Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/15
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 26, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.
America, United States of
- Hon. H. White.
- Mr. L. Harrison.
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir Ian Malcolm, K.C.M.G.
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin.
- M. Tittoni.
- M. Paterno.
- Baron Makino.
- M. Kawai.
- America, United States of
|America, United States of||Col. U. S. Grant.|
|British Empire||Capt. E. Abraham.|
|France||Capt. A. Portier.|
|Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.|
Marshal Foch, the Military Advisers, Mr. Hoover and the experts on Polish Affairs entered the room.
(1) M. Cambon said that the line proposed by Marshal Foch included in the Polish area the districts of Suvalki and Seiny. The population of this area was Polish. It was therefore preferable so to fix the line as to attribute those territories to Poland. Line of Demarcation Polish and Lithuanian Forces
M. Clemenceau asked whether these areas were still occupied by the Germans.
M. Cambon said the Germans were evacuating the territories slowly.
Mr. Balfour said he would like to know how the various lines which had been drawn had come about. He understood that the territory was Polish but that it had been deliberately excluded from Polish occupation by the Council of Five. If it were true that the Council had laid down a policy to which the Poles had refused to submit, [Page 316] it would not be very satisfactory to reverse the Council’s policy in favour of the Poles merely because they had been insubordinate.
General Le Rond explained that when it had been a question of establishing a line of demarcation between Poles and Germans a line had been drawn north and east of the districts of Suvalki and Seiny, giving these to the Poles. This line had been notified but had never been acted on. It had been drawn in accordance with a recommendation of the Committee dealing with the eastern frontiers of Poland. The recommendations of the Committee had come up before the Council but had not been accepted. All the experts had agreed that the territory in question was Polish.
M. Clemenceau said that he had been told that the territory was mostly Lithuanian. He would like to know what the opinion of the experts really was. (The American, British, French and Italian experts agreed that the population in these districts was mainly Polish.)
General Le Rond continuing, said that at a later date, according to the demands of the Lithuanian Military Mission, the question was brought before the Council and a line passing just north of Augustovo had been fixed as the line of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces. This was the green line on the annexed map (see Appendix A). The Poles had complained that there were distinctively Polish areas north of this line and on the 20th June they had proposed that the line of demarcation should be that shown in blue on the map. This line, not only enclosed Polish areas, but also a wide defensive zone in addition. The line since proposed by Marshal Foch, enclosed what were really Polish areas and only a shallow defensive zone in addition. This was the red line on the map.
(Note:—Map will be issued later.)
M. Clemenceau asked whether the change from the green to the red line had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles.
General Weygand said that this was not so. General Henrys1 had been told to allow the Poles to occupy Polish territory evacuated by the Germans.
Mr. Balfour said that he had been given the impression that the Poles had defied the orders of the Conference, but he was prepared to accept the explanation given and to agree to the line proposed by Marshal Foch, in view of the unanimous opinion that the territory which would be assigned to the Poles was Polish in character.
(Marshal Foch was then instructed to communicate through General Henrys, the line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of Suvalki, Grodno, and Vilna, in accordance with the red line on the annexed map.)[Page 317]
2. Mr. Balfour said that he had had a talk with Mr. Hoover and as a result of his conversation, had prepared a draft Hungarian which he then read:— Hungarian Affairs
“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian people, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. But if Peace is to be settled, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if the blockade is to be removed, if supplies are to be made available, the co-operation of the Hungarian people is required. It is only with a Government which really represents them that such a settlement can be arranged.
The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”
Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that the last paragraph meant that the Roumanians would have to evacuate territory occupied in what was to be Hungary according to the Treaty, as soon as the Armistice had been carried out on the Hungarian side. The draft dealt with one half of the Allied policy. It would explain to the world and to the Hungarians the intentions of the Powers. What instructions should be given to Marshal Foch to carry out this policy remained to be decided. He was strongly of opinion that the Council could not allow the Armistice to be violated with impunity. Having ordered the Hungarians to reduce their troops to six divisions and by implication to remain at peace with the Allies of the Powers, the latter could not sit and watch the Hungarians double their forces and attack their Allies. If Marshal Foch could put an end to this with the forces available, it appeared clear that he ought to do so.
