Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 18, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. F. L. Polk.
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • British Empire
      • The Bt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
    • Secretaries
      • Mr. H. Norman
      • Sir George Clerk
    • France
      • M. Pichon.
    • Secretaries
      • M. Berthelot
      • M. de St. Quentin.
    • Italy
      • M. Tittoni
    • Secretary
      • M. Paterno.
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui.
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai.
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Captain Chapin.
British Empire Captain E. Abraham.
France Captain A. Portier.
Italy Lt. Colonel Jones.
Interpreter—M. Demolon.

1. M. Pichon asked whether his colleagues had received any news of Hungary. He assumed that all had seen the telegram from General Bandholtz. Situation in Hungary

(This telegram was read. See Appendix A.)

M. Pichon also mentioned another telegram addressed to M. Clemenceau by the Archduke Joseph. (See Appendix B.)

Mr. Balfour said that the latter telegram appeared to be satisfactory. The Government undertook to proceed to a general election in a short time, and to remit the negotiation of peace to the national assembly.

M. Pichon said that the phrase used, namely, “on the basis of universal suffrage” was not very precise. It did not necessarily imply that the voting would be direct and secret.

M. Tittoni said that failing this condition there would be no legitimate government.

M. Pichon said that in addition the time limit “as soon as possible” [Page 695] was very indefinite, and the resignation of the government “when the National Assembly met” might be considerably postponed. He thought that instructions should be given to the representatives of the Allied Governments to arrange that the elections should take place very soon; that they should be based on direct and secret voting, and that the Constituent Assembly should be formed immediately.

Mr. Polk asked whether the Allied Representatives had yet made any report on the present Government. He had himself received information from two sources: from Mr. Hoover, and from certain persons who had just returned from Hungary. Both agreed that it was scarcely possible for the Council to recognize the Archduke Joseph. He only remained in power because he controlled the police and the Hungarian army. No labour representative or socialist had joined his Government. The mere fact that he was a Hapsburg had greatly upset the neighbouring small States. Mr. Hoover’s conclusion was that this Government should not be recognised, as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognise him he would fall, and he could then be replaced by a. Coalition Government.

M. Pichon asked whether there was any proof that the Roumanians had supported this Government.

Mr. Polk said that they of course denied it. The information received was to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party.

M. Tittoni said that retrospective considerations were not of much import. The Roumanians denied any complicity in forming the present Government of Hungary, and their mere presence at its formation did not establish complicity. Their presence, however, inasmuch as it contributed to the maintenance of order, also contributed to maintaining any Government in power. The question for the Council was whether this Government should be recognised as a de facto government, or whether the Council should say that elections must be held by a government more representative of all parties in the country.

Mr. Polk said that he understood no social democrat or labour representative would join a Coalition Government with the Archduke. Recognition of the Archduke’s Government would amount to excluding from recognition the real representation of the country. He thought, therefore, that it would be a fatal error to recognise the Archduke’s Government. He felt American opinion would be very strongly opposed to it.

Mr. Tittoni thought it would be better to consult the Allied Mission in Budapest before coming to a decision. The Mission might [Page 696] be asked whether, should the Archduke Joseph withdraw, power would be likely to pass without revolution to a Coalition Government. The Mission might also be asked whether, seeing that the Archduke Joseph did not furnish a rallying point for all parties in Hungary, it would not be well to recommend him to resign and yield his place to a Government which might be really representative.

M. Pichon said that there were undoubtedly objections to any Government with a Hapsburg as chief. Such a Government was bound to be a reactionary government. The Conference, however, had said that it would not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs. Nevertheless the Allied Mission in Budapest had inevitably had relations with the Archduke, hence a very delicate situation. If the question suggested by M. Tittoni were to be in the precise form he proposed, the Conference would be open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary. He thought that the representatives should be asked for information on Hungarian conditions. The previous instructions sent to them should be recalled. They should be told not to appear to interfere and above all to do nothing tending to convey any recognition of the present Government which, in the eyes of the Conference, had no legal existence, which did not represent the chief parties in Hungary and especially excluded all democratic elements.

