Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VII

763.72119/5839

HD–3

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 9, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, July 9, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. R. Lansing.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Italy
    • M. Crespi.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
  • Secretaries
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • Mr. H. Norman.
    • M. Paterno.
    • M. Ashida.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Lieut. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. For Great Britain, General Watts was appointed.

Appointment of Inter-Allied Commission To Enquire Into Incidents at Fiume M. Crespi said that he could not at present nominate an Italian officer. He thought that there would be an officer on the spot and it was agreed that he should join his colleagues at Fiume and be sent the same instructions as were given to them.

(It was agreed that the officers nominated should attend the Council the following day at 3.30 p.m. to receive their instructions. As it was not possible for General Watts to be present, it was agreed that General Thwaites¹ should attend to receive instructions in his stead. It was also agreed that General Cavallero² should attend to receive instructions in place of the Italian officer to be nominated.)

2. M. Clemenceau asked if any of his colleagues had any news from Italy.

Situation in Italy Mr. Balfour said he had nothing save what he had shown the Chairman on the previous day. Though there was a British Admiral and a British colonel commanding a battalion in Fiume, he had received no news from them. He had telephoned to London, asking for more news to be sent him.

M. Crespi said that he had received a despatch from M. Nitti and one from Fiume. It appeared from these despatches that no incidents had occurred since Sunday. In any case, the Italian Government was determined to maintain order.

M. Clemenceau said that the French Military Attaché in Rome again reported the words of General Albricci, to which he had previously alluded. The French Ambassador was also of the opinion that an attempt was being made to influence the Conference.

M. Crespi said that he was quite sure this was a complete misunderstanding.

3. M. Crespi said that he was not able to reply at once to the document handed to him by M. Clemenceau on the previous day.³ He would, however, furnish a reply at the next meeting. Stoppage of Trains at Modane

4. Mr. Lansing said that, before taking up the subjects on the Agenda, he wished to draw attention to a despatch (Appendix “A”) he had received two days previously from Warsaw. It was to the affect that the retiring German troops were removing horses, cattle, agricultural implements and everything necessary for the cultivation of the next harvest. This might be the act of irresponsible soldiery, but it was necessary to put a stop to it. Acting of German Troops Withdrawing From the East

M. Clemenceau proposed that M. Dutasta⁴ should proceed at once to the Germans at Versailles and make a formal complaint to them on behalf of the Council.

(This was agreed to.)

5. (On Mr. Balfour’s proposal, it was agreed to summon the Bulgarian Government to send a Delegation to Paris to receive the Peace Terms. The Secretary-General was asked to take the necessary steps.)Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria: Summoning of Bulgarian Delegation to Paris

6. Mr. Lansing proposed that this question should be taken up before the first question on the Agenda. He thought the two questions were connected and that the means of action should be determined before addressing any communication to Bela Kun. Military Means To Oblige the Hungarians To Respect the Armistice

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites entered the room.)

General Bliss was asked to make a statement and said that all that was necessary was mentioned in the report. (Appendix “B.”)

The report was then read by M. Mantoux.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not doubt that the appreciation of the Military Representatives was accurate. If the Allied Powers, France, Great Britain, Italy, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia, were too weak to deal with one recalcitrant power, the position was one of great humiliation. That, perhaps, did not matter much, but Bela Kun was turning Hungary into a military stronghold of revolution. Buda-Pest had become an armed camp and all the factories were making munitions. Propaganda was being carried on in the most dangerous fashion in the neighbouring countries. If the Allies must sit still and see the Armistice broken before their eyes, they were bound to lose prestige. Central Europe was likely to lose more than prestige. The Bulgarians had just been summoned to Paris to hear the Peace Terms. Was it likely that they would obey if they saw that the Allies could not even coerce a fragment of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy? The Bulgarians were only half disarmed and would feel that they could defy the Conference. The situation in Central Europe was both difficult and critical. The wave of disturbance might go west as well as east. The situation would, he thought, grow more critical if it were manifest that the Conference could not control a small and defeated nation, which was not only breaking the terms of the Armistice, but, in alliance with the Russian Soviet Government, attempting to cause general revolution. He did not favour wild military adventures, but he did not like a confession of impotence.

Mr. Lansing said that he had nothing to add to what Mr. Balfour had said. He thought Allied prestige should be maintained. Bolshevism would spread to Austria, if it appeared to be successful in Hungary. He wondered whether the contribution suggested for Serbia in the report of the Military Representatives was not underestimated. He was not aware that Serbia was fighting or anticipated fighting on any other front. He therefore suggested that the Military Representatives should get into touch with the authorities of Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia and Roumania, in order to find out what these States could do to help.

M. Clemenceau said that he must remind Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing that there were neither British nor American troops at hand. The French had two divisions, but other help would be required. He suggested that the Military Representatives, after conferring as suggested by Mr. Lansing, should return, together with Marshal Foch, and tell the Council what results they had obtained. He felt sure that Marshal Foch would ask for British and American troops.

Mr. Balfour said it would be necessary for him to summon Sir Henry Wilson.⁶ Only the British Cabinet could decide whether any British troops were to be employed. He would ask Sir Henry Wilson to consult the Cabinet before fining over to Paris, in order that he might be in a position to state what could be done.

General Bliss observed that it would not be of much use for the Military Representatives to consult the Czech, Serbian and Roumanian military authorities as to the number of troops at their disposal, unless there were means of knowing whether their Governments would consent to give troops for this purpose or not.

Mr. Lansing said that, perhaps, the best course would be to confer with the heads of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian Delegations in Paris.

(It was then agreed that the Heads of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian Delegations be invited to attend the Council on Friday, 11th July, and that Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson be also asked to be present, in order to discuss the possibility of military action against Hungary.)

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites withdrew.)

7. The Council had before them the following documents:—

1. A Report of the Financial Commission. Sale of Securities by Government of Bela Kun

2. A draft Joint Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers and to the Government of the German Empire and of Austria.

3. A draft Joint Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun.

4. A draft communication to the Press.

(All these documents are contained in Appendix “C”.)

