Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/21


Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 1 August, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. H. White.
      • Hon. F. L. Polk.
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
    • Secretaries
      • Mr. H. Norman.
      • Sir Ian Malcolm.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
      • M. Pichon.
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta.
      • M. Berthelot.
      • M. de St. Quentin.
    • Italy
      • M. Tittoni.
    • Secretary
      • M. Paterno.
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui.
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai.
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Capt. Chapin.
British Empire Lt. Commander Bell.
France Capt. A. Portier.
Italy Lt.-Col. A. Jones.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives entered the room.

1. M. Clemenceau stated that he had received a communication from Berlin through General Nudant1 (See Appendix “A”). It was to the effect that the German Government, as a result of the revelations made by Herr Erzberger,2 had been violently attacked from the Conservative and Independent Socialist Sections. The question most at issue was the surrender of the military officers demanded by the Treaty. Herr Erzberger asked that the provisions to that effect might not immediately be put into force.

Communication From the German Government on the Subject of the Subject of the Surrender of officers Guilty of the Laws of War

M. Tittoni said that as the Allies had representatives in Germany, it would be best to ask their advice.

M. Clemenceau said that at the present moment the situation was not quite clear. The list of German Officers guilty of breaches of [Page 450] the laws of war comprised over 1,000 persons, of whom some were Princes of the Blood. He believed that the list of Naval Officers who were to be surrendered was not yet ready.

Mr. Balfour replied that the list made out in Great Britain was ready.

M. Clemenceau remarked that the Council must be dear as to the demands that it was going to make. It was dangerous to postpone executing the provisions relating to the surrender of German Officers, if, at the same time, German prisoners were to be repatriated. M. Larnaude3 had made a report on the question of German Prisoners, and had pointed out that the problem of their repatriation was intimately connected with the surrender of enemy officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had themselves recognised, that the two questions emphasised in M. Larnaude’s report should be considered together. He thought that it would be improper to return German prisoners if the Germans did not themselves surrender the guilty officers. He proposed that no reply should be given at once. Herr Erzberger’s telegram might certainly be based on fact, but, on the other hand it might be intended to promote a hasty decision on the part of the Council. He asked whether the matter might not be referred to a Committee of experts.

Mr. Balfour said that it was evidently the President’s opinion that an answer should not at once be given. At the same time, the Treaty did not, in itself, permit the return of German Prisoners to be much postponed, and, by its very provisions, prevented the Allies from making a delay in their repatriation a political weapon. If the detention of the prisoners was decided upon, it must be put into force before the Treaty received general ratification.

M. Clemenceau stated, in reply to Mr. Balfour’s question that the French ratification of the Treaty would probably take place in the first week in September. He suggested that Marshal Foch, who had agents in Germany, should make a report on the subject, and that he should be given the assistance of jurisconsults.

Mr. Balfour stated that the British agents in Germany would be asked for information, and he supposed that the question to be put to the jurists would be, whether we should be justified in adopting a measure for the detention of German prisoners if the Germans refused to surrender the culpable officers.

M. Clemenceau then said that that was not quite his meaning. He wished to point out that the Germans in their note were asking for a definite favour—the waiving of the stipulations with regard to the surrender of guilty officers. The Allies, if they granted this, might ask for certain military measures to be carried out on the [Page 451] part of Germany, to compensate them for granting the German demand.

M. Tittoni pointed out that the Germans did not quite put forward their request as a favour, but were suggesting certain measures to us, on account of the social and political situation in Germany, which menaced the Allies’ interests as well as theirs. In these circumstances, would it not be advantageous to obtain further information, and come to a decision when it had been tendered.

M. Clemenceau returned to his original proposal of referring the question to a Committee of jurisconsults and military men.

Mr. Balfour then remarked that such a Committee might say “You have a right to take what measures of security you please”. He asked what Marshal Foch thought.

Marshal Foch replied that the surrender of guilty officers was not a military question, but a political one.

M. Clemenceau agreed with Marshal Foch, and said that he would like his opinion as to a suitable military compensation for the favour which would be granted to the Germans by acceding to their request.

Mr. Balfour asked whether we should not be asking the military men to verify political facts.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not think so, since military men would only be advising on the subject of military compensation.

Mr. Balfour said that it would be necessary, therefore, to ask our diplomatic representatives for information. In the meantime, the Military Representatives at Versailles should endeavour to find out whether the statements in the German communication were correct, and should further advise the Council as to what military measures on the part of Germany would be adequate compensation to the Allies for acceding to their demand. Whatever questions were put to Versailles, the British War Office must refer the matter to its own military representatives.

M. Tittoni said that the situation would be that each country would refer the matter to whatever agents or bodies it thought capable of making a suitable examination.

Mr. Polk agreed with Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni.

(It was decided:—

That no immediate reply to the German Government’s request should be given.
That the Military Representatives at Versailles, in collaboration with Marshal Foch, should investigate the accurancy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilise all available sources of information at their command.
That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on such military compensations as might be demanded from Germany in return for a compliance with their present request.)

[Page 452]

2. M. Clemenceau circulated two telegrams from Germany (see Appendices B & C) stating (1) that Germany had at present 800,000 men under arms, and (2) that the students in Munich were being armed in violation of the Peace Treaty. Information From Germany With Regard to the Number of Men Under Arms in That Country and the Arming of Students of Munich

Mr. Balfour stated, that before proceeding further with the question, he would like to have comprehensive figures comparing the total number of enemy and Allied troops at present in the field. He feared that such figures might be alarming.

M. Tittoni said that as Marshal Foch was going to study the questions put to him under decision No. 1, he would like him to state what force was now required in Germany for the maintenance of order.

Marshal Foch replied that the question was answered by the military provisions of the Armistice and of the Peace Treaty. He considered that the significance of the events at Munich lay in the fact, that the Germans wished to show, by what they were doing, that they knew that Allied control over their actions would soon cease.

M. Clemenceau remarked that the communication circulated drew attention to the point.

(It was therefore decided that the two documents circulated should be submitted to Marshal Foch for examination and report.)

3. M. Clemenceau read a telegram from General Franchet d’Esperey with regard to the Allied occupation of Thrace (see Appendix D). Communication From General Franchet d’Esperey, Commander in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East

He remarked that it was obviously necessary to rein force the Allied troops in Bulgaria although the measure presented practical difficulties.

