Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/23
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 4, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.
- America, United States of
- Hon. F. L. Polk.
- M. L. Harrison.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir Ian Malcolm.
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin.
- M. Tittoni.
- M. Paterno.
- M. Matsui.
- M. Kawai.
- America, United States of
|America, United States of||Capt. P. Chapin.|
|British Empire.||Capt. E. Abraham.|
|France||Capt. A. Portier.|
|Italy||Lt. Col. A. Jones.|
|Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.|
1. (Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)
Situation in Hungary Mr. Hoover said that the situation had changed since since he last attended the Council. The Roumanians were now entering Budapest. What he proposed was a relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of foodstuffs to Hungary from the Banat. He thought action should be taken without delay. The new Government though very radical, represented the Trade Unions. He thought Trade Unionism was an instrument that should be used to upset Bolshevism. If this were a correct estimate the present Hungarian Government should be encouraged, as a very important reaction, even on Russia, might result. A member of the Food Administration in Vienna held the opinion that the new Government might take in a certain number of peasants. This might lead to a really representative Government.
Mr. Hoover said he had read the telegram. The only thing that it did not mention was relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of food from the Banat. He thought these measures represented the practical application of the policy outlined in the telegram, and that instructions to that effect should be given at once. As long as the Council was able to threaten a reimposition of the Blockade, it would be able to control the situation. A week or two of relaxation would not give the Hungarian Government such economic strength as to make it independent. If the Government by then had not shown itself satisfactory by fulfilling all the conditions of the Armistice, by demobilizing and by doing what the Council wished, the Blockade could be reimposed. If, on the other hand, action were not taken at once the opportunity would be lost.
Mr. Balfour said he thought that the Council should both re-open the Danube and declare that it would close it again if it so wished.
Marshal Foch said that he had no objection to raise.
M. Tittoni agreed but he thought that it should be made clear that the Hungarians must conform to the Armistice.
M. Clemenceau suggested that Mr. Hoover should furnish a draft.
Mr. Hoover then suggested a draft, which after some amendments suggested by M. Tittoni, was adopted in the following form:—
“It is agreed that instructions should be sent to the representatives of the various Allied Governments at Vienna and to the Blockade Commission in that area and to the Danube River Commission and to General Franchet d’Esperey that the Blockade on Hungary shall be lifted at once and that the Danube shall be opened and shall remain opened so long as the present Hungarian Government gives practical evidence of its intention to comply promptly with the conditions of the Armistice.”
Mr. Hoover continuing said that there was a surplus of food in the Banat. The Council had tried to supply Vienna from this surplus. The Serbians, however, had stopped the exit of the supplies. The Banat was now the only source from which Budapest could be fed. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised was that German agents were offering bigger prices for the food than could be afforded by the Allies. The result of all this was that the relief of Vienna and Budapest was jeopardised. He asked whether the Council would be ready to address a request to the Government of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes not to hamper the export of food stuffs from the Banat.
Mr. Balfour said that Mr. Hoover put the blame in one sentence on the Serbian Government for the stoppage of relief from the Banat, [Page 506]and in another said that the reason was that German Agents outbid everyone else. If the latter were the case, he could not understand why the Serbian Government was to blame. No Government could make a merchant sell cheap if he could sell dear.
Mr. Hoover said that the explanation was a very long story. The Economic Council had negotiated the cession of an iron bridge to the Serbians in exchange for food stuffs. The Serbian Government had put an embargo on all food exports from the Banat. By means of this, the Serbian Government entirely controlled the direction taken by food exports. The intervention of the Germans had only complicated the question. The main element, however, remained the control of the Serbian Government. There were in the Banat 500,000 or 600,000 tons of food; the only source of supply from which Vienna and Budapest could be fed. He had prepared a draft to be addressed to the Serbian Government which might perhaps be too strong, but which might form the basis of the re-draft. He then read the following draft:—
“The Council is informed by the Supreme Economic Council and by its various Allied representatives that there is a very considerable surplus of foodstuffs now lying in the Banat and surrounding counties and that with the impending favourable harvest in Greater Serbia there is now no reason for the reservation of these supplies from general distribution through Central Europe. The continuation of provisioning of Vienna is absolutely dependent upon the free shipment of these supplies to that city and the recent over-turn of Government in Budapest makes it of prime interest to the Allies and to all hope of stability in Central Europe that the City of Budapest should be given every facility for the purchase and export of foodstuffs from these counties.