M. Clemenceau said that when Mr. Balfour said that the Powers could not tolerate violation of the Armistice, he presumably meant all the Powers. It was noticeable, however, that there were no Italian, no British and no American troops available, but only the remnants of the two French divisions, together with Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs. According to Marshal Foch, the initial effort [Page 318] required would not be great, and the troops at hand might suffice, but the sequel must be considered.
M. Tittoni said that regarding Italian co-operation, he saw no difficulty in the region of foreign policy, but in respect to internal politics, the outlook was not so clear. Any campaign against Hungary would produce a general strike in Italy. The cost of living had reached heights unequaled in any other country. As to coal, there was only a fortnight’s margin. He must therefore state, with great regret, that the economic situation in Italy and its political consequences would not allow Italy to contribute any force for action against Hungary, although action in this direction would suit his foreign policy admirably.
Mr. Balfour said that two questions were raised by M. Clemenceau’s remarks. One was a general question, and the other was a military one. As to the latter, he need say little, as Marshal Foch considered he had enough troops on the spot to undertake action. As to the general question, he would like to ask whether in M. Clemenceau’s opinion, it was necessary, whenever Inter-Allied military action was required, that the troops be furnished by an equal contribution of all the Powers interested.
M. Clemenceau said that he had not meant his remarks to be stretched to that extent. He would like to say, however that his situation, though not as serious as M. Tittoni’s, had some analogies with it. There were two French divisions in Bulgaria who were expected to assist the Greeks, and there were two in Hungary, which were expected to act without any Allied assistance whatever.
Mr. Balfour said the only question remaining then was whether Marshal Foch was right in saying that he had enough troops to proceed with.
Marshal Foch said that he had reported on July 17th.2 Nothing had happened in the intervening week to make him alter his views, provided a definite policy were adopted and an agreement were reached between small States who would be called upon to furnish the main contingent.
Mr. Balfour asked M. Clemenceau what alternative he had to the policy suggested.
M. Clemenceau said that his alternative would be to allow Hungary to settle her own fate without military intervention. The war was over, the American Army had been withdrawn very rapidly, the British Army nearly as rapidly, and the French Army was being demobilised. He was forced to demobilise very quickly; it could not be helped. He could not, therefore, contemplate the sending of two French divisions into Hungary unsupported by their Allies. [Page 319] There would shortly be only two classes under the colours in the French Army. Marshal Foch quite reasonably asked for a definition of the exact intentions of the Conference. This was a political question, and to tell the truth, it was hard to give him an answer. In any case, he was not ready to begin fighting again. He felt inclined to adopt the proposals made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hoover. He would encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way. Hence, it would be well, as Marshal Foch suggested, to consult the small Powers, who were, in any event, principally concerned. Their position was not clear. The Serbians would only act on certain conditions, the Roumanians also made reservations, and so did the Czechs. What was the net result?
Marshal Foch said that it was for this reason that he recommended that the small Powers should be consulted, in order that the Conference might determine whether their terms could be accepted.
Mr. Balfour said that he quite understood M. Clemenceau’s position. It meant, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers confessed their impotence to enforce their will on a small nation. If what had been said in the Council were known outside, namely, that all the Powers had demobilised so fast under the stress of domestic necessity, it would certainly be regarded as absurd that the Powers, which, eight months ago, were the conquerors of the world, could not, at the present moment, impose their will on an army of 120,000 men. This inglorious situation he did not particularly mind, but he wondered how the Conference would be able to terminate its work successfully. An unpleasant Treaty would have to be imposed on the Bulgarians, and a still more unpleasant one on the Turks. Further, the new small States lately created, must be controlled, and prevented from attacking one another. If the Conference could not enforce its will on Hungary, could it do all these things? If the picture drawn by M. Clemenceau was accurate, the Conference would have to leave its work unfinished.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not take such a gloomy view. All that he wished to do was to adapt the means at the command of the Conference to the ends it had in view. He believed Mr. Hoover held the key of the situation. The offer of food in return for good behaviour would be a very effective weapon. The case was similar to that of Russia, but in the case of Russia, there were no means of coercion, against the Hungarians there were. They could be surrounded, and in time, would have to come to terms. This might be inglorious, but there was little glory in fighting without men, or in making threats that could not be carried out.
