763.72119/5955

HD–7

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 15, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. H. White.
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
    • Secretary
      • Mr. H. Norman.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta.
      • Capt. de St. Quentin.
    • Italy
      • M. Tittoni.
    • Secretary
      • M. Paterno.
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui.
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai.
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Lieut. Burden.
British Empire Capt. E. Abraham.
France Capt. A. Portier.
Italy Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a communication from Bela Kun, which was a reply to that sent him on behalf of the Council according to the decision taken on July 12th. (See H. D. Minute 5 [6].)1Correspondence With Bela Knn

M. Mantoux read the communication from Bela Kun. (Appendix “A”.)

M. Clemenceau expressed the opinion that Bela Kun had right on his side. He had been told that, if his troops evacuated Czechoslovakia, the Roumanians would be ordered to evacuate the part of Hungary they had invaded, but they had not done so. Mr. Balfour had since informed the Council that the Roumanians could not safely carry out the order. It was a pity this point of view had not been explained before the order was made. Nevertheless, whatever reasons the Roumanians might allege, if the Conference did not order them to withdraw and could not enforce the order, the Council would be in a bad position.

[Page 130]

Mr. Balfour admitted there was force in M. Clemenceau’s remarks. He believed that the Council of Four would not have taken the decision it took on June 12th,2 to arrange an Armistice involving the withdrawal of the Roumanians, had they known that the Hungarians were breaking the most essential terms of the original Armistice. This had not been known until both President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had left Paris. M. Clemenceau had not been aware of it, as he had expressed doubt when the matter was first brought to his notice. No doubt the Council was in an unsatisfactory position, but it would be in a worse [one?] if it were to order the Roumanians to withdraw. M. Bratiano, in his farewell visit, had expressed himself very firmly and concisely. He said that the Powers had no authority to demand of Roumania a retreat which they could not protect. Unless the Powers could guarantee the safe withdrawal of the Roumanian troops and the secure holding of another line of defence against a superior enemy, it would be unfair to enforce the demand on Roumania. According to the military advice he had received, in view of the increase of the Hungarian army, Roumanian national existence might be at stake if this were done. In his communication, Bela Kun alleged breaches of the Armistice by the Czecho-Slovaks and by the Roumanians. It was the business of the military authorities to see that the Armistice was carried out. He thought that the military authorities had not treated the politicians very well, as they had not kept them informed of the breaches of the Armistice whether by one side or by the other. He would, therefore, propose to send Bela Kun’s letter to Marshal Foch before any reply was made, and to ask the latter for a report regarding the way in which both the Hungarians and our own Allies had respected or broken the Armistice. He thought it might be possible to reply that, when the Council had addressed Bela Kun in June, it was not aware that Hungary was breaking the Armistice in doubling her army. If, however, the Hungarians now agreed to respect the terms of the Armistice, the Council would obtain the withdrawal of the Roumanians. It might further be stated that the frontier between Hungary and Roumania had already been fixed by the Peace Conference and that no amount of local fighting would alter this decision to Hungary’s advantage or detriment. He wished to draw attention to a communication he had had from General Greenland, to the effect that the Hungarian population on the eastern side of the Theiss were greatly alarmed at the prospect of the Roumanians withdrawing, lest they be left thereby to the tender mercies of Bela Kun.

(It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances [Page 131]of the original Armistice Conditions by all parties concerned.)

2. At M. Clemenceau’s request, M. Mantoux read a lengthy document (Appendix “B”), which it was decided should be circulated and discussed at a future meeting. Armistice on Esthonian Front

3. The Council had before it a Joint Note by the Allied Blockade Committee and the Eastern Blockade Committee (W. C. P. 1133) and a Note by the British Delegation (W. C. P. 1133.A.) (Both of these documents are contained in Appendix “C”.)Question of Blockade in the Baltic

(At this point, Sir W. Mitchell Thomson, Mr. Waterlow, Captain Fuller, M. Seydoux and Mr. J. F. Dulles entered the room.3)

M. Clemenceau said that the Council was considerably embarrassed in dealing with this question. He read paragraph 7 of the Joint Note.

M. Seydoux said that the question had been raised by the Supreme Economic Council, which had received in reply a communication of the decision taken on June 17th by the Council of Four, in the following terms:—

“After the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia or Hungary. On the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council it was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council is asked, however, to examine whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevist Russia.”

This decision was communicated by Sir Maurice Hankey in a letter to Mr. McCormick.4 (Appendix “D”.)