Therefore, the Council wishes to urge upon the Serbian Government in the strongest terms that not only will the greatest contribution be made by Serbia towards the re-establishment of order and stability in the countries adjacent to her borders, but that the dictates of humanity demand that no obstruction of any character shall be placed in the way of food exports from the Banat to the surrounding counties and that, in fact, the Serbian Government is requested to join with the Allies and through their various agencies in promoting the export and distribution of these supplies. The Council hopes for an early and favourable reply to this representation, the importance of which it cannot over-emphasize, and it trusts that the Serbian Government will realise that unless the Allies can receive co-operation in the labors they have undertaken for the restoration of stability in Central Europe that it is impossible that the Allied Governments should continue the economic support which they have given and expect to continue giving to the Greater Serbian Government.”
M. Clemenceau said that before pursuing this question any further, he wished to inform his colleagues of two communications he had received—the first from Lt. Col. Romanelli (Appendix “A”) and the second from the new Hungarian Government (Appendix “B”).[Page 507]
Under these conditions, M. Clemenceau said that he approved Mr. Hoover’s policy.
M. Pichon said that he thought it was overstepping the mark to threaten Serbia. The measures taken by the Serbian Government had been in accordance with the views of the Council at the time. The Government had acted in good faith. The Serbs were now to be asked to adopt another policy. This was not a sufficient reason for addressing any threats to them.
Mr. Hoover said that he did not agree that the Serbian Government had acted in good faith. In respect of Vienna, the Serbian Government had refused to supply certain goods which had already been paid for. He agreed, however, that it might be as well npt to threaten the Serbians.
M. Clemenceau suggested that a re-draft of Mr. Hoover’s proposal should be made. He asked M. Berthelot to make a draft.
Mr. Polk said that the latest news received was to the effect that the Roumanian advance guard had reached Budapest and that the Trade Union Government feared an occupation of the City by the Roumanians and a further invasion by the Czecho-Slovaks. These fears would doubtless rouse nationalist feelings. At two o’clock the news was that 600 Roumanian cavalrymen were to the west of Budapest, where they had cut all communications with Vienna. Looting was said to have begun in the suburbs. To avoid worse trouble the Hungarians suggested that an inter-allied police force should be sent immediately to Budapest.
Mr. Balfour asked what the Council could do to enforce good behaviour on the Romanians.
Marshal Foch said that he did not know.
M. Tittoni said that the Roumanians had been invited to go to Budapest together with the Serbs and the Czecho-Slovaks. All they had done was to go there by themselves.
M. Clemenceau said that as the Council could neither blame the Roumanians nor praise them, it was perhaps best to say nothing.
M. Tittoni said that he advocated sending an Allied Mission.
Mr. Polk said that he agreed to this. He also thought it was essential that the Roumanians should withdraw from Budapest.
Mr. Balfour said that if the Roumanians insisted on going forward and occupying Budapest the result would be the fall of the present Government in Hungary and an outbreak of nationalist feeling. He could not see what the Roumanians could gain either for themselves or for the common cause by persisting in their present course. Their only excuse previously for not withdrawing was that they feared an attack by the Hungarians, this they had no reason to fear now. The Hungarians had said that they would observe the Armistice; the Council was therefore bound to give them an opportunity of proving [Page 508]that they meant what they said. It was not giving them a fair chance to send Roumanians to plunder the suburbs of Budapest.
Marshal Foch said that an inter-Allied character could be given to the occupation of Budapest either by sending allied regiments as suggested by the Hungarian Government, or by sending Missions of Allied Officers. The former, under the circumstances, it was not easy to realize. On the other hand it was possible that the Roumanian Government might wish to settle the whole situation by itself.
M. Clemenceau said that the Roumanian Government would then be solving the Council’s problems; if so the Council would settle theirs without them.
