763.72119/6401
HD–28
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday,
11 August, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.
Paris, August 11, 1919, 3:30 p.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Secretary
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir G. Clerk.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin
- Italy
- Secretary
- Japan
- Secretary
| Joint Secretariat |
| America, United States of |
Colonel U. S. Grant. |
| British Empire |
Capt. E. Abraham. |
| France |
Capt. A. Portier. |
| Italy |
Lt.-Col. A. Jones. |
| Interpreter—Professor P. J.
Mantoux |
1. M. Clemenceau asked if any of his colleagues
had any news from Hungary.
Situation in Hungary
Mr. Polk distributed a number of telegrams
annexed in Appendix “A”.
Mr. Balfour asked if there were any indication
that the Roumanians had received or meant to obey the orders of the
Council.
M. Clemenceau said that there was not the
slightest sign.
Mr. Balfour said he thought the silence on the
part of the Roumanians was deliberate.
M. Pichon said that he did not think this could
be inferred with certainty. The latest news was dated 7th or 8th and by
that date the orders of the Council could not have arrived. There was a
rumour that the line to Buda Pesth had been cut. He added, that a
telegram had been received from the French Chargé d’Affaires at
Bucharest dated 10th which was to the effect that he had handed, on the
previous day, the telegrams from the Council to the Roumanian
Government. None of the news contained in the telegrams distributed by
Mr. Polk was subsequent to the 9th.
[Page 647]
Mr. Balfour said that he thought that the
Roumanian Generals at Buda Pesth must have been made aware of the
desires of the Council.
Mr. Polk said that according to information
given to him by Mr. Buxton the Allied Generals had great difficulty in
their dealings with the Roumanian General in avoiding unpleasant
incidents. The attitude of the Roumanian General was very insolent.
M. Pichon said he fully admitted that the
Roumanians were not behaving well but he suggested that a judgment
should not be based on the news received.
M. Clemenceau said he thought it would be best
to wait until the following day.
Mr. Polk observed that the way in which the
Roumanians treated the Conference might become a pattern not only for
other Small States but possibly even for Germany.
M. Tittoni asked what means of communication
existed between the Conference and the Roumanian Generals at Buda
Pesth.
Mr. Balfour said he understood the telegraph
was in American hands as far as Vienna; communication thence to Buda
Pesth was by telephone. If the Roumanians had cut the telephone,
communications were severed. He added that he hoped the Allied Ministers
at Bucharest were being kept informed of the instructions sent to the
Generals at Buda Pesth.
M. Tittoni asked whether communication by
wireless could not be maintained.
M. Pichon said that he would enquire from
Marshal Foch what other methods could be employed to establish
communication.
2. The Council had before it a letter from M. Benes (See Appendix
“B”).
Letter From Czecho-Slovak Delegation Relative to the
Roumanian Occupation of Hungary
Mr. Balfour suggested that a suitable
acknowledgment should be sent to M. Benes of his letter and that he
should be told that it would receive full consideration.
(It was then decided that M. Benes’ letter of August 8th, 1919, regarding
Czecho-Slovak Interests in Hungary should be acknowledged and that M.
Benes should be assured that due note would be taken of its
contents.)
3. The Council had before it the following communication from Colonel
Haskell.
“From: Colonel Haskell, High Commissioner for the Entente in Armenia.
Situation in Armenia
To: President Clemenceau, Peace Conference.
Have received official notice from the British Command at
Constantinople that all British troops at the present time in the
Caucasus have orders to commence complete evacuation on August 15th;
an order from London only can prevent this movement.
[Page 648]
The Italians officially declare that they will not send troops. This
retreat will leave several million dollars worth of relief
provisions deposited at Batum Tiflis, Erivan, etc. without
protection and will stop all measures of assistance now operating,
without which thousands of Armenian refugees in Russian Armenia are
exposed to death from famine. The Armenians are surrounded by
enemies and have not enough arms munitions or energy to protect
themselves. Two million of lives are in danger after the retreat of
the British troops; anarchy will reign in the Caucasus where all the
lives and properties are menaced. The French High Command in the
East declares that British troops in the Caucasus are not under his
jurisdiction.
In the name of the future of these regions, I ask that the British
Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the
question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This
viewpoint receives the approbation of all the authorities here who
understand the situation.
Signed: William
Haskell.
Allied High Commissioner to
Armenia”
Mr. Balfour said that the situation in Armenia
was very serious and very disturbing. Historically what had led to the
present position was, as far as he could remember, as follows. British
troops had been sent into the country in 1918. In March and April of the
current year it had been made clear to the Conference by Mr. Lloyd
George that the British troops would be withdrawn. The date for
withdrawal had first been the 15th July, but had since been postponed to
the 15th August. It was probable that movements had already begun. It
had therefore been known to the Conference for a long time that
continuance of British occupation could not be expected. It had been
understood that Italian troops would replace the British. Italy had
accepted this exchange and the relief had been expected. From certain
remarks made lately by M. Tittoni, he inferred that Italy regarded the
enterprise as too great a burden. What resulted was that British troops
were leaving the country, that Italian troops were not coming to replace
them and that America was not sending any men.
M. Tittoni said that the question in as far as
it concerned Italy, related to Turkish Armenia and not to Russian
Armenia, of which Mr. Balfour had spoken. Italy at one time had thought
of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper.
Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no
objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral
Koltchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he
might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the
conditions demanded by the Georgians, Italy would have taken upon
herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia.
This, she could not do. In any case the area to be guarded was a large
one; the Railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable
length; some 40,000 men would be required [Page 649] and, in addition, shipping and supplies would have
to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it
appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be
available. The initial expense would be, he was told, 75 million lire
and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not
undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore been given up.