Mr. Polk said that he agreed that information was what the Council desired. He drew attention to the fact that the Archduke’s government had not been put in power by the Hungarian people, but by a coup d’état. It took the place of the Government in whose favour Bela Kun had resigned. If the Archduke knew that the Powers were unfavourable to him he would resign, and a Coalition Government might soon be possible. The representative of the French Government had had an interview with the Archduke, who had said that he would abdicate as soon as a Socialistic Government could be formed. If he had spoken the truth he might resign immediately.

M. Pichon said that it would be necessary for the Council to make up its mind as to what it wanted. Was it prepared in the end to say to the Archduke that he must resign? If the Council was bound by its decisions not to interfere in Hungarian internal politics, it would not be easy to do this. If the Archduke were told that he could not be recognised officially, this would be of little avail, as even without official relations, the Governments were to some extent committed to the intercourse they must have with the administration in power. The Archduke had formed a programme, and had communicated it to the Allied Generals in Budapest. The Generals had received him, and even their silence was construable as a sort of recognition. The question was therefore whether the Council should await the advice [Page 697] of the Allied representatives in Budapest or not before asking the Archduke to resign.

M. Polk said that he thought it would probably be better to wait. But he reminded the Council that M. Clemenceau had made a strong point in the instructions to the Generals of not recognising this Government because of the bad example this would set to the rest of Europe. If the Generals, therefore, had recognised the Archduke’s Government, they had exceeded their mission.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not think that they had done so.

M. Tittoni said that they had been visited by the Archduke. They had received his programme, they had remained silent, they had made no protest. All this amounted almost to a recognition. The question therefore was should the Archduke be asked to retire.

M. Polk observed that there were precedents for official relations with unrecognised Governments. For instance, the Government of Lenin and Trotsky had not been recognised, but agents of the Powers had been in contact with them.

M. Pichon observed that the agents in question, at least as regards France, had not been officials. The telegram alluded to by Mr. Tittoni had not, he thought, contained a programme. It merely contained a communication by the Archduke to the members of his Cabinet.

M. Tittoni said that it was necessary to take into consideration public opinion. Throughout the Allied world it was thought that the Council was in some manner favourable to the Archduke’s Government. The papers were engaged in speculations as to whether it was France, Italy or Roumania that backed the Archduke. All Governments would be questioned in their Parliaments. It was therefore important that the Council should take sides openly and that all should appear to be following the same course.

M. Pichon said that the Council had already declared that it would only recognise a Government representing the national will.

Mr. Balfour then proposed a draft telegram for communication to the Allied Generals in Budapest. (See Appendix C.) He said that he thought the advantages of this telegram were that it would recognise the need of the Allied representatives to work with the people in power. It made it clear that the Conference did not trust these people; that the main reason for this distrust was that the head of the Hungarian Government was a Hapsburg; and that what the Conference desired was to obtain the opinion of the Hungarian people. A National Assembly based upon universal suffrage and direct and secret voting was necessary. It was only on these conditions that peace could be made with a Hungarian Government. He thought this constituted sufficient material for a very strong hint to the present Hungarian Government.

[Page 698]

M. Pichon said that it was undesirable to use any sentence which might suggest that the Allies were ready to agree to the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary.

Mr. Balfour said that the Allies could not oppose a monarchical form of government in Hungary should the Hungarians desire it.

M. Tittoni said that he agreed with M. Pichon, not that he objected to a monarchical form of government, but because in Hungary it would be bound to have a Hapsburg at its head, and because the Hapsburgs were the authors of the war.

(The telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour (see Appendix C) was then adopted.)

2. Mr. Polk communicated to his colleagues a telegram from Mr. Hoover regarding the situation in Upper Silesia. (See Appendix D.)Situation in Silesia

M. Tittoni said that the conclusion of the telegram was that a military occupation was necessary. The Council he understood had already decided that there should be a military occupation at Silesia.

M. Pichon pointed out that the occupation could only be carried out after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. Tittoni pointed out that a question affecting the very existence of Central Europe was at stake. If the coal mines of Silesia were destroyed, the life of Europe would be in jeopardy. Even if the Treaty did not give the Conference the right to intervene, he thought that in a case of this kind it would be quite fair to exceed Treaty rights.