Mr. Lansing thought that the result of the previous discussion showed that no action could usefully be taken at present.

Mr. Balfour thought that there could be no harm in telling Bela Kun, on behalf of the Conference, that he was considered to be a thief. He might take no notice of it and put the communication in the waste paper basket, but it could do him no harm. He thought Bela Kun should be warned that his right to steal funds for his own political purposes was not recognised. He did not think that the letters drafted were very suitably worded, but, in substance, he thought they might be adopted.

Mr. Lansing said that his objection referred specially to the note addressed to Bela Kun. He did not like threats which could not be followed by action. He thought the less the Conference had to do with him the better, and the less he was regarded as a power the better. The letter addressed to other Governments and that addressed to the Press, he did not object to. He thought they would produce the desired effect without adirect threat to Bela Kun. He also pointed out that the expressions “bolshevik” and “communist” should be expunged from these letters.

Mr. Balfour said that he would not object to the omission of the document addressed to Bela Kun, which he admitted was not likely to have much effect on him.

M. Crespi said that the question had been closely examined in the Commission. It had been recognized that the letter addressed to Bela Kun would not produce much effect, but it was necessary, before taking action in Allied countries regarding the sales of securities, to furnish such action with a legal ground. The only legal ground in this instance could be an official protest against the anticipated action of the Hungarians. The letter was therefore proposed for its legal rather than for its political effect.

Mr. Lansing said that he could not agree with this point of view. A lawless government, unrecognized by any other government, had no legal standing at all. He thought the Allies would have as strong a legal position whether they informed an outlaw that he was doing wrong or whether they addressed no remonstrances to him at all.

M. Crespi then suggested that the three letters should be sent back to the Commission to be re-drafted in such a manner as to contain a clear declaration that the Allied Powers defined Bela Kun’s proceedings as thefts. The drafting would be done in accordance with the views expressed by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing.

(This was agreed to, and M. Crespi undertook to obtain a re-draft by the Financial Commission.)

8. (At this point, M. Tardieu, Mr. Nicolson, and Mr. Leeper and M. Vannutelli-Rey entered the room.⁷

Frontiers Between the Ser-Croat-Slovene States and Hungary The Council had before them the recommendations of the Yugo-Slav Committee (Appendix D). These and Hungary recommendations were adopted.

(The Experts then withdrew.)

9. Mr. Lansing said that he was unable to act on this subject. He must take the Convention to Washington. The Economic side of the question had not been discussed in America. He suggested that as the matter did not really concern the Peace Conference it might be carried through by ordinary diplomatic methods. Approval of Air Convention

After some further discussion Mr. Lansing agreed that the Convention might be discussed inasmuch as it concerned European Powers—American adhesion being reserved.

(It was decided that the subject be put on the Agenda for the following day on this understanding.)

10. (At this point the Military Representatives entered the room.)

Repatriation of Czech-Slovak Forces From Siberia General Bliss said that a short time ago the Council of Four had sent to the Military Representatives at Versailles a of project of Mr. Winston Churchill’s⁸ for repatriating the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia.⁹ These troops numbered some 60,000 men. The proposal combined the repatriation of these troops with a movement regarded as useful to the Allied cause. One group of 30,000 men at present in the neighbourhood of Omsk was to operate on Koltchak’s right flank and to gain contact with the North Russian forces, and thus to reach Archangel. The other portion was to be repatriated by sea in American ships from Vladivostok. The Military Representatives were asked to examine this proposal together with Czecho-Slovak authorities. He, himself had an interview with M. Benes—as a consequence of which M. Benes had attended a meeting at Versailles. Before agreeing to the movement of Czecho-Slovak troops to Archangel, M. Benes wished to know whether Allied troops would remain in Northern Russia or whether they would be removed before winter, irrespective of the arrival of the Czechs in time for shipment from Archangel before the port was icebound. Thus the matter could not be proceeded with until it was known whether or not the Allied forces in North Russia would await the arrival of the Czecho-Slovaks. He had written a letter to that effect which hitherto had remained unanswered.

Mr. Balfour said that at the time of Mr. Winston Churchill’s proposal there had been, he understood, a fair prospect of a junction of the Czecho-Slovak forces with the Inter-Allied troops in North Russia. Since Koltchak’s reverses this junction appeared less probable; in fact there now seemed to be little chance for the Czecho-Slovaks of reaching the White Sea before the ice set in. The question for them, therefore, was whether the Allied troops would wait for them. He was informed that the British Government meant to withdraw its troops before the winter. If the Czechs therefore were unable to reach Archangel before November, he could not promise that they would find British troops awaiting them. He believed that the same applied to the other Allied contingents in North Russia. If this was so it appeared to follow that all the Czech troops must be repatriated from Vladivostok. The result of this would be that part of the Siberian Railway would be deprived of the troops guarding it and Koltchak would have to fill the gap. Therefore, the only point to be dealt with immediately was the question whether Allied troops would stay in North Russia through the winter. As far as Great Britain was concerned, the answer was “No”.

M. Pichon said that the French Government also meant to recall the French troops from Archangel. He pointed out that the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovaks had a very serious result on the whole situation in Siberia.

General Beun stated that these troops were guarding 1300 kilometres of railway. If withdrawn they must be replaced. It appeared that Japan and the United States must be called upon to fill the gap. The Czechs were at present along the central portion of the line. The Japanese and American troops lay to the east of them. As the Czechs were moved towards Vladivostok the American and Japanese might move westward into their place. There were at the present time 5,000 Czechs in Vladivostok. Their immediate shipment would give some satisfaction to opinion in Czecho-Slovakia.

M. Crespi said that Italian action would be in conformity with French and British action.

M. Matsui said that Mr. Churchill had enquired some time ago whether Japanese troops could replace the Czecho-Slovaks on the Siberian Railway. He was now informed that it was the question of finding troops to guard 1300 kilometres. The Japanese General had not felt authorized to reply without consulting his Government. He doubted whether there were enough Japanese troops in Siberia to undertake so large a task. If more were required he was not at present able to say what view the Japanese Government would take. He had already telegraphed to his Government on the subject and would do so again.