Sweden had now opened the question and it was necessary to find some solution. The solution suggested was contained in the terms of the last clause of paragraph 7 of the Joint Note. This applied only to the Baltic. In the Black Sea, the position was less acute. There were few countries anxious or able to import much into Russia. In Petrograd, however, the situation was critical. It is but a few hours’ steam from Stockholm and Copenhagen. The means suggested were, he admitted, opportunist methods, based on the fact that naval hostilities were taking place in the Baltic. It might be possible without declaring a blockade, which was legally impossible, to proceed on the [Page 132]ground of these hostilities to enforce an embargo which should only be raised at the discretion of the Allied Powers. There was, however, another way out. The Allied and Associated Powers had offered help to Admiral Koltchak5 on certain terms. If this help was to be given to him, it must be given at all points. If neutrals were to be allowed to furnish supplies to the Bolsheviks whom he was fighting, Allied assistance elsewhere would be neutralised. The neutrals might therefore be told that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider it an unfriendly act on their part should they send supplies to Bolsheviks. This could now be stated with more confidence since help had been promised to Admiral Koltchak. He suggested that the Council adopt one or other of the two plans proposed.

Mr. Balfour said that M. Seydoux’s statement was very clear. The question was an extremely embarrassing one. The Council was being hampered at every turn by difficult questions of international law, both in relation to new States and to unrecognised or de facto Governments. There were two areas to be considered, first the gulf of Finland, and second the Black Sea. The White Sea was already provided for. Trade with the Baltic States of Finland, Latvia etc., need cause no concern because trade with them would not lead to the percolation into Soviet Russia of any arms or ammunition. Of the two doors into Soviet Russia, one would be closed by ice at the end of November. Until that date, the means of stopping trade from passing through it, which had been suggested amounted to this—that neutral States be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were not making a formal blockade on Soviet Russia; but, seeing that active hostilities were in progress in the Gulf of Finland, they must insist on the right of turning back trading vessels from the zone of operations. The waters in question were mined, and operations must for success be provided with secrecy. He did not suggest that trading vessels should be subject to capture, sunk or proceeded against in Prize Courts; only that they should be sent back to their port of origin. This course was no doubt open to objection, but less so, he thought, than any other, and it seemed the best that could be done to carry out the policy laid down by the Council of Four. As to the Black Sea, he understood there was a proposal to recognise a blockade to be declared by Koltchak and Denekin.6 These methods he would be inclined to accept.

M. Clemenceau said that as temporary expedients the proposals put forth by M. Seydoux might be adopted.

M. Seydoux said it must be clearly understood that no legal right could be appealed to. In order to endow Koltchak and Denekin with [Page 133]some powers to enforce the blockade, he suggested that they might be supplied with a Destroyer or two by the Allied Powers.

M. Tittoni said that the proposals were expedients, but as he could see no better, he would accept them.

Mr. White said that all that had been suggested amounted to a pacific blockade. The American Government was extremely sensitive regarding matters of this kind. Without special instructions he would hesitate to accept any proposal tending to stop traffic on the High Seas in time of Peace.

Mr. Balfour said that in his view, what was proposed was not quite a pacific blockade. The régime in the Gulf of Finland was not peace. Even though it might not legally be war, active hostilities were being waged. As the Soviet Government had not been recognised these hostilities could not lawfully be considered war, since it appeared that war could only be waged against a recognised Government. The military operations going on had an object accepted by all the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, to preserve the small border Republics which had sprung up in the north-west of Russia. Commerce, therefore, should not be allowed to interfere with these operations. He thought the suggestion made in the last paragraph of the Addendum by the British Delegation to the Joint Note might be adopted.

M. Tittoni observed that the Powers could not escape the anomaly of assisting Koltchak in one quarter, and allowing his enemies to be assisted in another.

M. Clemenceau observed that President Wilson had offered his help to Koltchak.

Mr. White said that he was willing to send a cable message to Washington, explaining the views of his colleagues, but he could not accept them without reference to his Government. Theoretically there was peace with Russia. He would ask whether he might join in the proposal before the Council which he understood his Colleagues all accepted.

Mr. Balfour said that he fully understood Mr. White’s position, but the question addressed to the British Government by the Swedes had to be answered. He did not know how long the answer could be postponed.

M. Clemenceau suggested that Mr. White inform the Council of the views of his Government within two days.

Mr. Dulles said that it would be necessary to explain to President Wilson why the question was re-opened. At the time when the Council of Four had made its decision, it was well aware that the present situation was bound to come about. The question had been considered first in the Blockade Council, then in the Supreme Economic [Page 134]Council, and lastly, in the Council of the Heads of Governments. No aspect of the situation, therefore, had been lost sight of and the very contingency now being discussed was that in view when Sir Maurice Hankey sent his Note to the Supreme Economic Council. It would, therefore, be necessary to inform President Wilson of whatever new circumstance might exist which justified the re-opening of the question.

Mr. Balfour said that it was no doubt quite accurate to say that the Council of the Heads of Governments had decided that nothing could be done, and it was doubtless reasonable to say that President Wilson must be informed of the reason why the present Council desired a different decision. He would point out that, in the decision of the Council of Four, Hungary was coupled with Russia. Nevertheless, a blockade on Hungary had been imposed. At the time of the latter, there was some hope that Petrograd would fall; this would have removed all necessity for a blockade. It might, further, be pointed out that the Soviet Government was conducting active hostilities against the small Baltic States. Should the Powers not protect the latter, the Soviet Government could land troops in the rear of their forces and destroy them. Hence it was necessary for the Powers to maintain maritime control of the Baltic. This could not be done without active operations, as the Soviet had ships and showed fight. It was impossible to carry on naval operations in narrow waters and to allow merchant shipping to go through with food and arms. The removal of the blockade was, therefore, inconsistent with the conduct of the policy unanimously favoured by the Powers.