Mr. Balfour said that as he understood it the situation was serious and a comparison between the available Allied and Bulgarian forces would be disadvantageous to ourselves. He had received a report that the disarmament of Bulgaria was incomplete, on account of the different way in which demobilisation was carried out in such countries as England and France, and in Bulgaria. In the former case, demobilisation meant that soldiers returned absolutely to their civil occupations, and ceased to appear on the list of any military unit. This was not the case in Bulgaria, where demobilisation meant no more than the reduction of a military unit, from war to peace strength. The Bulgarian Army had comprised ten divisions. Under the Armistice it had been allowed to keep three and had been ordered to demobilise seven. This meant no more than that, Bulgaria now had a powerful military force of three divisions on full war strength, and seven others on a reduced footing.

Marshal Foch said that he thought Mr. Balfour’s remarks as a [Page 453] whole were correct, but he could not guarantee the accuracy of the details.

M. Clemenceau said that General Franchet d’Esperey had been asked to give a detailed report, but that no very clear statement had yet been received from him.

Marshal Foch said that the Bulgarian Army had never even obeyed orders it had received from the Allies. It was quite possible that they would have a superior force to that of the Allies, at the time that the Peace Treaty was presented.

M. Clemenceau said that he proposed that Marshal Foch should report on the situation, and asked the approximate time necessary for the preparation of such a report.

Marshal Foch said it would require several days, as he would be obliged to refer the matter to General Franchet d’Esperey.

General Weygand stated that a certain amount of information was already at hand and that a report on the basis of the information available could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should submit on August 2nd a report oil the present status of the Bulgarian forces, based upon information at present in his possession.)

(It was further decided that Marshal Foch should make investigations through General Franchet d’Esperey, and submit a full report when these latter had been received.)

4. M. Clemenceau circulated a telegram from the Military Representatives at Klagenfurt (see Appendix E).

Telegram From the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Klagenfurt Relative to the Execution of the Decision of the Conference M. Berthelot further explained the telegram stating that by the withdrawal of the Austrians and Jugo-Slavs from Klagenfurt a certain quantity of war material had been left behind, under the custody of a few Italian carabinièri. In view of the fact that the Supreme Council had asked that an Inter-Allied guard should be placed in charge of the material in question, it was now requested that it should be constituted, and, until it could be so constituted, two companies of Italian carabinièri should be authorized by the Council to form the guard. He pointed out that the value of the property in question was inconsiderable, and suggested that two platoons of Italian carabiniéri would be quite efficient to ensure the custody of the material.

(It was agreed that the Italian Command should be authorised to furnish two platoons of carabinièri, for the purpose of guarding the war material at Klagenfurt.)

[Page 454]

5. The Council had before it a communication from Marshal Foch to the following effect:—

“When the Army of Occupation shall have been organised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front, who was in command during the war, will no longer exercise this command. Organisation of the High Command of the Army of Occupation in Western Germany After the Treaty Comes Into Force

However, it is necessary to maintain a superior After Germany Command for the group of Allied forces of occupation, were it only to establish a liaison with the High Commission who should communicate directly with the High Military Command (Art. IV of Memorandum of June 9th4), also for regulating all military questions dealing with railway, river, telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications.

France, on account of the number of troops in her army of occupation, should place a General at the head of the Rhine Army. The other Nations will probably not do this.

It is proposed that this General be designated to command the group of Allied occupation forces, as soon as the command of Marshal Foch on the Western front shall have ceased, in other words, at the moment that the Peace Treaty goes into force.”

(The proposals which Marshal Foch’s communication contained were agreed to without discussion.)

6. (a) Frontier of Prekomurye.

Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs Regarding Further Claims by Yung-Slavia M. Tardieu stated that the Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Committee had submitted on July 22nd a Memorandum with regard to two new claims which had been presented by the Delegation of the Yugo-Slav kingdom regarding the northern frontier of that State, (see Appendix F).

(It was decided to adhere to the boundary line in Prekomurye formerly adopted by the Supreme Council which line in general follows the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.)

(b) Baranya

M. Tardieu read the Memorandum regarding Baranya, (see Appendix F).

(It was decided to accept the proposal of the Committee with regard to Baranya, and the frontier which had been proposed by it.)

7. (a) Bacska.

Serb-Croat-Slovene Claims M. Tardieu reported on the notes submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs dated 25th July, 1919 (see Appendix G).

(It was decided to accept the draft proposals of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Bacska region; [Page 455] and to uphold the frontier line previously laid down, in view of the fact that the ethnographic conditions in the locality would not allow of the aforesaid frontier line being extended to the north. It was further decided to refer the question of laying down regulations of an international kind, with regard to the working of the Deak Canal, at present in Jugo-Slavia, by means of hydraulic installations now in Hungarian territory, to the Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways.)

(b) Banat.

M. Tardieu drew the attention of the Conference to the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs on the subject of the Banat.

(It was decided to adopt the proposals contained in the report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Banat, as follows:—

Central Banat: The previously adopted frontier is to be upheld, and a notification to that effect sent to persons concerned. The Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways will take the necessary measures to maintain and to develop, the irrigation canals in the Banat, to the equal advantage of the States to which the Banat is allotted.
Northern Banat: The question is to be adjourned for further study.

8. M. Tardieu said that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had received a note dated July 10th from the Jugo-Slav Delegation, asking that their troops be allowed to occupy the territories granted to Serbia by the Conference, in the region in question. The Committee had submitted a reply dated 26th July (see Appendix H). Since the Council had settled the territorial question in Prekomurye, he proposed that the suggested military occupation should be granted. Occupation of Perkomurye by Jugo-Slav Troops

(It was decided that the Jugo-Slav State should be authorised to occupy the territory in Prekomurye bounded by the frontier laid down and notified (see para. 6 subsection (a).)

9. M. Tardieu stated that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had given him a report dated 30th July, to which he had nothing to add. (See Annex 1 [to Appendix I].)Roumanian Frontiers in Bukovina

Mr. Balfour said that the Commission, after its first examination of the question, had decided, that, for ethnographical reasons, the small territorial area under discussion could not be given to the Bukovina. The reasons in question still held good, because the population of the district was more Ruthene than Roumanian in character. In addition to this, Poland had received Eastern Galicia, and laid no claims to the area now being considered. [Page 456] The desires of the population affected were the real matter for study. He asked what was the reason given by the Committee in support of these proposals. The answer probably was, that it would be advantageous, from a political point of view, to maintain the historical frontiers of Bukovina since that would be a measure which would please the Roumanian Government, and Roumanian public opinion. The Bukovina had never belonged properly to Roumania, and he was not in favour of granting it to that country, until such time as its real attitude towards the Allies had been cleared up. Up to the present time, the wishes and instructions of the Conference had been grossly disregarded by Roumania. That country had never acceded to our demands, and now that a territorial change, violating the principles of nationalities, was proposed in the interests of Roumanian public opinion, he preferred to adjourn the question.