Nevertheless, he wished again to point out that the question of Georgia
was quite distinct from that of Armenia.
M. Clemenceau asked whether the United States
could do anything.
Mr. Polk said that the United States could do
nothing until Congress acted. Troops could not be sent into a country
with which the United States were not at war. The question of a mandate
for Armenia would be put before Congress by the President.
Mr. Balfour asked whether President Wilson was
aware of the critical condition of Armenia.
Mr. Polk replied that he had sent him two
strong personal messages on the subject already within the last few
days.
M. Clemenceau said the conclusion was that
France could do nothing: Italy could do nothing: Great Britain could do
nothing and, for the present, America could do nothing. It remained to
be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.
(As no Government was prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the
question raised by Colonel Haskell of August 5th, 1919, was left without
solution.)
4. M. Clemenceau asked his colleagues whether
they had read the letter sent by General Dupont to Marshal Foch
(Appendix C). For his part he thought that what Erzberger had said was
true. All French agents, both civil and military, were of one mind on
the subject. He thought, therefore, that General Dupont’s conclusion was
sound. He had no intention of giving up the principle of demanding the
surrender of culprits, but it might be advisable to confine the demand
to a few symbolic persons, for instance, the Kaiser, the assassin of
Miss Edith Cavell and the murderer of Captain Fryatt. A demand limited
to a small number would probably not be resisted. The suggestion he
would make was that each of the members should name one representative
to proceed to Berlin and to consult General Dupont as to what was
practicable. For himself, he would nominate M. Haguenin, who knew
everybody in Berlin and whom he could trust implicitly to form a correct
estimate. Probably his colleagues could make equally satisfactory
nominations. Execution of Clauses 227–230 of the
Treaty With Germany
Mr. Balfour said that he considered M.
Clemenceau’s proposal very worthy of consideration, but before he could
give complete assent to it, [Page 650] he
would like to observe first that it represented an abandonment of the
Treaty. Secondly, this abandonment was on a point, concerning which
English public opinion had been greatly excited at the time of the
Election. He thought that scarcely a Member had been returned who had
not addressed his constituents on this subject and promised them that
the guilty should be punished. He would therefore ask to be allowed to
consult Mr. Lloyd George before assenting to M. Clemenceau’s
proposal.
Mr. Polk said that from his point of view, the
proposal represented a change in the Treaty.
M. Tittoni Said that he quite agreed with
General Dupont’s proposal. He also concurred in the opinion that it was
not advisable to try the Kaiser.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not intend to
abandon anything. What he had proposed to do was to execute the Treaty
bit by bit. It was desirable to help the present German Government to
live on for a few months. He believed that the presentation of the full
demand would destroy it. He, himself, had a list of 1,000 names.
Doubtless his colleagues had similar lists.
Mr. Balfour said that M. Clemenceau’s plan was
doubtless excellent. It consisted not in giving up any of the culprits,
but in deferring the demand for some of them. The proposal was therefore
different from that made by General Dupont who only proposed to take a
few. He did not think, however, that it would comfort the Germans.
M. Clemenceau said that M. Haguenin had a very
long conversation with Erzberger who had assured him that this was not a
thing to be trifled with. There was no intention on the part of France
to abandon the execution of the Treaty. At first, it was suggested that
a few prominent culprits should be asked for; the rest could await their
fate for a few months.
Mr. Balfour said there were three possible
plans. One was to stick to the Treaty to the letter and ask for all the
culprits at once. The second was M. Clemenceau’s plan to ask for a few
well selected victims at once and to put off the rest. The third, to
abandon part of the Treaty entirely and only insist on the surrender of
a very few. He thought these three possible plans should be submitted to
the various Governments.
(It was decided to postpone discussion on the execution of Articles
227–230 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, pending consultation of their
respective Governments by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk on General Dupont’s
proposals.)
(M. Seydoux entered the room.)
5. M. Seydoux gave the Council an explanation
of the document annexed as Appendix “D”.
[Page 651]
Note From Supreme Economic Council on the Exchange of
Goods Between Countries of Central Europe
Mr. Balfour asked why, since the Blockade had
been raised, it had been necessary to bring this question before the
Council at all.
Mr. Seydoux said he had agreed with Mr. Balfour
that there was no particular reason for the intervention of the
Council.
(It was decided that the raising of the Blockade had rendered unnecessary
any action by the Council regarding the regulation of exchanges of goods
between the countries of Central Europe.)
6. Note From Supreme Economic Council on the Allies in
Russia
M. Seydoux read and commented [on] the report
of the Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on Russia, dated
9th July, 1919:—
“With reference to Minute 244 of the Supreme Economic Council,
the Sub-Committee on Russia presents in Russia the following
report:
- 1.
- The Committee considers that any discussion of the
ultimate economic rehabilitation of Russia is at present
purely academic.
- 2.
- The Committee considers that economic assistance
should at once be given to those areas of Russia now
under the jurisdiction of the so-called “Provisional
Government of Russia” in conformity with the terms of
the telegrams exchanged by the Council of Four and
Admiral Koltchak.1
- 3.
- This assistance should take the form of credits from
the various Allied Governments to be expended in
purchases and transportation of commodities from the
countries furnishing such credits.
- 4.
- The Nature of these credits and the commodities to be
supplied and their distribution should be determined by
a Commission organised for this purpose from the
countries supplying the credits and the goods. The
Commodities to be furnished should be of such a
character as are necessary to rehabilitate
transportation and the production of manufactures. Their
distribution should be organised in such a manner as to
reconstitute commercial life.
