Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/15

HD–15

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 26, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, July 26, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. H. White.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman.
    • Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Berthelot.
    • M. de St. Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni.
  • Secretary
    • M. Paterno.
  • Japan
    • Baron Makino.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Col. U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Colonel Jones.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Marshal Foch, the Military Advisers, Mr. Hoover and the experts on Polish Affairs entered the room.

(1) M. Cambon said that the line proposed by Marshal Foch included in the Polish area the districts of Suvalki and Seiny. The population of this area was Polish. It was therefore preferable so to fix the line as to attribute those territories to Poland. Line of Demarcation Polish and Lithuanian Forces

M. Clemenceau asked whether these areas were still occupied by the Germans.

M. Cambon said the Germans were evacuating the territories slowly.

Mr. Balfour said he would like to know how the various lines which had been drawn had come about. He understood that the territory was Polish but that it had been deliberately excluded from Polish occupation by the Council of Five. If it were true that the Council had laid down a policy to which the Poles had refused to submit, it would not be very satisfactory to reverse the Council’s policy in favour of the Poles merely because they had been insubordinate.

General Le Rond explained that when it had been a question of establishing a line of demarcation between Poles and Germans a line had been drawn north and east of the districts of Suvalki and Seiny, giving these to the Poles. This line had been notified but had never been acted on. It had been drawn in accordance with a recommendation of the Committee dealing with the eastern frontiers of Poland. The recommendations of the Committee had come up before the Council but had not been accepted. All the experts had agreed that the territory in question was Polish.

M. Clemenceau said that he had been told that the territory was mostly Lithuanian. He would like to know what the opinion of the experts really was. (The American, British, French and Italian experts agreed that the population in these districts was mainly Polish.)

General Le Rond continuing, said that at a later date, according to the demands of the Lithuanian Military Mission, the question was brought before the Council and a line passing just north of Augustovo had been fixed as the line of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces. This was the green line on the annexed map (see Appendix A). The Poles had complained that there were distinctively Polish areas north of this line and on the 20th June they had proposed that the line of demarcation should be that shown in blue on the map. This line, not only enclosed Polish areas, but also a wide defensive zone in addition. The line since proposed by Marshal Foch, enclosed what were really Polish areas and only a shallow defensive zone in addition. This was the red line on the map.

(Note:—Map will be issued later.)

M. Clemenceau asked whether the change from the green to the red line had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles.

General Weygand said that this was not so. General Henrys¹ had been told to allow the Poles to occupy Polish territory evacuated by the Germans.

Mr. Balfour said that he had been given the impression that the Poles had defied the orders of the Conference, but he was prepared to accept the explanation given and to agree to the line proposed by Marshal Foch, in view of the unanimous opinion that the territory which would be assigned to the Poles was Polish in character.

(Marshal Foch was then instructed to communicate through General Henrys, the line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of Suvalki, Grodno, and Vilna, in accordance with the red line on the annexed map.)

2. Mr. Balfour said that he had had a talk with Mr. Hoover and as a result of his conversation, had prepared a draft Hungarian which he then read:— Hungarian Affairs

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian people, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. But if Peace is to be settled, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if the blockade is to be removed, if supplies are to be made available, the co-operation of the Hungarian people is required. It is only with a Government which really represents them that such a settlement can be arranged.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that the last paragraph meant that the Roumanians would have to evacuate territory occupied in what was to be Hungary according to the Treaty, as soon as the Armistice had been carried out on the Hungarian side. The draft dealt with one half of the Allied policy. It would explain to the world and to the Hungarians the intentions of the Powers. What instructions should be given to Marshal Foch to carry out this policy remained to be decided. He was strongly of opinion that the Council could not allow the Armistice to be violated with impunity. Having ordered the Hungarians to reduce their troops to six divisions and by implication to remain at peace with the Allies of the Powers, the latter could not sit and watch the Hungarians double their forces and attack their Allies. If Marshal Foch could put an end to this with the forces available, it appeared clear that he ought to do so.

M. Clemenceau said that when Mr. Balfour said that the Powers could not tolerate violation of the Armistice, he presumably meant all the Powers. It was noticeable, however, that there were no Italian, no British and no American troops available, but only the remnants of the two French divisions, together with Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs. According to Marshal Foch, the initial effort required would not be great, and the troops at hand might suffice, but the sequel must be considered.

M. Tittoni said that regarding Italian co-operation, he saw no difficulty in the region of foreign policy, but in respect to internal politics, the outlook was not so clear. Any campaign against Hungary would produce a general strike in Italy. The cost of living had reached heights unequaled in any other country. As to coal, there was only a fortnight’s margin. He must therefore state, with great regret, that the economic situation in Italy and its political consequences would not allow Italy to contribute any force for action against Hungary, although action in this direction would suit his foreign policy admirably.

Mr. Balfour said that two questions were raised by M. Clemenceau’s remarks. One was a general question, and the other was a military one. As to the latter, he need say little, as Marshal Foch considered he had enough troops on the spot to undertake action. As to the general question, he would like to ask whether in M. Clemenceau’s opinion, it was necessary, whenever Inter-Allied military action was required, that the troops be furnished by an equal contribution of all the Powers interested.

M. Clemenceau said that he had not meant his remarks to be stretched to that extent. He would like to say, however that his situation, though not as serious as M. Tittoni’s, had some analogies with it. There were two French divisions in Bulgaria who were expected to assist the Greeks, and there were two in Hungary, which were expected to act without any Allied assistance whatever.

Mr. Balfour said the only question remaining then was whether Marshal Foch was right in saying that he had enough troops to proceed with.