Mr. Lansing said that the problem now before the Council appeared to be a military one with which he could not deal. The political question was whether the Czecho-Slovaks should be evacuated from Siberia. The answer to this was in the affirmative, provided it were militarily possible.

M. Pichon said it would be possible if the Americans would send a few troops to reinforce the Japanese.

General Bliss said he thought this could not be done. American troops had been sent to Siberia to help the Czecho-Slovaks to leave it. Once the Czecho-Slovaks had left there would be no pretext to justify the retention of American troops in the country.

M. Pichon said that if the United States would not take on the task it remained for the Japanese to do so; otherwise the whole country would become a prey to Bolshevism.

M. Matsui said that he was not in a position to state whether the Japanese Government would undertake so much. He would consult it and say that the Conference desired that Japan should be responsible for the guarding of the Siberian Railway.

Mr. Balfour said that the question now being discussed was not the one on the Agenda. Without knowing how much the American and Japanese Governments were prepared to do it was difficult to see any solution to the military difficulty which had been raised.

Mr. Lansing said that the question on the Agenda was whether the Czechs could be shipped from Archangel. The answer to this was in the negative. They must, therefore, be shipped from Vladivostok.

M. Clemenceau said that as Mr. Lansing expressed no hope of American assistance it was desirable to know whether the Conference wished to invite Japan to undertake the defence of the Siberian Railway.

Mr. Lansing said that before giving a final answer he would like to consult Washington. He suggested that the Government at Washington should be consulted by the President of the Conference.

(It was then agreed that the Military Representatives at Versailles should prepare a draft dispatch to be sent by M. Clemenceau to the American and Japanese Governments regarding the necessity of providing for the defence of the Siberian Railway after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops.)

11. (The Report of the Representatives (Appendix “E”) was accepted.)Report of Military Representatives Regarding Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions

12. Mr. Lansing observed that this question was one between France, Great Britain and Italy, and that America was not concerned.

Army of Occupation in Bulgaria M. Clemenceau, alluding to documents appended (Appendix “F”), asked M. Crespi how many troops Italy were prepared to send.

M. Crespi said that Italy would send two battalions if Great Britain sent two.

Mr. Balfour said he was not prepared to say how many British troops would be sent.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not support the proposals made by General Franchet d’Esperey¹⁰ that there should be three British battalions and two Italian, while there were two French divisions in the country. France had no special interest in Bulgaria. He personally did not care who possessed Cavalla. He did not agree to maintain two French Divisions in Bulgaria while Great Britain had only one platoon, and Italy two battalions. The French Army was being demobilised, and a number of the troops in Bulgaria would be automatically recalled. In his opinion, there should be an Inter-Allied occupation in equal shares, or none.

General Bliss said that on the 9th June the Military Representatives had made recommendations,¹¹ which had been approved on the 16th June by the Council of Four.¹² It had been agreed that two French Divisions should be maintained, and that Great Britain and Italy should both be represented. On consultation, Great Britain had offered one platoon, and Italy one battalion. Now General Franchet d’Esperey called attention to the insufficiency of the British and Italian contribution.

M. Clemenceau said that the situation had changed, as he was now forced to demobilise, and remove his troops from Bulgaria, unless his Allies took their share. The only Great Power which had not been demobilised was Italy. Why they had not done so was their business. The only people with interests at stake in Bulgaria were the Greeks, and they sent their troops to Smyrna.

M. Crespi said that M. Clemenceau had more than once declared that Italy had not demobilised. He wished to make a formal and official statement that Italy had demobilised as much as France, and had even demobilised one class more than France.

M. Clemenceau said that if that was so, Italy could take her share of the watch on Bulgaria. Meanwhile, she was sending 40,000 troops across the Black Sea to Baku.

M. Crespi said that the British Government had requested that the British troops in the Caucasus be relieved by the Italians. He was not aware that Italy had as yet decided to send even one man.

M. Clemenceau said that he had nevertheless received official telegrams in support of what he said.

General Cavallero said that he had just given General Thwaites a statement in complete contradiction of the information mentioned by M. Clemenceau.

(It was then decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles the question of devising means for an equal Inter-Allied occupation of Bulgaria.)

13. M. Clemenceau announced that, according to the, Havas Agency, the Weimar Assembly had ratified the Treaty, the Rhine Convention, and the Protocols of the Treaty, by 208 votes against 115. Ratification of Treaty With Germany

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, July 9th, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–3

[The American Minister at Warsaw (Gibson) to the Secretary of State]

The American Minister at Warsaw reports under date of 3rd July that he had been informed by Colonel Grove,¹³ who received the information from the Polish Delegation from West Prussia, that the German troops in withdrawing from the west bank of the Vistula were clearing out horses and farm implements from Polish and German inhabitants alike. It would seem that these seizures were possibly the work of soldiery without orders. Should this continue it will be impossible to reap this year’s harvest. It would also prevent seeding their next year’s crop and result in this district having to import rather than export foodstuffs.

Appendix “B” to HD–3

SWC–438

supreme war council military representatives

Report on the Measures To Be Taken Regarding Hungary

On July 5th the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council:¹⁴

(a) To examine from the military point of view the means at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers to compel Hungary to comply with the conditions of the armistice accepted by her;^*

(b) To give the Supreme Council information regarding the manufacture and the stocks of munitions at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.

In their Joint Note No. 43 of June 7th, 1919,¹⁵ the Military Representatives already considered the military measures to be taken eventually against Hungary in order to put an end to the Hungarian attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks.

At that time the greater part of the Hungarian forces was concentrated on the Czecho-Slovak front; the Hungarian Command had only left weak covering forces in the East (Rumanian front) and in the South (Franco-Serbian front.)

The execution of the Military operation set forth in its broad lines in the Joint Note above mentioned would seem therefore to have been capable of realisation without any great difficulties if it had been undertaken immediately.

Since the 7th June, however, the military situation in Hungary has appreciably changed.