- 5.
- It appears to the Committee that credits to the amount
of £50,000,000 sterling would cover the amount of
commodities (exclusive of arms and munitions) that could
advantageously be supplied and used within a period of
twelve months.”
Mr. Balfour suggested that consideration of the
question be deferred until the discussion of the general policy to be
adopted regarding Russia.
(It was decided to defer consideration of the proposals of the Supreme
Economic Council regarding the economic reconstitution of Russia until
the settlement of the general policy of the Council regarding
Russia.)
(At this point M. Seydoux withdrew and members of the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council and other experts entered the room.)
[Page 652]
7. Captain Morizot-Thibault read the note of
the Inter-Allied Transportation Council contained in Appendix “E”.
Participation of the Interested Powers in the
Improvement of the Railway From Chambery to Turin
M. Tittoni said that the question was not a
military one but a financial one. The Transportation Council had, he
thought strayed beyond its province. The Supreme War Council had agreed
that the improvement of this Railway was a matter of common Allied
interest, and should be undertaken. All the Transportation Council
should have done was to allot the expenses proportionately. It had, as a
matter of fact, reached conclusions which modified the original decision
of the Supreme War Council, because it had suggested that the
participation of the Allies should be limited to meeting the excess cost
of labour and material furnished during the war. In so doing, it had
exceeded its functions. It suggested that the sharing of the cost should
cease at the end of 1918. But the work once begun had to be completed.
If all the Allies were responsible for the beginning of the work, they
must remain responsible for it up to its completion. Had the Armistice
come about immediately after the decision taken by the Supreme War
Council, he asked what Powers would have borne the cost. In his opinion
all the work carried out on this line had the same inter-allied
character. The Council, however, made a distinction between work before
January, 1919, and work subsequent to that date. The resolution adopted
by the Supreme War Council represented a binding contract. If Italy had
not been assured of help, she would not have undertaken the work. Since
December 30th, 1918, all that had been done was to complete the work
begun during the war.
M. Pichon said that as the question involved
large sums and complicated financial considerations, it should be
referred to the Financial Commission.
M. Tittoni said that in any case the original
contract could not be interfered with or altered in any way.
Mr. Polk said that apparently a commitment had
been made during the war. He knew nothing about its exact value or the
justness of either method of settlement proposed.
(It was then decided to refer to the Financial Commission for
consideration and report the Note of the Inter-Allied Transportation
Council regarding the division of the cost among the Powers of the
improvements to the Railway from Turin to Chambery.
It was also decided to communicate the record of the discussion of the
Council as well as other relevant documents to the Financial
Commission.)
8. Mr. Polk said that he had received a reply
from Washington2
[Page 653] in which Mr. Lansing stated
that it was possible that suitable tonnage might be available from the
United States’ Army by August 30th, but neither the State Department nor
the War Department had any funds of its own which could be used for the
purpose in question. It was roughly estimated that repatriation would
cost 250 to 300 dollars per man. Repatriation of
Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia
Mr. Polk enquired whether any agreement had been reached as to financing
the operation.
M. Berthelot said that France had hitherto
advanced all the money for the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia and in Siberia.
The advances amounted to one milliard a year. Great Britain had
furnished arms, munitions, and supplies as an advance. These advances
were ultimately to be shared by France, Great Britain and the United
States in equal thirds. Application for ships had been made to Japan and
the United States. The United States had not made a definite reply but
thought it might be difficult to find the ships, while Japan had found
enough for about one-third of the force. It was always understood that
the cost would be equally divided between Great Britain, France and the
United States.
Mr. Balfour asked whether it had never been
thought that the Czecho-Slovak State should pay.
M. Berthelot replied that it was a matter of
course that the Czecho-Slovak would re-pay the whole cost.
Mr. Polk asked if a statement might be prepared
for him regarding the agreements made.
(It was agreed that M. Berthelot should furnish Mr. Polk with a statement
of the agreements reached regarding the payment of the expenses for
maintenance, transportation and repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops
in Russia and Siberia.)
9. Mr. Polk drew attention to the decision of
the Council taken on August 6th adopting three proposals by General
Groves (See H. D. 25, Minute 143). He thought that the first and third Proposals To
of these proposals exceeded the terms of the Treaty and that the Germans
might be justified in refusing to comply with them. He thought it was
very necessary to examine the question at once as it was clearly
undesirable to exceed the Treaty rights of the Council. Proposals To Prevent the Germans From Disposing of
Aeronautical Material
(It was decided to ask the Air Commission to re-examine at once the
Resolution taken on August 6th regarding the sale of aeronautical
material by Germany, with a view to establishing whether the action
decided on goes beyond the terms of the Treaty of Peace.)
[Page 654]
(It was further decided to suspend all action on this Resolution pending
receipt of the report.)
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 11 August, 1919.
Appendix “A” to HD–28
Budapest, Aug. 7, 1919—12:35
p.m.
[Telegrams on the Situation in
Hungary]
(i)
Hoover, Paris.