Marshal Foch said that he had reported on July 17th.² Nothing had happened in the intervening week to make him alter his views, provided a definite policy were adopted and an agreement were reached between small States who would be called upon to furnish the main contingent.

Mr. Balfour asked M. Clemenceau what alternative he had to the policy suggested.

M. Clemenceau said that his alternative would be to allow Hungary to settle her own fate without military intervention. The war was over, the American Army had been withdrawn very rapidly, the British Army nearly as rapidly, and the French Army was being demobilised. He was forced to demobilise very quickly; it could not be helped. He could not, therefore, contemplate the sending of two French divisions into Hungary unsupported by their Allies. There would shortly be only two classes under the colours in the French Army. Marshal Foch quite reasonably asked for a definition of the exact intentions of the Conference. This was a political question, and to tell the truth, it was hard to give him an answer. In any case, he was not ready to begin fighting again. He felt inclined to adopt the proposals made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hoover. He would encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way. Hence, it would be well, as Marshal Foch suggested, to consult the small Powers, who were, in any event, principally concerned. Their position was not clear. The Serbians would only act on certain conditions, the Roumanians also made reservations, and so did the Czechs. What was the net result?

Marshal Foch said that it was for this reason that he recommended that the small Powers should be consulted, in order that the Conference might determine whether their terms could be accepted.

Mr. Balfour said that he quite understood M. Clemenceau’s position. It meant, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers confessed their impotence to enforce their will on a small nation. If what had been said in the Council were known outside, namely, that all the Powers had demobilised so fast under the stress of domestic necessity, it would certainly be regarded as absurd that the Powers, which, eight months ago, were the conquerors of the world, could not, at the present moment, impose their will on an army of 120,000 men. This inglorious situation he did not particularly mind, but he wondered how the Conference would be able to terminate its work successfully. An unpleasant Treaty would have to be imposed on the Bulgarians, and a still more unpleasant one on the Turks. Further, the new small States lately created, must be controlled, and prevented from attacking one another. If the Conference could not enforce its will on Hungary, could it do all these things? If the picture drawn by M. Clemenceau was accurate, the Conference would have to leave its work unfinished.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not take such a gloomy view. All that he wished to do was to adapt the means at the command of the Conference to the ends it had in view. He believed Mr. Hoover held the key of the situation. The offer of food in return for good behaviour would be a very effective weapon. The case was similar to that of Russia, but in the case of Russia, there were no means of coercion, against the Hungarians there were. They could be surrounded, and in time, would have to come to terms. This might be inglorious, but there was little glory in fighting without men, or in making threats that could not be carried out.

Mr. Balfour said that there was not a very great difference between his policy and M. Clemenceau’s. Marshal Foch might be requested to demand that the Hungarians at least observed the Armistice.

M. Clemenceau said that a reiteration of this demand would not be of much avail, as it had already been made and neglected. He would prefer to accept the proposal Mr. Balfour had read, to avoid issuing any ultimatum, to refrain from engaging Marshal Foch or any troops and to give General Boehm the month for which he had asked. At the end of this time, the situation would not be much worse than the present, one-third of the French troops would have been demobilised, but there would still be means of action, if absolutely necessary.

Marshal Foch said that as long as there was no understanding between the great and the small Powers the situation would not be clear. It would not improve after the lapse of a month or even two or three months. It was even possible that the smaller Powers would get out of hand and destroy the edifice so laboriously set up by the Conference.

Mr. Balfour said that if assured that the situation would not grow worse he would raise no objection. He presumed that if the Military Authorities said that they could settle the matter at once, failing which the situation would grow worse, M. Clemenceau would agree to act. If Bela Kun was going to fall there need be no anxiety, but on the other hand if he were going to have a military success the result might be grievous.

M. Clemenceau said that he was not prepared to prophesy what would happen. The world had just gone through a fearful war and had only secured fragments of peace. The people were looking out for means of starting their economic life again. He wished to do nothing to jeopardise this reasonable ambition. He could not ask his people to go to war again. They would not do it with the same readiness as they did in 1914. The situation appeared to him to require prudence. No doubt prudence involved some elements of risk but there was a greater risk in giving an ultimatum which, if rejected, would lead to war. Marshal Foch did not offer a clear solution. He made his action conditional on the definition of a certain policy and on the agreement of the lesser powers concerned. Any check would have very serious results in Italy, as M. Tittoni said, in France and also probably in Great Britain. He did not wish to run this risk. The plans of General Boehm offered for the moment a better outlook than existed a week ago. If the Hungarians were really in the majority opposed to Bela Kun they might under the stress of M. Hoover’s blandishments over-throw the Bela Kun Government. There might then occur a favourable opportunity of which Marshal Foch could avail himself.

Mr. Balfour said that he sympathised with M. Clemenceau as he also had no wish to plunge the world into war again. He would add that without a French Commander-in-Chief and without the cooperation of the two French divisions he thought there was little prospect of success. As M. Clemenceau said that neither of these conditions could be fulfilled the case was judged; but he would like to say in justification of the advice he had given that he was not animated by any spirit of adventure. He wished to get his own and other countries out of an adventure. He wished to avoid further misfortunes in the future. He wished the Conference to have the authority which power alone could give. He agreed that the economic weapon was still available. Nevertheless rapid demobilisation had put the Conference into a difficulty which was almost comic. Right months ago the Allies had fifteen million men in the field; now it was difficult to lay hands on a single battalion. His fear had been that if Bela Kun were allowed to know that the Conference was militarily powerless he might use this knowledge to great effect and the evil might spread all over the world. If the French Government who had two divisions available declined to use them, it was not for him to press for the campaign. Possibly the prestige of past victories and economic power might enable the Allies to over-come this difficulty. He would therefore content himself with half of the policy he had proposed.