M. Pichon said that the military occupation of Silesia before the ratification of the Treaty was a very serious matter. He suggested that General Weygand should be sent for.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought according to the armistice the Allies were entitled to occupy any strategic point they wished in Germany.

M. Tittoni pointed out that it was not necessary to occupy the whole of Silesia. It was, however, of vital interest to save the mines.

Mr. Polk read another telegram from Mr. Hoover recommending that representatives of the Coal Commission should proceed at once to Upper Silesia. He thought this might be decided upon without awaiting General Weygand’s arrival.

Mr. Balfour suggested that M. Loucheur, who, he understood, presided over the Coal Commission should be asked to send its representatives to Silesia.

M. Tittoni said that he thought a Commission would not be able, without military assistance, to save the mines.

(At this point General Weygand entered the room.)

[Page 699]

General Weygand, after reading the telegrams, said that he had just received from General Henrys similar news to that sent by Mr. Hoover. General Henrys also asked for troops to occupy Upper Silesia. A reply had already been sent to General Henrys to the effect that according to the Treaty the Allies had no right to enter Silesia, but that his request had been communicated to the Conference.

Mr. Balfour asked whether the Allies had no rights under the Armistice.

General Weygand replied that Silesia was still German territory, and that no article in the Armistice with Germany entitled the Allied Armies to enter into German territory. All that could be done was to anticipate the terms of the Treaty.

M. Pichon thought that all that could be done for the time being was to send the representatives of the Coal Commission.

General Weygand said that the German Government, if questioned, would be bound to disavow the promoters of trouble in Upper Silesia. In this case the German Government would probably declare itself unable to control the situation. Should it do this, the Allies would have sufficient reason for offering to assist in controlling it.

M. Pichon said that he understood General Weygand’s proposal to be that the German Government should be asked to remedy the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia. If it declared itself unable to do so, the Allies would tender their help.

Mr. Balfour asked whether the Allies had not a right to send troops into Germany to occupy strategic points.

General Weygand said that a provision to this effect existed in the Armistice with Austria, but not in the Armistice with Germany.

Mr. Balfour remarked that according to Mr. Hoover the strikes in Upper Silesia had a political character, and were really fostered by the Germans themselves. If the Allies asked the German Government to suppress the strikes, the Polish party in Upper Silesia would consider itself aggrieved and this policy might amount to sacrificing the Poles to the Germans.

M. Tittoni said that he understood that German troops had not yet evacuated Upper Silesia. In that case the responsibility for ensuring order was theirs.

Mr. Balfour drew attention to the passage in Mr. Hoover’s telegram stating that the Polish miners had been protecting the mines against the Spartacists who appeared to have combined with the German Volunteer Corps in shooting the Poles. Under such circumstances it was difficult to send German Soldiers into the district to restore order without incurring the reproaches of the Poles.

M. Tittoni said that the destruction of the mines must be put a stop to by some means or other. There was really no question of [Page 700] sending German troops to quell the disorder, as German troops were already there.

M. Pichon said that the Council was faced with a dilemma. The Germans would certainly fall upon the Poles. On the other hand, it was a big responsibility to occupy German territory before the Treaty.

M. Tittoni thought that the destruction of the coal supply in Central Europe was a worse evil.

M. Pichon said that the Military Commission suggested in Mr. Hoover’s telegram was not, in his opinion, very likely to have a very great effect.

General Weygand pointed out that such a Mission could only be sent with the consent of the German Government. Should it proceed to Silesia without the consent of the German Government, the latter might refuse to be responsible for its safety.

M. Pichon said that the Allies had really no means of military intervention within the terms of the law.

Mr. Balfour said that in one sense the Germans had as great an interest in putting a stop to the destruction of the mines as the Allies. German industries depended upon Silesian coal. They would therefore lose as much as Tchecho-Slovakia, Vienna or Italy. He suggested that the Germans might be told that if they declined to help, the Allies would arrange that they should have no coal from Silesia, should the district go to Poland.

M. Berthelot observed that Herr Erzberger in a recent speech had drawn attention to the diminishing production of coal in Silesia. He had added that there was reason to anticipate a still further diminution. For this reason he had urged that restrictions be imposed on the consumption of coal in Germany in order that sufficient coal should be left for the winter months. This indicated that the German Government was aware of the situation in Silesia, and had perhaps contributed to bring it about. It was not therefore quite safe to speculate on the good faith of the German Government.