Mr. Polk said that he had been told in the morning that the line shown in red on the chart, ran along the bottom of a Valley; and that he did not care for such a solution.

M. Tittoni said that he would like to draw attention to the following point, which was, that the frontier now proposed had been promised to Roumania when she entered the war. For this reason he would uphold it willingly. On the other hand, he recognised the strength of Mr. Balfour’s argument, and thought that Roumania should be informed, that it would only receive the territory in question, if it were willing to carry out the wishes of the Allies, and to sign the Treaty. Roumania was now in a state of discontent. The demands of that country in the Banat had been curtailed; and it would be unwise, therefore, to displease it with regard to Bukovina, unless there were important reasons for so doing. That is to say, the proposals of the Committee might be accepted under certain conditions.

M. Tardieu said that the Bessarabian question had not been settled either. Since the Council could exert pressure, it could be announced that the report of the Committee would be accepted if Roumania satisfied the Council in other ways.

Mr. Balfour said that there were also numerous negotiations proceeding between Roumania and Hungary, of a kind that did not arise out of the Treaty. It was nevertheless important that these negotiations should be concluded in a manner satisfactory to all. Roumania was not only concerned in signing the Treaty, it was also called upon to manifest its general goodwill.

Mr. Polk said that he accepted the proposal in principle; but that he would prefer that the question should again be referred to experts, since a frontier running through the bottom of a Valley seemed to him unsatisfactory.

M. Tardieu said that the question had been carefully examined by the Committee. The difficulty was that a part of the Bukovina had [Page 457] already been given to Roumania, and had been occupied by that country. The alternative would be to give it to Poland, who did not demand it.

Mr. Polk said that he raised no objection and that he was only insisting on a point of detail.

(It was decided to accept the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, and to grant Bukovina to Roumania, with the exception of the area traversed by the railway line—Zaleszczyki-Kolomea—(see Annex 1 to Appendix I); on the condition that Roumania should show goodwill towards the Allies, with regard to the signature of the Treaty, and to the other questions in which she was concerned.)

10. M. Tardieu said he wished to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem was that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision. Bessarabian Question

M. Maklakoff and M. Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Roumanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision.5 It remained to be known what solution the Council would adopt, for it was difficult to settle the Roumanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at the same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it.

M. Pichon said that the question was particularly important, in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia.

M. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Koltchak,6 which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Roumanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favour of that country.

M. Clemenceau said that it was evidently important to be able to inform Roumania what its frontiers exactly were.

Mr. Balfour asked whether M. Tardieu thought that the Committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report.

M. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Koltchak.

M. Pichon said that he did not think that the Council had been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Koltchak that Bessarabia as a whole would be granted to Roumania.

[Page 458]

Mr. Balfour asked whether M. Pichon thought the telegram to Admiral Koltchak was not binding on the Council.

M. Pichon said that Admiral Koltchak’s attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Roumanian rights in Bessarabia.

M. Tittoni said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which was, that the Committee had justified its proposals by saying that it wished to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Roumania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Roumania would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.

Mr. Balfour said he did not think he could admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.

M. Tittoni remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.

M. Clemenceau said that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposed to put it on the Agenda for the following day.

Mr. Balfour said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Roumania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being considered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Roumanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of the Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Roumania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally, she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. Was it therefore possible to say to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction. The Roumanians were difficult people to deal with, and M. Bratiano was no exception.

M. Tittoni said that he had heard that a new ministry had been set up in Roumania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.

Mr. Balfour said that he had also heard that, but the Cabinet had not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration.

Mr. Polk said that the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Koltchak in his reply, had [Page 459] protested against his country being divided. He thought that the effect of dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.

M. Tittoni remarked that Russia’s point of view had been presented to the Council.

Mr. Polk said that the Roumanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.

M. Tittoni said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism.

Mr. Balfour said he did not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days’ time, if it were possible to settle it then. He did not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He was willing to wait for the formation of the new Roumanian Cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.

M. Tardieu said that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favourable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It was not possible to do this at present.

Mr. Balfour said that if the new Roumanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favourably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Roumania, on the condition that the Roumanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved.

M. Clemenceau said that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.

Mr. Balfour said that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remained open.

(It was decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Dobrudja until the formation of the new Roumanian Government.

It was further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)

M. Sergent and M. Cheysson7 entered the room.

[Page 460]

11. M. Clemenceau left the room and M. Pichon took the Chair.

Reparation and Financial Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria M. Pichon said that the Council had to examine the amendments brought forward by the Reparations and Finance Committee after hearing the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak [Greek?] and Jugo-Slav Delegations.

M. Sergent read the report prepared by the two Committees. (See Appendix J.) He added that the Reparations Commission had been presented with a note from the Serbian Delegation. The note in question had been examined and its suggestions adopted partially. On the day in question, however, at two o’clock, a new note, couched in the most violent terms had been received, stating that Jugo-Slavia refused point-blank to accept article 4 in the Reparation Clauses. In the Peace Treaty with Germany the article in question had laid down that Bulgaria should transfer her debt with Germany to the Allies. In article 4 of the Reparation Clauses with Bulgaria that country was called upon to recognise the validity of the transfer of all credits due to the Governments of Germany, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, to the Allied and Associated Governments conformably with article 261 of the Peace Treaty with Germany; and to the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken these debts into account, when they had considered the sums payable by Bulgaria, and had undertaken not to put forward any further claims under this head. Serbia stated in her note, that, whilst the Allied and Associated Governments might be in a position to forego later claims, they had no right to impose a corresponding renunciation upon Serbia. The note ended in what amounted to a threat to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. The Reparation Committee had fixed the indemnity payable by Bulgaria at 2 billion francs. 250 million francs due from Bulgaria to Germany had been added to this sum. Since the Committee had taken the debt into account it thought that nothing further could be done.

Mr. Balfour said that the principle guiding the Council and the Reparations Committee had been that Bulgaria should pay the maximum amount that her resources allowed. It was of little importance, from the Bulgarian point of view that the sum should be paid to any particular Ally, since Serbia would have her share.

M. Sergent said that the Reparations Committee had first intended to divide the indemnity into two heads. Under the first head, would have been reparations amounting to 2 billion francs, and, under the second, 250 million francs owed by Bulgaria to Germany. This would have avoided giving the impression of renouncing the debt due to the Allies by Germany. It seemed that Serbia had not taken this simple calculation into account.

[Page 461]

M. Pichon said that the Reparations Committee, being now informed of the issue, could submit a report, which should be waited for.

