Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/96
HD–96
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 19, 1919, at 11:00 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. F. L. Polk
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison
- British Empire
- Sir Eyre Crowe
- Secretary
- Mr. H. Norman
- France
- M. Clemenceau
- M. Pichon
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta
- M. Berthelot
- M. de Saint Quentin
- Italy
- M. de Martino
- Secretary
- M. Trombetti
- Japan
- M. Matsui
- Secretary
- M. Kawai
- America, United States of
| Joint Secretariat | |
| America, United States of | Capt. B. Winthrop |
| British Empire | Capt. G. Lothian Small |
| France | M. de Percin |
| Italy | M. Zanchi |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux | |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- America, United States of
- Dr. I. Bowman
- Mr. A. W. Dulles
- Lt.-Commander Koehler, U. S. N.
- British Empire
- Mr. A. Leeper
- Mr. Forbes-Adam
- France
- General Payot
- General Le Rond
- M. Laroche
- M. Kammerer
- M. de Montille
- Italy
- M. Vannutelli-Rey
- M. Stranieri
- Japan
- M. Shigemitsu
1. (The Council had before it a report from the Committee on New States, and a draft treaty annexed thereto (See Appendix “A”).
[Page 222]M. Kammerer read and commented upon the report. He added that the only point on which the members of the Committee did not agree was: who should sign the treaty. The majority was of the opinion that as the Principal Powers had imposed Article 56 upon Bulgaria, they should all sign this document, but the minority, that is to say the American Delegation, had made reservations on that point. Treaty Between Greece and Bulgaria
Mr. Polk said he would put it up to his Government but he doubted that the United States Government would sign this Treaty; his feeling was that it would say “no”, as it had done in the case of the Treaty with the New States (Clauses relative to transferred territories).
M. Kammerer asked whether the other Powers should sign in case America would not, and thought that had already happened in the Treaty with Austria.
Sir Eyre Crowe stated that the precedent pointed the other way; when America refused to sign, it had been decided that the other Allied Powers should also refrain from signing, this occasioning a delay which had prevented the Treaty being presented for signature to the smaller Powers.
Mr. Polk said he saw the force of Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument and would refer this question to his Government.
M. de Martino thought that the Great Powers could not refuse to take their part of the responsibility for the settlement of Balkan affairs. The question of immigration was one of the most important, and one which might permit grave abuses. As they all knew, racial rivalries were very frequent between those countries. He thought they would be abstaining from a duty which befell them as a moral obligation if they did not take an effective part in the execution of these clauses with Bulgaria by affixing their signatures thereto.
M. Matsui said he had not yet received an answer from his Government on the subject. He believed it would be impossible for Japan to sign if one of the other Powers did not, but it was his opinion that all the Powers should sign.
M. Kammerer said there remained a second point, namely, should the Treaty be submitted to the Bulgarian Delegation? It had already been sent to the Greeks and approved by M. Venizelos. He added that the American Delegation felt they were morally obliged to submit the text of this Treaty to the Bulgarians; the majority did not feel it as a moral obligation, but thought it might be opportune to do so.
Mr. Dulles asked whether the Treaty could not become effective even if only Greece and Bulgaria were the signatories. It would be up to Greece and Bulgaria to carry their agreement into effect under the aegis of the League of Nations.
[Page 223]Sir Eyre Crowe said he saw no objections to submitting it to the Bulgarians and if it were found that they and the Greeks were prepared to sign it, perhaps by that time the other Powers would be ready too.
M. Kammerer asked whether a delay of two days could be given Bulgaria for accepting this text?
(This was agreed to.)
It was decided:
- (1)
- to submit to the Bulgarian Delegation the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria with regard to reciprocal immigration; (See Appendix “A”).
- (2)
- that two days’ time be given to the Bulgarian Delegation to consider this text;
- (3)
- that the question whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty would be considered later.
It was further decided:
that Mr. Polk should refer to Washington the question of the signature of this Treaty by the United States.
2. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on New States (See Appendix “B”). Signature of Minorities Treaty With Roumania
M. Kammerer read and commented upon the report. He added that on October 12th when the Supreme Council had notified the Roumanian Government that they must sign the Minorities Treaty it was added that the Supreme Council would examine any modifications of text presented by the Roumanians provided that the general principles were not altered.1 But the Roumanian Government had been notified that it must sign the Minorities Treaty before the Bulgarian Treaty. The period granted Roumania had almost expired. He asked whether a communication should be sent to the Roumanian Delegation asking them to submit observations without delay?
Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the situation was less complicated than it appeared unless the Roumanians should happen to create difficulties. The Council had presented its ultimatum. The period expired on the following Sunday. Roumania would have to accept the principle of the Minorities Treaty but might suggest modifications for the Council’s discussion, provided these modifications were confined to such articles as concerned Roumania, for example, articles 10, 11, and 12. They understood that the Roumanian objections referred more specially to general principles, and obviously the Roumanians would have to abandon these objections on account of the ultimatum sent [Page 224] them. He understood that no great value attached to articles 10, 11, and 12 either by the Roumanians or by the Council and the Council would therefore be ready to grant concessions if not to abandon the articles. It would be necessary to come to an agreement with Roumania within 24 hours.
Mr. Polk said he would not like to commit his Government to accept these modifications at this time but he thought they probably could agree to some compromise when he received an answer from Washington.
M. de Martino agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe and added that in order to facilitate the signature of the Treaty by the Roumanians, a declaration might be made to them such as the one which had been made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. That declaration stated that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not have in mind to confer special privileges to any Minority, but only to prevent racial conflicts by giving the Minorities an equitable protection, and that they were ready to give the same assurance to any State which would sign the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities.
M. Kammerer said there was no objection to such a declaration being made to the Roumanians, but he asked whether this should be done at once or whether it would be advisable to await such a request from the Roumanians.
M. Clemenceau said he thought it would be wiser to await the reply of the Roumanians to the Council’s ultimatum.
It was decided:
- (1)
- that no answer was called for by the Roumanian note relating to the Minorities Treaty, and that no further action be taken until an answer had been received from the Roumanian Government to the note of November 15th;1a
- (2)
- that if that answer were in the affirmative the Roumanian Delegation should be required immediately to put their observations before the Committee on New States;
- (3)
- that the Committee on New States should within twenty-four hours present a report to the Supreme Council on those observations; is being understood that the Minorities Treaty could not be modified in its general principles, but only in respect of such articles, e. g., 10, 11 and 12, as purely concerned Roumania. (See Appendix “B”).
3. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Esthonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated November 12th (See Appendix “C”).) Request of the Esthonians for the Establishment of a Neutral Zone Between the Baltic States and Russia Under the Control of a Third State
M. Kammerer read and commented upon the telegram. He said that this request tended to replace the local troops in those territories by Allied troops. Third state thought this would not be an enviable position for the Allies to be in between the Bolshevists and the [Page 225] Baltic States, and that it would imply a sort of agreement between the Allies and the Bolshevists.
M. Clemenceau said that he felt perfectly sure that it was the unanimous opinion of the Council that such a request should not be granted.
It was decided:
not to grant the request of the Esthonian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia under the control of a third State, to be appointed by the Conference. (See Appendix “C”).
4. (The Council had before it a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation (See Appendix “D”). Note From the Polish Delegation Requesting That the Arrangement Regarding Galicia Be Communicated to Them
M. Berthelot read and commented upon the letter. He added that the Council had already decided on November 11th2 to hear the Polish Delegates without communicating the report to them. He would ask the Polish Delegates to appear before the Council at the following meeting.
5. General Le Rond said that the question of transferring the sovereignty over the territories subject to a plebiscite had to be settled between the Commissions of the Allies and the German delegates, who had just arrived. The different plebiscite commissions had been organized since November 10th, but they had had great difficulty in getting their personnel; some of the members were still in Rome, others in London, trying to get it together. That was one reason why the discussion with the German delegates had not started. Organization of Plebiscite Zones in Germany
The questions to be discussed with the Germans arose from the application of the Treaty.
First, there was the question of administration of the plebiscite areas: there was no difficulty about that as it passed automatically to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.
Second, there was the economic organization which presented difficulties: as those economic services were administered mainly from Berlin, the relations between Berlin and those territories could not be suspended. It was necessary to provide for some liaison between the several Commissions and the Central Government at Berlin. The best solution would be to invite the Berlin Government to send an official belonging to the German Central Administration who would act as a sort of liaison officer between the Government and each of the Commissions. This official would have to be accepted by the [Page 226] Commission and must not belong to the province where he was to go, so that the local population should not be under the impression that the German Government was still keeping a hold over them. This official would be at the disposal of the Commission for all matters which concerned railways, postal, telegraph and mining questions, etc.