Mr. Balfour said that there was not a very great difference between [Page 320] his policy and M. Clemenceau’s. Marshal Foch might be requested to demand that the Hungarians at least observed the Armistice.
M. Clemenceau said that a reiteration of this demand would not be of much avail, as it had already been made and neglected. He would prefer to accept the proposal Mr. Balfour had read, to avoid issuing any ultimatum, to refrain from engaging Marshal Foch or any troops and to give General Boehm the month for which he had asked. At the end of this time, the situation would not be much worse than the present, one-third of the French troops would have been demobilised, but there would still be means of action, if absolutely necessary.
Marshal Foch said that as long as there was no understanding between the great and the small Powers the situation would not be clear. It would not improve after the lapse of a month or even two or three months. It was even possible that the smaller Powers would get out of hand and destroy the edifice so laboriously set up by the Conference.
Mr. Balfour said that if assured that the situation would not grow worse he would raise no objection. He presumed that if the Military Authorities said that they could settle the matter at once, failing which the situation would grow worse, M. Clemenceau would agree to act. If Bela Kun was going to fall there need be no anxiety, but on the other hand if he were going to have a military success the result might be grievous.
M. Clemenceau said that he was not prepared to prophesy what would happen. The world had just gone through a fearful war and had only secured fragments of peace. The people were looking out for means of starting their economic life again. He wished to do nothing to jeopardise this reasonable ambition. He could not ask his people to go to war again. They would not do it with the same readiness as they did in 1914. The situation appeared to him to require prudence. No doubt prudence involved some elements of risk but there was a greater risk in giving an ultimatum which, if rejected, would lead to war. Marshal Foch did not offer a clear solution. He made his action conditional on the definition of a certain policy and on the agreement of the lesser powers concerned. Any check would have very serious results in Italy, as M. Tittoni said, in France and also probably in Great Britain. He did not wish to run this risk. The plans of General Boehm offered for the moment a better outlook than existed a week ago. If the Hungarians were really in the majority opposed to Bela Kun they might under the stress of M. Hoover’s blandishments over-throw the Bela Kun Government. There might then occur a favourable opportunity of which Marshal Foch could avail himself.[Page 321]
Mr. Balfour said that he sympathised with M. Clemenceau as he also had no wish to plunge the world into war again. He would add that without a French Commander-in-Chief and without the cooperation of the two French divisions he thought there was little prospect of success. As M. Clemenceau said that neither of these conditions could be fulfilled the case was judged; but he would like to say in justification of the advice he had given that he was not animated by any spirit of adventure. He wished to get his own and other countries out of an adventure. He wished to avoid further misfortunes in the future. He wished the Conference to have the authority which power alone could give. He agreed that the economic weapon was still available. Nevertheless rapid demobilisation had put the Conference into a difficulty which was almost comic. Right months ago the Allies had fifteen million men in the field; now it was difficult to lay hands on a single battalion. His fear had been that if Bela Kun were allowed to know that the Conference was militarily powerless he might use this knowledge to great effect and the evil might spread all over the world. If the French Government who had two divisions available declined to use them, it was not for him to press for the campaign. Possibly the prestige of past victories and economic power might enable the Allies to over-come this difficulty. He would therefore content himself with half of the policy he had proposed.
Mr. White said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. According to his information Bela Kun was backed by a strong Nationalist movement. Military interference would only reinforce this sentiment which it was not desirable to inflame. The less national support Bela Kun had, the better. The action exercised by Mr. Hoover would therefore have, he thought, greater chances of success than military intervention.