Mr. White said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. According to his information Bela Kun was backed by a strong Nationalist movement. Military interference would only reinforce this sentiment which it was not desirable to inflame. The less national support Bela Kun had, the better. The action exercised by Mr. Hoover would therefore have, he thought, greater chances of success than military intervention.

After some further discussion it was decided to issue in the Press and by wireless the following declaration:—

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a Peace with the Hungarian People and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a Government which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as denned by the Peace Conference will cease as soon as the terms of the armistice have in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

M. Clemenceau said that in the meantime conversations might be undertaken with the smaller powers.

Mr. Balfour thought that if it was intended to do nothing this was hardly desirable.

M. Clemenceau said that he had not meant to convey that he would never act: on some favourable occasion he might. Meanwhile if possible he would like to see the success of General Boehm.

Mr. Balfour said that if the smaller Powers were called in consultation, the state of demobilisation would have to be revealed to them.

M. Clemenceau said they could be dealt with individually and asked to state under what conditions they would act should action be decided on. The Serbians, for instance, had certain desiderata.

M. Tittoni said that they desired that the Conference should intercede between them and the Italians.

M. Clemenceau said the Conference would do so.

Mr. Balfour asked what news Marshal Foch had received of the Roumanian Forces.

Marshal Foch said that the news was not bad and that the Roumanians were not alarmed by the Hungarian attack.

Mr. Balfour said that it would make a great difference if the Hungarian attack failed. Should Bela Kun fall of his own weight it would certainly be better than if he were overthrown by the Allies.

(It was then decided that Marshal Foch should continue negotiations with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak Delegations in order to obtain from them their exact views regarding the guarantees they required for military intervention in Hungary.)

3. M. Clemenceau read the telegram from General Henrys asking, in agreement with the Entente Military representatives, that energetic action should be taken to force the Germans to cease hostilities in Silesia and in Posnania. The village of Wirruszom had been daily bombarded and partially destroyed. Women and children had been killed and the population was abandoning the village and the cultivation of the fields. Steps To Be Taken To Comple the Germans To Cease Hostilities in Silesia

Marshal Foch said that on the 24th, instructions had been sent to General Nudant³ asking him to order the Germans to put a stop to this at once.

Mr. Balfour suggested that it would be desirable to send a Mission immediately.

Mr. Hoover said the situation in Silesia was producing a very serious diminution of the output of coal. Most of central Europe depended on Silesia for coal. For instance, the parlous condition of Vienna resulted from this situation. The best hope resided in an early appointment of a Commission which might restore order. In view of the plebiscite, both Poles and Germans were conducting active propaganda which was having a demoralising effect on production.

M. Tittoni said he had already nominated the Italian member on the Commission.

M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch, in consultation with the French War Office, to arrange for a designation of the French member.

(It was decided that each power should nominate one member for a Commission to undertake the administration of the plebiscite area of Silesia during the period of plebiscite.)

(It was further decided that the Commission for the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of Germany be appointed as speedily as possible. It should be composed of four officers for each power (one Commissioner, Head of the Commission, one Assistant Commissioner, two Technical officers.) The nominations were to be made on the following Monday (see Appendix C to H. D. 8. para 2⁴).

Mr. White said that he could not make a nomination without reference to Washington; in fact, no American nomination would be possible before ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

M. Clemenceau said that the other members could be nominated in the meantime.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Experts withdrew, and M. Clementel⁵ and the Financial & Economic Experts entered the room.)

4. (After a statement by M. Clementel (see Appendix “B”), it was decided that the examination of the question should be resumed on the following Monday.)Economic Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty With Bulgaria

Baron Makino gave notice of an amendment to Article 29, which he would propose at the next meeting. (See Appendix “C”.)

5. Colonel Peel said that there was unanimous agreement about these clauses (see Appendix “D”). The gist of the proposals was that Bulgaria should undertake to pay two milliards and a francs in gold. This sum might be reduced by the Reparation Commission should it consider it excessive. An international body, distinct from the Reparation Commission, on which France, Great Britain and Italy would be represented, would be established in Sofia to work out the details. It would have considerable powers, both of raising and controlling taxation in order that the Reparation clauses should be duly executed. Reparation Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty With Bulgaria

(The Reparation clauses submitted were then accepted.)

6. M. Sergent said that there was complete agreement regarding the Financial Clauses. (See Appendix “E”.)

Financial Clauses for the Treaty With Bulgaria Mr. White said that the American Expert had a word to say.

Mr. Dulles said that he thought the text of the Reparation and Financial Clauses should be communicated to the Serbians, Roumanians and Greeks, as they were concerned.

Mr. Balfour asked what had been done regarding similar clauses in the Treaty with Austria.

Mr. Dulles said that there had been a plenary meeting at which the smaller Powers had complained of the short time they had for considering the proposals.

Mr. Balfour asked whether they were likely to wish to discuss the proposals or merely to hear them.

Colonel Peel said that he felt sure that they would be anxious to discuss them and that the discussion would be interminable. He agreed however that the clauses should be communicated to them.

(It was agreed that the Serbian, Roumanian and Greek Delegations should be informed by the President of the Committees, which had drafted the financial and reparation clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria, of the provisions of these clauses. Should no modification of the present draft result, the text should be communicated forthwith to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.)

(The Experts then withdrew.)