Mr. Polk said that the Roumanians had not shown all the respect for the Conference that was desirable. They were not likely to treat the Hungarians in accordance with the laws of war. If the Council allowed Budapest to be looted, the effect on Russia would be instantaneous. The whole effect of the overthrow of Bela Kun would be lost. Any Occupation of the city was dangerous. He asked whether the Roumanians could not be required to remain outside.
Mr. Balfour asked whether the Roumanian army was not under the command of General Franchet d’Esperey.
Marshal Foch said that it was not.
M. Pichon said that he had sent a telegram on the previous night to the French Minister at Bukarest, requesting him to ask the Roumanian Government to stop the advance of Roumanian troops immediately on the positions then occupied. He had further asked the French Minister to inform him of the result of his démarche.
Marshal Foch said that the first thing that must be done was to disarm Hungary. The only guarantee of disarmament was the occupation of the country. This occupation must be effected with the available troops.
M. Clemenceau asked whose the available troops were.
Marshal Foch replied that they were Roumanian or Czech troops.
M. Tittoni said that the worst possible results would be obtained by sending Czech troops into Hungary. The Hungarians detested the Czechs even more than the Roumanians. He thought an Allied Mission, if sent at once, could judge on the spot what measures should be taken and would be able to exercise sufficient moral influence to have them carried out.
Mr. Polk said that the occupation of Budapest would make it impossible for the Hungarians to surrender their arms. National feeling would prohibit this unless the Hungarians could rely on Allied protection. An Allied Officer (not American) had heard a Roumanian General say that he expected to plunder Budapest. If this were to happen the Allies would be responsible should they take no steps to protest against the entry of the Roumanians.[Page 509]
Marshal Foch said that he would agree to M. Tittoni’s suggestion that a Mission composed of Allied Generals with an escort of one company from each Power should be sent to Budapest. This Mission could take charge of affairs and reduce the Roumanian occupation to the strict minimum necessary. The President of the Mission could be chosen by the Great Powers.
Mr. Polk agreed that this was desirable. He thought action should be taken at once. In addition to this the Roumanians should be warned that no abuses would be tolerated. He had already that morning sent word to the Roumanian Delegation in Paris that if any incident occurred in Budapest likely to rouse American public opinion against them, the consequence must be that the Roumanian Government could not rely on any further help from America in the future. He asked whether the Allied military Mission would have control over the Roumanian army.
M. Clemenceau said that it would only have a moral influence over it.
M. Tittoni said that the Mission should have the right to tell the Roumanians to withdraw if this appeared necessary.
M. Pichon said that the sending of the Mission re-established the situation existing before the establishment of the Bela Kun Government. There had then been a military Mission in charge of the execution of the Armistice.
Mr. Polk said he thought it would be necessary to obtain from the Roumanian Government an agreement to accept the decisions of the Mission. The Mission would have no authority unless the Governments concerned were notified.
Mr. Balfour said that he agreed to the despatch of a Mission provided it were endowed with all the authority the Conference could confer. Further, he thought that the American member might be empowered to make the economic threat mentioned by Mr. Polk. He suggested sending for M. Misu2 and requesting him to telegraph to Bukarest that any excesses committed in Budapest during this needless occupation would have the most disastrous results. The Hungarian Government having promised to accept the Armistice it was for the Conference to see that it did so. He would suggest, like Mr. Polk, that the Roumanians should occupy high ground outside Budapest, and Stop there. He would like to ask Marshal Foch whether if they did so, they would safely control the situation.
M. Clemenceau observed that there was a hill in Budapest but that all the surrounding country was flat plain.
Mr. Balfour asked whether an army in the vicinity could be itself safe and also able to control the situation.[Page 510]
Marshal Foch said that it depended on the size of the army.
Mr. Polk asked whether the Allies could not make the same sort of economic threat as he had made on behalf of the United States. He further observed that it would be difficult for the moment to promise an American company as escort. He would however endeavour to find the men.
Mr. Balfour said that he did not think that he could promise any British troops. Admiral Troubridge,3 however, had suggested going up the Danube with a Monitor.
M. Clemenceau said that the Mission must have written instructions. These instructions he hoped Mr. Balfour would draft as regards their political side. Marshal Foch might then add the military instructions. At the same time a telegram could be sent to Bukarest, stating that the Council considered the Roumanians responsible for any disturbances that might take place in Budapest and that unless they conformed to the wishes of the Conference the economic consequences to themselves would be to their detriment.