After some further discussion it was decided to issue in the Press and by wireless the following declaration:—
“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a Peace with the Hungarian People and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a [Page 322] Government which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.
The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as denned by the Peace Conference will cease as soon as the terms of the armistice have in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”
M. Clemenceau said that in the meantime conversations might be undertaken with the smaller powers.
Mr. Balfour thought that if it was intended to do nothing this was hardly desirable.
M. Clemenceau said that he had not meant to convey that he would never act: on some favourable occasion he might. Meanwhile if possible he would like to see the success of General Boehm.
Mr. Balfour said that if the smaller Powers were called in consultation, the state of demobilisation would have to be revealed to them.
M. Clemenceau said they could be dealt with individually and asked to state under what conditions they would act should action be decided on. The Serbians, for instance, had certain desiderata.
M. Tittoni said that they desired that the Conference should intercede between them and the Italians.
M. Clemenceau said the Conference would do so.
Mr. Balfour asked what news Marshal Foch had received of the Roumanian Forces.
Marshal Foch said that the news was not bad and that the Roumanians were not alarmed by the Hungarian attack.
Mr. Balfour said that it would make a great difference if the Hungarian attack failed. Should Bela Kun fall of his own weight it would certainly be better than if he were overthrown by the Allies.
(It was then decided that Marshal Foch should continue negotiations with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak Delegations in order to obtain from them their exact views regarding the guarantees they required for military intervention in Hungary.)
3. M. Clemenceau read the telegram from General Henrys asking, in agreement with the Entente Military representatives, that energetic action should be taken to force the Germans to cease hostilities in Silesia and in Posnania. The village of Wirruszom had been daily bombarded and partially destroyed. Women and children had been killed and the population was abandoning the village and the cultivation of the fields. Steps To Be Taken To Comple the Germans To Cease Hostilities in Silesia
Marshal Foch said that on the 24th, instructions had been sent to General Nudant3 asking him to order the Germans to put a stop to this at once.[Page 323]
Mr. Balfour suggested that it would be desirable to send a Mission immediately.
Mr. Hoover said the situation in Silesia was producing a very serious diminution of the output of coal. Most of central Europe depended on Silesia for coal. For instance, the parlous condition of Vienna resulted from this situation. The best hope resided in an early appointment of a Commission which might restore order. In view of the plebiscite, both Poles and Germans were conducting active propaganda which was having a demoralising effect on production.
M. Tittoni said he had already nominated the Italian member on the Commission.
M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch, in consultation with the French War Office, to arrange for a designation of the French member.
(It was decided that each power should nominate one member for a Commission to undertake the administration of the plebiscite area of Silesia during the period of plebiscite.)
(It was further decided that the Commission for the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of Germany be appointed as speedily as possible. It should be composed of four officers for each power (one Commissioner, Head of the Commission, one Assistant Commissioner, two Technical officers.) The nominations were to be made on the following Monday (see Appendix C to H. D. 8. para 24).
Mr. White said that he could not make a nomination without reference to Washington; in fact, no American nomination would be possible before ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.
M. Clemenceau said that the other members could be nominated in the meantime.
(Marshal Foch and the Military Experts withdrew, and M. Clementel5 and the Financial & Economic Experts entered the room.)
4. (After a statement by M. Clementel (see Appendix “B”), it was decided that the examination of the question should be resumed on the following Monday.)Economic Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty With Bulgaria
Baron Makino gave notice of an amendment to Article 29, which he would propose at the next meeting. (See Appendix “C”.)
5. Colonel Peel said that there was unanimous agreement about these clauses (see Appendix “D”). The gist of the proposals was that Bulgaria should undertake to pay two milliards and a francs in gold. This sum might be reduced by the Reparation Commission should it consider it excessive. An international body, distinct from the Reparation Commission, on which France, Great Britain and [Page 324] Italy would be represented, would be established in Sofia to work out the details. It would have considerable powers, both of raising and controlling taxation in order that the Reparation clauses should be duly executed. Reparation Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty With Bulgaria
(The Reparation clauses submitted were then accepted.)
