Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/85


Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 6, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. F. L. Polk
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison
    • British Empire
      • Sir Eyre Crowe
    • Secretary
      • Mr. H. Norman
    • France
      • M. Pichon
    • Secretaries
      • M. Berthelot
      • M. de Saint Quentin
    • Italy
      • M. de Martino
    • Secretary
      • M. Barone Russo
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Capt. G. A. Gordon
British Empire Capt. G. Lothian Small
France M. Massigli
Italy M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

  • America, United States of
    • General Bliss
    • Dr. J. B. Scott
  • British Empire
    • General Sackville-West
    • Mr. A. Leeper
  • France
    • General Walch
    • Colonel Roye
    • M. Fromageot
  • Italy
    • Lieut.-Colonel Toni
    • M. Vannutelli-Rey
    • M. Pilotti
    • Prince Boncompagni
  • Japan
    • M. Nagaoka
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1. (The Council had before it two telegrams from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 4th (See Appendix “A”) and November 5th (See Appendix “B”), a telegram from situation in the Interallied Military Mission dated November 5th (see Appendix “C”), and another telegram from the same sources dated November 3d, (See Appendix “D”). Situation in Hungary

M. Pichon pointed out that the telegram sent by the Council to Sir George Clerk on the preceding day1 satisfied in great measure the requests contained in his two telegrams. Both Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission were opposed to the despatch of Jugo-Slav and Czech troops. As the suggestion of the French Delegation had not met with approval the point would not be insisted upon.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that Sir George Clerk had asked authority to recognize at once the coalition government which he hoped would be formed. It would be well to give him this authority. The telegram of the preceding day gave him, as a matter of fact, an answer on this point. Sir George Clerk likewise desired not to be obliged to insist on the immediate withdrawal of Friedrich. On this point also the Council should meet his views.

M. Pichon said that a telegram should be sent to Sir George Clerk confirming the previous instructions of the Council and stating, moreover, that the Council relied on his tact. But the question still remained: what would happen after the departure of the Roumanian troops? Would not the presence of an Inter-Allied force be necessary? Would the Inter-Allied Mission suffice for the maintenance of order?

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that that question had already been raised in the telegram sent on the preceding day, which had crossed Sir George Clerk’s telegrams. He wished to call attention to another point: would it not be well to request the Jugo-Slavs and the Czechs to retire immediately within their frontiers as laid down by the Council? According to the telegram of November 3rd, from the Inter-Allied Military Mission, the Czechs were raising difficulties with respect to the evacuation of the mines of Salgo-Tarjan: they were demanding as a condition precedent, reimbursement for their expenses relative to the supply of the Hungarian population. Would it not be well to request the Czechs to withdraw, at the same time assuring them that the Council would take into consideration the question of reimbursement for their expenses? Likewise, in the south, the Jugo-Slavs were still occupying the mines at Pecs, whereas, according to the decisions of the Council, that territory was to remain in the possession of Hungary.

[Page 3]

M. de Martino thought that that was the time to insist upon all States bordering on Hungary recognizing the frontiers of the Hungarian State.

Mr. Polk observed that the Governments concerned had been notified of the lines laid down as the northern and eastern frontiers of Hungary;2 he wished to inquire whether there had been a similar notification with respect to the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. de Saint Quentin explained that at the time the Council had disallowed the Jugo-Slav claims in Baranya and Batchka,3 the Serbian Delegation had been notified of its decision.4 As a result of this notification the Serbs had formulated new proposals: They had, in particular, asked the right of exploiting the mines of Pecs for five years.5 The Serbian request had been referred to the Reparation Commission and the Economic Commission but both of these considered themselves without jurisdiction, as the question, to their minds, was essentially a political one; however, the Serbian request had neither been examined by the Central Territorial Committee nor the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

M. Pichon said that the Serbs must be informed that the territorial question had been settled, but that this decision would not prejudice the decision to be taken by the Council with respect to the exploitation of the mines of Pecs. He suggested that the latter question should be referred to the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that a new fact had occurred; on October 25th the Serbian Delegation had asked that the evacuation of the territories actually held by the Yugo-Slav troops should be deferred until the question of the exploitation of the mines had been settled.