General Weygand said that in negotiating on this matter with Germany, it was reasonable to assume that the German Government acted in good faith, seeing that it could not admit that it was inspiring the destruction of the mines.

M. Berthelot said that the German Government would then resort to dilatory tactics. They would say that it was not a case of revolution but a case of strikes, which it was difficult to suppress.

General Weygand said that the coal from Silesia was a matter of European interest. Many arguments were at the disposal of the Conference. This coal concerned Austria, Tchecho-Slovakia and other States. The Conference moreover was bound to hand over the [Page 701] territory to Poland in good condition should it ultimately be assigned to Poland.

M. Pichon said that General Dupont might perhaps be asked to intervene with the German Government and ask it to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. He suggested that General Weygand should prepare a text of a telegram to General Dupont, and submit it to the Council on the following day.

Mr. Balfour said that he had been struck by one of the considerations brought forward by General Weygand. The situation should be looked at in its broader aspect. The Silesian coal question affected not merely the comfort, but the very existence of the new states created by the Conference. The question was not one of local strikes and local destruction of property, which, unfortunate though it might be, might well be considered no business of the Conference. It was the consequences elsewhere that mattered. These consequences might perhaps justify the Conference in exceeding the letter both of the Armistice and of the Treaty, and in anticipating the terms of the latter by a few weeks. He thought the policy to which the discussion pointed might be summarised under three heads. First, the representatives of the Coal Commission should be sent to Silesia; second, an appeal should be made to the German Government in the manner suggested by General Weygand, and third, Marshal Foch should be asked to devise plans for combining with the forces of order in the country, in order to protect what was not merely German or Polish property, but a world interest.

M. Pichon said that he understood that the third proposal would only come into play if the two former were insufficient.

(It was then agreed that:—

M. Loucheur be asked to send representatives of the Coal Commission to Upper Silesia without delay, to examine the situation and to report on the means of remedying it.
That the attention of the German Government be called to the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia and to the danger of destruction of the coal mines, and that it be asked to take necessary steps to ensure order. General Weygand was asked to submit at the following meeting, draft instructions to General Dupont, embodying this policy.
To ask Marshal Foch to prepare means of sending forces into Upper Silesia, should the need arise, in order to protect the mines from destruction.)

3. M. Tittoni said he wished to draw attention to a memorandum he had received from the British Delegation, regarding the plan according to which the Conference should work. Programme of work for the Conference

M. Pichon suggested that this question be held over until Thursday, when M. Clemenceau was expected to return.

[Page 702]

4. M. Tittoni said that he thought the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed. He asked when this event could be expected. Functions of the Editing committee

Captain Portier said that the first meeting of the Editing Committee was to take place on the following day. The last reports from the various Commissions had only just been received. He thought that the labours of the Editing Committee could, at best, be completed in 48 hours, provided that the Committee confined itself to co-ordinating the answers prepared by the Commissions, and that it did not deal afresh with the various problems.

Mr. Balfour said that even after the Committee had finished its work, time would be required for printing and correcting proofs.

Captain Portier said that, presumably, the Austrians would be given, as the Germans had been given, 5 days to consider whether they would sign or not.

Mr. Balfour asked if a time table of the various necessary operations could be prepared by the Secretary-General. He agreed that the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed and the Bulgarian Treaty presented.

M. Pichon said he thought that all were agreed that the Editing Committee should confine its labours to co-ordinating reports of Commissions, except in case any two reports were inconsistent.

Mr. Polk said that he would like to see the instructions to the Committee. He thought the Committee should not be too strictly limited, though its main task was certainly to co-ordinate the answers prepared by the Commissions. He understood that some of its members proposed to re-cast the Treaty.

Captain Portier pointed out that the Committee had received no instructions. There was merely a resolution to the effect that a similar organism should be set up to that set up to make the final reply to the Germans.

(It was agreed that the Editing Committee should be instructed to limit its labours to the co-ordination of the various replies prepared by Commissions, except when inconsistencies in these replies required examination of any question on its merits.)

M. Tittoni observed that the Conference had dealt with many important matters. It might fairly be said that it had governed Europe, but it would be severely criticised by public opinion should it separate without having made peace.