M. Pichon said that he thought it was undesirable to threaten the Roumanians. Even though they were not obeying orders they were helping the Allied cause. They did not deserve to be treated like enemies.
M. Tittoni agreed. It was possible he thought, that the withdrawal of the Roumanians might not be desired by the Mission. He thought they should be informed that a Mission was being sent under the authority of the Conference and that the Conference expected the Roumanian Government to order their Generals to obey the instructions given by this Mission.
M. Clemenceau asked if Mr. Balfour would make a draft at once.
M. Pichon said that the same communication should be made to the Czecho-Slovak and Serbian Governments. They would be pleased at receiving it and re-assured that Roumania was not to be allowed undue expansion.
Mr. Polk said he had no objection. The American Delegation would like to go further and say that the Conference would hold the Roumanians responsible for any untoward incidents that might take place. On this condition he was ready to waive the economic threat.
(After some further discussion a draft prepared by Mr. Balfour to be addressed to the Roumanian Government and one prepared by M. Berthelot to be addressed to the Serbian Government were accepted (see Annex C and D).
(It was also agreed that the telegram addressed to the Roumanian Government should be communicated to the Serbian and Czechoslovak Governments.)[Page 511]
(It was decided to proceed at once to the nomination of a Mission of Allied Generals to be sent to Budapest accompanied by a small escort of Allied troops.)
(It was agreed that written instructions should be given them to be prepared by Mr. Balfour and Marshal Foch.)
(Mr. Hoover withdrew and Count Wrangel, Count Ehrensvärd and Capt. Akerblom entered the room.)
Hearing of Swedish Point of View on the Subject of the Aaland islands Count Ehrensvärd then read a document (Appendix E).
M. Clemenceau thanked the Swedish Representatives who then withdrew.
(It was then resolved at Mr. Polk’s suggestion that the question of the Swedish claims to the Aaland Islands as embodied in the declaration read by Count Ehrensvärd, be referred to the Baltic Commission for examination and report.)
3. (The Military Representatives, General Baird, Colonel Mougin and Colonel Georges entered the room.)
Hearing of General Baird on Situation in Bulgaria General Baird said that it was doubtless the intention if the Great Powers to make a lasting peace in the Balkans. He assumed that was their first intention. The punishment of Bulgaria was their second purpose. It was therefore necessary so [sic] to punish Bulgaria so as not to jeopardise a lasting peace. The most contentious questions in the Balkans were territorial questions. As regards Bulgaria there were two such questions which might be said to be analogous to that [of] Alsace Lorraine. There was even possibly a third in Thrace. It was the question of Macedonia and the question of the Dobruja that had brought Bulgaria into the war against the Allies. Proof of this could be found in the fact that while the Bulgarian attitude was still undecided, the Allies had urged the Serbians and Roumanians to make concessions in these very areas in order that the Bulgarians should be inclined to take the Allied side. What held at that time probably held now. If the Powers took no heed in this they would have to face the consequences. The Roumanians had taken the Dobruja for strategic reasons, and also to penalise the Bulgarians. Their strategic reason need not prevail. The Bulgarian forces at the present time could be reduced to any extent desired, and it could also be laid down that no Bulgarian troops should be sent beyond a line from Varna to Ruschuk. The Roumanians freely admitted that the Southern Dobruja was Bulgarian in population; but no Roumanian statesman would offer to return it, lest he be reproached for alienating his country’s possessions. It was therefore necessary to exert pressure on the Roumanians, if a lasting bone of contention was to be removed. It would be easier for the Roumanians to yield to Allied injunctions [Page 512]than to offer the country themselves. Macedonia had been taken by the Serbians in 1913 because they were in effective occupation; secondly on grounds of compensation, seeing that they had not obtained access to the Adriatic; thirdly to maintain a balance of power.
Mr. Balfour asked whether Serbia had not claimed the country on the ground that it was peopled by populations of Serbian blood.