M. Berthelot thought the Yugo-Slav request inadmissible from the territorial point of view.

M. Pichon said it was agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs, as well as the Roumanians, should be asked to evacuate. Moreover, M. Berthelot would prepare a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

M. Berthelot read a draft telegram prepared in accordance with the views expressed by the Council.

[Page 4]

Sir Eyre Crowe felt it useless, since it had been decided not to send Czech and Yugo-Slav contingents into Hungary, to ask Sir George Clerk if he deemed it expedient to send an Interallied force.

M. Berthelot thought that the question should nevertheless be raised, because if Sir George Clerk should say that such a force was necessary it would be worth while studying the plan anew. In view of Sir George’s report as to the attitude of Friedrich it might be well to reflect on what would happen when Friedrich, with 30,000 men, found himself opposed to the Supreme Council and a mission of Generals without any troops.

Sir Eyre Crowe wondered what would happen if Sir George Clerk indicated that the sending of an Inter-Allied force was essential or even desirable. The only possible reply would be that no one could be sent.

M. Berthelot acknowledged that the situation would be difficult but he thought that it would not present an absolute impossibility.

M. de Martino remarked that Italy would certainly not send any troops.

M. Pichon agreed that the French also would find great difficulty in sending any.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the question was purely an academic one. The wording proposed by M. Berthelot presented the difficulty that Sir George Clerk might well think that he was being offered something which the Council could not give him.

M. Pichon agreed that the telegram should be modified in the light of Sir Eyre Crowe’s remarks and should state that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would find it very difficult to send any troops if the need should arise.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that Sir George Clerk should also be asked if he deemed the Hungarian Police force adequate to cope with the situation.

M. de Martino desired a further addition to the effect that the Police force could be placed under the control of the Interallied Military Mission.

It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram prepared by M. Berthelot (See Appendix “E”);
that the Czech and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments should be requested to withdraw their troops immediately beyond the frontiers of Hungary as laid down by the Council;
that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should be informed that the decisions taken by the Council with respect to territorial questions were final, but that the evacuation requested would not prejudice the solution of the question of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs;
that the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation proposing the grant to that Government for five years of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs, should be referred to the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Yugo-Slavia.

2. M. Berthelot informed the Council that the Germans had given to the Press a fairly complete summary of the note7 and annexed Publication of protocol8 sent to them by the Council. He inquired if, under the circumstances, it would not be advisable to publish the complete text of that note. Publication of the Note and the Annexed Protocol Addressed to the German Government by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to publish the text of the note addressed to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace as well as the draft protocol annexed to that note.

3. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet dated October 21, 1919 (See Appendix “F”), a note from the Drafting Committee dated October 28th [29th] 1919 (See Appendix “G”), and a letter from Marshal Foch dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix “H”.).) Salaries of the Personnel of Commissions of Control in Germany

General Walch read and commented upon Marshal Foch’s letter.

Mr. Polk, with respect to the organization of the personnel of the Commissions of Control, asked why it was necessary to call upon civilian engineers?

General Walch explained that the military technical personnel was inadequate to control the manufacture of war material. It was necessary to call upon competent specialists who could not be found in the regular army.

General Nollet had called upon about 10 engineers and about 40 university graduates. In so doing he had only followed the example furnished by the British Commission of Control.

(It was decided:

that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany not belonging to regular military forces, should be assumed by Germany.)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix “I”) Publication of the Correspondence With the Austrian Delegation

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the note of the British Delegation specified that extreme care should be exercised with respect to the publication of the Austrian Notes marked “Confidential”.

[Page 6]

Mr. Polk said that evidently such notes could not be published without the consent of Chancellor Renner.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that Dr. Renner could be asked if he still objected to the publication of those Notes.

M. de Martino observed that the publication of the notes raised some questions which were delicate from an Italian point of view, and he asked that a decision on this point be postponed.

(The question was adjourned)

5. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 30th, 1919 (See Appendix “J”), and a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 5th, 1919 (See Appendix “K”) Demobilization of the Men of Haller’s Army

M. Fromageot read and commented upon these documents.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to approve the recommendations of the note of the Drafting Committee relative to demobilized Poles who had borne arms against Germany.)