5. Mr. Polk said he had received a telegram from Sofia to the effect that General Franchet d’Esperey, acting under the authority of the Peace Conference, had ordered the Bulgarian Government to disarm its forces. He asked whether General Franchet d’Esperey had given an order to the Bulgarian Government, or had conveyed a request. [Page 703] The Council had agreed that no orders could be given.1 He would, therefore, like to know exactly in what manner the General had proceeded, as it appeared that he had obtained the removal to Constantinople of the firing mechanism of all the surplus small arms in Bulgaria. He was also informed that the General had gone to Bulgarian Thrace and told his officers to say that the country would be attributed to Greece, and that the Bulgarians must evacuate it. General Franchet d’Esperey’s Action in Bulgaria

General Weygand said that he had no information whatever regarding the second point, but he did not think that the information received by Mr. Polk could be accurate. As to the first the measures taken by General Franchet d’Esperey were the result of the telegram sent him from the Conference.2 He had been told he could not exact anything from the Bulgarians which was not required of them in the armistice. The results he had obtained had been reached by negotiation.

Mr. Polk asked whether he could be furnished with a copy of the request addressed by General Franchet d’Esperey to the Bulgarian Government.

General Weygand said that no other instructions had been given to General Franchet d’Esperey except those sent from the Conference. He believed that his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government had been conducted verbally.

Mr. Polk said he would like to have a report from General Franchet d’Esperey regarding these negotiations, as well as a copy of any documents that might have passed between him and the Bulgarians.

M. Berthelot said that there was a telegram sent by General Franchet d’Esperey to the French War Office, saying that he had gone to Sofia and had obtained his results by negotiation. It might have been pointed out that there were forty-five thousand Bulgarians under arms instead of the twenty-eight thousand to which they were entitled.

Mr. Polk asked whether there was any objection to the furnishing of a report.

M. Pichon said he thought the General would have nothing to report.

Mr. Polk said that the Bulgarians must be very easy people to manage if so much had been obtained from them even in excess of the terms of the armistice. Marshal Foch had told the Council that the Bulgarians had been very punctilious in executing the armistice.3 The honour of the Council was therefore engaged and General Franchet d’Esperey had acted as the agent of the Council. He did not [Page 704] question the way in which the General had acted, but he thought there could be no possible objection to his furnishing a report to the Council.

M. Pichon said that the General had only followed the instructions given him.

M. Tittoni pointed out that the armistice only prescribed the number of divisions the Bulgarians were to keep, not the number of men in each division.

General Weygand agreed that this was so. The armistice had been deficient in this respect. Any request for reductions of the number of men under arms was in excess of the armistice, but this had been obtained by negotiation.

(It was decided: that General Franchet d’Esperey should be asked to furnish a report to the Council on his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government regarding disarmament and the alleged evacuation of Thrace.)

6. General Weygand said that according to a Nauen wireless message the German Government had recalled General von der Goltz. Recall of General von der Goltz

7. M. St. Quentin said that according to the terms of Peace handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 20th July, some districts of Western Hungary had been attributed to Austria. In their note of the 1st August the Austrian Delegation complained that the Hungarian authorities, having obtained information of the intentions of the Conference, were exercising brutal reprisals on the populations of these districts. Cattle and agricultural implements were being removed. The inhabitants were being forcibly enlisted. The Austrian Delegation therefore requested that the Commission to superintend the plebiscite should be sent immediately to Western Hungary. No attention had yet been paid to this request as the Treaty did not provide for a plebiscite. Only the Austrian Delegation asked for one. The Conference had not taken a plebiscite into consideration. Occupation by Austrian Forces of German-Speaking Districts of Western Hungary

M. Tittoni asked why the Austrians were asking for a plebiscite in a country which the Conference had attributed to them without one.