Mr. Dulles observed that the blockade on Hungary was maintained because the Powers were still at war with Hungary. They had never been at war with Russia.

(It was agreed that Mr. Dulles should draft a telegram to be sent in the name of the Council to President Wilson explaining the reasons for maintaining in the Baltic and the Black Sea an embargo on merchant shipping trading with Soviet Russia.

It was further agreed that the subject should again be put on the Agenda on the 17th instant.)

4. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a communication stating that the Belgian and Dutch Governments had nominated their representatives for the Commission which was to revise the Treaties of 1839.6a It was, therefore, desirable to summon the Commission. The Belgian Government asked that the first meeting should be fixed for Tuesday, July 29th, as the two Belgian representatives, M. Orts, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. Segers, Minister of State, were detained in Brussels until the 28th, for the festivals in honour [Page 135]of the President of the Republic. The British and Italian representatives on the Commission had already been nominated. The American and French remained to be appointed. On behalf of France, M. Clemenceau nominated M. Laroche—on behalf of the United States of America, Mr. White nominated Mr. Hudson. Revision of Treaties of 1839

(It was agreed that the first meeting should take place on 29th July, at 10.30 a.m. at the Quai d’Orsay.)

5. The Council had before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles. (Appendix “E”)Allied Army of Occupation in Silesia During Plebiscite

(At this point, the Military Representatives and their Chiefs of the Staff, entered the room.)

Mr. Balfour said that he had read the report. The only difficulty he found was in finding 13,000 men.

M. Clemenceau said that he had none to offer. He counted on Mr. Balfour.

Mr. Balfour said he had none to offer. He counted on General Bliss.

General Bliss said that it was not beyond the limits of possibility that Allied troops might be entirely dispensed with. The Inter-Allied Commission which was to conduct the plebiscite, was to spend six months studying the country. It would be able to report whether order could be maintained without armed forces. It had been provided that there should be neither German nor Polish troops in the area. He suggested, therefore, that the Commission, together with its staff, which would be numerous, should go to the country and report later whether it required an Allied force or not.

Mr. Balfour quoted paragraph “D” of the general consideration set forth in the report and pointed out that it seemed to have been the intention that the Commission should have an Allied force until local police could be organised. If, however, General Bliss considered that the risk of doing without an Allied force could be taken, he would not insist on a pedantic adherence to the original intention.

General Buss said that the plebiscite was not to take place until six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. This would give the Commission plenty of time to find out whether an armed force could or could not be dispensed with.

M. Clemenceau asked what would happen should the Commission find that they required troops.

Mr. Balfour drew attention to the provision excluding any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation. He asked whether this should be held to apply to police forces.

General Bliss thought that it did not apply to police forces.

Mr. Balfour asked when the Commission was to proceed to Silesia. He also asked whether members had been nominated.

[Page 136]

Mr. White said that he understood the Commission was to proceed to Silesia 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. As to nomination, so far as the United States were concerned, no American member could be appointed until the American Senate had ratified the Treaty.

M. Clemenceau said that he was informed that the Commission to supervise the execution of the clauses of the Treaty had examined this question and that it could furnish a report at the next meeting.

(The question was therefore postponed till the following day.)

6. The Council had before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. (Appendix E [E bis].)

Occupation of Bulgraia by Great Britain, Great Britain France, and Italy in Equal Proportions M. Clemenceau observed that in spite of the platonic recommendations of the Military Representatives, it appeared from the footnote that Italy would contribute one battalion, Great Britain 40 men, America none, while Trance had in the area two divisions, two-thirds of which he proposed to demobilise. The only way out of the difficulty that he could think of was to ask the Italians who were on good terms with the Bulgarians to stand surety for their good behaviour.

M. Tittoni said that he was not aware of any special intimacy between Italy and Bulgaria.

M. Clemenceau said he could show M. Tittoni evidence to that effect. He made no complaint, in fact he would be glad if Italian policy could produce in Bulgaria the results desired by the Conference. The only end in view was to make the Bulgarians behave peacefully towards the Greeks.

M. Tittoni said that Italian policy was to conform with the policy of the Allies.

M. Clemenceau said that he had dreamt that Italy was inaugurating a new policy, and was now seeking to make friends with her neighbours in the Adriatic, applying in case of misunderstanding to her Allies for arbitration, which would be most willingly undertaken.

M. Tittoni said that he was quite willing to conform with M. Clemenceau’s dream.

M. Clemenceau said that if an agreement between the Bulgarians and the Greeks could be arranged through Italy it would be a great service to the Allied cause. The Bulgarians had been summoned to be in Paris on the 25th. There remained only ten days. If in this period M. Tittoni could give the Allies a foretaste of the new policy, the situation on the arrival of the Bulgarians would be much easier.