Mr. Polk said that Serbia was dissatisfied on another point, which was the amount of livestock to be delivered to her by Bulgaria. Was it possible to know what extra amount, under this head, had been granted to the Serbians?

M. Sergent said that the original figures had been doubled except in the case of the oxen. Serbia was actually going to receive 6,000 milch cows 5,000 horses and mares, 1,000 mules, 4,000 yoke oxen and 12,000 sheep. Notwithstanding this, the Serbian demand amounted to ten times that figure.

M. Berthelot said that in spite of the figures having been doubled, Serbia was only going to receive one tenth part of that which had been taken from her by the Bulgarians.

(It was decided to accept the Reparation Clauses, with the exception of article 4, dealing with the transfer of credits, and of article 6, dealing with the delivery of live-stock.)

M. Sergent and M. Cheysson then left the room and Generals Duval, Groves and [Rear Admiral] Orsini entered.8

12. General Duval said that he had to submit a report, dated 30th July, on the subject of the distribution of aeronautic material delivered by the enemy Governments (see Appendix K). Distribution of Aeronautic Material

Mr. Balfour said that the Note brought forward two questions:—

What principle was to govern the distribution of war material— a difficult question which had already raised considerable controversy.
How was this material to be dealt with when distributed between the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Committee proposed that the material in question should become the property of whatever Government it was given to, so long as this latter should undertake not to alienate it. He proposed to adjourn the first question and to accept the second principle enunciated.

M. Tittoni said that he accepted Mr. Balfour’s proposal, but asked that the first question should be referred to Versailles, in order that the settlement should be made conformable to the general principles guiding the general distribution of war material, in general.

(This proposal was adopted.)

(It was therefore decided:—

To request the Military Representatives at Versailles to submit a proposal regarding the principles to govern the distribution of all [Page 462] aeronautical war material turned over by the Central Powers in accordance with the Peace Treaty.

It was further decided that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be charged with the details of the distribution to be made in accordance with the principles established above. It was further decided that once this material had been allotted to and accepted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it should become the property of such Government, which latter should agree not to alienate the material in question by any form of transfer.)

13. M. Tittoni presented the President with a report from the Italian Delegation on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czecho-Slovakia by Austria. (See H.D. 13, paragraph 11.)8a The report is contained in Annex “L”. The Delivery Arms and Munitions to Czecho-Slovakia

Villa Majestic, Paris, August 1, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–21


Telegram—General Nudant to Marshal Foch

I hereby inform you that I have just received from General Dupont10 a report which Erzberger asked Von Hockhammern, President of the Wako11 in Berlin to transmit to me.

The text of this report is as follows:

“The German Government is at the present moment being very vigorously attacked: it is running afoul of the hostility of the parties of the right, whom the recent revelations have deeply displeased, in addition to that of the independent socialist fractions.

The Government can only maintain itself by leaning on the military element and the former officers’ corps.

The Entente, demanding the delivery of numerous generals and officers, will weaken our position and withdraw from us our support. The Government will be overthrown and the country given over to communism.

In order to ward off this danger, as serious for the Entente as for us, we request that you postpone the execution of the delivery clause.”

[Page 463]

Appendix B to HD–21


general staff of the army no. 2, office a

Note on the German Army

Numerous indications, coming, in general, from good sources, indicate that the effectives of the German Army amount, at the present time, to 800,000 men* (minimum figure).

These 800,000 men are divided among the following formations:

The Reichswehr,

The volunteer corps existing outside of the Reichswehr,

The remaining units of the former Army,

Those which it is necessary in reality to add, the Einwohnerwehren, Burgerwehren, and Sicherheitwehren,—theoretically police troops, and practically, reserves in disguise.

The Reichswehr should include, according to the Imperial law of March 6, 1919,13 18 brigades of which 6 should be heavy, consisting of 12,000 men each, and 12 light, consisting of 7,200 men each. However, from the first of April, the Ministry of War has decided upon the creation of 28 brigades (18 heavy, 10 light).

Under date of May 16, an official document indicated 31 brigades, a second§ dated May 21 gave the figure 38 (22 heavy brigades, 16 light), and a third announced on June 15 the existence of 40 brigades (23 heavy, 17 light). Further, there has just recently been identified a 42nd Brigade, which makes the number of units of the Reichswehr correspond within two units with the number of former divisions in peace time (42 in place of 44, making a deduction of 3 corps for the Army of Alsace-Lorraine).

[Page 464]

By itself, then, the Reichswehr should include more than 400,000 men.

There should be added to this effective force, another of 400,000 men belonging to certain volunteer corps, to the Einwohnerwehren, and to formations of the old Army not yet broken up. It is quite difficult to give figures for each of these categories, but the total forces which they actually represent at the present time is established, and the following facts are certain:

The volunteer corps should be put into the Reichswehr or be disbanded. Nevertheless, there are in existence some of them which have an independent existence side by side with the Reichswehr—a certain number of these corps are maintained by special subsidies (Pan-German League and Heavy Industry).
The Einwohnerwehren are only a disguised reserve. In order to throw one off the scent, they come under the Minister of the Interior; but they are armed, drilled, and constitute a vast centralized organization.**
The units of the old Army should have been disbanded without delay by the fifth of last June.†† However, although this dissolution is fairly advanced, it is not completed, and numerous units of the old Army are still to be found, reduced in strength, to be sure, but constituting nuclei capable of being strengthened in case of need.

The Germans maintain, then, very important effective forces. The question of cadres and the question of matériel also are of interest to them.

We know, indeed, that:

1. They can make available, under the pressure of the peace treaty, a great number of officers (16,000 are spoken of) by means of a bill introduced in the National Assembly and therefore public, while on the other hand they can recruit officers among the students‡‡ in accordance with a secret instruction by the Minister of War.§§

During the past two months, they have reinforced the gendarmery; then decreed that it constituted “a non-military force.”‖‖ An increase in the number of firemen is also being considered.¶¶

2. As regards matériel, measures are being taken to the end that the artillery armament of the brigades of the Reichswehr may be full, in good condition, and “absolutely fit to be used in the field.”*

Postal aviation is being developed, which will permit having airplanes for a double purpose.

The German Army tends, therefore, to resume its former strength. [Page 465] It is undergoing methodical training which tends to place it again entirely in the hands of its chiefs.

Perhaps a more serious matter is that the old spirit which had disappeared for a while, is tending to revive. The Government encourages it for Noske,14 who tolerated “The National League of German Officers” of reactionary tendencies, brought himself, only on the day when he found himself faced with the “Republican League of German Officers” to declare it to be inadmissible that “associations with political tendencies install themselves in the Army.”