6. M. Sergent said that there was complete agreement regarding the Financial Clauses. (See Appendix “E”.)
Financial Clauses for the Treaty With Bulgaria Mr. White said that the American Expert had a word to say.
Mr. Dulles said that he thought the text of the Reparation and Financial Clauses should be communicated to the Serbians, Roumanians and Greeks, as they were concerned.
Mr. Balfour asked what had been done regarding similar clauses in the Treaty with Austria.
Mr. Dulles said that there had been a plenary meeting at which the smaller Powers had complained of the short time they had for considering the proposals.
Mr. Balfour asked whether they were likely to wish to discuss the proposals or merely to hear them.
Colonel Peel said that he felt sure that they would be anxious to discuss them and that the discussion would be interminable. He agreed however that the clauses should be communicated to them.
(It was agreed that the Serbian, Roumanian and Greek Delegations should be informed by the President of the Committees, which had drafted the financial and reparation clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria, of the provisions of these clauses. Should no modification of the present draft result, the text should be communicated forthwith to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.)
(The Experts then withdrew.)
7. It was agreed that the nominations of this Commission should be sent to the Secretary-General as speedily as possible. A Commission for the Delimitation of Frontier Between Belgium and Germany
8. Members of the Commission on Baltic Affairs entered the room.
The following document was read:—
“Considering the importance of maintaining ordered and stable Governments in the Baltic territories as a barrier against Bolshevism on the one hand and against German aggression on the other, and the necessity of close co-operation between these Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments which can only be secured if the Baltic peoples have complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies to protect their liberties in case of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia, the Baltic Commission are of opinion that the time has [Page 325] come when the Allied and Associated Powers should clearly define their policy towards these Governments and recommend that a joint declaration be made to them in the following sense:— Declaration Proposed by Commission on Baltic Affairs To Be Addressed to the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
In response to the representation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Delegations, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the fifth condition of their Note to Admiral Koltchak,6 which runs as follows:—
‘If a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.’
The Allied and Associated Governments are anxious and willing to do all in their power to assist the Baltic Governments to organise their local defences and to re-establish in the interests of general peace an orderly and stable government in these countries.
They further declare their intention to protect their liberties in the event of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia.
At the same time it seems to them impossible to reach any definite solution which will guarantee a durable peace without a previous arrangement with a recognised Russian Government, and while reserving to themselves the right of collaboration either directly or through the League of Nations to obtain a settlement satisfactory to both parties, they cannot at the present moment take any steps which would bind them as regards a definite settlement pending the restoration of a recognised Russian Government.
The Allied and Associated Powers would add that they feel confident that if they assist the Governments of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia, they may rely on these Governments to accept such provisions as the Allied and Associated Powers may consider necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities in these territories.”
Mr. Balfour said that the objections to these proposals were clear to him. Their advantages were not manifest.
M. della Torretta said that no precise instructions had been given to the Commission on Baltic Affairs. It had therefore studied questions connected with the New States set up on the north west frontier of Russia. There were in these countries de facto Governments which had been encouraged by the Allied and Associated Powers to resist, both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, who were either intriguing against them or fighting them. The Commission had thought that these Governments required some moral support from the Entente. A dispatch had been sent to Admiral Koltchak from the Conference in which reference had been made to these New States. A satisfactory answer had come from Admiral Koltchak, The Commission [Page 326] thought that it was opportune to do something to encourage these New States. They could not be offered independence, but they might be offered some guarantee for the preservation of their liberties without interfering with Russian sovereignty. In some way or other these de facto Governments must be recognised.
