. As the text of that joint letter was not available he had telegraphed to the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest to obtain the same. He thought it would be well to await the receipt of that joint letter and to examine the same before taking any action on General Tcherbatcheff’s note. Disposal of Russian War Materiel Left Roumania After Demobilization of the Russian Army
(This was agreed to)
(The meeting then adjourned)
- Ante, p. 308.↩
- Appendix A to HD–93, p. 182.↩
- See telegram to the British Chargé, appendix B to HD–68, vol. viii, p. 583.↩
- See HD–78, minute 3, ibid., p. 805.↩
- Ante, p. 312.↩
- Chief Military Representative in Paris of Admiral Kolchak’s Government.↩
- Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.↩
- German commander-in-chief in the Baltic Provinces.↩
- See HD–89, minute 3, and appendix C, pp. 95 and 110.↩
- Appendix B to HD–89, p. 103.↩
- See HD–96, minute 1, and appendix A, pp. 221 and 228.↩