It may be concluded from the foregoing that Germany does not seem to have the intention of complying with the peace terms in the matter of the military clauses relating to effectives. Cunningly she puts on, perhaps, the appearance of complying. Moreover, she carefully selects her effectives in such a manner as to keep, in case of need, those who are best, around which reserves of all kinds could be grouped. In an underhanded way, she will forge the instrument of a revenge of which the officers are already talking.

In brief, “camouflage” and bad faith are expressions which summarize the situation. Years ago, after 1806, Scharnhorst recommended the creation of militia forces, “capable of being expanded quietly,” and, in 1811, Hardenberg wrote: “Today the essential thing is the preservation of existence. In the changing play of circumstances, there can turn out to be remedies which we do not dream of.”

But the example of 1806 is there to warn us; “history is a perpetual beginning again.”

Appendix C to HD–21


national defense recruiting at the academic university of munich

Translation of a Document of the “Reichswehr Akademische Werbestelle Müchen Universität” Furnished by Professor Foerster to a Very Good Agent

To the Professors, Officials, and Assistants.

Secret Enlistment in Bavaria The Academic Recruiting Office (Akademische Werbestelle) is endeavoring [Page 466] to obtain, as far as possible, the participation of all persons belonging to higher institutions of learning in the national defense; it will thus contribute greatly toward the maintenance of order in Munich.

It has not been possible to create a military unit recruited exclusively from the university body, because, on the one hand, this project is rendered unrealizable by the clauses of the peace treaty, and on the other hand, it is not desired to encourage the idea, which is unjust but nevertheless widely held, that the spirit of caste reigns in the higher institutions of learning.

There are two possible ways in which the professors, officials, and assistants can participate in the national defense:

Men who have completed their military classes can have themselves enrolled, without it being necessary to hold them to a period of service. When they are called to the colors, they will serve in the infantry or artillery. But in order to put them beforehand into direct contact with the corps of the troops to which they will be attached, they shall be placed in a company or a battery which will be indicated to them verbally. They will have, then, every facility to act with these units and to fix the dates on which they could, once a week, receive training (especially in marksmanship).
Special courses, meeting bi-weekly, have been organized for men who have not performed military service and for those who have not completed their terms of service or who need to complete their military education.

Men who take these courses receive very elementary military instruction. They are taught to fire a gun, carbine, and revolver and to use hand-grenades.

These courses, which are held only in the morning, are scheduled so as not to conflict with the University courses; it is for this reason that they are now held only on the two days in the week when there are no classes.

It is probable that a third course will be organized, which will begin at a date to be decided upon in agreement with those who enroll. The participation of professors in appreciable numbers has already had a very good influence on the students, who, in the presence of such a fine example, naturally do not wish to be outdistanced.

Consequently, whoever enlists not only brings his own cooperation to the service of the cause, but also aids us to recruit other forces in numbers and of a value which are really appreciable.

For this reason, it is fervently to be wished that no one abstain who is in a position to serve the national cause in any manner whatever.

It is necessary, on the other hand, for the Academic Recruiting Office to take into account the participation of the professors, officials, and assistants in other similar organisations (such as the Einwohner-wehren, Ostwehren, etc.)

[Page 467]

On these grounds, we earnestly implore you to signify, as soon as possible, to the Academic Recruiting Office (Room 116 at the University), whether you are already participating in the national defense or in a similar organization, or whether it is your intention to take advantage of one of the possibilities indicated above for participating therein.

In the latter case, we beg you to be kind enough to enroll yourselves on the lists which are kept in Room 114 at the University.

Considering the interest of the question, a prompt response is desired.

The clauses of the peace treaty require, as you know, the severing as far as possible, of all ties between the higher institutions of learning and the Army.

However, it will be some time before the agencies of the Entente entrusted with enforcement, direct their attention to the execution of the relevant clause of the peace treaty.

(Note by Intelligence Service Agent—The original document is sent to General Headquarters: it is tp be noted that the individual copies are numbered.

It appears from an examination of this circular that the Bavarian University actually puts pressure on the professors and students with a view to increasing Germany’s military force, in a disguised form and profiting by the momentary absence of Entente enforcement agencies.)

Appendix D to HD–21


General Franchet d’Esperey to the Minister of War

The decision of the Inter-Allied Supreme Council17 which you communicated to me on June 10 provided for the participation of British and Italian troops in the occupation of Bulgaria.

I decided to form for the occupation of Bulgarian Thrace a detachment composed of two French battalions, of one Italian battalion of the 62nd Regiment of Infantry stationed at Adrianople and designated by the Italian command, and of an English detachment.

The Italian General Headquarters advises me that the question of what effectives are to be maintained in Turkey by Italy is being submitted to the Peace Conference by the delegation of this Power, and [Page 468] that there is no occasion in the meanwhile to withdraw the battalion from Adrianople.

On the other hand, the British command has not yet made known the effective force of the detachment to be furnished by the British Army.

Under these conditions, the French troops are going to be alone in bearing the burden and the responsibility of the occupation of Bulgaria at the time of the treaty of peace.

Appendix E to HD–21

Telegram From the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Klagenfurt


The Serbo-Croat-Slovene and Austrian Delegates signed, on July 28 at 16 o’clock, the convention regulating the evacuation of zone B of the Klagenfurt basin by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene troops.

The line of demarcation fixed by the Supreme Council on June 2318 will be occupied on July 31 at 17 o’clock by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene posts on one side and the Austrian posts on the other, a neutral zone of 600 meters being maintained between the two parties:

The military representatives are of the opinion that the guarding of the war material left at Klagenfurt can not be safely entrusted to the Austrian gendarmerie. They propose therefore that, until the Interallied detachment requested by the telegram of July 25 arrives, this guard be insured by Italian carabinièri.

As the Italian detachment now at Klagenfurt to insure the guarding of the city is only half a platoon, it should be reinforced by two platoons.

The Italian Supreme Command, from whom the military representatives have requested this reinforcement, has refused to send it without authorisation from the Supreme Council of the Allies.

The military representatives have the honour to request instructions from the Supreme Council.

Appendix F to HD–21


Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs examined, [Page 469] in its session of July 19, two new claims presented by the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes concerning the northern boundary of this state.

In Prekomourie;
In the Baranya.

1. Prekomourie

Claim of the Ser-Croat-Slovene Delegation In view of the territorial increases accorded to Austria at the expense of Hungary, especially in the St. Gothard region, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation claims the attribution of the territory included between the northern boundary previously assigned to the Kingdom in this region and the river Raab.