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated October 31st, 1919 (See Appendix “L”) Financial Measures of Coercion Taken Against Germany on Account of the Non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

M. Fromageot read and commented upon this note. He observed that it was not correct to speak of the annulment of authorizations which might have been given: the question was one of revocation of said authorization. Germany could not now create new pledges by availing itself of authorizations previously given, inasmuch as any such authorizations were now revoked.

(It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee should prepare a reply to M. Lou-cheur’s letter dated October 31st, 1919, relative to the interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See the Note of September 27th, 1919).9

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “M”) Liquidation of the Property of Inhabitants of Schleswig

M. Fromageot stated that the Danish Government had pointed out that after the plebiscite the inhabitants of Schleswig would become Danish citizens. What would become of the interests of those newly-made Danish subjects whose property in the meantime might have been liquidated by one of the Allied and Associated Powers as belonging [Page 7] to enemy subjects? The Drafting Committee had considered this contingency in the note which the Council had before it. It appeared that answer might be made to the Danish Government along the lines of the last paragraph of the said note; the Allied and Associated Powers, however, would always be at liberty to avail themselves of their rights of liquidation with respect to such new Danish subjects as did not seem to merit the consideration therein contemplated. Moreover, if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers arrived at such a decision, they should notify the other Allied Powers who, doubtless, would raise no difficulty over adopting the same procedure.

M. Pichon suggested that the Drafting Committee should come to an agreement with the Economic Commission, which had the question in hand, on the draft of a resolution to be communicated to the other Allied Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the Danish Government would have to be approached.

Mr. Polk took it as understood that the draft resolution would be submitted to the Council. He pointed out that he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

8. M. Berthelot reminded the Council that at a previous meeting the question of an American Military Mission reported to be at Riga had been brought up.10 According to his present information there appeared to be at Riga, besides a mission of relief and supply and a Red Cross mission, a mission under Colonel Holliday, who was reported to have arrived at Riga on October 15th. The Colonel was reported to have stated that he did not desire to collaborate with the Anglo-French Mission. Military Missions at Riga

Mr. Polk explained that Colonel Holliday was there alone. His duties were purely to collect information, and he had no political role to play. Moreover, General Cheney would see that he did not exceed his powers.

9. M. de Martino informed the Council that the Italian delegates to the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions would arrive at Paris on November 10th. They would be ready from that day on to confer with their Allied colleagues. Plebiscite and Delimination Commissions

M. Pichon said that Marshal Foch would be informed of this.

10. M. de Martino said that he had been informed from Vienna that Serbian and Roumanian representatives wished to participate in the work of the Commission, presided over by Sir Francis Dent, which was charged with the distribution of rolling stock. This claim seemed inadmissible, [Page 8] inasmuch as neither Serbia nor Roumania had signed the Austrian Treaty. Commission at Distribution of Rolling Stock

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the Commission in question was only a provisional one.

M. de Saint Quentin explained that it had been decided to send to Vienna a provisional Commission which would become a permanent Commission when the Treaty came into force. The character of the Commission was apparent from the fact that Hungary, an enemy country, was represented on it; it would therefore be difficult to deny representation to the Serbs and Roumanians.

M. de Martino said that he would examine the question anew.

11. M. Polk said that his Government wished to know if the question of the recognition of Luxembourg was to be decided by the Council. Luxembourg Affairs

M. Berthelot summarized the history of the question: when the question first arose five or six months ago the French Government declared that, from a political point of view, it would refrain from active participation in the Luxembourg question, and that it thought that the Belgian Government should be the first to make a decision. Belgium had told the French Government that it was opposed to recognizing the Grand Duchess. The French Government had transmitted this information to Rome, Washington and London and the Principal Powers abstained from recognizing the Grand Duchess. Eventually, and after at first refusing, Belgium consented that the fiancé of the Grand Duchess should be allowed to go to Luxembourg. The marriage was taking place that very day. Two days previously the Belgian Government had asked the French Government if it intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. He himself had replied by putting the same question to the Belgian Ambassador, since France had decided that Belgium should have the first word in political questions concerning Luxembourg. The Belgian Government had not yet replied. The French Government had been informed from other sources that the British Government intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. The French Government had then acquainted the British Government with the exact situation, at the same time informing the Italian Government.

M. Pichon said that the Council would arrive at a decision on the Luxembourg question.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel de Crillon, Paris, November 6, 1919.