General Baird replied that in 1912 Serbia had admitted the country was not Serbian. Only one portion of it known as the “contested area” had been reserved for arbitration by the Czar of Russia. If the main purpose was to establish peace and not to punish Bulgaria, some other solution of the Macedonian problem must be found. No one could expect that Bulgaria after the war should be rewarded by an accession of territory. Macedonia was neither Greek nor Serbian, it was Bulgarian. Nevertheless it did not desire to be, and need not be placed under Bulgarian Government. The situation was now very different from that in 1912. Serbia had obtained her compensation towards the west, and there was no fear that Bulgaria would now become the most powerful military state in the Balkans. Very much the same might be said about the Greek claims to Thrace. In the opinion of all the Allied Officers in Sofia, there would be a repetition of the Smyrna episodes if Bulgarian Thrace were given to Greece. The population was principally Pomak, and the next most important element in it was Bulgar. He heard from General Bridges4 that General Franchet d’Esperey was opposed to the cession of Thrace to Greece. General Milne was also opposed to it as well as all the Allied Generals. The Greeks would not be able to administer the country. In addition, some of the Pomaks had appealed to General Franchet d’Esperey not to be put under the Greeks. He thought that should the Dobrudja be returned to Bulgaria, the Roumanians would never go to war to get it back, because the Roumanian people would feel no enthusiasm on the subject. He thought the same applied to Macedonia and Thrace. Neither the Serbs nor the Greeks would willingly wage a war to regain those areas. On the other hand the Bulgarians would go to war whole-heartedly to regain them if they were taken from them. As to the present situation, he thought a wrong impression prevailed in Paris that Bulgaria had been turbulent since the armistice. Bulgaria complied with every demand made. Her army had been reduced below the figures required by the armistice. The armistice allowed an army of 4,000 officers and 80,000 other ranks. The Bulgarian army really numbered 3,500 officers and 55,000 [Page 513]other ranks. There were 8 infantry divisions instead of 10, and in each of them one class was serving instead of two. Bulgaria had attempted to do nothing against the interests of the Allies. Moreover, the Allies had no troops, and, if a national rising were provoked, it would be impossible to stop it. There would, moreover, be no Bulgarian Government to appeal to.
M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch whether the armistice enabled Bulgaria to maintain 10 divisions.
Marshal Foch said that the Bulgarians had not been asked to reduce the number of their divisions, but to keep only 3 of them mobilised.
General Baird said the Bulgarians had not even kept 3 mobilised. He observed that the Bulgarians could be very heavily fined in money, cattle and corn. Moreover, the Allies could administer and develop certain state resources such as railways and mines, and thus obtain what they required without touching territory and incurring the permanent hostility of the Bulgarians and a readiness on their part to take the side of any possible enemy of the Entente. He suggested that the same kind of peace as the British Government had made with the Boers should be made with the Bulgarians. It would be better to have the Bulgarians on our side next time than against us.
Mr. Balfour said that it might comfort General Baird to know that inside the Conference there had never been any idea of subordinating everything to a desire to punish the Bulgarians.
M. Clemenceau thanked General Baird, who then withdrew.
M. Clemenceau then asked Colonel Mougin to give an account of the present military situation of Bulgaria.
Colonel Mougin said that the clauses of the armistice had been carried out by the Bulgarians as regards the number of their troops. It might be possible, with tact, to induce the Bulgarians to disarm still further. This would be advantageous, seeing that if they disliked the treaty, they would only find weak Allied forces opposed to them. The bulk of the available Allied force would be French. It might not be numerous enough to cope with the situation. It would certainly not be adequate should a popular rising occur. It must be remembered that in these parts every man had a rifle, and since the war a great many had machine guns. The question then was whether the Greeks could be depended on. He thought not. Of their 11 divisions, 5 were in Smyrna. Their policy in that region was such that they would require a large number of troops to enforce it. Of the remainder, the bulk must be kept in Macedonia, which was not Greek, but either Bulgarian or Mohammedan. Thrace also, if [Page 514]Greece should have it, could only be held by force. Unless the Allies supplied the force, Greece would have to do so. It followed that Greek troops could not be relied on to cope with the Bulgarians should they rise. This would not lighten the task of the French troops, which would also have to cope with difficulties of transport. The troops at General Franchet d’Esperey’s disposal might, if he were warned in time, be able to keep the railways, the stores of ammunition, and the arsenals, but it must also be borne in mind that the Turks would take sides in favour of the Bulgarians as a consequence of what had happened in Smyrna. They were now less anti-Bulgarian than anti-Greek. In a word, throughout Thrace the majority was Mussulman. The Turkish peasants might be armed by the Bulgarians, and all would make common cause against the Greeks. His personal opinion was that the Allies were in a fair way to making permanent enemies of the Turks, who lately had been friendly.