7. It was agreed that the nominations of this Commission should be sent to the Secretary-General as speedily as possible. A Commission for the Delimitation of Frontier Between Belgium and Germany

8. Members of the Commission on Baltic Affairs entered the room.

The following document was read:—

“Considering the importance of maintaining ordered and stable Governments in the Baltic territories as a barrier against Bolshevism on the one hand and against German aggression on the other, and the necessity of close co-operation between these Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments which can only be secured if the Baltic peoples have complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies to protect their liberties in case of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia, the Baltic Commission are of opinion that the time has come when the Allied and Associated Powers should clearly define their policy towards these Governments and recommend that a joint declaration be made to them in the following sense:— Declaration Proposed by Commission on Baltic Affairs To Be Addressed to the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

In response to the representation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Delegations, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the fifth condition of their Note to Admiral Koltchak,⁶ which runs as follows:—

‘If a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.’

The Allied and Associated Governments are anxious and willing to do all in their power to assist the Baltic Governments to organise their local defences and to re-establish in the interests of general peace an orderly and stable government in these countries.

They further declare their intention to protect their liberties in the event of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia.

At the same time it seems to them impossible to reach any definite solution which will guarantee a durable peace without a previous arrangement with a recognised Russian Government, and while reserving to themselves the right of collaboration either directly or through the League of Nations to obtain a settlement satisfactory to both parties, they cannot at the present moment take any steps which would bind them as regards a definite settlement pending the restoration of a recognised Russian Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers would add that they feel confident that if they assist the Governments of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia, they may rely on these Governments to accept such provisions as the Allied and Associated Powers may consider necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities in these territories.”

Mr. Balfour said that the objections to these proposals were clear to him. Their advantages were not manifest.

M. della Torretta said that no precise instructions had been given to the Commission on Baltic Affairs. It had therefore studied questions connected with the New States set up on the north west frontier of Russia. There were in these countries de facto Governments which had been encouraged by the Allied and Associated Powers to resist, both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, who were either intriguing against them or fighting them. The Commission had thought that these Governments required some moral support from the Entente. A dispatch had been sent to Admiral Koltchak from the Conference in which reference had been made to these New States. A satisfactory answer had come from Admiral Koltchak, The Commission thought that it was opportune to do something to encourage these New States. They could not be offered independence, but they might be offered some guarantee for the preservation of their liberties without interfering with Russian sovereignty. In some way or other these de facto Governments must be recognised.

Mr. Balfour said that he had some doubt concerning the Policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It was unlikely even to please the new states. In one paragraph the telegram to Koltchak was quoted. This telegram was known to the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians. Nothing was therefore gained by restating it. The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers could not do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions they were being given. If this declaration were made, the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. The next paragraph was either not new or represented a somewhat formidable undertaking on the part of the Entente Powers to enter into antagonism with a strong centralised Government in Russia. Such a declaration would not help the Baltic States and might greatly embarrass the Allied Powers. The first sentence of the next paragraph appeared to him to go too far. He hoped that Russia would reconstitute itself, but for the time being he saw no elements tending in that direction. Was it desirable to tell the Baltic States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. As to the last paragraph, desirable as the proposals suggested might be, it was not an opportune moment to ask for the acceptance of these provisions at a time when the Allied Powers could only offer a very slight assistance to the Baltic States. He could not help thinking that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it failed to convey the encouragement it wished to convey. He would not advise the Council to accept it.

M. della Torretta said that the Commission had been unanimous and had considered that its proposals followed directly from the Allied Policy outlined in the telegram to Koltchak. There seemed to be no other way of reconciling the unity of Russia with an offer of autonomy to the Baltic peoples. Certain things had been done which had led these peoples to believe that their fate would be settled by the Conference. They were being supplied with money, arms and munitions. The declaration suggested made no essential alteration in the Allied attitude. All that was aimed at was a transitory regularisation of the situation and a confirmation of the declarations previously made. The Commission was informed that the Baltic Governments required some encouragement of this kind to continue action against the Bolsheviks on one hand and the Germans on the other.

M. Pichon said that the Lithuanians, Esthonians and Letts had repeatedly asked the Governments of the Powers to recognise them. They had always been told that their efforts were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as de facta Governments in their struggles against Bolsheviks. They had always been told, however, that the Powers could go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation. The Council of Five had always kept these two considerations closely connected. The Baltic Delegates had asked whether the Conference would end without settling the question of Russia. He had replied that he hoped it would not but he could not undertake to make a definite statement. The declaration suggested by the Commission would not, he thought, give them any particular satisfaction nor would it please the Russians. What the Baltic States really wanted was separation. This the Conference could not for the time being offer them. Promises of autonomy would not satisfy them. No other declaration, however, could be made without producing a very difficult situation in regard to Russia.

M. della Torretta said that the Commission recognised that the declaration would not entirely satisfy the Baltic States. It would, however, be a beginning. On the other hand it would not displease the Russians as it did not threaten the separation of the Baltic Provinces which they feared.

(After some further discussion the question was adjourned.)

(9) M. Clemenceau read a telegram suggesting that three Karelian Delegates elected by an Assembly held at Olonetz be heard by the Peace Conference in order to express the wishes of the population of that region. The Finnish Government was greatly interested in the question and would like the affairs of Karelia to be explained to the Conference. Despatch of a Karelian Delegation to the Peace Conference

(After some discussion it was decided to refer the question to the Commission on Baltic Affairs.)

(10) M. Clemenceau said that the Council of Transylvania had asked the French Representative at Bucharest to grant passports to five Swabians of the Banat anxious to come to Paris to explain to the Conference the desires of the populations they represented. M. Bratiano favoured their request. Before authorising the Delegation to proceed to France the French Government wished to know the opinion of the Allied and Associated Delegations. Despatch of a Delegation of Swabians from the Banat

(It was decided that this question should be referred to the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, July 26, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–15

[Appendix A, referred to on page 316 as a map upon which are indicated the lines of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces, does not accompany the file copy of the minutes. The map is filed under Paris Peace Conf. 186.3116/4.]