M. St. Quentin said the Austrians asked for more territory than the Conference desired to give them. In addition to this the Austrians hoped to create a precedent in order to ask for a plebiscite in Styria for instance, where the Conference had no intention of holding one. On the 9th August the Austrian Delegation had been authorised by the Austrian Government to ask the Conference for authority to [Page 705] send Austrian police into the affected districts to maintain order until the plebiscite should take place. On the 14th August a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation saying that the Hungarians threatened to retake Western Hungary by force. The letter further expressed anxiety as to the movements of Roumanian troops. It requested the Conference to forbid both the Hungarians and the Roumanians to enter the area attributed to Austria, and renewed the request for permission to send police into the country. Finally on the 15th August the Delegation informed the Conference that the necessities of the case had forced the Austrian Government to act and to send police and customs officials into Western Hungary up to the frontier line laid down by the Conference. The Delegation hoped that this action would be approved by the Conference. There were therefore two questions for the Council to settle. Would it ratify the fait accompli either expressly or by maintaining silence and in that case would it notify the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments?

In reply to a question M. St. Quentin said the Austrians had occupied the whole of the territory assigned to them.

(It was decided that no answer should be sent to the various communications of the Austrian Delegation regarding the occupation of Western Hungary.)

M. Tittoni observed that this did not imply approval.

8. M. St. Quentin said that a similar instance arose in regard to Prekomurie. The Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation had asked for occupation of permission to occupy the portion of this territory attributed to them.6 Troops had been got in readiness to occupy the area. The Delegation now asked that the Hungarian Government should be notified of the decision of the Conference, in order that opposition should not arise. Occupation of Prekomurie by Yugo-Slavs

(It was agreed that as the Conference could not deal with any recognised Government in Hungary, notification in the sense desired by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could not be made.)

9. M. St. Quentin said that the frontier fixed in Baranya7 had not been notified to the Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation. The Delegation persisted in asking for localities beyond the line adopted by the Conference. He suggested that the best means of stopping these requests would be to inform them of the frontier so fixed. Frontier of Baranya

M. Tittoni asked why the Delegation had not been informed.

M. St. Quentin replied that the general rule of the Council was that no frontiers should be communicated to any Delegation, without an express decision to that effect.

[Page 706]

(It was decided that the Serb-Croate-Slovene Delegation should be informed of the frontier laid down in the Baranya.)

10. The Committee had before it the following note:

Distribution of Expenses of the Delimitation Commissions The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty, in its session of August 11th took up the question of the expenses of the Boundary Commission and of the Reparation Commission, as well as the distribution of these expenses. It has been unanimously decided to submit the following resolution to the Council:

“The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty, having been entrusted with the question of the expenditure of the Boundary Commission and having found no precise indications, in the Treaty with Germany, concerning the distribution of these expenses, except in the case of Schleswig, calls the attention of the Council to the advantage of adopting a general rule for the distribution of these expenditures, as regards the Treaties to be signed with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.”

The various solutions examined in the course of the discussion were the following:

To divide the costs between the Two States concerned (Schleswig case).
Expenditure divided between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.
Expenditure charged to the League of Nations.

Mr. Polk said that he thought some difficulty would be experienced in collecting the money from the two contributing States. He thought that it would perhaps be simpler that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should advance the funds and recoup afterwards from the two States concerned.

Captain Portier explained that what was desired was a principle for application in all cases in the future. The Treaty with Germany had only provided for the expenses of holding a Plebiscite, in the case of Schleswig. No such provision had been made for the districts in dispute between Germany and Poland. This omission caused considerable difficulties, and the Committee for the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty wished to avoid a repetition of this difficulty in future. The question was of some urgency seeing that the treaties with Austria and Bulgaria were approaching the final stage.

Mr. Balfour suggested that the Commission should decide on the incidence of the cost, in accordance with the loss and gain of the two countries concerned. The country gaining territory should pay a contribution proportionate to its gain.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the cost of the Delimitation Commissions should be shared equally between the two States [Page 707] concerned, and that the cost of Commissions conducting Plebiscites should be allotted in proportion to the gain and loss incurred by the States concerned. The percentages should be fixed by the Commissions in each case.)