[Page 9]

Appendix A to HD–85

Telegram From Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council, No. 3

Monsieur Diamandy came to see me this afternoon to tell me officially that Rumanian troops would begin their evacuation from Budapest November 9th and finish on November 11th. He was immediately followed by Count Somssich, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me that Friedrich was absolutely defiant; that if Allies insisted on his giving up post of Minister President he would go into opposition with nine of his present ministers and that after all it was not Hungary but Allies who wanted peace.

I told Count Somssich that I still hoped that wiser counsels would prevail but that if Friedrich maintained this short-sighted attitude I could do no more and should have to leave when Roumanians withdrew. I was not here to turn out Friedrich government and set up Opposition as a government; I was only here to ask Hungarians to form a temporary coalition government with whom Allies could deal.

I still hope that Friedrich may be induced to see reason but it is all the more necessary that I should have authority to recognise coalition government immediately on its formation if that proves to be possible.

Appendix B to HD–85

Telegram No. 4 From Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council

Monsieur Cerruti, civil member of Italian mission, has just informed me of a telegram received by mission from Paris from which I understand following proposals are under consideration by Supreme Council.

That Friedrich shall be required to resign at once as he has been unable to form democratic government.
That Roumanians shall be required to evacuate at once.
That two divisions composed of Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slav troops under Allied command shall be sent into Hungary.

With regard to (1) I venture to ask for two or three days delay. I hope I am on the point of securing coalition government which all parties in Hungary will accept. I have got so far as to get provisional consent of Friedrich to resignation of office of Minister President. It is a task of great difficulty to bring various parties together and secure general consent but I shall know by end of week whether I can really count on success.

[Page 10]

(2) As I reported in my telegram No. 3 Roumanian High Commissioner has definitely informed me that Roumanians intend to begin evacuation on November 9th. There is, however, one very important point on which I trust Allies will insist namely that Roumanians shall not remain on the Theiss but withdraw from limits of all territory that is to remain Hungarian. For one reason alone this is desirable namely because elections cannot be held until country is clear of foreign troops. But also difficulties are being raised by Friedrich party and others who say that Roumanian evacuation will not be genuinely carried out.

(3) I venture to express my earnest hope that under no circumstances will Jugo-Slav and Czecho-Slav divisions be sent into Hungary even under Allied officers. Result in country would be indescribable and I am convinced that Hungarians would at once sink all their differences and resist with such arms as they have to last man.

Appendix C to HD–85

[The Secretary General of the American Delegation (Grew) to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]

The Secretary General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace has the honor to transmit herewith for Mr. Dutasta’s information a very urgent telegram which has just been received from the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest.

“Budapest, November 5th.

“To the Supreme Council,

“Peace Conference,


“No. 775, Double priority. This Mission is aware that a telegram has been received in Budapest from Paris covering three points: First, the Friedrich Cabinet, second, the immediate Roumanian evacuation, and third, the occupation of Hungary by two divisions under Interallied officers, one division of Czecho-Slovaks and one division of Yugoslavs. Against this third proposition the Interallied Military Mission unanimously and urgently protests. Such procedure it is believed would stir Hungary into revolution and would destroy all prospects for an early solution of the Hungarian question. It is further urged that the Roumanians, the Yugo-Slavs and the Czecho-Slovaks be all required to retire at once behind their respective lines of demarcation.

“(Signed) Interallied Military Mission.”

Mr. Dutasta,
Secretary General of the Peace Conference,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

[Page 11]

Appendix D to HD–85

[The Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest to the Supreme Council]


To the Supreme Council—Paris.

Supplement to Telegram No. 740 of October 31.

The Czecho-Slovak Government subordinates the evacuation of Salgo Tarjan to three conditions:

—The Hungarians are to be capable of insuring order;
—The Hungarians are not to attack the Czecho-Slovaks;
—The Hungarian Government is to reimburse the amounts advanced by the Czecho-Slovaks to feed the population.

The Commission has given the two first assurances. It is of the opinion that the execution of the third condition would be the cause of a new delay which must be avoided at any price. The Budapest mills are without coal.

The Commission replied to this effect.

The Commission asks the Supreme Council to use its influence with the Prague Government.

The President of the Day

Appendix E to HD–85


From: Supreme Council.