M. Tittoni said he would be very pleased to do his best.

[Page 137]

M. Clemenceau suggested that M. Tittoni should have private conversations on behalf of the Council with M. Venizelos.

Mr. Balfour asked to what extent disarmament had proceeded in Bulgaria.

M. Clemenceau said that he thought the situation unsatisfactory. He did not think that General Franchet d’Esperey7 had controlled events very successfully according to the instructions given him. He had the impression that the Bulgarians meant to resort to force should they be dissatisfied with their new frontiers. He was asking General Franchet d’Esperey’s opinion on Bulgaria and its present condition from the military point of view. If, meanwhile, M. Tittoni would have a talk with M. Venizelos, good results might be obtained.

Mr. Balfour said that he presumed that M. Tittoni’s conversation with M. Venizelos would be on the basis of what had been decided at the Conference.

M. Clemenceau said that it must undoubtedly be on the basis that the Entente was victorious, and that Bulgaria had been defeated.

M. Tittoni asked that he might be supplied with the requisite information by his colleagues.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether the intention was that M. Tittoni should discuss frontiers with M. Venizelos.

M. Clemenceau said he suggested no plan whatever. He left the whole matter to M. Tittoni’s ingenuity. He had heard among other things that Greece thought of giving Bulgaria a share in the port of Kavalla. If so this was a good beginning which deserved encouragement.

(M. Tittoni agreed to engage in conversation with M. Venizelos, and report the results obtained daily to the Council.

It was further decided that General Franchet d’Esperey should furnish as soon as possible all available information regarding the military situation of Bulgaria.)

7. The Council had before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. (Appendix “F.”)Assistance To Be Given to Poland in the Area Ceded by Germany

M. Clemenceau asked General Belin what the conclusion of the Report was.

General Belin said that it was proposed that the Frontier Delimitation Commission should begin to function at once instead of waiting for the time appointed, namely, 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not think there was any authority to set the Commission at work before its time. This could only be done by agreement with the Germans. Should they refuse the Council [Page 138]could do nothing. It was important not to exceed Treaty rights. In this connection he wished to inform the Council that the Germans had approached him with a request for permission to occupy Frankfurt with troops by reason of disturbances expected there. On the strength of the Treaty he had refused this request. It was therefore hardly possible to ask Germany for favours. He suggested that the Report expected from the Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty be awaited.

(It was therefore decided to postpone the consideration of this question till the following day, when the Report of the Commission to Supervise the Execution of the Treaty would be heard.)

8. M. Clemenceau said he wished to read a despatch he had received from General Franchet d’Esperey. (Appendix G.)Action of the Italians in Bulgria

M. Tittoni said he would immediately make an enquiry into the allegations made in this despatch.

9. M. Clemenceau caused a letter from M. Venizelos to be read. (See Appendix H.)

Letter from M. Venizeols Concerning Asia-Minor M. Tittoni said that he denied in a most formal manner the allegations made in this letter. Greek troops were refusing to obey the orders of the British Admiral on the ground that they were receiving direct instructions from the Peace Conference sent to them by M. Venizelos. It would be necessary for the Conference to settle this matter. The British Admiral’s powers would have to be increased. The Italian Commander was in complete accord with the British Commodore at Smyrna. He had himself summoned General Bongiovanni8 and given him personal instructions that no further Italian troops should be landed, and that no new localities should be occupied. He was, moreover, to act only in concert with the British Admiral. It was necessary to enforce a similar line of conduct on the Greeks. The Turks at present believed that they were being invaded by the Greeks, and that they must fight them. The Greeks must conform to a common plan, and must realise that they formed part of the forces of the Allied Powers. The Greeks must therefore first halt on their present positions.

Mr. Balfour suggested that M. Venizelos be asked to attend the Council in order to give a frank explanation of what was going on. He would like to ask the Military Experts what they thought of the allegation made in the letter read by M. Clemenceau that there were 300,000 well-armed Turkish troops in the field. The British Military Experts were of the opinion that this was far from the mark.

[Page 139]

General Belin replied that he thought that these figures very much exaggerated. He agreed that there were perhaps some 60,000 men in all Anatolia.

(It was agreed that M. Venizelos should be invited to attend the Council on the following day to discuss the situation in Asia-Minor.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, July 15, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–7

[Translation9]

Radio from Budapest

To the President of the Peace Conference, Paris.

In reply to our radio telegram of July 11,10 the Peace Conference, instead of ordering the Roumanian troops to retreat, has just sent us a telegram saying that because of our failure to observe our part of the armistice conditions, it is impossible to deal with us for the moment.11 We should have been glad to see the precise facts by which the armistice conditions were violated by us. We experience so much satisfaction in seeing these facts stated precisely that we are sorry we must bring up immediately a whole series of violations of the armistice conditions committed by the Allied and Associated Governments and principally by those of the Kingdom of Roumania, and of the Czechoslovak Republic. We are contented to note very briefly that the Royal Roumanian troops still continue to occupy the line of the Tisza, although, according to the terms of the military convention of November 13,12 the demarcation line should be that of the Maros river.