Appendix B to HD–15

[Translation⁸]

Observations on the Economic Clauses Inserted in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria

The economic clauses to be inserted in the treaty with Bulgaria were adopted unanimously by the Economic Commission. Later, three modifications were proposed, relating to articles 35, 36, and 51.

Article 35

Article 35, which was unanimously adopted by the Economic Commission, has been made the subject of reservations by the English delegation. The effect of this article is to confirm the substitution of Bulgaria in the obligations of Turkey with regard to concessionaires and beneficiaries of contracts in the territories ceded to Bulgaria under the 1912 [1913?] treaties.

This substitution was guaranteed by the Bulgaro-Turk treaty of September 16/29, 1913⁹ and by the Greco-Turk treaty of November 1/4 [14], 1913.¹⁰

In order to accede to the requests of the English delegation, as well as to certain reservations which have been made in recent days by interested French groups, it would perhaps be expedient to suppress article 35 and to deal with the question in the treaty with Turkey.

The necessary guarantee would be assured by the insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria:

(a) Of a general clause providing that:

“Bulgaria undertakes to adhere, in matters which concern her, to all the stipulations of the treaty which the Allied and Associated Powers will conclude with Turkey.”

(b) A clause to be inserted in the treaty with Bulgaria providing that:

“the cession states of Bulgarian territories will assure to the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers and to the companies controlled by them in the transferred territories, the advantages and guarantees which they enjoy under the Bulgaro-Turk treaty of September 16/29, 1913 or of the Greco-Turk treaty of November 1/14, 1913.”

Article 36

(1) In the first two lines, it is a question of agreements between the Bulgarian Government and Allied companies which would seem to exclude concessions granted by Bulgarian authorities other than the Government. For this reason, it would seem expedient to replace the words: “The Bulgarian Government” by “The Bulgarian authorities”, so as to include especially various concessions granted by the city of Sophia, and whose owners have been robbed of them.

Article 51

Article 51 was formulated before changes were made, on the one hand, in the treaty with Germany (article 297, paragraph (h) 2 and article 92), and on the other hand in the treaty with Austria (article 49 of Part X, Economic Clauses).

Article 51 becomes useless, since article 31 was put in harmony with the doctrine of the preceding treaties. According to this doctrine, Bulgarian property in the transferred territory could be liquidated only for the benefit of Bulgarian claimants, but the Reparations Commission could oppose the payment of the proceeds of these liquidations.

clauses reserved

The four clauses (A) to (D) contained in the annex, are those for which the Economic Commission did not consider itself solely competent. The Economic Commission transmitted them to other Commissions. Clause (A) alone received favorable consideration from the Commissions consulted by the General Secretariat. A final decision could not be obtained to date on clauses (B) and (C).

Appendix C to HD–15

[Translation¹¹]

Draft of Article 29 for Insertion in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria

The privileges and immunities of foreign subjects as well as the rights of jurisdiction and of consular protection attaching to the Allied and Associated Powers in Bulgaria in virtue of capitulations and usages as well as of treaties can be made the subject of special conventions between each of the interested Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria. Concerning these matters, the principal Allied and Associated Powers will enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in Bulgaria.

The Allied and Associated Powers concerned undertake among themselves to formulate only conditions to the stipulations of the present treaty. In case of difference of opinion among them, the League of Nations will be called upon to decide.

Appendix D to HD–15

July 25, 1919.

Bulgarian Treaty.—Reparations Clauses

Article 1

Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make adequate reparation.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the resources of Bulgaria are not sufficient to enable her to make adequate reparation. Bulgaria, therefore, agrees to pay and the Allied and Associated Powers agree to accept, as being such reparation as Bulgaria is able to make, the sum of 2,250,000,000 (two and a-quarter milliards) francs gold.

This amount shall (except as hereinafter provided) be discharged by a series of half-yearly payments on the 1st January and the 1st July in each year, beginning on the 1st July, 1920.

The payments on the 1st July, 1920, and the 1st January, 1921, shall represent interest at the rate of 2 per cent, per annum on the total sum from the 1st January, 1920. Thereafter, each half-yearly payment shall include payment of interest at 5 per cent, per annum on the amount of the capital sum outstanding, and the payment of a sinking fund at a rate sufficient to extinguish the total amount in 37 years from the 1st January, 1921.

These sums shall be remitted through the Inter-Allied Commission created under this Treaty to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed on the 28th June, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as the Reparation Commission), and shall be disposed of by the Reparation Commission in accordance with the arrangements already made.

If the Reparation Commission desires at any time to dispose, either by sale or otherwise, of gold bonds based on the payments to be made by Bulgaria, it shall have power to do so. The nominal amount of the bonds shall be fixed by it after taking due account of the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of this Part in consultation with the Inter-Allied Commission, but shall in no case exceed the total capital sums then outstanding.

Bulgaria undertakes in such case to deliver to the Reparation Commission, through the Inter-Allied Commission, the necessary bonds in such form, number, denominations and terms as the Reparation Commission may determine. These bonds shall be free of all taxes and charges of every description established, or to be established, by the Bulgarian Government.

These bonds shall be the direct obligations of the Bulgarian Government, but all arrangements for the service of the bonds shall be made by the Inter-Allied Commission. The Inter-Allied Commission shall pay all interests, sinking fund or other charges connected with the bonds out of the half-yearly payments to be made by Bulgaria in accordance with this Article. The surplus, if any, shall continue to be paid to the order of the Reparation Commission.