For Atwood.4
Following letter addressed General Holban Commanding the Roumanian
forces occupying the city of Budapest. It has been brought to my
attention by the Hungarian Government that traffic of every
character has been absolutely suspended on all the railroad lines
entering the city of Budapest and that on several of the lines the
rails have been broken. This condition of affairs was stated to you
this morning by me in a personal interview. I now make formal
written confirmation of this interview and in my capacity as
President of the Allied Railway Mission under the direction of the
Supreme War Council in Paris urge that the repairs to all the
railroads be immediately effected and that traffic be immediately
resumed on all the railroad lines entering the city of Budapest at
least that the transportation of food supplies from the adjacent
territory be allowed to move freely to the city. The suspension of
railroad transportation has created additional hardship not only by
stopping the incoming carloads of foodstuffs but by preventing the
citizens of Budapest from travelling to the nearby country for the
purchase of individual supplies. Acting in accordance with
instructions from the Director General of Allied Relief for Europe
Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, I came to Budapest as soon as advice was
received of the downfall of the communistic government. It is my
province the representative for Relief Transportation of the Supreme
War Council to take charge of the transportation lines of the old
Austro-Hungarian Empire so far as the movement of Relief supplies is
concerned. The co-operation of the Roumanian military command is
absolutely essential to the successful prosecution of my mission and
I would be very much pleased if you would evidence your co-operation
by immediately repairing the railroads and making them fit for
normal traffic and by [Page 655]
ordering the immediate resumption of Relief traffic of every
description on the railroads in the territory you have entered with
your forces. Will you kindly acknowledge receipt of this
communication and advise if you will comply with my requests and
indicate time when traffic will be resumed. A copy of this letter
has been forwarded to the Supreme War Council at Paris through Mr.
Herbert C. Hoover Director General of Relief for Europe.
W. B. Causey
Lieut Col. Engineers, USA President, Allied
Railway Mission
Budapest, August 8, 1919—9:00
p.m.
(Received Aug. 8, 1919.)
(ii)
Hoover and Atwood, Paris.
This is the 5th day since the Roumanian forces entered Budapest and
all transportation lines are still out of service including the
Danube river, although the Roumanians promise that they will open
the transportation lines.
The Roumanians continue their advance beyond Budapest. Vast
quantities of agricultural machinery of all kinds have been
collected for shipment to Roumania. They also continue to confiscate
great quantities of live stock. As stated in previous communications
the Roumanian Army is practically living on the occupied territory.
This will mean ultimate starvation for the Hungarians unless aid is
given by the Allied Powers. Military occupation of Hungary by the
Roumanians badly hampers their present re-organisation of new
Hungarian Government and the functions of the civil are almost
entirely interrupted. The Hungarian Government has no organised
forces at its disposal to keep order. The only organised force
consists of about six hundred of the old Gendarmerie in Budapest. Up to this time the Roumanians
have allowed only six hundred of the Gendarmes to carry arms. It is
absolutely essential if the Government is to function, armed forces
must be organised in sufficient numbers to preserve order in the
country outside of Budapest as well as in Budapest. At the present
time the Roumanians have cut off all means of communication between
the central government and outlying districts and even telephone
communication has been impossible between the central government
offices and other points in the city. There have been many reports
of attacks on Jews and others by the so-called white guards with the
tacit support of the [Page 656]
Roumanian soldiers, but as a matter of fact there has been very
little blood-shed.
In company with Captain Leath, who is to have charge of feeding of
the children in Budapest, I called on General Holban, commanding
officer of the Roumanians this afternoon and arranged to bring 240
tons of food in from Vienna. General Holban stated that if advised
about what time the train would arrive he would restore the tracks
for passage of same to Budapest. The food situation in Budapest is
worse than it has been any time since the war commenced in 1914. It
is worse here now than it was in Vienna in January. With their full
knowledge of food situation in Budapest, it would seem that the
Roumanians are trying to starve out the population by cutting the
city off entirely from all supplies from the surrounding country.
The carrying off of farm animals, farm machinery and food supplies
of every character would seem evidence the Roumanians have the same
intentions towards the country in general as towards Budapest.
General Gorton, Col. Romanelli and myself have been holding sessions
daily and nightly and have made vigorous protests to the Roumanian
Commander about cutting the city off from supplies and about various
other outrages that have been committed and have endeavoured to
represent what we believe to be the attitude of at least three of
the allied powers; there is no French representative here. It is my
belief that if permitted to properly function, the new government
would soon complete its organisation along the lines laid down from
Paris and demonstrate a firm hold of the situation.
Unless the food blockade is raised at once supplies brought into this
city, hunger and privation may produce great excesses. I would urge
in the name of humanity that the representative powers in Paris take
such steps as will ensure an immediate raising of the blockade
placed by the Roumanians and that the blockade so far as the food is
concerned be raised in every other direction.
W. B. Causey
Lt. Col. Engrs.
USA Pr. Inter-allied Ry.
Miss.
Budapest, Aug. 8, 19—2:22
p.m.
(Received August 8, 1919.)
(iii)
To Col. Twiss, British Mission, Hotel Astoria,
Paris.
Can you tell me whether it is the intention of Entente to cause
withdrawal of Roumanian army from Budapest and if so how far. [Page 657] Impossible for new
Government to function if they are allowed no troops or police to
keep order and food supply is hampered by destruction or military
control of railways and by removal of food and animals for army of
occupation. Roumanian army is carrying off large quantities of
agricultural machinery and other property not necessary for military
purposes and referred to in Reparation and economic clauses of
treaties. I have had no reply of any sort from Hotel Astoria to my
telegrams.
Budapest, August 8, 1919—5
p.m.
(iv)
[Translation]5
Telegram transmitted by
the American Telegraphic
Service
Mr. Clemenceau
President of the Peace Conference, Paris.