Decision of the commission The Commission considers that the proposed modification would result in attaching to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state a region which is, in part, peopled with Slovenes, but whose economic interests are oriented toward the north.

It proposes, therefore, the maintenance of the line previously adopted by the Supreme Council, which followed in a general way the line of the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.

2. Baranya

Claim of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation In the definitive statement of claims, presented to the Commission on May 22 [20], the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation renounced its original claims to Somogy, and limited itself to claiming in Baranya, the triangle included between the Drave, the Danube, and a line prolonging toward the Southwest the boundary accorded to the Kingdom in Bacska.

Very recently the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation recommended a petition presented by a delegation of distinguished Serbs, Magyars, and Germans of the Baranya. These persons requested that the northwest base of the triangle be moved back in such a way as to include within the Serb-Croat-Slovene territory, the Serbian center of Mohacs and the Mohacs-Siklos railroad.

The Commission recognises that the Danube and the Drave constitute very unsatisfactory political boundaries since their thalwegs change position continually and thus cause ever-recurring disputes among the riparian property owners. It admits that this reason justifies in principle the Yugo-Slav claim to the South-Eastern part of Baranya. Decision of the Commission
It considers that there is no need to receive the petition from the Baranya notables who seem inspired by circumstances rather than [Page 470] by the natural affinities of a very mixed population and who tend to deprive Hungary of part of the coal mines of Pecs necessary to the development of that state.
The American, British, and French delegations propose a line leaving the Danube to the west of Berog and rejoining the Drave to the southwest of Torjancs, so as to include in the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state the railroads connecting Monoster with Misköszeg and Osjek as well as the villages of Daly ok and Baranyavar.§ This line, in their opinioitem:
would remove for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the inconveniences of a river boundary without according to this state any strategic advantage menacing to Hungary;
would assure under satisfactory conditions the economic life of the populations;
would satisfy the national aspirations of the Slavic villages which lean up against the hills situated between Misköszeg and Monoster.
The Italian delegation believes that the most equitable boundary from the military point of view between Hungary and Yugo-Slavia in Eastern Baranya would be constituted by the crest of the hills situated between Misköszeg and Monoster. However, in view of the local interests presented by the Yugo-Slavs, it associates itself with the solution presented by the other delegations.

Annex I

The Boundary Between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Hungary in the Baranya

Starting from the point at which the boundary between the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and Hungary in the Bacska crosses the principal arm of the Danube, at about 8 kilometers to the north of point 169 (Misköszeg) and as far as point 93, at about 3 kilometers to the southwest of Baranyavar;

A line to be determined on the ground in a general southwesterly direction leaving to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state the localities of Dalyok, Föherezeglak, and Baranyavar as well as the railroad connecting these two localities and the junction immediately to the north of Baranyavar, and to Hungary the localities of Izabellaföld with its railroad, Udvar, Sarok, and Ivan Darda.

Starting from point 93 and toward the west as far as the secondary arm of the Drave at a point to be selected on the ground near point 90, at about 10 kilometers to the east of Miholjacdolnji:

[Page 471]

A line to be determined on the ground leaving to Yugo-Slavia the localities of Benge, Löcs, and Torjancz and to Hungary the localities of Illocska, Beremend, and Kassad and crossing the railroad immediately to the south of the station of Beremend.

The secondary arm, then the thalweg of the principal arm of the Drave upstream as far as its confluence with the river Mur.

Appendix G to HD–21


Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs has examined:

The protests presented by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in its letters of July 10 and 16, against the boundaries previously assigned to this state;
The new claims presented by the same delegation concerning the Bacska;
The question of the Island of Ada-Kalessi.

It has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council its conclusions on these various points, as follows:


I. Southern Banat

A. Claims of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation:

The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation claims the region of Bazias chiefly on the following grounds:

Predominance of the Slav over the Roumanian elements in this region;
The rights of dominion which the inhabitants of the Serbian communes in Banat, former soldiers of the 14th frontier regiment, possess over the forests of the Klissoura.

B. Opinion of the Commission:

The Commission recommends the maintenance, in a region where two Allied states only are in controversy, of the boundary previously decided upon by the Commission after a detailed study, and notified to the interested parties by the Supreme Council.

It considers that there could be occasion, after study and verification [Page 472] of the rights of dominion possessed by the communes of Serbian Banat over the forests of Klissoura, to take account of these rights in the indemnity settlements to be arranged between the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and Roumania.

II. Central Banat

A. Claims of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation:

The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation requests a rectification of the boundary in the regions of Zsombolya-Modes in such a way:

As to assure direct railroad communications between Nagy-Kikinda and Versecz;
As not to destroy, to the detriment of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, the unity of the system of hydraulic works on the Aranka, Bega, and Temes Rivers which feed the irrigation canals on the plain of Banat.

B. The Opinion of the Commission:

The Commission recommends for reasons given above, the maintenance of the boundary previously adopted and notified to the interested parties.

It considers that there is occasion to point out to the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, the necessity of taking international measures for the purpose of maintaining and developing the system of irrigation canals in the Banat in the equal interest of the various states among which the Banat is divided.

III. Northern Banat

The Commission reserved this question for a more thorough study which will require several more days.


A. Claim of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation:

The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation claims the city and region of Baja on the grounds:

that this city numbers 34,000 Slavs in a population of 89,000;
that Baja has close economic ties with Zombor, a city previously assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state;
that Baja plays an important part in the hydro-technical system of the Bacska. The Francis Deak Canal which serves the northern part of this province, is, in reality fed by the hydraulic installations established at Baja.

B. Opinion of the Commission:

The Commission recommends the maintenance of the boundary previously adopted, the extension of which toward the north would not be justified by ethnographic conditions in the region of Baja.

[Page 473]

It considers that there is occasion to bring to the attention of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, the necessity of providing international arrangements to guarantee the satisfactory functioning of the Francis Deak Canal, situated on Serb-Croat-Slovene territory, by means of hydraulic installations left on Hungarian territory.

Ada-Kalessi Island

By a telegram dated July 11, General Franchet d’Esperey reported that Roumanians and the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes both claim the island of Ada-Kalessi, situated in the Danube opposite Orsova, left to Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin of 187822 and occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1908.

The Commission, considering that the island of Ada-Kalessi was occupied by Austria-Hungary, proposes that it be attributed to Roumania, successor to Austria-Hungary in regard to Transylvania which borders on the Danube opposite the island.

It requests that the clauses of Article 52 of the Final Act of Berlin which stipulate for the demilitarization of the island be maintained and, if necessary, confirmed.