Entire regions have been devasted, all the mobile means of production, as well as all the alimentary productions taken away. The military convention of November 13 does not recognize the Danube line as a line of demarcation: this however does not prevent the Czechoslovak troops from occupying the line of the Danube. The Rousska-Kraina, the federative party of the Republic of Hungarian Councils is under the domination of the Czech and Roumanian armed forces. We remind the Peace Conference that the troops of the Czecho-Slovak Republic had already advanced, contrary to the armistice conditions, as far as the south of Miskolcz, when our troops, to defend the vital interests of the country, took the offensive in turn, in victoriously putting to rout the Czecho-Slovak troops. Notwithstanding, we withdrew our troops from the territory retaken from the Czecho-Slovaks relying upon Monsieur Clemenceau’s promise that in this case, The Royal Hungarian troops will withdraw in their turn to the line fixed [Page 140]by the Peace Conference in its telegram of July [June] 13th addressed to the Government of the Hungarian Councils.13 It can be clearly shown that the violations of the stipulations of the armistice and of the renunciation to bloodshed took place contrary to our wishes. The Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian troops were those who crossed the line of demarcation and everything which happened afterwards is the direct consequence of this offensive. The above mentioned countries have not respected and what is more do not now respect the treaty of armistice concluded in the name of the Allied and Associated States, which they violate at every moment up to this point and which because of their attitude contrary to the principles of the right of peoples, can be considered non-existent as a treaty.

Having stated all the foregoing, we are forced to put once more the question before the Peace Conference, whether the order of Monsieur Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, is obligatory or not for the troops of the Royal Roumanian Government. Must they execute Monsieur Clemenceau’s order to withdraw from the Tisza on the line designated in the July [June] 13th telegram? Can we count on the fulfillment of Monsieur Clemenceau’s promise by the Royal Roumanian troops? We send the observation to the Peace Conference that it is not a question of negotiations but of the observance of Monsieur Clemenceau’s promise, or rather of the order of the Peace Conference, on the part of the Royal Roumanian troops.

The Government of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils, having done all in its power in order that the armistice stipulations be carried out in the sense of the military convention of November 13th, in no way opposes further negotiations. It desires however in taking its stand on the promise of Monsieur Clemenceau, that the order be given to the Royal Roumanian troops to commence without delay the evacuation of the territory designated in the telegram of June 13.

Bela Kun

Commissioner of the People for Foreign Affairs

Appendix “B” to HD–7

[Translation14]

Report Dated July 9, 1919 From French Military Attaché duParquet at Stockholm, on the Armistice Conditions Concluded on the Esthonian Front

Ordered by Allied missions to negotiate armistice between belligerents on Esthonian front. I …15 Riga July 1st. First, I examined [Page 141]conditions …16 Von der Goltz.17 Then I crossed German and Esthonian lines alone with two German soldiers carrying white flags and tri-color. Bombardment and rifle and machine gun fire from Esthonians when we started. Very badly received by Esthonians and various commanders, except General Peder. I had to use all my energy to reach my goal in defiance of bad feeling and rudeness. Peder told me he was astonished that I reached him. It was possible to modify greatly these armistice conditions which were at first very hard but they refused to compromise on the question of the occupation of Riga (doubtful) by Esthonian troops.

I was provided with full powers by the Allied missions and by Von der Goltz to sign an armistice but I did not consider myself able to do it on this basis without further consultation. I arrived near the German line on the morning of July 2. I was bombarded twice by Germans on the way but they stopped firing when they saw white flag. I asked Von der Goltz to give iron cross to two German soldiers who accompanied me and acted bravely. My intervention on the Esthonian front produced great impression at Riga …16 Riga bombarded by Esthonians July 1 and 2; victims among civil population, destruction and fires. Evening July 2 on German front and at Strassenhof farm, 12 kilometers east of Riga meeting of representatives of Allied Mission, Esthonians, Germans, Landwehr, Lett troops, for conclusion of armistice which was signed July 3 at 3:00 a.m.

Clauses: 1. Cessation hostilities land, sea, air July 3, noon.

2. German troops withdraw from Lettonia as soon as possible in accordance with peace treaty. No advance by German troops except against Bolshevists of Russian Soviet Republic, in accordance with peace treaty.

3. German officers and troops will immediately leave Riga and suburbs, evacuation to be finished 6:00 p.m., July 5 except officers and troops necessary to empty and guard German warehouses.

4. Allied officers will make sure that non-military warehouses will remain as they are.

5. Landwehr will leave Riga bridge and district and will withdraw beyond Duna; evacuation to be completed 6 p.m., July 5.