In conformity with the public opinion of the country, the provisional
government, recruited partly from the previous government of Kun,
was asked to resign; whereupon, the government yesterday handed in
its resignation and a new provisional government has been formed. In
my capacity as Governor, and by request of the new provisional
government, I have taken the power into my hands. I have named and
instructed the government. It is with great enthusiasm that the
population of the capital of Budapest has witnessed the downfall of
the Bolshevist regime of terror, and my conviction is that the
people of the whole country will regard it in the same way. Our most
urgent task at the moment is to make ready for and to convoke the
National Assembly as soon as possible in order that upon a
constitutional basis it may then make a definitive decision on the
form of the state. Until that time our program is the complete
crushing of Bolshevism which was transplanted into the country by
means of the terror, the execution of the terms of the armistice,
the restoration of order in the deranged affairs of state, the
guaranteeing of productive labor, the preparation of data for the
discussion of peace; and to that end we shall strive for closer
relations with the Allied and Associated Governments.
We request your friendly support and, in the interest of the success
of our efforts, the recognition of our government.
- The Archduke Joseph
- Marshal
[Page 658]
Budapest, Aug. 9, 1919—6
p.m.
(Received August 10, 1919.)
(v)
Hon. A. J.
Balfour.
Astoria, Paris.
G. 7. Ninth dispositions of Roumanian Army of Transylvania on 8th
August as follows. Army Hq. Törökszentmiklós. General Holban’s group
Hq. Budapest includes 1st and 2nd Chasseur divisions with one
regiment of Chasseur de Montague and armoured cars at Budapest, 7th
Division at Hatvan, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions at Gyöngyös with
detachments along Czecho-Slovak frontier. General Mosious group Hq.
Czegléd includes 1st and 6th divisions at Kecsekemét and one brigade
dismounted of 1st Cavalry at Nagy Körös. Other troops are 2nd
division at Jaszo Ladany 16th Division at Kiskörös 18th Division at
Mezötur 21st Division at Gyoma 20th Division at Debreczen. According
to General Holban all that is left of Red Hungarian Army are bands
of disorganised troops in area Kisber, Mór, Plattenzee. I shall
obtain further information from Hungarian War Minister. The
relations between Roumanians and Hungarians are greatly improved in
consequence of following measures taken by General Holban. Firstly
establishment of bureau where representations of government and
Roumanian army work together and are in close liaison, secondly,
employment of Hungarian police working in pairs with Roumanian
soldiers. Movement in Budapest is unrestricted except to leave city
for west when pass is required. General Holban has given Commander
Freeman full hand in working Danube Commission except for
examination of persons wishing to cross from left to right bank of
river.
Appendix B to HD–28
[The Czecho-Slovak
Plenipotentiary (Benes) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
[Translation]6
Mr. President: I have just received a copy
of the despatch which the Conference was pleased to send to the
Roumanian Government [Page 659] on
the subject of the occupation of Hungary by Roumanian forces. Having
received some alarming reports from Prague, and having seen the
despatch of the Conference addressed to the Government at Bucharest,
I take the liberty to draw the attention of the Conference to the
following facts:
During the invasion by the Magyar Red Army into the territory of
Slovakia, it devastated the country, pillaged the villages, and
carried away either their means of conveyance, or their live-stock,
or finally the considerable stocks of provisions of all kinds.
The Peace Conference, in a note addressed to Bela Kun, recognized the
right of the Czecho-Slovak Government to reparations for these
injuries, and declared that the Magyars will be held
responsible.
The Czecho-Slovak Government has several times indicated to the
Conference its intention to participate in a military intervention
in Hungary. I have addressed several letters to the Conference
setting forth the Czecho-Slovak point of view, while constantly
emphasizing, however, that although desiring intervention in
Hungary, I refuse to undertake it without the approval, or at least
without the permission of the Conference. In the outcome, and after
having respected the decisions of the Conference, the Czecho-Slovak
Government finds itself in a very difficult position, for at Prague
there are apprehensions that the present events in Hungary are of a
kind to deprive us of every compensation due us.
I take the liberty of stating further, Mr. President, that decisions
were taken some time ago by the Conference on the subject of the
distribution of the rolling-stock of former Austria-Hungary whenever
the liquidation of that equipment is made by the competent
commission. Even in this question our interests might be injured by
the present events. Inasmuch as by my very explicit personal
interventions at Prague, the Czecho-Slovak Government has been
careful to stand upon the strict ground of law in regard to the
decisions of the Conference, I take the liberty of calling the
attention of the Supreme Council to this fact, while expressing our
reservations on the subject of what is now taking place in Hungary,
and of whatever touches the question of our reparations.
In the name of our Government, I take the liberty of expressing our
firm hope that the fact of having followed the decisions of the
Conference will not be injurious to our interests, whether material
or moral.
Accept [etc.]
[Page 660]
Annex C to HD–28
french military mission at
berlin
Note for Marshal Foch on the Subject
of the Surrender of Criminals to the Entente (Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty)
My opinion is that the Erzberger argument is well founded.
The surrender of the criminals will bring on the governmental crisis
which he predicts. At first, disturbances; then a Haase government
with members from among the most communistic of the independents;
revolt by the great majority of the troops; then communism, if not
anarchy.
If we do not wish for disorder, it is necessary to compromise.
What is culpable is the German doctrine of war: The more ferocious a
war, the shorter it will be. Whence comes this sophism that the
maximum humanity resides in the maximum cruelty.
The suffering will be terrible, but being brief and localized, the
sum of the misfortunes will be less in a short war of that kind than
in a very long war carried on more mildly.
Experience has disposed of this barbarous theory.
The responsible persons are its promoters. Although as a matter of
fact, it is the whole German people which accepted with enthusiasm
this thesis suited to its mentality.
If one wishes to fix the responsibility, it is the Emperor who ought
to be punished. Given the German autocratic system, it is the
Emperor alone who necessarily occupies the chief place in the sphere
of military affairs. The generals are only his agents. Moltke,
Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, and Ludendorf are lost in him.