Mr. Balfour said that he had some doubt concerning the Policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It was unlikely even to please the new states. In one paragraph the telegram to Koltchak was quoted. This telegram was known to the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians. Nothing was therefore gained by restating it. The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers could not do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions they were being given. If this declaration were made, the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. The next paragraph was either not new or represented a somewhat formidable undertaking on the part of the Entente Powers to enter into antagonism with a strong centralised Government in Russia. Such a declaration would not help the Baltic States and might greatly embarrass the Allied Powers. The first sentence of the next paragraph appeared to him to go too far. He hoped that Russia would reconstitute itself, but for the time being he saw no elements tending in that direction. Was it desirable to tell the Baltic States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. As to the last paragraph, desirable as the proposals suggested might be, it was not an opportune moment to ask for the acceptance of these provisions at a time when the Allied Powers could only offer a very slight assistance to the Baltic States. He could not help thinking that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it failed to convey the encouragement it wished to convey. He would not advise the Council to accept it.
M. della Torretta said that the Commission had been unanimous and had considered that its proposals followed directly from the Allied Policy outlined in the telegram to Koltchak. There seemed to be no other way of reconciling the unity of Russia with an offer of autonomy to the Baltic peoples. Certain things had been done which had led these peoples to believe that their fate would be settled by the Conference. They were being supplied with money, arms and munitions. The declaration suggested made no essential alteration in the Allied attitude. All that was aimed at was a transitory [Page 327] regularisation of the situation and a confirmation of the declarations previously made. The Commission was informed that the Baltic Governments required some encouragement of this kind to continue action against the Bolsheviks on one hand and the Germans on the other.
M. Pichon said that the Lithuanians, Esthonians and Letts had repeatedly asked the Governments of the Powers to recognise them. They had always been told that their efforts were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as de facta Governments in their struggles against Bolsheviks. They had always been told, however, that the Powers could go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation. The Council of Five had always kept these two considerations closely connected. The Baltic Delegates had asked whether the Conference would end without settling the question of Russia. He had replied that he hoped it would not but he could not undertake to make a definite statement. The declaration suggested by the Commission would not, he thought, give them any particular satisfaction nor would it please the Russians. What the Baltic States really wanted was separation. This the Conference could not for the time being offer them. Promises of autonomy would not satisfy them. No other declaration, however, could be made without producing a very difficult situation in regard to Russia.
M. della Torretta said that the Commission recognised that the declaration would not entirely satisfy the Baltic States. It would, however, be a beginning. On the other hand it would not displease the Russians as it did not threaten the separation of the Baltic Provinces which they feared.
(After some further discussion the question was adjourned.)
(9) M. Clemenceau read a telegram suggesting that three Karelian Delegates elected by an Assembly held at Olonetz be heard by the Peace Conference in order to express the wishes of the population of that region. The Finnish Government was greatly interested in the question and would like the affairs of Karelia to be explained to the Conference. Despatch of a Karelian Delegation to the Peace Conference
(After some discussion it was decided to refer the question to the Commission on Baltic Affairs.)
(10) M. Clemenceau said that the Council of Transylvania had asked the French Representative at Bucharest to grant passports to five Swabians of the Banat anxious to come to Paris to explain to the Conference the desires of the populations they represented. M. Bratiano favoured their request. Before authorising the Delegation to proceed [Page 328] to France the French Government wished to know the opinion of the Allied and Associated Delegations. Despatch of a Delegation of Swabians from the Banat
(It was decided that this question should be referred to the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs.)
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, July 26, 1919.[Page 330] [Page 336]
- Gen. Paul Henrys, chief of the French Military Mission at Warsaw.↩
- Appendix B to HD–9, p. 187.↩
- Gen. P. Nudant, French representative and president of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.↩
- Ante, p. 165.↩
- Etienne Clémentel, French representative and president of the Economic Commission.↩
- Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 706.↩
- Ibid., p. 893.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Note to Drafting Committee.—This Article to be concluded later. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- vol. ii, p. 241.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 706.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 658.↩
- Treaty of Peace between Roumania and the Central Powers, May 7, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 771.↩
- Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Central Powers, March 3, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, p. 442.↩
- The Drafting Committee will doubtless consider whether this Article should be placed here or in the Chapter concerned with Prisoners of War. [Footnote in the original.]↩