6. Esthonians in occupied positions at 3:00 a.m., July 3.

7. Germans will reestablish free communication by railway and telegraph between Riga and Libau.

8. Allied mission temporarily insures administration of Riga with Lett Government.

9. Details to be arranged under direction of chief of the Allied mission.

Armistice well executed up to evening July 5, when Germans and Landwehr had completely evacuated city and suburbs. I left Riga [Page 142]July 6 to enter Libau by American steamer. Perfect order at Riga, population relieved. Lett troops insure order, service and protection in city. Municipal police have assumed municipal functions. Ulmannis18 Ministry left Libau for Riga morning July 8 on steamer Samtow. British mission left for Riga evening July 7. French mission will leave as soon as notice is sent. Russian concentration in Latvia constitutes a danger at present because the effectives are large; supplies not assured and difficult. Under these conditions there is a danger that the Russians will pillage and resort to bolshevism. Embarkment of German troops at Libau will constitute a danger for the safety of the city which is perfectly quiet since the Germans [arrived?]. However, they should be brought at the last moment only to the military port and they should be absolutely forbidden access to the city. Disorders by German troops are to be feared. It is advisable to require evacuation of Germans to south and west of Mitau where great concentration constitutes present danger for Riga and national government. Rumor of plotted conspiracy at Mitau by Germans and Nédra party.

Parquet

Appendix “C” to HD–7

WCP–1133

trade with bolshevik russia

Note for Supreme Council of Principal Allied and Associated States

[1.]
The Allied Blockade Committee and the Comité de Blocus de l’Orient Paris, who are charged by the Supreme Blockade Council with the executive control of Blockade, find it necessary to call the urgent attention of the Supreme Council to the question of commerce with Bolshevist Russia.
2.
The Committees venture to recall to the Council that on June 7th a Note was presented by the Blockade Council to the Council of Four19 pointing out that it had in fact been possible during the Blockade of Germany to maintain, as part of such Blockade, effective restrictions upon commerce with Bolshevist Russia, either by means of agreements with neutral States or by the actual exercise of naval control; but that with the raising of the German Blockade, it would be difficult to continue to apply such restrictions to Bolshevist Russia, unless measures were directly framed towards that end. They therefore [Page 143]enquired whether the Council of Four desired that upon the raising of the Blockade of Germany.
(a)
A formal blockade of Bolshevist Russia ports in the Baltic and Black Sea should be proclaimed by the Allies, or
(b)
That negotiations should be entered into with the neutrals to secure the maintenance of guarantees against re-export to Bolshevist Russia.
3.
The Council of Four replied on June 17th20 that they did not desire that either (a) or (b) should be adopted, but that no further announcement should be made as to the possibility of trade with Bolshevist Russia, and that they trusted that in fact the physical difficulties in the way of commerce would prevent its resumption.
4.
The Committees were in hopes that, as regards the Baltic and the Black Sea, which are the two zones of difficulty, the question might have been rendered more simple by the events which seemed at the time quite likely to occur before the raising of the German Block-ade. These events were (a) the fall of Petrograd, and (b) the Proclamation by Admiral Koltchak of a blockade of the Bolshevist ports in the Black Sea, and the recognition of such a blockade as effective. The occurrence of either of these events would have gone far to solve the difficulty in the respective zones.
5.
It has now, however, become apparent that neither event is likely to antedate the raising of the German Blockade, and the Committees respectfully point out that in these circumstances absence of a definite policy will place the executive authorities in an impossible position. Already enquiries are being made—not only by Allied nationals, but also by neutrals, such as Sweden and Denmark, as to the treatment likely to be given to goods shipped to destinations in Bolshevist Russia,—and, upon the raising of the German Blockade (which is now probably only a matter of days, if not of hours) the executive authorities must be enabled to reply to such enquiries.
6.
The Committees therefore respectfully, but very earnestly, beg for an immediate statement as to the pleasure of the Supreme Economic Council upon the following enquiries:—
7.
Upon the raising of the Blockade of Germanitem:
(a)
Are the nationals of the Allied States to be free to trade with Bolshevist Russia?
(b)
If not, are neutrals to be free to conduct such trade?
(c)
If (a) and (b) are answered in the negative, how are the contemplated restrictions to be enforced?
(d)
In particular, having regard to the naval hostilities which are actually occurring at this moment, especially in the Gulf of Finland, it is still regarded as undesirable for the Allies to proclaim a local blockade of the Neva ports.
[Page 144]

WCP–1133A

trade with bolshevist russia

Addendum by British Delegation to Joint Note on Russian Blockade by Allied Blockade Committee and Eastern Blockade Committee

1.
The methods hitherto used to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia included every weapon known to the Blockade. They may be summarised as:—
(a)
Physical, e. g. control at Constantinople by Allied Naval Command who refuse permits for vessels to proceed to Black Sea ports in the occupation of Bolshevists and enforce their control through patrols: and
(b)
Conventional, e. g. agreements with neutral governments, under which these governments agreed to add Bolshevist Russia to the destinations to which export was prohibited under their agreements with the Associated Powers. These agreements will terminate with the raising of the German Blockade tomorrow.
2.
Two possible courses were suggested to the Council of Four on the 7th June.
(i)
To proclaim a Formal Blockade of all Bolshevist Russia, thus regularising the continued exercise of physical control.
(ii)
To invite the neutral governments to enter into special arrangements to retain their prohibitions against export to Bolshevist Russia after the termination of the main agreements upon the raising of the German Blockade, thus securing the retention of conventional control.