Article 2

The Inter-Allied Commission shall from time to time consider the resources and capacity of Bulgaria, and, after giving her Representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to recommend to the Reparation Commission either a reduction of any particular payment due or a postponement of such payment or a reduction of the total capital sum to be paid by Bulgaria. The Reparation Commission shall have power by a majority of votes to make any reduction or postponement up to the extent recommended by the Inter-Allied Commission.

Article 3

Bulgaria shall have the power at any time, if she so desires, to make immediate payments in reduction of the total capital sum due over and above the half-yearly payments.

Article 4

Bulgaria recognises the transfer to the Allied and Associated Powers of any claims by the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey against the Bulgarian Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers, on the other hand, agree not to require from Bulgaria any payment in respect of claims so transferred arising out of the supply by Austria-Hungary and Germany of war material since the 1st August, 1914, as they have taken these claims into account in fixing the amount to be paid by Bulgaria under Article 1.

Article 5

Bulgaria binds herself to discover and forthwith return to the Governments of Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State respectively any records or archives or any articles of archaeological, historic or artistic interest which have been taken away from the territories of those countries during the present war.

Any dispute between the Governments above named and Bulgaria as to the ownership of any such articles shall be referred to an arbiter to be appointed by the Inter-Allied Commission, whose decision shall be final.

Article 6

Bulgaria further binds herself to deliver to the Governments of Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, within six months from the coming into force of this Treaty, livestock of the descriptions and in the numbers set out in the Annex of this Article.

These animals shall be delivered at such places as may be appointed by the respective Governments. They shall be inspected before delivery by agents appointed by the Inter-Allied Commission, who shall satisfy themselves that the animals so delivered are of average health and condition.

No credit shall be made to Bulgaria in respect of their value, but the animals handed over shall be regarded as having been delivered in restitution for animals taken away by Bulgaria during the war from the territories of the countries named.

annex to article 6

	Greece	Serbia	Roumania
Bulls (18 months to 3 years)	15	50	60
Milch Cows (2 to 6 years)	1,000	3,000	4,000
Horses and Mares (3 to 7 years)	1,500	2,500	3,500
Mules	300	500	700
Draught Oxen	1,200	2,000	2,800
Sheep	4,000	6,000	10,000

Article 7

By way of special compensation for the destruction caused to the coal-mines situated on Serbian territory by the Bulgarian armies, the Bulgarian Government undertakes, subject to the proviso contained in the final paragraph of this Article, to deliver to the Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during five years from the coming into force of this Treaty 50,000 tons of coal a year, from the output of the Bulgarian State mines at Pernik. These deliveries will be made free on rail on the Serbian frontier on the Pirot-Sofia railway.

The value of these deliveries will not be credited to Bulgaria, and will not be taken in diminution of the payment required under Article 1.

Provided, nevertheless, that these deliveries will only be made subject to the approval of the Inter-Allied Commission, which approval shall only be given if and in so far as the Commission is satisfied that such deliveries of coal will not unduly interfere with the economic life of Bulgaria. The decision of the Commission on this point shall be final.

Article 8

The following shall be reckoned as credits to Bulgaria in respect of her reparation obligations:—

Amounts due to Bulgaria in respect of transfers under Part … (Financial clauses)^* (Economic), (Ports and Waterways).

Article 9

In order to facilitate the discharge by Bulgaria of the obligations assumed by her under this Treaty, there shall be established at Sofia as soon as possible after the signature of this Treaty an Inter-Allied Commission, composed of three members to be nominated respectively by the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy.

The Government of Bulgaria shall be represented by a Commissioner, who shall take part in the sittings of the Commission whenever invited by the Commission to do so, but shall not have the right to vote.

The Inter-Allied Commission shall be constituted in the form and shall possess the powers prescribed by the present Treaty, including the Annex to this Article.

The Commission shall continue in existence as long as any of the payments due under the terms of this Part of the present Treaty remain unpaid. Each Government represented on the Commission shall have the right to withdraw therefrom upon six months’ notice filed with the Commission.

The Members of the Inter-Allied Commission shall enjoy the same diplomatic rights and immunities as the personnel of the Legations accredited to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Government agrees to provide by law, within six months of the coming into force of this Treaty, the necessary authority for the functioning of this Commission. The text of this law must be approved in advance by the Powers represented on the Commission. It must conform to the principles and rules laid down in the Annex to this Article and also to any other relevant provisions laid down in this Treaty.

annex to article 9

1. The Commission shall elect a Chairman annually from its members, and it shall establish its own rules and procedure.

Each member shall have the right to nominate a deputy to act for him in his absence.

Decisions shall be taken by the vote of the majority (except when a unanimous vote is expressly required). Abstention from voting is to be treated as a vote against the proposal under discussion. In case of an equality of votes, when the difference of opinion among the members of the Commission cannot be solved by reference to their Governments, the question at issue shall be referred for decision to the Reparation Commission.

The Commission shall appoint such agents and employees as it may deem necessary for its work.

The cost of administration of the Commission shall be paid by Bulgaria and shall be a first charge on the revenues payable to the Commission. The salaries of the members of the Commission shall be fixed on a reasonable basis by agreement from time to time between the Governments represented on the Commission.

2. Bulgaria undertakes to afford to the members, officers and agents of the Commission full power to visit and inspect at all reasonable times any places, public works or undertakings in Bulgaria, and to furnish to the said Commission all records, documents and information which it may require.

3. The Bulgarian Government undertakes to place at the disposal of the Commission in each half-year sufficient amounts in francs gold, or such other currency as the Commission may decide, to enable it to remit at due date the payments on account of reparation; the Bulgarian Government also undertakes to pay to the Commission any other such amounts as may be necessary to meet obligations undertaken by Bulgaria under this Treaty.