To: Sir George Clerk, Budapest.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your telegrams of November 411 and 5th,12 and of the telegrams from the Commission of Generals of November 313 and 5th.14

Although very precise indications were given you in our telegram of yesterday,15 the Supreme Council desires to reply to your further suggestions and specify its views on the following points:

The Czech and Serb Governments will receive a formal invitation from the Conference to evacuate Hungarian territory, and to retire to the interior of the frontiers determined by the Supreme [Page 12] Council, of which notification has already been made.16 A similar invitation was telegraphed to Rumania on October 12th [11th].17
It is to be understood that the evacuation by Rumanian troops is to be complete; these troops are not to remain on the Theiss, but to withdraw beyond the boundaries of the territory which will remain Hungarian, in order that the elections may take place without being influenced by the presence of Rumanian troops.
A telegram will be sent to Prague requesting the Czech Government to not subordinate the shipments of coal to a previous agreement concerning the payment of the coal supply indispensable in the operations of the Budapest mills. The Czech Government will be assured at the same time that the Allies will arrange the question without delay with the Hungarian Government in a legitimate manner.
The unanimous opinion of the Commission of Generals, as well as your own, relative to the danger which the presence of Czech and Serb troops would present, even under an Allied Command, in Budapest, has decided the Supreme Council to renounce that idea.

However, you are requested to make a reply on the question which was posed yesterday, relative to the utility, or even the necessity, of a bona fide Inter-Allied force to support the authority of the Commission of Generals and the orders of the Conference. The attitude of defiance adopted by Mr. Friedrich, referred to in your telegram of November 4th, immediately after the decision calling for the evacuation of the Rumanian troops leads us to fear that the reactionary elements will offer resistance as soon as the Allies will no longer have a sufficient local military force to force respect for their decisions. You must be aware, for that matter, that, under the present conditions, the sending of Allied troops by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would encounter serious difficulties. Do you consider that the local gendarmerie would be sufficient under the control of the Commission of Generals.

Appendix F to HD–85

delegation of the interallied
military commission of control


From: General Nollet, President of the Interallied Military Commission of Control.

To: President of the Peace Conference, Versailles.

Article 207 of the Peace Treaty provides that the upkeep and expenses of the Commissions of Control, as well as the expenses incident to their operations, will be charged to Germany.

[Page 13]

The question having arisen, as to whether the pay of officers and men of the Military Commission, according to those provisions, would be assumed by Germany, various interpretations have been given.

Article 249 of the Peace Treaty, it is true, gives a definition of the term “upkeep”, but it refers to the Armies of Occupation; and it is doubtful whether it can be applied for the determination of the administrative statute of the Military Commission.

On the other hand, certain Powers are supposed to have taken measures for the disbursement of the pay, on their territory, to their nationals, who are members of the Military Commission. It may be asked whether these Powers have not already esteemed that the above-mentioned pay should be assumed by them.

In fact, operation expenses being equal for the Allied military of the same rank, while the pay is different, it may be advantageous not to impose on Germany expenses which vary, for the same rank, according to nationality.

This question, on account of these considerations and of the high moral interest which is, of course, attached to it concerning Germany, seems to me beyond the sphere of my duties and to call for a decision from the Allied and Associated Powers.

I have the honor to ask you to kindly provoke this decision.


Appendix G to HD–85

Note for the Secretariat General Relative to the Payment of Officers Who Belong to the Commissions of Control

By the terms of Article 207 of the Treaty, Germany must bear (1) the costs, (2) expenditures and (3) upkeep of the Commissions of Control. This enumeration would be meaningless were it not to include all payments, consequently that of officers’ pay.

Article 249 of the Treaty, in enumerating the various elements constituting upkeep, includes the pay of officers. It is true that this article especially refers to the troops of occupation. But there is a great similarity with the Commissions of Control; for, in both cases, it refers to the presence and maintenance in Germany of military elements necessitated by the guarantee of execution of the Treaty. In equity, it is a question of an expense caused by Germany, it is just that she bear it.

The inconveniences which may result from the inequality of pay in the different Allied and Associated Armies would be avoided if it were agreed that the pay be disbursed by each State to its officers and that the reimbursement would be made by Germany.

For the Drafting Committee
Henri Fromageot

[Page 14]

Appendix H to HD–85

the allied armies
general staff

No. 5249

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Council, the President of the Peace Conference (Secretariat General).