11. General Sackville-West explained the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles regarding the allowances to be granted to officers serving on Commissions of Control in Germany. (See Appendix E.) The, main conclusions were that officers should continue to receive the ordinary rate of pay of the rank held by them at the time of their appointment. The pay would therefore vary according to the nationality of the officer, but it was considered that allowances for work on Commissions of Control in Germany should be equalised. In order to arrive at a uniform principle, seeing that naval and air officers were concerned as well as army officers, it was suggested that a Committee should be formed of one Military, one Naval and one Air Officer of each Nation, together with a Financial Expert. The Council was asked to ratify this proposal, and to appoint members to the suggested Committee. Allowances To Be Assigned to Officers on Commission of Control in Germany

(The Report of the Military Representative was accepted, and it was decided to appoint a Committee composed of one Military, one Naval, one Aeronautical member and one Financial Expert for each country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of control, to fix under the Chairmanship of General Nollet, the rate of allowances to be granted for service on Commissions of Control in Germany.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, August 19, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–32

[The United States Representative on the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest (Bandholtz) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]



To His Excellency M. Clémenceau
President of the Peace Conference at Paris.

The Commission of Allied Generals received this morning, August 15, the Archduke Joseph, who notified it of the formation of a new [Page 708] Coalition Ministry, under the presidency of M. Friedrich. Four ministerial posts remain to be filled. The list will be telegraphed as soon as it is complete and definitive. After having conferred with the Roumanian General Holban and the Hungarian Minister for War accompanied by the Chief of Police at Budapest, the Commission came to a decision on the subject of the Roumanian garrison at Budapest and its reorganization of the Hungarian police, for the purpose of maintaining order in the capital. The Roumanian garrison for Budapest and its vicinity will remain for the moment fixed at a division of infantry, the stationing of which the Commission has slightly modified in order to clear the center of the city as far as possible and the better to assure order in the vicinity among the working men who constitute the most turbulent element. The Hungarian police for the city and its vicinity will be reorganized as soon as possible, and will number an effective force of 6,000 men.

General Holban has promised to discuss this matter immediately with the Hungarian authorities and to keep the Commission informed. The Commission having been advised that the Czechoslovak troops had not yet evacuated the mining region of Salgotarjan, which is in the neutral zone, has this day repeated to the Government at Prague, by telegraph, the invitation to withdraw its troops immediately.


Appendix B to HD–32

[The Archduke Joseph of Hungary to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]


Radio from Budapest No. 132 W 261, August 17, 9:15 a.m.:

M. Georges Clémenceau,
President of the Peace Conference,

Mr. President: I have the honor to inform you that the definitive government has been formed in Hungary, the aim of which is to restore internal order, to set as early a day as possible for an election on the basis of universal suffrage, and to conclude peace.

[Page 709]

The members of the Cabinet are:

President of the Council and Minister of Commerce ad interim, Etienne Friedrich, manufacturer.
Interior. Baron Sigismond Perengi, State official.
Foreign Affairs. Martin Lovahzi, President of the Associated Bourgeois Parties.
Finance. Jean Gruenn, State official.
Justice. Georges Baloghy, Judge.
Agriculture Etienne Szabo, agriculturist.
Minister for the Interests of Small Tenants. Jean Mayer, farm laborer.
Worship and Public Education Charles Buszar, School master, Christian Socialist.
Public Health. André Osillery, physician.
Minister for National Minorities. Jacques Bleyer, professor at the University of Budapest.
War. Francois Schnetzer, general.
Publicity. Etienne Haller, of the Christian Socialist Party.
Minister charged with preparing the peace negotiations. Count Paul Teleki, landowner.

Three other portfolios are reserved for industrial workers, namely: of public welfare, of supply, and of the ministry for industrial interests.

This Government will hand in its resignation upon convocation of the National Assembly.

At the same time, my functions as Chief of the Government will also cease; the National Assembly will have the responsibility of ratifying the peace as well as of fixing the form of the State and of the Constitution.

You are requested to take note of this communication.

Archduke Joseph

Appendix C to HD–32

[Telegram Drafted by Mr. Balfour for Communication to the Allied Generals at Budapest]

Though it is necessary for you to take account of any Ministry which, for the moment, holds the machinery of power, we cannot recognise or make terms of peace with a Government which does not, as far as we can judge, represent the country. The mere fact that the Head of the State is a Hapsburg, diminishes the possibility of feeling confidence in an administration which has, in any case, been established by a coup d’état during a foreign occupation. We have, [Page 710] of course, no wish to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary, but we do wish to be assured that its Government represents its people. An assembly elected directly by universal suffrage and secret voting seems to us to be a necessary preliminary to any satisfactory arrangement, or any stable peace.