In the law relating to the Commission, there shall be laid down a list of the taxes and revenues (now existing or hereafter to be created) estimated to be sufficient to produce the sums above referred to. This list of taxes and revenues shall include all revenues or receipts arising from concessions made or to be made for the working of mines or quarries or for the carrying on of any works of public utility or of any monopolies for the manufacture or sale of any articles in Bulgaria. This list of taxes and revenues may be altered from time to time with the unanimous consent of the Commission.

If at any time the revenues so assigned shall prove insufficient, the Bulgarian Government undertakes to assign additional revenues. If the Bulgarian Government does not assign sufficient revenues within three months of a demand by the Commission, the Commission shall have the right to add to the list additional revenues created or to be created, and the Bulgarian Government undertakes to pass the necessary law.

In case of default by Bulgaria in the performance of her obligations expressed in Articles 1 and 9 and in the Annex to Article 9 the Commission shall be entitled to the extent and for the period it may determine to assume the full control and management of and undertake the collection of such taxes and sources of revenue and to hold and disburse the proceeds thereof, and to apply any net proceeds after meeting the cost of administration and collection to the satisfaction of the reparation obligations of Bulgaria, subject to any priorities laid down in this Treaty.

In the case of such action by the Commission in consequence of a default by Bulgaria, Bulgaria undertakes to recognise irrevocably the authority and powers of the said Commission, to abide by its decisions and to obey its directions.

4. By agreement with the Bulgarian Government, the Commission shall have power to assume the control and management and the collection of any taxes, even if no default has occurred.

5. The Commission shall also take over any other duties which may be assigned to it under this Treaty.

6. No member of the Commission shall be responsible, except to the Government appointing him, for any action or omission of such member. No one of the Allied or Associated Governments assumes any responsibility in respect of any other Government.

Article 10

Bulgaria undertakes to pass, issue and maintain in force any legislation, orders and decrees that may be necessary to give effect to these provisions.

Appendix E to HD–15

July 25, 1919.

Financial Clauses for Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria

Article 1

Subject to the provisions of Article 7 and to such exceptions as the Inter-Allied Commission established by Article …, Chapter …, of the present Treaty may unanimously approve, a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of Bulgaria shall be the cost of reparation and all other costs arising under the present Treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto, or under arrangements concluded between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers during the Armistice.

Up to the 1st May, 1921, the Bulgarian Government shall not export or dispose of, and shall prohibit the export or disposal of gold without the previous approval of the Inter-Allied Commission.

Article 2

There shall be paid by Bulgaria the total cost of all armies of the Allied Governments occupying territory within its boundaries, as defined by the present Treaty, from the date of the signature of the Armistice of the 29th September, 1918,¹² including the keep of men and beasts, lodging and billeting, pay and allowances, salaries and wages, bedding, heating, lighting, clothing, equipment, harness and saddlery, armament and rolling-stock, air services, treatment of sick and wounded, veterinary and remount services, transport services of all sorts (such as by rail, sea or river, motor lorries), communications and correspondence, and, in general, the cost of all administrative or technical services, the working of which is necessary for the training of troops and for keeping their numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.

The cost of such liabilities under the above heads, so far as they relate to purchases or requisitions by the Allied Governments in the occupied territory, shall be paid by the Bulgarian Government to the Allied Governments in any legal currency of Bulgaria. In cases where an Allied Government, in order to make such purchases or requisitions in the occupied territory, has incurred expenditure in a currency other than Bulgarian currency, such expenditure shall be reimbursed in Bulgarian currency at the rate of exchange current at the date of reimbursement, or at an agreed rate.

All other of the above costs shall be paid in the currency of the country to which the payment is due.

Article 3

Bulgaria engages to pay towards the charge for the service of the external pre-war Ottoman Public Debt, both in respect of territory ceded by Turkey under the Treaty of Constantinople, 1913,¹³ for the period during which such territory was under Bulgarian sovereignty, and in respect of territory the cession of which is confirmed by this Treaty, such sums as may be determined hereafter by the Commission to be appointed for the purpose of assessing the contributive parts of that debt amongst the Powers to which Ottoman territory is ceded.

Article 4

The priority of the charges established by Articles 1, 2, and 3 shall be as follows:—

(i.) The first charge shall be for the cost of military occupation as defined by Article 2 of the present chapter of this Treaty.

(ii.) The second charge shall be for the service of such part of the external pre-war Ottoman Public Debt as may be attributed to Bulgaria under this or any other Treaty in respect of the cession to Bulgaria of territory formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire.

(iii.) The third charge shall be for the cost of reparation as prescribed by this Treaty or any Treaties or agreements supplementary thereto.

Article 5

Bulgaria confirms the surrender of all material handed over or to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of the 29th September, 1918, and recognises the title of the Allied and Associated Powers to such material.

There shall be credited to the Government of Bulgaria against the sums due from it to the Allied and Associated Powers for reparation, the value, as assessed by the Reparation Commission acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, of such of the above material for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, be allowed.

Property belonging to the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals, restored or surrendered under the Armistice Agreement, in specie, shall not be credited to the Government of Bulgaria.

Article 6

The right of each of the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of enemy assets and property within its jurisdiction at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty is not affected by the foregoing provisions.

Article 7

All rights created and all securities specifically assigned in connection with loans contracted or guaranteed by the Bulgarian Government which were actually contracted or guaranteed before the 1st August 1914, are maintained in force without any modification.