By letter No. 146, under date of October 21, 1919,18 General Nollet, President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany, requested you to be kind enough to have the Supreme Council decide whether the pay of Officers and troops in the Commissions of Control should be included in the upkeep expenses of the said Commissions, and later be charged to Germany.

No decision has been taken on this subject.

It follows that General Nollet experiences great difficulty in recruiting the civil personnel necessary,—interpreters and engineers—this personnel at the present time receiving no pay, but only having the right to allowances allotted to the Members of Commissions of Control.

This state of affairs is prejudicial to the good operation of the Commissions of Control.

Consequently, I have the honor to ask you to be kind enough to advise the Supreme Council of this question as soon as possible.

P. O. The Major General

Appendix I to HD–85

[The British Plenipotentiary (Crowe) to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]

british delegation

My Dear Ambassador: I have the honor to transmit herewith to Your Excellency a draft of resolution19 concerning the publication of the correspondence exchanged with the Austrian Delegation. I should be glad to see it on the calendar of the Supreme Council as soon as possible.

The question has been raised in the British Parliament as to whether this correspondence should be published and my Government is awaiting a decision of the Supreme Council before deciding in that matter.

[Page 15]

By the way, I think I must remind you that, concerning the correspondence exchanged with the German Delegation, the Council of Four decided to communicate to the press all the German notes and Allied answers, without any change, gradually as they were received or sent. This procedure has been observed in certain cases but not for all the Austrian notes and those which were sent to them.

However, there seems to be no objection to the publication of the Austrian correspondence; only, exception should be made for certain notes marked “Confidential” by the Austrian Delegation (Nos. 360, 863, 906 and 1070).

When writing those notes the Austrian Delegation relied on the assurance given by the note of M. Clemenceau to Doctor Renner (“these notes would be of an absolutely confidential character and would only be communicated to the members of the Supreme Council”).

With a view to rendering the Austrian notes intelligible, it will be necessary, as it was for the German notes, to publish certain parts of the original “peace conditions”, which were ulteriorly modified and replaced by the final text of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

Your Excellency will remember that M. Clemenceau has now removed the objections first raised by him against this method concerning the German correspondence. I informed Mr. Polk, Mr. Tittoni and Mr. Matsui of it, and I told them that my government proposed to publish the extracts in question.

Eyre A. Crowe

Appendix J to HD–85

of the allied armies
general staff

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President Clemenceau.

A communication received from General Henrys states that the Polish Government has asked the Allied Powers to obtain authorization from the German Government that the demobilized soldiers of the P. A. O. F. (Polish Army Organized in France) be free to return to their homes, situated in the following regions:

—The regions which are, properly speaking, German;
—The regions whose fate shall be decided by plebiscite;
—The regions attributed to Poland, but not yet occupied by her.

It would seem that, in the present situation, the free return, to the regions above referred to, of the demobilized soldiers in question, cannot [Page 16] be demanded of Germany, since until the ratification of the Peace Treaty, this Power has the right to consider the parties concerned as deserters from the German Army.

Under these conditions, the intervention of the Allied and Associated Powers could limit itself to obtaining the assent of Germany for the free return to their homes of demobilized soldiers belonging to the categories referred to above in paragraphs 2 and 3; those belonging to category 1 being retained in Poland up to the coming into force of the Treaty.

I would be grateful for information as to the decision which shall be taken on this subject by the Supreme Council.

P. O. Major General

Appendix K to HD–85

Note for the Secretariat General Relative to Demobilized Poles

1. Neither the Armistice nor the Treaty contain stipulations expressly binding Germany not to institute proceedings against German Poles having served in the Polish Army for having taken up arms against Germany.

2. But, according to the provisions of Article 91 of the Treaty, Germany undertakes to allow German Poles domiciled in Germany to opt for Polish nationality.

According to the provisions of Articles 88, 95, and 96 of the Treaty, Germany undertakes to allow German Poles, born in the plebiscite zones or domiciled therein, to freely exercise their right of vote.

According to the provisions of Article 278 of the Treaty, Germany undertakes to release, from every point of view, the German nationals, acquiring a new nationality by virtue of the Treaty, of all allegiance to Germany.

Finally, according to the provisions of Article 277, Germany undertakes to assure to all Allied nationals, that is to say to the Poles, a constant protection to their body and their property.