Dispositions of the Hungarian Army

On the intervention of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Government of Bela Kun agreed to stop its attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks, and moreover to order its troops to evacuate Czecho-Slovak territory under the conditions laid down by General Pellé¹⁶ in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

From the latest information received from General Pellé it would appear:—

That the evacuation of the above-mentioned territory by the Hungarian troops has been carried out within the time limit prescribed.

That the greater part of the Hungarian troops who were on the Slovak front and who have been liberated as a result of this evacuation, are in process of concentration in the regions of Miskolcz (150 kilometres N. E. of Buda Pesth), Cegled and Kecskemet (80 to 100 kilometres S. E. of Buda Pesth), where they are in a position to threaten both the Rumanian and the Franco-Serb forces.

It appears also that the Government of Buda Pesth is at the present moment forming 2 new divisions of infantry, which will bring the total number of the Hungarian forces up to 8–10 divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry, or 100,000 to 120,000 combatant troops. Recent information points to these troops being disciplined, well-equipped, provided with numerous machine-guns and considerable artillery, and to their supplies of ammunition, though no precise information is forthcoming,^† allowing them to offer considerable resistance; and lastly to their being animated by a very strong national feeling.

Under these conditions, and taking into consideration the force that the Hungarian Command would in the ordinary course of events be obliged to maintain on the Czecho-Slovak front, it does not seem an exaggeration that on the Rumanian and Franco-Serbian fronts alone the Armies of the Entente, in case of offensive action against the Hungarian Army, would have to fight a force of a least 90,000 to 100,000 good troops.

It must be added that Buda Pesth, the seat of the Hungarian Government and the final objective of the Entente Armies, appears now to have been transformed into a veritable fortress provided with successive lines of defence extending to a great distance and a strong defensive organisation, the capture of which would without doubt entail a great effort if the Hungarian Government had not beforehand asked for peace.

Dispositions of the Allied Armies

The Allied and Associated Powers could oppose to the Hungarian Army:—

(1) Conditional on the agreement of the Rumanian and Serbian Governments

6	Rumanian	Divisions.	}	60,000	men.
1	“	Cavalry Division.
2	French	Divisions.		16,000	“
1	Serbian	Division.		8,000	“

in all, 84,000 men of which two-thirds belong to the Rumanian Army.

It must moreover be noted that the Rumanian troops have been forced to evacuate, after the initial success of the Hungarian offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, the bridge-heads which they had occupied on the right bank of the Theiss, and are consequently in a disadvantageous position to undertake operations against the Hungarians.

(2) Conditional on the agreement of the Government of Prague

Such weak Czecho-Slovak forces as it has been possible to reorganise up to date after the reverses of last month, amounting to at the most:—

2 Divisions . . . . . .

20,000 men.

The remainder of the Czecho-Slovak Army will probably not be available for action for two months.

In any case the Entente would have at its disposal for the proposed operation only a total force, including Czecho-Slovaks, of

100,000 to 110,000 men

with which to oppose

100,000 to 120,000 Hungarians.

Conclusions

In consideration of the above, the Military Representatives are of opinion that the proposed operation is possible, but presents a great element of risk if measures are not taken to ensure the reinforcement of the Allied forces in time.

The Military Representatives further consider they should draw the attention of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to the following points:—

(1) The possibility of undertaking this action depends absolutely on the consent of the Serbian, Rumanian and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

(2) Serious difficulties must be expected in the carrying out of the operation, viz:—

(a) Changes in the dispositions of the Hungarian Army in process of concentration between the Theiss and the Danube to the South of Budapest and in the region of Miskolcz.

(b) The loss by the Rumanian forces of the bridgeheads which they had occupied on the right bank of the Theiss.

(c) The defensive organisation carried out round Budapest.

(3) If the operation is contemplated it is of importance to postpone the retirement of the Rumanian troops from the region East of the Theiss.

With these reserves and if a military operation against the Hungarian Army is decided on by the Supreme Council in spite of the difficulties set forth above and the large expenditure involved, the general plan of operations contemplated by the Military Representatives in their Joint Note No. 43 of June 7th still appears capable of execution in its broad lines. It would be for the General Commanding-in-Chief the operating Armies to modify the plan as circumstances may dictate.

In any case the Military Representatives insist, if the success of the operation is to be assured, on the necessity of the operations being under the direction of one Commander accepted by the Rumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak Governments. The General Commanding-in-Chief, the Allied Armies of the East is the sole Commander who appears for the moment to be in a position to make the necessary dispositions without loss of time and consequently to ensure the necessary co-ordination of action.

Gal Belin

Military Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council.

C. Sackville-West

Major General,
Military Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council.

Ugo Cavallero

Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.

Tasker H. Bliss

Military Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War Council.

Given at Versailles on the 8th July, 1919.

Appendix “C” to HD–3

WCP–1116

Financial Commission,
Paris, July 7, 1919.

Translation

The President of the Financial Commission

To the President of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference

The Supreme Council at its meeting of July 5th, 1919, decided that the “Financial Commission of the principal Allied and Associated Powers should propose immediately to the Supreme Council measures intended to prevent the sale on foreign markets of deeds and bonds seized by order of the Government of Bela Kun in Hungary.”¹⁷

The Financial Commission met on the call of Mr. Crespi on July 7th, 1919, and decided to submit to the Supreme Council the following considerations.

The decision taken by the communist Government to seize all the bonds and values now deposited in the Banks of Hungary, thus procuring for itself from four to six milliard crowns, is very prejudicial to the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers and to those of their nationals:

1. –It enables the Government of Bela Kun to form an important fund with which to subsidize bolshevist actions not only in Hungary but also in Allied and Neutral Countries.

2. –The sale of the bonds deposited with Hungarian Banks deprives the Allied and Associated Powers of part of the pledge assured them by the Treaty with Germany and the draft treaties with the other enemy powers for the payment of reparations for losses due to the war.