Article 8

If, in accordance with Articles 235 and 260 of the Treaty with Germany, signed on the 28th June, 1919, and the corresponding Articles in the Treaties with Austria and Hungary, all rights, interests and securities held by any German, Austrian, or Hungarian national under the contracts and agreements regulating the loan contracted by Bulgaria in Germany in July, 1914, are taken over by the Reparation Commission, Bulgaria undertakes to do everything in her power to facilitate this transfer. Bulgaria likewise undertakes to hand over to the Reparation Commission within six months of the coming into force of this Treaty all such rights, interests and securities held by Bulgarian nationals under the contracts and agreements regulating the said loan. The rights, interests, and securities held by Bulgarian nationals will be valued by the Reparation Commission, and their value will be credited to Bulgaria on account of the sums due for reparation, and Bulgaria shall be responsible for indemnifying her nationals so dispossessed.

Notwithstanding anything in the preceding Article, the Reparation Commission shall have full power, in the event of the transfer to it of the interests mentioned above, to modify the terms of the contracts and agreements regulating the loan, or to make any other arrangements connected therewith which it shall deem necessary, without prejudice to the rights under the contracts and agreements of any persons interested therein other than German, Austrian, Hungarian, or Bulgarian nationals, and without prejudice to the rights of the holders of Bulgarian Treasury Bills issued in France in 1912 and 1913 to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the next financial operation undertaken by Bulgaria. By agreement with the parties concerned, the claims referred to above may be paid off either in cash or in an agreed amount of the bonds of the loan. Any arrangement with regard to the loan and the contracts and agreements connected therewith shall be made after consultation with the Inter-Allied Commission, and the Inter-Allied Commission shall act as agent of the Reparation Commission in any matters connected with the loan, if the Reparation Commission so decides.

Article 9

Nothing in the provisions of this Part of this Treaty shall prejudice in any manner charges or mortgages lawfully effected in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals, respectively, before the date at which a state of war existed between Bulgaria and the Allied or Associated Powers concerned by the Government of Bulgaria or by Bulgarian nationals on assets in their ownership at that date, except in so far as variations of such charges or mortgages are specifically provided for under the terms of the present Treaty or any Treaties or agreements supplementary thereto.

Article 10

Any power to which Bulgarian territory was ceded under the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913,¹⁴ or under the Treaty of Constantinople, 1913, or is ceded under this Treaty, undertakes to pay in such manner as may be prescribed such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on the 1st August, 1914, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, may determine to be equitable, having regard to the ratio between the revenues of the ceded territory and the total revenues of Bulgaria for the average of the three complete financial years next before the Balkan War (1912).

Article 11

Any State to which Bulgarian territory is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated within such territory belonging to the Bulgarian Government, and the value of such property and possessions so acquired shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission and placed by it to the credit of Bulgaria or Turkey and to the debit of the State acquiring such property or possessions.

For the purposes of this Article, the property and possessions of the Bulgarian Government shall be deemed to include all the property of the Crown.

Article 12

1. Having regard to the provisions of Article 292 of the Treaty with Germany and the corresponding articles of the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Turkey, Bulgaria renounces any benefit disclosed by the Treaties of Bucharest, 1917 [1918]¹⁵ and Brest-Litovsk,¹⁶ and by the Treaties supplementary thereto, and undertakes to transfer either to Roumania or to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as the case may be, any monetary instruments, specie, securities, and negotiable instruments or goods which she may have received under the aforesaid Treaties.

2. Any sums of money and all securities, instruments, and goods, of whatsoever nature, to be delivered, paid, and transferred under the provisions of this Article, shall be disposed of by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in a manner hereafter to be determined by those Powers.

Article 13

The Bulgarian Government undertakes to refrain from preventing or impeding such acquisition by the German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Turkish Governments of any rights and interests of German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Turkish nationals in public utility undertakings or concessions operating in Bulgaria as may be required by the Reparation Commission under the terms of the Treaties of Peace between Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey and the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 14

Bulgaria undertakes to transfer to the Reparation Commission any claims she may have to payment or reparation by the Governments of Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Turkey, and in particular any claims which may arise now or hereafter in the fulfilment of undertakings made between Bulgaria during the war and those Governments. Any sums which the Reparation Commission may recover in respect of such claims shall be transferred to the credit of the Bulgarian Government on account of the sums due for reparation.

Article 15

Any monetary obligation arising out of the present Treaty shall be understood to be expressed in terms of gold, and shall, unless some other arrangement is specifically provided for in any particular case under the terms of this Treaty or any Treaty or agreement supplementary thereto, be payable at the option of the creditors in pounds sterling payable in London, gold dollars of the United States of America payable in New York, gold francs payable in Paris, or gold lire payable in Rome.

For the purpose of this Article, the gold coins mentioned above shall be defined as being of the weight and fineness of gold as enacted by law on the 1st January, 1914.

Article 16^†

The High Contracting Powers declare that they renounce reciprocally all claims to reimbursement of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war within their respective territories.

1. Gen. Paul Henrys, chief of the French Military Mission at Warsaw.
2. Appendix B to HD–9, p. 187.
3. Gen. P. Nudant, French representative and president of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.
4. Ante, p. 165.
5. Etienne Clémentel, French representative and president of the Economic Commission.
6. Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.
8. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
9. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 706.
10. Ibid., p. 893.
11. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
12. Note to Drafting Committee.—This Article to be concluded later. [Footnote in the original.]
12. vol. ii, p. 241.
13. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 706.
14. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 658.
15. Treaty of Peace between Roumania and the Central Powers, May 7, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 771.
16. Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Central Powers, March 3, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, p. 442.
17. The Drafting Committee will doubtless consider whether this Article should be placed here or in the Chapter concerned with Prisoners of War. [Footnote in the original.]