3. In undertaking these suits, Germany jeopardizes the loyal execution of the engagements above referred to. On this point, to put Germany under the necessity of annulling and ceasing the said proceedings would be justified.

4. On the one hand, if Poles are to return to German territory, on the contrary there are the Germans on Polish territory. Both should be equally protected from all interference and any obstruction in the free exercise of their right of option and vote, and transfer of domicile.

An understanding on this subject would be of a nature to put an end to and prevent all difficulties in the future.

[Page 17]

The presence at Paris on November 10 of German representatives for the settlement of questions raised by the coming into force of the Treaty, appears to furnish a favorable opportunity to proceed to this accord.

For the Drafting Committee
[No signature on file copy]

Appendix L to HD–85

C. R. 359

From: Loucheur, President of the Organization Committee of the Separations Commission.

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to call your attention to the passage quoted below of the note communicated by the Allied and Associated Governments to the German Government on September 27, 1919,20 relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces:

“The evacuation shall commence without delay and shall continue without interruption.

“The Allied and Associated Governments declare positively, that if they are not satisfied that the measures demanded by them are in course of execution, they will not consider any of the requests being presented by the German Government relative to the furnishing of food products. Consequently, they have ordered that the study of these requests be postponed.

“The Allied and Associated Governments furthermore refuse any financial aid which would benefit the German Government at the present time, or that it might endeavor to obtain from the Allied or Associated Governments or from their nationals.

“In the event that the German Government may continue to disregard its engagements, the Allied and Associated Powers will take all measures they may judge necessary to insure the execution of the corresponding clauses of the Armistice.”

The Organization Committee of the Separations Commission assumes that the passage above applies only concerning the requests presented by the German Government upon dates subsequent to the sending of the note, and that it is not the intention of the Supreme Council to annul authorizations previously accorded for the sale or security of titles with a view to the purchase of foodstuffs for Germany.

Please, etc.

[Page 18]

Appendix M to HD–85

Note for the Secretariat General Relative to the Eventual Liquidation of Property Belonging to the Inhabitants of Schleswig

The Danish Minister, in his letter of October 24, 1919, remarked that the inhabitants of Schleswig, becoming Danish after the plebiscite, will not be able to avail themselves either of Article 297 b, alinea 3, to be exempt from liquidations, since they do not acquire the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power; or of Article 297 i, to be compensated by Germany for the consequences of these liquidations, since they will no longer be German nationals.

This consequence of the Treaty can only be contested by subtleties of interpretation which it would hardly be wise to adopt.

But, in any case, the liquidation is, according to the provisions of the Treaty, merely optional and the Allied and Associated Powers have full liberty to abstain, within the measures which they shall deem suitable, from exercising their right before as after the plebiscite. After the plebiscite this abstention shall be especially justified in respect to individuals which shall have ceased to be German nationals.

For the Drafting Committee
[No signature on file copy]
  1. Appendix B to HD–84, vol. viii, p. 959.
  2. Appendices V (E) and V (F) to CF–65, vol. vi, pp. 413 and 416.
  3. HD–21, minutes 6 and 7, and appendices F and G, vol. vii, pp. 454, 468, and 471.
  4. HD–32, minute 9, ibid., p. 705.
  5. HD–74, minute 7, and appendix D, vol. viii, pp. 733 and 741.
  6. Appendix B to HD–80, vol. viii, p. 863.
  7. Appendix C to HD–80, ibid., p. 865.
  8. Appendix E to HD–62, vol. viii, p. 419.
  9. HD–79, minute 5, ibid., p. 838.
  10. Appendix A to HD–85, p. 9.
  11. Appendix B to HD–85, p. 9.
  12. Supra.
  13. Appendix C to HD–85, p. 10.
  14. Appendix B to HD–84, vol. viii, p. 959.
  15. See appendix V (E) to CF–65, vol. vi, p. 413; HD–21, minute 6, and appendix F, vol. vii, pp. 454 and 468; HD–32, minute 9, ibid, p. 705.
  16. See appendix B to HD–68, vol. viii, p. 583.
  17. Appendix F to HD–85, p. 12.
  18. Does not accompany the minutes in Department files.
  19. The translation here of the passage from the note is not identical with that in appendix E to HD–62, vol. viii, p. 419.