Let us place ourselves, as far as possible, in the German mentality
in order to pass judgment, or rather it is this mentality which we
intend to chastise. Let us smite it at the top.
I say, the Emperor alone. If it be insisted upon, let us add Tirpitz.
No doubt he simply carried the military principles over into
maritime warfare. But it was an innovation, introduced on his
initiative. He has, in strictness, a personal and direct
responsibility.
Let us add besides: the commanders of submarines who torpedoed
hospital ships; the commandants of prison camps conspicuous for
excessive severity; the commandants of halting places who were
personally guilty of murders and of thefts; the judges of Miss
Cavell and of Captain Fryatt.
[Page 661]
Since they have not found judges at home, let us exact their
surrender.
The Emperor, then, and perhaps Tirpitz and some subordinates who
carried out directly decisions taken upon their own
responsibility.
That is the most that we could get from a government. Further, it is
necessary to exercise great care lest the Emperor return to Germany.
Our right to exact his surrender would remain the same, but
difficulties in exercising it would present themselves as in the
case of the generals.
The argument that the Government is failing to keep its word in not
carrying out a surrender provided for in the treaty which it has
signed has no force.
It does not, in fact, say: “I refuse.” It says to you: “I cannot”, “I
shall vanish, whether of my own accord or carried away by
revolution, and you will not find a regular government which could
give you satisfaction.” At best it will say, “I have promised, I
shall try to fulfill, but without hope.”
Whatever is decided, it is important to specify what will be
exacted.
Rumors, spread in Berlin by the Americans, have spoken of 3,500
names, among which are all the generals of repute. Everyone feels
threatened. Because of human cowardice, as soon as any conjectures
are given out the movement of resistance will be confined to the
circle of friends of the appointed victims, the less numerous
according as the victims are less highly placed.
The Emperor is absent. The protests will be theoretical. The
Government will declare itself powerless. The resistance cannot
consolidate itself at any particular point.
Tirpitz is a sailor. He is, moreover, the man against whom the people
bear the greatest grudge for having got them implicated, and
especially for not having succeeded. They will be seen giving him up
like a scape goat, without very much effective resistance. The
others are small fry.
Let this list be published. Perhaps it would be possible not to fix
the date of surrender, or to put it off until a little later, if
there is any wish to weigh the effect produced, to witness the
outbreak of protest, its culmination and extinction, while leaving
the possibility of fresh negotiations.
For it goes without saying that our lenity will call for
compensations: complete reparations for offenses committed against
us; facilities for our commissions of control, to whom the slightest
resistance would be punished by the order for surrender of all or
part of the hostages on the list; execution, with good grace, of the
Polish territorial clauses.
This list will be the scarecrow which will take the place of the
Marshal’s sword put back into its scabbard at the peace.
[Page 662]
Appendix D to HD–28
supreme economic
council
Extract From the Minutes of the
Session of July 17, 1919
Exchange of Goods Between the
Countries of Central Europe
The Council notes a telegram from the Allied Missions of Railways and
of Supply at Warsaw, dated July 13 (doc. 248) on the subject of
reestablishing and regulating the exchange of goods, such as
potatoes and coal, between Poland on one side and Germany, German
Austria, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other.
It has been decided:
- (a)
- To submit for the approval of the Supreme Council the
proposals made by the Allied Missions of Railways and of
Supply.
- (b)
- To leave full liberty to the Italian Government to name,
if it so desires, a representative on the committees which
will be formed at points of transit with the object of
supervising the execution of the regulations governing
traffic.
Appendix E to HD–28
M–451
inter-allied transportation
council
Note Relating to the Works for
Improving the Chambery-Turin Line
By the Collective Notes No. 19 of 15th March 1918 and No. 22 of 18th
April 1918, the Supreme War Council requested the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council to study the question of transportation
between France and Italy and vice versa, and the means to increase
the capacity for strategic movements between the two countries. The
Inter-Allied Transportation Council decided that the number of
trains moved via Modane was limited on the one hand by the
congestion in the station of Modane and on the other hand by the
insufficient working of the section Modane-Bussoleno, and suggested
that an Inter-Allied Commission should be sent to study on the spot
the methods to remedy quickly these defects and to increase the
capacity of the line.
[Page 663]
On the 28th June 1918 the report of the Sub-Committee, adopted by the
Inter-Allied Transportation Council, was submitted for the approval
of the Supreme War Council.
This report recommended the necessity of carrying out with as little
delay as possible certain works both on the French and Italian
sections of the line.
The enlarging of the Station of Modane and of the stations of
Salbertrand and Bussoleno; the extension of the triage [sic] at St. Jean du Maurienne and
supplementary installations for traction purposes; the doubling of
the overhead electric cable from Modane to Bussoleno; doubling of
the line Bussoleno to Ponte Dora and from Salbertrand to Pont de la
Dora. Installation of new block-posts on the whole length of the
line, etc.
By collective note No 33 of the 5th July 19189 the Military
Representatives of the Supreme War Council adopted the decisions of
the Inter-Allied Transportation Council and declared that:—
“Given the great and ever increasing strategic importance of
the Modane line and the necessity of increasing its carrying
capacity as a counter-balance to the greater facilities of
transport between the fronts, which the enemy possesses
to-day, it is urgent that all the measures proposed by the
Inter-Allied Transportation Council be approved, put into
execution and completed with the least possible delay.
“For reasons indicated in the report of the said Council and
the explanatory memorandum annexed, the work in question
should be of a frankly inter-allied character, and should
therefore be carried out by the joint contribution of means
and labour by all the Allies acting as one.