Third, there were also financial questions. Under the Treaty, all expenses were to be charged against local revenues; this should be interpreted to mean future as well as present revenues. The present local revenues would be insufficient to cover the charges set against them; in Upper Silesia for instance, the charge for military occupation alone would amount to fifteen million francs a month. In consequence, several solutions could be devised: a local loan guaranteed by resources of the territory, and which of course, would be borne ultimately by the Power to whom the territory would be attributed. Such a solution could be contemplated only in case of occupation for a long period, as in the case of Upper Silesia. The expenses to be incurred could be divided in three classes: First, expenses of administration by local officials. This was merely a continuation of the previous regime; therefore, it was natural that the Germans would have to find the funds. Secondly, the cost of maintaining forces of occupation: it would be difficult to ask the Germans to bear that expense; they would be justified in objecting and serious difficulties might be encountered. Another solution was to be found, and it would be necessary for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to advance these funds, either by bearing the expense each of their own forces of occupation, or by establishing a common fund. Third, the cost of maintaining the Commissions. This cost would be a much lighter charge, and funds could be advanced in two ways either by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by Poland. This latter method would be an equitable one and might well be accepted by Poland, as she had asked for the plebiscites.
He wished to point out that those expenses would only be made as advances, and that the whole amount would be refunded by the Powers to whom attribution of the territories would be made after plebiscite.
Sir Eyre Crowe said it was difficult to solve that question without the advice of financial experts. The argument, however, did not take into account cases like Danzig and Memel. Neither Poland nor Germany were concerned there. The matter would have to be referred to his Government.
General Le Rond thought that the point relating to the liaison between the Central German Government and the Commissions could be settled at once.
[Page 227]M. de Martino said he did not think this question was on the agenda, and he was not ready to discuss it; as it was a financial matter he should have to refer it to his Government.
Sir Eyre Crowe thought the point just referred to could be accepted at once.
M. Clemenceau asked General Le Rond to prepare a report suggesting a solution to the financial questions.
General Le Rond replied that financial representatives should be appointed by each of the Powers to discuss this question.
Mr. Polk said that as the United States Senate had not ratified the Treaty, the United States could not be represented.
After some further discussion,
It was decided:
(1) that in the course of negotiations with the German Delegates appointed to sign the protocol the German Government should be asked to appoint to each Government Commission an official who, having been accepted by the Commission, would act as an intermediary between the Central German Government and the Commissions;
(2) that financial representatives be appointed by each Power to prepare, together with General Le Rond, a report on the financial questions relative to the organization of plebiscite areas and to the occupation of Dantzig and Memel.
(Mr. Polk made the reservation that the United States Government could not be represented on this Commission as the Treaty with Germany had not yet been ratified by the Senate.)
6. General Payot said that Marshal Foch’s staff had examined the question of transportation of troops and supplies with the representatives of the Allied armies and had drafted a memorandum which could be transmitted to the German Delegates who would have 48 hours to examine the proposal. If the Germans accepted this, the question would be settled; otherwise the Allied Delegates might see the German Delegates and come to an agreement with them. He pointed out that in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans, the question who would pay those expenses arose and as he had not known what the Council’s decision would be, a non-committal formula had been adopted. Cost of Transportation of Troops and Supplies in Plebiscite Areas
Sir Eyre Crowe said there could be no doubt whatsoever that the cost of transportation of troops and of supplies was included in the costs of occupation and therefore should be borne by the States to whom attribution of territories would be made.
General Payot remarked that the cost of the transportation of troops alone would amount to approximately 5,000,000 marks.
[Page 228]Sir Eyre Crowe said that, in order not to give the Germans the impression that all costs were being imposed on them, it should be made clear in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans that the costs of transportation were to be borne by the States to whom attribution of said territories would ultimately be made.
It was decided:
- (1)
- that a memorandum should be submitted to the German Delegates regarding the transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas;
- (2)
- that the cost of transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas should be a charge against the States to whom attribution of these territories would be made and that a phrase to that effect would be put in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans;
- (3)
- that a delay of 48 hours be given them for examination.
(The meeting then adjourned).
- See telegram to British Chargé at Bucharest, October 11, appendix B to HD–68, vol. viii, p. 583.↩
- Appendix A to HD–93, p. 182.↩
- HD–89, minute 7, p. 99.↩
- HD–47, minute 4, vol. viii, p. 101.↩
- Appendix F to HD 25, vol. vii, p. 590.↩
- HD–55, minute 3 (b), and appendix E, vol. viii, pp. 236 and 244.↩
- See appendix B to HD–68, vol. viii, p. 583.↩
- See HD–78, minute 3, vol. viii, p. 805.↩
- Appendix A to HD–93, p. 182.↩
- See HD–93, minute 1, p. 175.↩