Annex I

Telegram From General Franchet d’Esperey to the Minister of War

On March 27 last I refused the Serbs permission, in advance of a decision by the Peace Conference, to occupy the island of Ada-Kalessi, situated in the Danube to the east of Orsova.

The Roumanians also claim this island.

Since the boundary between Serbia and Roumania which’ you communicated to me does not mention this island, I beg that you be so kind as to acquaint me with the decision of the Peace Conference on this point.

Appendix H to HD–21


Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

In a letter addressed on July 10 to the President of the Peace Conference, [Page 474] the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes denounced the excesses committed by the agents and troops of the Government of the Magyar Soviets in the Prekomourie. It requested authorization for the Serb-Croat-Slovene state to occupy militarily the territories which should have been attributed to it in this region by the Conference.

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, to whom this request was submitted by the Secretary-General of the Conference, has the honor to recommend to the Supreme Council of the Allies:

That the boundary assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state in Prekomourie after an examination of the note presented by the Commission on July 22,25 be notified to the delegation of that state;
That, in conformity with the precedent established by the decisions of the Supreme Council in regard to Moravia, Transylvania, the basin of Klagenfurt, and the Banat, the military boundary coincide in Prekomourie with the political boundary.

That, consequently, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state be authorized to occupy immediately the territory delimited by the boundary which shall haye been notified to it.

Appendix I to HD–21


Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs Regarding Bukovina

In its report No. 1 of April 6, 1919, the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, taking into consideration the national aspirations of the Roumanians in Bukovina, the economic ties of this region with Roumania, and the advantage that the Ruthenians of Bukovina would find in associating themselves with the Roumanians, admitted in principle that it would be just to attach Bukovina as a whole to Roumania.

Nevertheless, it did rectify the historic boundaries of Bukovina to the disadvantage of Roumania at two points: at the north, in order to avoid cutting the railroad which connects the two Galician cities of Kolomea and Zaleszczyki, at the west in order to reserve the position of the Ruthenian populations inhabiting in compact masses the basin of Czeremosz.

[Page 475]

The Supreme Council has approved these proposals.

Since that date, the territories thus detached from Bukovina, which are actually occupied by Roumanian troops, have not been assigned to any state. On the other hand, Eastern Galicia, which they border upon, has been placed with a guarantee of autonomy, under the supervision of the Polish Republic.

In the presence of this new situation, the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs has submitted its previous conclusions to a new examination.

Considering, on the one hand, that the Polish delegation, far from making any pretension to any part whatever of Bukovina, has instead showed itself disposed to concede to Roumania an extension of territory in this region;

Considering, on the other hand, that there would be a political advantage in giving satisfaction to the Roumanian Government and to Roumanian opinion by respecting as far as possible the historic boundaries of Bukovina;

Considering, however, the necessity of leaving outside of Roumanian territory the Kolomea-Zaleszczyki railroad, necessary to Galician communications;

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs has the honor to recommend to the Supreme Council the attachment to Roumania of Bukovina in its entirety, except for the territory traversed by the Zaleszczyki-Kolomea railroad. The line that it proposes for the approval of the Council is described in annex I appended hereto.

Annex I

Roumanian Boundary Line in Bukovina

A line leaving the thalweg of the Dniester at a point about 2 kilometers down stream from Zaleszczyki.

From there toward the southwest to the point of meeting of the administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina with the boundary between the districts of Horodenka and Sniatyn at about 11 kilometers to the southeast of Horodenka.

A line to be determined on the ground passing through numbers 317–312 and 239.

From there toward the southwest the old administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina to its point of meeting with the old boundary between Hungary and Galicia.

Then following this boundary in the direction northwest to number 1655, etc. …

[Page 476]

Appendix J to HD–21


reparations commission financial commission secretariat

Note for the Supreme Council of the Allies

In execution of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 26, 1919,29 the Serbian, Roumanian, and Greek delegations have been notified of the financial and reparations clauses of the Conditions of- Peace with Bulgaria.

The Financial Commission and the Reparations Commission have examined carefully the observations presented by the different delegations.

The observations relative to the reparations clauses bear upon three principal points:

(1) Regarding the recovery of objects stolen or carried away from the occupied territories, the Reparation Commission is of the opinion that the observations presented are justified, and it proposes to the Supreme Council to add a new article (article V of the appended draft of July 2930) to the clauses accepted by the Supreme Council on July 26.31

(2) Regarding the deliveries of cattle to be imposed on Bulgaria. The Greek, Roumanian, and Serbian claims amount to almost a million head of cattle.

A new study of Bulgaria’s cattle resources has led the Commission to estimate that the demands presented by the three delegations could not be satisfied without ruining the economic life of Bulgaria, which is essentially an agricultural country and which lives principally from its farming and cattle raising.

It considers that the number of heads of cattle to be demanded from Bulgaria should not exceed 80,000, a figure ten times lower than that of the demands presented by the three interested powers.

Consequently, the Commission proposes to modify the figures inserted in the text approved by the Supreme Council on July 26, and to increase the deliveries of cattle (with the exception of bulls) to Greece and to Roumania by 50 percent, and to Serbia by 100 percent.

(3) In regard to the financial clauses, almost all the observations [Page 477] formulated relate to article 10 concerning the division of the Bulgarian debt.

The Financial Commission considers that the text adopted by the Supreme Council on July 26 might lend itself to confusion, and it proposes a new text which specifies clearly the obligations of the grantee powers not only with regard to the Bulgarian debt but also regarding the Ottoman debt appertaining to the ceded territory.

The Commission also submits to the Supreme Council a modification of form intended to make clearer the draft of article II concerning public property situated in the ceded territories.

Appendix K to HD–21


From: General Duval, Chairman of the Commission on Aerial Conditions.

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to submit to you two requests voted unanimously by the Commission on Aerial Conditions in its meeting of July 26th in order to examine:

The conditions under which the war material to be delivered by Germany might be divided among the Allied and Associated Powers.
The measures to be taken to avoid creating, in neutral countries or in Allied countries not included in the division, an outlet for German aeronautic industry by the sale, cession or exchange of the material delivered.

The Commission, composed of Delegates of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Belgium, requests:

That the Supreme Council determine the principles which shall govern the distribution of all the war material delivered by the Central Powers as a result of the application of the conditions of the Peace Treaty, whether it is a question of material to be utilized on land, at sea or in the air, and that the Interallied Commissions of Control be instructed to settle the details of the distribution by applying the principles thus established.
That this war material, once allotted to and accepted by the Government of one of the Allied or Associated Powers, become the property of this Government, which shall pledge itself not to allow this material afterward to go beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.