“The proportion of this contribution as regards both means
and labour should be studied by the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council in consultation with the competent
authorities (and subject to the recommendations of the
Permanent Military Representatives) should be given final
endorsement by the Governments concerned.”
After studying the question, the Representatives of the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council agreed upon the subject of the provision of
labour and the contribution of the Allied Nations in the supply of
raw and manufactured material. The work was undertaken and was
carried on until the intense cold of the season caused the work to
be suspended.
In view of the extreme urgency of the works of improvement on the
Modane line, as recognised by the Supreme War Council, the question
of the allocation of the expense involved had not been agreed upon
before the works were actually commenced, especially [Page 664] the material supplied to Italy which
was furnished without prejudice to the financial adjustment.
The settlement of the principle of Allied participation in the
expenses for these works (participation of which the principle had
been specially mentioned by the Supreme War Council in Note 33,
para. 2) which had been placed before the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council had been postponed until the French and
Italian Representatives were in a position to furnish an exact
statement of expenses incurred for the carrying out of these works
on the French and Italian sections of the line.
The French and Italian Representatives presented their accounts to
the Inter-Allied Transportation Council on 27th June, 1919, and the
following points were discussed:
- 1.
- Would the Allies agree to participate in the expenses of
the total programme of works on the Chambery-Turin line,
without limitation as to date?
- 2.
- If the answer to the above question were in the negative
would the Allies agree to participate in the cost of the
works carried out up to a date to be agreed upon, say, June
30th, 1919, or December 31st, 1918, for example?
- 3.
- Being given that the works carried out comprised a certain
economic value, should the participation of the Allies be in
the total expenses or in the supplementary expenses
resulting from the works having been carried out during war
time (Difference in the prices of 1913 and 1918)?
- 4.
- In what proportion should the participation of each Ally
in the expenses be fixed?
Following this discussion the Inter-Allied Transportation Council,
not having been able to arrive at a decision on the common ground,
decided to forward the following resolution to the Supreme War
Council:
“Collective Note No. 33 of the Permanent Military
Representatives on the Supreme War Council in respect of the
improvements on the Chambery-Turin line, stated:
‘For reasons indicated in the report of the said
Council and the explanatory memorandum annexed, the
work in question should be of a frankly Inter-Allied
character and should therefore be carried out by the
joint contribution of means and labour by all the
Allies acting as one.’
“By reason of the permanent value of the improvements of this
line from an economic point of view, the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council is of opinion that the inter-allied
financial assistance should only be applied on the one hand
to the difference between the cost of these works in war
conditions and the cost of such works in the prewar period,
and on the other hand to such works executed until the 1st
January, 1919. Subsequent to that date the French and
Italian [Page 665]
Governments would bear the entire cost of the works which in
their judgment it would be policy to continue.
“By the ordering of the immediate execution of these works in
a period during which the cost of labour and raw materials
had reached a very high figure, supplementary expenditure
was in consequence imposed upon the French and Italian
Services, and the Inter-Allied Transportation Council
proposes that such expenditure should be distributed as
follows:—
- One-fourth to the American Army
- One-fourth to the British Army
the remaining half to be divided between
France and Italy in proportion to the works actually
undertaken by each of the two Nations.
“The cost of the material supplied to Italy by the United
States of America, Great Britain and France shall be
deducted from the expenses borne by each of these
Powers.
“The Inter-Allied Transportation Council makes a reservation
in respect of the acceptance of the figures submitted by the
Italian and French Railway Construction Services until they
have been submitted to the experts of the four Allied
Governments.”
G. Mayer
,
Lt.-Col.
British
Representative
General
McCoy
American
Representative
General Levi, as Italian Representative, cannot accept the above
proposal. He wishes to stand by the literal interpretation and
spirit of the Collective Note No. 33 and the explanatory
memorandum annexed, which it is desirable should bear the
interpretation that all the Allies shall participate in the
total expenditure which has been necessary for the works on the
Modane line up to date.
These works were in effect only undertaken on the understanding
that this assistance would be guaranteed. General Levi asks in
consequence that the question be decided by the Supreme War
Council.
Levi, General Italian Representative
The French Representative considers that the participation of
Great Britain and America as embodied in the above resolution
constitutes the minimum. If the Supreme War Council decides that
the two Allied Nations should participate in a higher
proportion, he asks that France should receive an equally
favourable treatment as Italy.
Le Henaff, Colonel French Representative
[Page 666]
Approximate Valuation of
Expenses
|
|
Cost in 1915 |
Cost in 1918 |
Difference |
| Expenses of work completed up to 1st Jany
1919. |
Work carried out by French on French section. |
696,000 frcs. |
1,766,000 frcs. |
1,070,000 frcs. |
| Work of electrification of line at Modane carried out
by Italian Authorities. Amount to be paid by France to
Italy. |
755,000 lire |
2,487,000 lire |
1,732,000 lire |
| Work carried out by Italian Authorities on Italian
Section. |
2,880,406 lire |
9,306,946 lire |
6,516,540 lire |
| Expenses of work completed on 1st July,
1919. |
Work carried out by French on French Section. |
696,000 frcs. |
1,766,000 frcs. |
1,070,000 frcs. |
| Work of electrification of line at Modane carried out
by Italian Authorities. Amount to be paid by France to
Italy. |
815,000 lire |
2,649,500 lire |
1,834,500 lire |
| Work carried out by Italian Authorities on Italian
Section. |
3,680,000 lire |
11,530,500 lire |
7,850,500 lire |
| Expenses for completion of whole programme of
work. |
Work on French Section. |
752,000 frcs. |
1,965,000 frcs. |
1,213,000 frcs. |
| Work of electrification of line at Modane. Amount to
be paid by France to Italy. |
1,209,000 lire |
3,814,000 lire |
2,605,000 lire |
| Work on the Italian Section. |
4,335,000 lire |
13,534,000 lire |
9,199,000 lire |
Versailles, July 5, 1918.
supreme war council
the military
representatives
Collective Note No. 33
Works To Be Carried Out and
Measures of Urgency To Be Taken To Increase the Capacity of the
Modane Line in Relation to Strategic Necessities
The Permanent Military Representatives of the Supreme War
Council.