3. –Lastly, this measure is a real theft prejudicial to individuals, some of whom are nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Financial Commission considers the only really effective means of protecting the interests threatened would be that suggested by the Colonel, Chief of the Italian Military Commission at Budapest, who proposes to sequester for purposes of conservation all the bonds deposited in Hungarian banks and to place these Banks under the control of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. But it believes that these measures can only be carried out if the Allied and Associated Governments have at their disposal the military forces required for enforcing them on the Hungarian communist government and for ensuring their maintenance.

The decisions which the Supreme Council will take on this subject will determine the possibility of preventing Bela Kun from carrying out his purpose of seizing all the assets deposited in the Hungarian Banks and sending them abroad.

Anyhow, the Financial Commission suggests to the Supreme Council the following measures which it believes are such as to at least mitigate the effects of the orders given by Bela Kun even if they do not afford complete protection to Allied and Associated interests.

First of all, a note should be sent to the Hungarian Communist Government by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

This would back up and re-enforce the note which the Colonel, Chief of the Italian Military Commission in Budapest, has already taken the well-advised initiative of sending to Bela Kun.

This note of protest against the order given to the Hungarian banks would clearly state that the Allied and Associated Powers consider that the assets seized are the security for their war reparation credits, or for the property belonging to their nationals, and that they cannot consent to its being disposed of. All measures of confiscation will therefore be held as null and void and the Hungarian Government will be held personally responsible for all losses incurred by the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the second place, a circular note could be addressed to the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers and to Neutrals informing them of the step taken by Bela Kun in the matter of the Hungarian banks.

It could draw their attention to the danger involved for all the nations by the formation of a bolshevist propaganda fund, and it could ask these Powers to assist in mitigating the effects of Bela Kun’s orders and in frustrating his intentions.

Such assistance might consist in measures similar to those taken by the Scandinavian and Swiss Governments with regard to bank-notes coming from Russia; in prohibition of the entry, or in special super vision of Hungarian securities and of all securities coming from Hungary.

The same note might be sent to the German and Austrian Governments which are interested in protecting themselves against the bolshevist danger.

In the third place, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers may require their nationals to make a declaration of all securities deposited with Hungarian banks of which they are the owners. This declaration might subsequently be completed by opposition to the sale of such securities in all the countries which have adopted legislation allowing of such opposition.

The Supreme Council will not fail to see that the first of these measures would only have the value of a protest if it were not backed up by force of arms.

WCP–1116A

Translation

financial commission of the principal allied & associated powers

July 7, 1919.

Joint Draft Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to the Governments of the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers and to the Governments of the German Empire and of Austria

According to information received by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the communist Government of Budapest has ordered the banks in Hungarian territory to deliver up to it all securities and values held by them on deposit, and it would appear that this order has already begun to be carried out.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed a formal protest to the Communist Government.

The Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Governments draw the attention of the Government of . . . . . to the danger involved for all nations by the formation of a fund for subsidising bolshevist action not only in Hungary but also in foreign countries.

It appears to them that joint action is essential, on the one hand, for opposing the propaganda of Bela Kun, and on the other for mitigating, in respect of all depositors, both Hungarian and foreign the consequences of a measure of spoliation.

WCP–1116B

Translation

financial commission of the principal allied & associated powers

July 7, 1919.

Joint Draft Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kim

According to information received by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers the Communist Government of Budapest has given order to the banks on Hungarian territory to deliver up to it all bonds and securities and values held by them on deposit; and it would appear that this order has already begun to be carried out.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider that these securities and values, in as much as they are not the property of their nations, are the security for the credits on account of war reparations.

They make formal protest against all measures aiming at disposing of the same.

They also declare that they consider as a qualified theft all seizure of securities and values belonging to their nationals.

They warn the communist government that they consider as null and void all measures which it has decreed for their confiscation, and that they hold the Hungarian Government responsible for all loss which may result from same to themselves and to their nationals.

WCP–1116C

Translation

July 7, 1919.

Draft Communication to the Press

According to information received, the Communist Government of Budapest has ordered the banks on Hungarian territory to deliver up to it the securities and values which they hold on deposit; and it would seem that steps have been taken to carry out this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have addressed to Bela Kun a formal protest, stating that they consider as a qualified theft the seizure of all securities and values belonging to their nationals, and warning the communist Government that they will hold as null and void all measures of confiscation, and that they will hold the Hungarian Government responsible for all losses which may result therefrom to them and to their nationals.

The (French) owners of securities deposited in Hungary are requested to declare same to (the Commission of Claims Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as soon as possible; which they have already done.

Moreover, owners of such securities are advised to make the declarations foreseen by the Law of June 15th, 1872 on oppositions,¹⁸ to the Syndical Chamber of Brokers of Paris.

Appendix D to HD–3

Frontier Between Yugo-Slavia and Hungary in the Prekomurye

a. demand of the serbo-croat-slovene delegation

The Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation no longer claim the eastern districts inhabited by a compact Magyar population and the northern districts which are connected with the valley of the Raab by their economic interests.

b. decision of the committee

(1) Principles

(a) The Committee considers that from the geographical point of view the new frontier claimed by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation is of an artificial character like the former one, as indeed is unavoidable in any delineation of the Yugo-Slav salient to the north of the Mur.

(b) It notes that this salient, thus reduced, is inhabited by a population of which three-quarters are Slovene.

(c) It recognises that from a general political point of view the fate of the Slovene race, united under the Austro-Hungarian domination and in its resistance to Germanisation, but now inevitably destined to be split up as a result of the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is worthy of all attention.

(2) Conclusions

The Committee proposes to assign to Yugo-Slavia the part of the Prekomurye now claimed by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation. The geographical boundary is as follows:—

The talweg of the Lendva upstream to a point to be determined on the ground to the south of point 265.

Thence, a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a north-north-westerly direction to point 209 (3 kilometres west of Nemesnep) and leaving Pincze, Csente, Hidveg, Gönterhaza, Zsitköcz and Kebeleszentmarton to Yugo-Slavia; and Lendva-Ujfalu, Dedes, Gaborjanhaza, Bödehaza and Lendva-Jakabfa to Hungary.