Both proposals were rejected by the Council of Four on the 17th June.21

It is now suggested for consideration that a physical control might be at least adopted as regards the Gulf of Finland, where active hostilities exist at present, and that this might be regularised by a notification by the Allies that under existing circumstances traffic into and out of ports in the Gulf of Finland can only be conducted under permit from the Allied Naval Command there.

W. Mitchell-Thomson

Appendix “D” to HD–7

blockade of hungary and bolshevik russia

Decisions of Council of Heads of States

Sir: I am directed to inform you that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, this afternoon, considered the note from the Supreme Economic Council on the subject of the Blockade of [Page 145]Hungary and Bolshevist Russia, forwarded in your letter of June 7th.

It was decided that, after the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia or Hungary. In addition, the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade.

It was further decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to examine as to whether, consistently with the above decisions, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevist Russia.

The Council also considered the second note22 forwarded in your letter of June 7th, proposing an agreement by Austria regarding trade with Hungary and Germany.

In regard to this, the Council felt that they could take no decision without fuller explanations.

I am [etc.]

M. P. A. Hankey

Secretary

Vance MoCormick, Esq.
Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, Hotel Crillon, Paris.

Appendix “E” to HD–7

SWC–440 (77MR)

supreme war council military representatives

Report on the Composition and Size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia

On June 25th [26th],23 the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers decided to ask the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to examine the following question:—

“Composition and size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia, and the method of occupation of this Area”.

General Considerations

The Area in question is defined by Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

On the other hand, by the terms of the annexure which was made to that article:— [Page 146]

(a)
The German troops and authorities must evacuate the area submitted for a Plebiscite after the coming into force of the Treaty and within a maximum period of 15 days (para. 1).
(b)
This Area shall be occupied by troops of the Allied and Associated Powers—(Para. 2).
(c)
The Plebiscite Area shall be immediately placed under the authority of an International Commission composed of 4 members to be appointed by the United States of America, France, the British Empire and Italy. (Para. 2.)
(d)
It shall be the duty of the Commission to maintain order with the help of troops to be placed at its disposal and, to the extent which it shall consider necessary, of a police force to be recruited from the native inhabitants of the country. (Para. 3.)

Character of the Forces of Occupation

From the terms of the Treaty, which it seemed useful to recall above, it results that any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation is excluded.

It is equally indispensable not to admit any Polish units, if there is not to be a danger of the result of the plebiscite losing its character of sincerity which is essential.

Size of the Forces of Occupation

In fixing their strength, consideration must be taken of the following particulars:—

(1)
The population of the plebiscite area is estimated at about 1,632,000 inhabitants (of which 570,000 are Germans and 1,062,000 Poles).
(2)
There are present in this area two elements in the population of such different mentality and tendencies that they will only accept the new condition of affairs with reluctance. This may provoke serious trouble if the forces available do not allow of all necessary measures being taken in time.
(3)
This situation will assuredly continue up to the day of the plebiscite; it is even possible that it will tend to increase as the date approaches for taking the vote which is to definitely decide the future of the country.
(4)
The existing local police, composed mostly of Germans, would not seem to offer any guarantee of impartiality, however, at the present time or during any of the period preceding the plebiscite; consequently, this police should be probably disbanded as soon as possible, and reconstituted and increased.
(5)
The territory in question includes important industrial centres in which the total population attains 450,000 and which can easily become centres of disturbances.
(6)
Serious social movements have already arisen in this country; Councils of Workmen and Soldiers have been set up, which the Treaty of Peace with Germany has ordered to be dissolved (Paragraph 1 of the Annexure of Article 88 of the Treaty).

[Page 147]

Consequently, the Military Representatives are agreed in considering that an armed force of 1 Division (about 13,000 men) is, at least for the time being, indispensable to guarantee the maintenance of order and ensure the authority of the Inter-Allied Commission.

It will be for the President of the International Commission to propose either a reduction of this force or their repatriation as soon as the creation and increase of the police force and gendarmerie, organised on the spot, shall permit.

Gal. Belin
Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council
Ugo Cavallero
Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council
C. Sackville-West
Major General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council
Stanley D. Embick
for
Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council

Given at Versailles the 10th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true copy of the original document.

W. N. Wicks
, Capt.
Secretary, British Section,
Supreme War Council

[Appendix E bis]24
[Translation]25
supreme war council
military representatives

Report on the Strength and Organization of the Occupation Force in Bulgaria

On July 9, 1919,25a the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to request from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council a report on the strength and organization of the occupation force in Bulgaria, on the basis of equal participation by the three Powers directly concerned.

[Page 148]

In their collective note No. 44 of June 9, 1919, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council have set forth the importance of the “inter-Allied character that the measures to be taken in Bulgaria ought to have, and the necessity of not permitting, until further notice, any military intervention by the neighboring powers directly concerned (Greece, Serbia, Roumania), in order to eliminate all grounds for premature agitation.”