Mr. Balfour asked what Colonel Mougin had meant by tactful methods of reducing Bulgarian armaments.
Colonel Mougin said that he thought that the methods might be left to General Franchet d’Esperey. All the Council need do was to tell him what was desired.
(Colonel Mougin then withdrew).
M. Clemenceau said that he was not sure that the discussion could be pursued with advantage. In any case, it must be understood that French troops would not fight alone against the Bulgarians in the interests of Greece. The Greeks had gone to Smyrna, with the result known. They would also have trouble in Macedonia. They courted further trouble by claiming Thrace. He was quite prepared to give them Thrace, but not to meet the trouble for them.
M. Tittoni said that the Italian battalion was there for the purpose of bringing about peace, not for war.
M. Clemenceau said that the same applied to the 15,000 French troops.
Marshal Foch said that whatever form the treaty took, it was unlikely to be entirely to the taste of the Bulgarians. The question then arose: what could the Allies do? There were a few French troops under General Franchet d’Esperey. In front of them was the Bulgarian army and its store of arms. General Franchet d’Esperey might perhaps prevail on the Bulgarians to yield some of these arms. That would be so much to the good, but it must be done at once, because the process of demobilization would reduce his troops to a negligible quantity in a month. He therefore proposed to tell General Franchet d’Esperey to get possession of the Bulgarian guns. The Allies would [Page 515]be more able to cope with the situation when the treaty was signed. At that time only the small states—Greece and Serbia, and, possibly, Roumania, would be able to furnish the police force. They would only be able to secure the execution of the Treaty if the Bulgarians had been disarmed before-hand. He therefore concluded that General Franchet d’Esperey should be ordered to disarm the Bulgarians as far as possible.
Mr. Polk asked whether the Allies were entitled under the armistice to give him this order.
M. Clemenceau said that no such order could be given to the Bulgarians. They might or might not comply with General Franchet d’Esperey’s request. He was inclined to ask Marshal Foch to do as he suggested under the reservation that the use of the French divisions remained at the disposal of the French Government.
Marshal Foch read a draft telegram he proposed to send to General Franchet d’Esperey.
M. Clemenceau suggested that it be made quite clear to General Franchet d’Esperey that he must obtain his results by diplomacy, and not by giving orders to the Bulgarians, who were entitled under the armistice to disregard them.
Mr. Balfour thought it most unlikely that the Bulgarians would agree, but, if the Military Authorities thought there was some hope, he was quite ready to try.
(After some further discussion, the telegram annexed as Appendix “F” was adopted, subject to final consideration at the next Meeting.)
M. Tittoni suggested the holding of a plebiscite in Thrace.
M. Clemenceau observed that as the population was predominantly Mussulman, the result would be a foregone conclusion.
M. Pichon suggested the country should be given to the League of Nations.
4. The following nominations were made:— Appointment of Allied Commissioners for Negotiation Between the German and Polish Governments
|For France||General Dupont.|
|For Great Britain||General Malcolm.|
|For Italy||General Bencivenga.|
(The Meeting then adjourned).
Villa Majestic, Paris, August 5, 1919.[Page 516]
- Appendix B to HD–22, p. 490.↩
- Nicolas Misu, Roumanian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.↩
- Admiral Sir Ernest C. T. Troubridge, British Admiral commanding on the Danube.↩
- Lt. Gen. Sir George Tom Bridges, head of the British Mission with the Allied Armies of the East.↩
- The translation of the text of this telegram is that quoted in the telegram of August 7, 1919, from the American Mission at Paris to the Secretary of State (Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/23).↩
- Appendix B to HD–22, p. 490.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/16.↩
- The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 860D.014/56.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol, i, p. 338.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xlvi, p. 23.↩
- The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/16.↩