Thence, in a north-westerly direction as far as point 295, approximately the crest line separating the basins of the river Nemesnepi in the north and the river Kebele in the South.

Thence a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a northerly direction to point 313 (about 10 kilometres to the south of Szt. Gotthard) passing over points 291–319 and leaving Kisszerdahely, Domonkosfa, Kapornak, Domafold with its railway station, and Nagy-dolany to Yugo-Slavia; and Szomorocz and Kotormany to Hungary.

Thence, in a westerly direction as far as point 371 (about 10 kilometres to the south-south-east of Fehring) approximately the crest-line separating the basins of the Raba [Raab?] in the north and the Mur in the south.

Thence, a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a south-westerly direction to the old frontier between Austria and Hungary to the east of point 400, and leaving Gedoudvar to Yugoslavia and Bonisfalva to Hungary.

A. W. A. Leeper

SWC–437

Appendix E to HD–3

[Report of the Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council Regarding Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions]

• Present
  • France
    • Gen. Belin.
    • Rear-Admiral Grasset.
    • Gen. Duval.
  • Gt. Britain
    • Maj-Gen. Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, K. B. E., C. M. G.
    • Vice-Adm. Sir E. F. B. Charlton, K. C. M. G., C. B.
    • Brig-Gen. P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
  • Italy
    • Gen. Cavallero.
    • Admiral Grassi.
    • Admiral Orsini.
  • America
    • Col. S. D. Embick, C. M. G.
    • Rear-Adm. H. S. Knapp.
    • Rear-Adm. H. A. Wiley.
  • Japan
    • Maj-Gen. Tanaka.
    • Admiral Jeda.
    • Col. Sato.
  • Also Representing Belgium—Major Van Egroo.
• In Attendance
  • Maj. Lacombe.
  • Capt. Boehl.
  • Captain Levavasseur.
  • Captain Boissiere.
  • Lieut. Robert.
  • Lieut. Fould.
  • Brig-Gen. H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.
  • Maj-Gen. Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham, K. C. M. G. C. B.
  • Lt-CoL W. L. O. Twiss, M. C.
  • Paymaster-Capt. W. F. Cullinan, C. M. G.
  • Lt-Commdr. A. R. J. Southby.
  • Lt-Col. Toni.
  • Capt. McNamee.
  • Commdr. G. Nakajima.
  • Lieut. R. Sugiyama.
  • Major Katsuki.
• Secretariat
  • Lieut. Fould.
  • Capt. C. L. Wicks.
  • Capt. T. F. Powell.
  • Capt. Majnoni.
  • Lieut. Bosio.
  • Col. U. S. Grant,
  • C. M. G.
• Interpreter
  • Lieut. Sergent.

ORGANISATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 203–210 OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

General. Formation of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

part i

Article 1

Three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control shall be created, viz:—

• The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control.
• The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.
• The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

These Commissions shall enter upon their duties as from the date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 2

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Military Clauses (Article 208).

The President of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a French General.^‡

Article 3

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Naval Clauses (Article 209).

The President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a British Admiral.

Article 4

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Aeronautical Clauses (Article 210).

The President of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a British Brigadier-General.

Article 5

The General Officers and Admiral referred to in Articles 2, 3, and 4 shall mutually detail a permanent representative (assisted if necessary by other Officers) for the purpose of maintaining liaison between them.

part ii.—powers of the inter-allied commissions of control

Article 6

The powers of each of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control are defined in Articles 203 to 210 of the Treaty of Peace.

In addition to the application of the Military Clauses (Articles 159 to 180), the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control shall enforce Articles 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Naval Clauses.

Article 7

The general clauses (Articles 211–212 of the Treaty of Peace) shall be under the supervision of the President of the Military, Naval or Aeronautical Commissions of Control as the case may be.

part iii.—expenses of the inter-allied commissions of control

Article 8

The maintenance and expenses of the Commissions of Control and their working expenses are chargeable to Germany in accordance with Article 207 of the Treaty of Peace.

These expenses shall be paid direct, through the President of the Commissions, to the parties concerned, by the Allied and Associated Governments, who shall obtain repayment of such expenses from the German Government.^¶

Article 9

The German Government will be notified of the accommodation required for the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and will provide such accommodation in accordance with Article 206 (paragraph 1) of the Treaty of Peace.

part iv.—duration of activities of inter-allied commissions of control

Article 10

The duration of the activities of each commission shall be limited to the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses under its supervision, for which a time limit is fixed in the Treaty of Peace; and in case the execution be not completed within the period fixed, this fact will be reported by the Commission concerned to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for a decision as to the action to be taken.

Until a decision is reached the Commission will continue to supervise the execution of the particular clause in question.

Organisation of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control

Article 11

The General Officer presiding over the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Staff which shall include Officers of each of the Armies of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of Belgium.

He shall moreover be assisted by the necessary technical personnel (legal, financial and other experts). It will sit at Berlin.

Article 12

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall include three Sub-Commissions:—

(a) A Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament and Material.

(b) A Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.

(c) A Sub-Commission for Fortifications.

Article 13—Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament, and Material

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 164–172,180, 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by a British General Officer, assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; and shall sit at Berlin.

The Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart and at such other places as may be found necessary. The total number of officers necessary for this Sub-Commission will be decided by the President; it will probably not exceed about 20 Officers. It will be assisted by a technical staff of about 4–8 Officers, specially entrusted with the execution of Articles 168 and 169.

Article 14—Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 159–163 and 173–178 of the Treaty of Peace, particularly as regards the abolition of military schools provided for in Article 176.

It shall be presided over by a French General Officer assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; and shall sit at Berlin.

The Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart and at such other places as may be found necessary.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission will be decided by the President; it will probably not exceed about 30 Officers.

Article 15—Sub-Commission for Fortifications

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 180, 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by an American General Officer and divided into two sections:—

(1) The Section making the returns (faisant le reconsement [recon-naisement?]) of fortifications to be maintained (Articles 180 and 196) which shall sit at Berlin and have delegates at Munich, Dresden, Stuttgart and Konigsberg.