[Page 667]
Referring to:
- Their collective note No. 19, of March 15, 1918,
- Their collective note No. 22, of April 18, 1918.
And after examination
Of the report by the Interallied Transportation Committee concerning
the works to be carried out and the measures to be taken on the
Modane line to increase its capacity;
Of the explanatory memorandum annexed to the same report;11
Consider that:
In view of the constantly growing importance of the Modane line in
relation to strategy > and considering the necessity of
increasing the ease and rapidity of transporting troops from one
front to the other, in order to redress the balance, now in favor of
the enemy, all the works and all the measures proposed by the
Interallied Transportation Committee should be approved and put into
execution immediately.
By reason of the considerations contained in the report by the
Committee named above and in the attached explanatory memorandum,
the works in question ought to have a clearly interallied character,
and their execution ought, therefore, to be guaranteed with the
assistance of all the Allies without distinction.
The proportion in which this assistance will be lent should be the
object of study by the Interallied Transportation Committee,
together with the various interested authorities, and then receive
final ratification by the Allied Governments upon advice of the
Permanent Military Representatives.
All steps relating to this matter should be taken with the greatest
dispatch; likewise, it would be very desirable to have this note
approved as soon as possible by the Allied Governments.
Military Representative of the French Section
of the C. S. G.
Belin
Military
Representative of the Italian Section of the C. S.
G.
Robinant
Military
Representative of the British Section of the C. S.
G.
Sackville-West
Military
Representative of the American Section of the C. S.
G.
Tasker
Buss
[Page 668]
Versailles, July 5, 1918.
Explanatory Memorandum
(Annexed to the Report of the Inter-Allied
Transportation Council)
The problem of increasing the means of transport between France and
Italy has already been the subject of study by the Permanent
Military Representatives, and the various measures which have been
recognized as necessary to attain that end, are already, in great
part, being carried out.
The complete realization of these measures will of itself constitute
a very important achievement, since it will enable the capacity of
strategic transport between France and Italy to be almost doubled in
case of need and during a limited period.
Nevertheless, the problem cannot yet be considered as completely
solved.
Studies recently completed by the Interallied Transportation Council
have demonstrated that the Central Empires are in a position to
carry out, with an ease and speed far greater than that of the
Allies, important movements of troops from one end to the other of
the western front. With the object of remedying as far as possible
this strategic inferiority, the Interallied Transportation
Committee, after studying afresh the question of the capacity of the
Modane line has recognized the possibility of increasing that
capacity still further.
This question being at present of the highest importance, it is
necessary that it be examined and decided with the least delay.
The present capacity of the Modane line is about 20 trains a day both
ways, and it should be remembered that in going from Italy to France
the trains are necessarily limited in their tonnage (about half that
of an ordinary military train) because of difficulties in traction
which have existed up until now.
Among the causes which limit the capacity of the Modane line, the
following should be borne in mind:
- (1)
- The excessive length of halts by trains in the station at
Modane in consequence of the inspection of carriages,
switching, and customs operations.
- (2)
- The length of certain block signal sections which does not
permit a greater number of trains to be moved along the most
difficult sections of the line.
- (3)
- The insufficient number and length of sidings in several
stations on the line.
- (4)
- The number and type of electric locomotives at present
available.
- (5)
- The total supply of electrical energy now
available.
- (6)
- The necessity of using a third locomotive from Modane to
Km. 6.5 and the consequent limitation on speed over that
stretch.
The recent studies (Annexes to the present memorandum)13 which
have been conducted by the Interallied Transportation Committee,
with the assistance of the Franco-Italian military, railway, and
customs authorities, have shown the possibility of increasing the
capacity of the line at first up to 36 complete trains a day, and
later up to 42 trains, by adopting the following measures:
- (1)
- The regular use of two locomotives on all trains without
distinction, to avoid cutting the trains in half.
- (2)
- Increase in the number of locomotives available on the
electrified section, and adoption of measures for their
normal use in double draft.
- (3)
- Urgent works to permit the movement of a larger number of
trains on the single track section by reducing the length of
certain signal block sections.
- (4)
- Necessary works to increase the capacity of the
installations in several stations, among others Bussoleno,
Salbertrand, and first of all Modane.
- (5)
- Measures designed to reduce the length of halts at Modane
for the inspection of carriages and the operations of the
customs.
- (6)
- Agreements to be taken for making up trains adapted to the
new requirements of double-traction.
- (7)
- The setting up of a single body of control and direction
for the line from Turin to Chambery by means of
representatives of the two interested railway
administrations.
Once the opportunity is recognized of enlarging the capacity of the
Modane line by the foregoing means, it should be noted that France
as well as Italy will be unable in the present situation to divert
the necessary labor and materials for completing the works.
It will be necessary therefore that a clearly interallied character
and interest in these works be recognized and that they be
undertaken with the most liberal assistance of all the Allies. It is
necessary therefore that all these works be approved and carried out
within the briefest time, with the cooperation of all the Allies,
with priority over all other works in order to attain the proposed
object.