Please report on the political situation.

Appendix D to HD–32

[Telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace From Mr. Hoover Regarding the Situation in Upper Silesia]

Vienna, Commission to Negotiate Peace Paris.

Number Ham 1158. Complete strikes now in progress in Upper Silesia and appear more political than economical in character and has become so violent as to already result in the destruction of one important coal mine and to threaten the destruction of the entire district. The whole of Central Europe is dependent upon this district for coal and unless all railway transport and municipal service are to totally disappear through these areas this coal district must be gotten back to operation at once. The causes of the trouble are somewhat obscure. Considerable arrest and shooting of Poles were made by Germans stating that they were putting down a Spartacist uprising. There seems to be some genuine Spartacist agitation but the Poles claim that it is entirely manufactured by the Germans and have shown me various documents indicating direct complicity of the Government at Berlin if the documents can be demonstrated authentic. In any event the Polish miners have struck claiming tyranny and persecution of the German Volunteer Corps and the whole district is now idle. Curiously enough the Polish miners have been actually protecting the mines from destruction by the Spartacists. In two or three cases the Spartacists appear to be mixed with the German Volunteer Corps when it comes to shooting up the Poles. Altogether the situation requires immediate attention. There can be no settlement of the question without occupation, as provided for under the Treaty and if the Allies do not occupy the district the repercussion on the coal supply will be terrible to all Europe. In any event another military commission comprising representatives of at least four Governments should be instantly dispatched to the district. The problem is not a question as to who is right or wrong in this disturbance. The fact of the case is that it is a largely political strike and is jeopardising the life of Europe through the stoppage of coal production and it fundamentally [Page 711] grows out of failure to create allied plebiscite commission to take charge of the district.

[Appendix E to HD–32]

supreme war council
british section

SWC–461 (83–MR)

Report Regarding the Fixing of Allowances To Be Granted to the Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers Sitting on the Military, Naval & Aeronautical Commissions of Control in Germany

The Peace Conference decided in its Meeting of August 2nd, 1919,10 to refer to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles for their examination and report, the question of fixing the allowances to be granted “to the officers of the Allied and Associated Powers sitting on the Inter-Allied Military, Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany.”

The Military Representatives, after considering the question, are unanimously of the opinion:

1. That the proposals as put forth below for the Inter-Allied Military Commissions of Control should be extended so as to cover the Inter-Allied Naval and Aeronautical Commissions of Control.

2. That it is necessary to assure to these officers during their tour of duty in Germany a treatment which would relieve them and their families of all financial care and would allow of their enjoying among the Germans a position fitting to their duties.

3. That although these officers belong to different nationalities but owing to the nature of their work will be in constant relationship both with each other and with the same German authorities, their allowances should be calculated on the same basis as for the officers of equivalent rank of every country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.

4. That the Military Representatives are not in a position themselves to fix absolutely the amount of the various allowances to be granted, and that in order to settle this question it is necessary to form as soon as possible a special Commission which will be composed for each country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control:—

  • 1 Military Member.
  • 1 Naval Member.
  • 1 Aeronautical Member.
  • 1 Financial Expert.

[Page 712]

The officers chosen to sit on this special Commission shall be appointed by their respective Governments and shall be selected preferably from among those who are to be Members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany.

General Nollet shall be President of this special Commission and shall decide on the place and the date of its meeting.

5. Lastly, that the amount of the allowances to be arranged for in these Conditions ought to be a generous one and ought to be chargeable to the first payment to be made by Germany. It is in the general interest to reduce it as far as possible in attaching to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control no more than the absolutely indispensable number of officers.

Gal. Belin

Military Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council.
H. W. Studd

Br: General, Military Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council.
Ugo Cavallero

Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.
P. D. Lochridge

Military Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War Council.
  1. HD–23, minute 3, p. 511, especially pp. 514515.
  2. Appendix F to HD–23, p. 526.
  3. Appendix D to HD–22, p. 492.
  4. See HD–21, minute 6 (a), p. 454.
  5. See HD–21, minute 6 (b), p. 454.
  6. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  7. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  8. HD–22, minute 6, p. 486.