(2) The Section dealing with dismantling which shall operate from Kiel (Article 195) with a branch at Stettin, and from Mayence (Article 180) with Branches at Strassburg and Cologne.

The Sub-Commission shall consist of about 15 Officers in all, 5 in the first and 10 in the second Section (exact numbers to be decided by the President). The second Section shall be provided with a large subordinate personnel to superintend the work of dismantling.

Article 16

The Officers representing each nation on the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control might be provided as far as possible in the following proportions:—

United States of America	3 in 20.
Great Britain	4 in 20.
France	5 in 20.
Italy	4 in 20.
Belgium	2 in 20.
Japan	2 in 20.

Organisation of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control

Article 17

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control which is charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses of the Peace Treaty will consist of:—

• The Main Commission with necessary Staff, with Headquarters in Berlin.
• A Sub-Commission (A) consisting of Professional and Technical Officers for dealing with matters set forth below.
• A Sub-Commission (B) similarly composed and constituted for a similar purpose.
• It is important that the execution of Article 115 of the Treaty of Peace which deals with the destruction of the fortifications of Heligoland shall be entrusted to a Sub-Commission of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.
• A Sub-Commission (C) shall be constituted for this purpose.

Article 18

The Main Commission will consist of:—

• Vice Admiral Sir E. F. B. Charlton, K. C. M. G., C. B.,
• Contre Admiral M. F. A. Grasset,
• Rear Admiral P. Orsini, R. I. N.,
• Rear Admiral H. A. Wiley, U. S. N.,
• Commander M. Sakonji, I. J. N.

or such Officers as may be designated by their respective governments to succeed them.

Article 19

Sub-Commission “A” will consist of about 8 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the British Navy.

Sub-Commission “B” will consist of about 9 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the French Navy.

Sub-Commission “C” will consist of about 4 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the British Navy.

An Interpreter will be attached to each Sub-Commission.

Article 20

As soon as possible after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, the Main Commission shall proceed in men-of-war to Germany and travel to Berlin to meet the representatives appointed by the German Government and notify them of the procedure which will be adopted by the Commission of Control.

Article 21

The date of the proposed visit to Berlin will be arranged in conjunction with the Commissions for the execution of the Military and Air Clauses.

Article 22

With regard to the allocation of responsibilities to the Sub-Commissions “A” and “B”—

Sub-Commission “A” shall deal with:—

(1) The surrender of ships.

(2) The breaking-up of ships under construction.

(3) The allowance of ammunition on board ships still in commission.

(4) The reduction of personnel.

Sub-Commission “B” shall deal with:—

The surrender of all other stocks of munitions and war material and the stoppage of manufacture.

The foregoing allocation is tentative and not to be regarded as arbitrary, as experience may show it to be desirable to amend it. It is based on the geographical situation in so far as Sub-Commission “A” will deal with the Naval Ports and the Admiralty in Berlin, while Sub-Commission “B” will be required to exercise supervision in various centres in Germany.

Article 23

Should it be found desirable or necessary, the personnel of Sub-Commissions “A” and “B” shall be interchangeable.

Organisation of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control

Article 24

The Headquarters of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission shall be at Berlin.

Article 25

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall consist of 6 Sub-Commissions:—

• 1 Sub-Commission on Production.
• 1 Sub-Commission on Naval Aircraft and Dirigibles.
• 4 Sub-Commissions on Military Aircraft.

Article 26

The Sub-Commission on Production shall supervise particularly the execution of the Clauses contained in Article 201.

It shall sit at Berlin, and be presided over by a French Colonel, assisted by the necessary technical staff.

Article 27

The Sub-Commission on Naval Aircraft and Dirigibles shall supervise as regards those types of Aircraft, the Clauses contained in articles other than Article 201.

It shall be presided over by a British Lieutenant-Colonel.

Article 28

The Sub-Commissions on Military Aircraft shall supervise as far as this class of aircraft is concerned, the execution of clauses other than those contained in Article 201.

A Sub-Commission at Berlin shall be presided over by an American Brigadier-General.

A Sub-Commission at Stuttgart shall be presided over by a French Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Sub-Commission at Munich shall be presided over by an Italian Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Sub-Commission at Dresden shall be presided over by a Belgian Lieutenant-Colonel.

Article 29

The details of the organization of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control are set forth in the attached Table which is put forward as an indication. The total numbers involved are:—

• Officers 196.
• Other Ranks 381.
• Interpreters 25.

INTER-ALLIED AERONAUTICAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL (Germany)

Distribution of Personnel and Transport

Personnel					Transport
Distribution	Nationality	Officers	Interpreters	Other ranks	Landau-lettes	Touring cars	Motor-cycles with side-cars	Motor cycles	Heavy tenders	Light tenders
Berlin.	British	46	9	106	1	a 14	3		1	3
	France.	39	9	98	1	15		3	thiru	2
	U. S. A.	15		24		7
	Italy.	21	4	34		7	1			2
	Japan.	6	1	4		2
	Belgium.	12	2	25		6
Totals to Berlin		139	25	291	2	51	4	3	1	7
Wurtenburg (Sotuttgart).	British.	7		9		2
	France.	8		15		2	1			1
	U. S. A.	1
	Italy.	1		2
	Belgium.	1		4		1
Totals to Stuttgart		18		30		5	1			1
Bavaria (Munich).	British	7		9		2
	France.	7		13		2		1		1
	U. S. A.	1
	Italy.	4		4		2
	Belgium.	1		4		1
Totals to Munich		20		30		7		1		1
Saxony (Dresden).	British.	7		9		2
	France.	7		13		2		1		1
	U. S. A.	1
	Italy.	2		4		1
	Belgium.	2		4		1
Totals to Dresden		19		30		6		1		1
Totals to Germany		196	25	381	2	69	5	5	1	10

Appendix F to HD–3

Constantinople, July 7, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

Ciphered Telegram

From: General Franchet d’Esperey.

To: War Minister—Paris.

Nos. 2156 and 2157.

2156 8184/3.