[Page 478]

Appendix M [L] to HD–21


italian delegation to the peace conference military section

Delivery of Arms and Munitions by German-Austria to Czechoslovakia

In its Session of July 25th, the Council of Five drafted the telegram (already known and a copy of which is appended) asking for information concerning the delivery to the Czecho-Slovak Army of war material existing in Austria.

On that subject, the following must be noted:

1st—Since the month of May last, the Czecho-Slovak Government has been asking, through M. Allize, Representative of the French Government in Vienna, for the cession of Austrian arms and munitions, to General Segré, Italian Representative in Vienna, who fully agreed with that request.

2nd—At the same time, the Supreme War Council of Versailles, while specifying the means for placing the Czecho-Slovak Army in a position to resist the Hungarian counter offensive of the first days of June, proposed, in its session of June 7th, that the supplies of this army be increased by the war material of German Austria and that the cession of this material be made, however, through the Italian Armistice Commission in Vienna.

The Council of Four, at its meeting of June 9th, fully approved this proposal of the Versailles Committee.34

Soon afterwards, during the month of June, Marshal Foch sent a letter to General Diaz, asking him to instruct General Segre to give orders so that the cession of war material by Austria to Czechoslovakia might be facilitated and hastened.

3rd—These instructions were given, and, indeed, on June 25th, the Italian G. H. Q. informed us that the Italian Mission in Vienna had obtained, from the Austro-Hungarian Government, the cession to the Czecho-Slovak Army of 20,000 rifles, 500 machine guns, 50,000 rounds of artillery munitions, a few million cartridges, a cession which is in the course of execution.

Besides, on June 30th, the following material had already been delivered to Czecho-Slovakia:

[Page 479]

Italian Material

130 Fiat Machine guns,
1,800 Muskets, 91 Model,
1,105 Revolvers,
3,000 Daggers,
21,728 Rifles, 91 Model,
3,210,000 Cartridges for machine guns,
1,144,800 Cartridges for arms, 91 Model,
200,000 Cartridges for arms, 91 Model, repaired,
200,000 Cartridges with explosive bullets,
108,000 Cartridges for muskets,
30,000 Cartridges for revolvers, 7.65.

Material From the Former Austro-Hungarian Government

3 Batteries of 15 c/m (4 pieces each)
4 Batteries of 10 c/m (4 pieces each)
8 Batteries of 8 c/m (4 pieces each)
132 Scwarzlose machine guns,
15,800 Austrian rifles,
31,000 Complete series (Austrian rifles)
17,000 Complete series of trimmings (slings and belts)
6,000 Rounds of 15 c/m
16,000 Rounds of 10 c/m
33,000 Rounds of 8 c/m
10,080,000 Cartridges for Austrian rifles.


It is decided that, after notification of the President, the text of the following telegram concerning the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks shall be sent to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna:

“The Austrian Delegation to the Peace Conference has answered as follows to the communication of the Conference ordering the Austrian Government to deliver its war material: ‘All the arms and munitions asked for until now are being delivered to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission in Vienna. This Mission has undertaken to transmit the material in question to the Czecho-Slovak Government, a procedure arrived at with the full cognizance and consent of the Allied and Associated Representatives in Vienna.’

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers asks:

—Who gave the consent mentioned in the Austrian answer and in what form was it given;
—If the arms and munitions delivered by the Austrian Government were delivered to the Royal Italian Mission only or to the Representatives of Italy and France;
—For how long has this delivery been taking place.
—What are the total amounts of the various categories of material, and what is the proportion already delivered.”

  1. General P. Nudant, French representative and president of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.
  2. Matthias Erzberger, German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance.
  3. Fernand Larnaude, French representative, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties.
  4. Appendix III to CF–64, vol. vi, p. 393.
  5. See FM–29, minute 1, p. 8.
  6. Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.
  7. French representatives on the Financial Commission.
  8. Respectively French, American, and Italian representatives on the Aeronautical Commission.
  9. Ante, p. 263.
  10. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  11. Gen. Charles Joseph Dupont, head of the French Military Mission at Berlin.
  12. Abbreviation for Die Deutsche Waffenstillstandskommission (German Armistice Commission).
  13. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  14. 1 million Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, May 22 (agent apparently reliable)
    Intelligence Service Aix-la-Chapelle, June 25 (officer attached to the Ministry of Marine)
    Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 1, 1,500,000 men (Intelligence includes reserves)
    Declaration from Foerster (Berne, July 19—Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, May 21)
    Intelligence Service, Mayence, July 7 (reliable source)
    800,000 Intelligence Service, July 26 (declarations by German officers)

    [Footnote in the original.]

  15. Reichs-Gesetzlatt, 1919, No. 57, p. 295.
  16. Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, June 27. [Footnote in the original.]
  17. Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 22. [Footnote in the original.]
  18. Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 16. [Footnote in the original.]
  19. Intelligence Service, Mayence, July 5. [Footnote in the original.]
  20. Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 22. [Footnote in the original.]
  21. See special study Intelligence Service fortnightly No. 2, Bureau No. 1, August. [Footnote in the original.]
  22. Circular of the Ministry of War, April. [Footnote in the original.]
  23. See note No. 2. Bureau, July 28. [Footnote in the original.]
  24. Instruction of July 14 (Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 23) [Footnote in the original.]
  25. Decree of July 2 (Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 26). The effective force of the gendarmery increased in 1919 from 240 officers, 9,395 men to 318 officers, 14,537 men. [Footnote in the original.]
  26. Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 26. [Footnote in the original.]
  27. Note, Ministry of War, June 18. [Footnote in the original.]
  28. Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.
  29. “The military authorities systematically deceive the Entente regarding effectives” writes Professor Foerster. “Information supplied to various Allied Military Missions is intentionally erroneous.” [Footnote in the original.]
  30. “There are still military men who seem not to be aware of the conditions of the Peace Treaty”, declares the Freiheit after an inquiry at the recruiting offices, “and who think even less of fulfilling them.” [Footnote in the original.]
  31. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  32. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  33. See appendix IV to CF–71, vol. vi, p. 498.
  34. See CF–85, minute 3, vol. vi, p. 628.
  35. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  36. See Annex I. [Footnote in the original.]
  37. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  38. Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895.
  39. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  40. Appendix F to HD–21, p. 468.
  41. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  42. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  43. HD–15, minute 6, p. 324.
  44. This document does not accompany the minutes.
  45. Appendix D to HD–15, p. 330.
  46. The translation is that given in S–H Bulletin No. 607, August 1, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/667).
  47. The translation is that given in S–H Bulletin 648 (Paris Peace Cont 185.2151/24).
  48. For previous reference to this proposal, see CF–53, vol. vi, p. 254.