1. By note number 44 from the Supreme War Council¹⁹ you informed me that it would be advisable to create an Allied Force in Bulgaria including two detachments, one Italian and one British.

2. General Mombelli²⁰ has already reported to me that according to orders received from the Italian Government his detachment would include 1 battalion whose stationing I have provided for in Southern Dobroudja.

2157.

3. General Milne²¹ can place at my disposal 1 battalion that would be stationed in Bulgarian Thrace, but no orders have been received from his government.

4. I beg you to request the British Government to be good enough to issue instructions to General Milne so that I may forthwith proceed with the organisation of the occupation of Bulgaria.

Note Concerning the Troops of Occupation in Bulgaria

July 7, 1919.

I. In their joint note No. 44, dated June 9th,¹⁹ the Permanent Military Representatives, after considering the situation in Bulgaria and finding it was necessary to maintain order at all events, at the time when the decisions of the Peace Conference are being notified have agreed on the immediate creation of an interallied military force of occupation to be placed directly and completely under the orders of the General Commanding in Chief the Armies of the East and consisting of:

“French Troops (2 divisions)

An Italian detachment, representing the Italian army

A British detachment representing the British Army”.

This note was approved by the Supreme Council at its meeting of 16th June.²²

II. On the 21st June, the British and Italian Military Representatives were asked to state the exact strength of their troops. On 25th June, the British Military Representative answered in writing “that in any case not more than one platoon would be available including one officer and forty other ranks for the purpose”. The Italian Military Representative stated orally that the strength contemplated for the Italian force would be a battalion.

III. These forces are both obviously inadequate. It is true that the Italian and British Governments have put forward the requirements of demobilization. Still, such requirements exist to the same extent as far as the French Government is concerned.

But first of all, the contemplated occupation must be interallied in character. France can no longer be the only one to bear all the material and moral inconveniences entailed by occupation and eventually by military intervention, should order happen to be disturbed and should the decisions of the Entente fail to be carried out.

Finally, it is necessary to note that for purposes of preventative policing which it is necessary to insure, one cannot rely on Greek or Serbian forces, since their mere appearing in Bulgaria would be sufficient to such troubles as must be avoided.

IV. In order that the occupation should be truly interallied in character and in order to be in a position to add to the two French Divisions such forces as is necessary to complete the total strength it is requested that the Italian and British detachments should be tactical units capable of a military role, that is to say, they should at least consist of:

• an Italian regiment including 3 battalions.
• a British Brigade including 2 battalions.

1. Maj. Gen. Sir William Thwaites, director of Military Intelligence Service of the British Army; military technical expert, British delegation.
2. Gen. U. Cavallero, Italian military representative on the Supreme War Council.
3. See HD–2, minute 4, p. 47.
4. P. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Conference.
6. Chief of the British Imperial General Staff and member of the War Cabinet since 1918.
7. André Tardieu, French representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo Slav Affairs; Harold Nicolson, British representative, Sub-Commission on Terri torial Questions: Alexander Leeper, British representative, Commission or Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs; and Count Vannutelli-Rey, Italian representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.
8. British Secretary of State for War and Aviation; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
9. Appendix VI to CF–92, vol. vi, p. 684.
10. Commander in chief of the Allied Armies in the East.
11. Appendix IV to CF–71, vol. vi, p. 498.
12. CF–71, vol. vi, p. 487.
13. Col. W. R. Grove, director for the American Relief Administration in Poland.
14. Ante, p. 28.
15. The Italian Military Representative said that he must repeat the declaration which he had already made before, namely that he could only consider the armistice of November 3rd, 1918 (Armistice of the Villa Giusti), as the military convention of General Franchet d’Esperey had not been recognised by the Italian Government. [Footnote in the original. For the armistice of November 3, 1918, see vol. ii, p. 175; for the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, see ibid., p. 183.]
15. This document was mentioned in the meetings of the Council of Four on June 7 and June 9, 1919, but does not accompany the minutes of these meetings. See CF–52, minute 2, and CF–53, vol. vi, pp. 240 and 254.
16. Gen. Maurice O. J. Pellé of the French Army, commander in chief of the Czecho-Slovak Army.

17. From the latest returns received by the British and French Military Representatives the Hungarian Army has at its disposal material and stocks of munitions from the old Honved, from the Mackensen Army, which was disarmed in Hungary, and an unknown quantity of arms and munitions which have been sent from Austria.

    The possibility of manufacturing war material in Hungary is little known.

    A great effort would appear to have been made and 6 or 7 factories appear to be in full working order, of which

    • 1 is for the manufacture of guns,
    • 1 for the manufacture of small arms,
    • 2 for the manufacture of explosives (20,000 shells per day?),
    • 1 for the manufacture of aeroplanes,
    • 1 for the manufacture of monitors, gun-boats and material for river craft.

    There is no indication of the manufacture of ammunition for infantry; this does not, however, appear to be deficient. Hungary is drawing from the mines of Salgo-Tarjan and from the region of Miskolcz 550 wagon loads of raw material (lignite and iron) per day. [Footnote in the original.]

17. Ante, p. 28.
18. Duvergier Collection complète des lois, dècrets, ordonnances règlements et avis du conseil d’ètat (Paris, 1872), tome 72, p. 263.
19. view of the great importance of this Commission, the Military Representatives are of opinion that its President should be a General Officer chosen with special reference to his military standing and reputation, as well as his energy and activity. They recommend that he should be selected from the General Officers in Command of Army Corps. [Footnote in the original.]
20. The American Representatives make a reservation on this paragraph to the effect that legislative action by Congress will be necessary before the United States can adopt the procedure proposed. [Footnote in the original.]
21. Including 4 Fords. [Footnote in the original.]
19. See appendix IV to CF–71, vol. vi, p. 498.
20. Gen. Ernesto Mombelli, head of the Italian Military Mission in Hungary.
21. Gen. Sir George Francis Milne, commander of the British forces in the Near East.
19. See appendix IV to CF–71, vol. vi, p. 498.
22. CF–71, minute 2, vol. vi, p. 487.