They believe they should reaffirm these two principles:

Whereas, moreover

(a)
A total force of about 25,000 men appears sufficient to ensure the maintenance of order and the execution of the decisions of the Peace Conference;
(b)
The Greek forces in Macedonia could, as the Military Representatives have pointed out in their collective note No. 44, make up a reserve ready to intervene, upon the invitation of the Allied Governments, if events took a more serious turn.

The Military, Representatives believe—that it is necessary to provide for the employment of three (3) divisions, each comprising a force of 8,000–9,000 men*

The French Military Representative
Signed:
Gen. Belin

The British Military Representative
Signed:
Sackville-West

The Italian Military Representative
Signed:
Cavallero

The American Military Representative
Signed:
Embick
[Page 149]

Appendix “F” to HD–7

SWC–444 (79MR)

supreme war council military representatives

Report on the Help To Be Given to Poland in the Event of Trouble in the Area Ceded by Germany

In two Resolutions; dated June 26th and 27th, 1919,26 the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles:—

(1)
To enquire how the Poles could best be assisted to establish their authority in the area ceded by Germany to Poland, in the event of trouble arising in that area;
(2)
To determine:—
(a)
The needs of the Polish Army in equipment and supplies;
(b)
The means of satisfying these needs;
(c)
From what sources these needs could best be made good.

First Question

In the course of their enquiry, the Military Representatives have found that the troubles likely to occur in the territories in question might arise:—

(a)
Either from a direct armed attack by Germany;
(b)
Or from excesses committed by the German troops during their retirement, or from purely local disturbances, as a result of the country being carried away by local propaganda organisations for many months past, or from the too abrupt taking over by the Poles of the territories the population of which was still permeated by German influence and administrative Customs.

In the first case an armed attack by Germany would be a violation of the Treaty of Peace which she has signed and ratified. In this instance the Allied and Associated Powers appear to have at their disposal only the following means of punishment:—

(1)
Restoration of the blockade.
(2)
Inter-Allied naval action.
(3)
Military action by the Allied Armies of the Left Bank of the Rhine, with a view to an occupation of especially important points in Germany as a Guarantee, such as the Ruhr Basin and the Frankfort region, etc. This action, as also the employment of all other available troops against Germany would be directed and ordered according to the plan which the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies would be called upon to furnish.

In the second case (excesses committed by German troops and purely local disturbances etc.) the Military Representatives consider [Page 150]that the assistance to be given to the Poles to allow them to establish their authority in the territories ceded by Germany could include:—

(a)
Preventive measures.
(b)
Assistance in material.

(a) Preventive measures

From the information given to the Military Representatives by General Dupont with the Mission at Berlin, it appears that an intervention on the spot and at the right time by a few capable Allied officers of sound judgment would ensure a certain moral authority and would prevent in all probability most of the excesses to be feared, or at any rate the aggravation of those excesses.

These Officers could be taken from among those nominated to form part of “The Commission of Delimitation” to be constituted 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany to “determine on the spot the frontier line of Germany”.

(Article 87 of the Treaty).

It would be indispensable, however, for this Commission to be on the spot the day after the coming into force of the Treaty. While preparing the work of delimitation, which must be started on the 15th day, it would superintend the operation of taking over and evacuation, and would protect the Polish and German populations against any excesses. In this case, the Commission must have a considerable personnel and sufficient means of transport to enable it to travel quickly from place to place and settle the differences which are bound to arise, and to smooth over difficulties of every kind.

A General Officer to be appointed by the French Government, and well acquainted with German and Polish affairs, would appear in every way suited to be President of this Commission and to organize its work.

The Military Representatives call the attention of the Supreme Council to the urgency of taking a decision on this particular point.

(b) Material assistance

In this case all necessary measures must be taken to hasten the sending to Poland of the numerous important orders placed in Allied countries by the Polish Army for material, as also orders which are now being carried out for material, the delivery of which will apparently be delayed owing to insufficiency of transport.

It would seem, therefore, apparent that sea transport to Dantzig must be used (as well as railways).

Second Question

The military representatives of the Supreme War Council consider that they should point out that a Convention dated June 14th, 1919, concluded between the Governments of the Allied and Associated [Page 151]Powers and the Polish Government, confers on Marshal Foch the Chief Command of Polish Armies.27

Under these circumstances and in accordance with the recommendations which they have addressed to the Supreme Council concerning the supplies for the forces of the Baltic States,

The Military Representatives Consider:—

(1)
that Marshal Foch should be asked to determine, through General Henrys, his delegate at Warsaw, the nature and amount of supplies of all sorts which may be necessary for the Polish Army in addition to the orders already placed;
(2)
that if it is necessary later to divide between the Powers the extra supplies considered necessary, this division should only be made when the exact nature and total quantity of the supplies is known;
(3)
that at this moment all facilities must be given to the Polish Requisitioning Commissions accredited to the Governments to carry out their work.

Gal. Belin
Military Representative, Military Representative French Section, Supreme War Council
Ugo Cavallero
Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council
C. Sackville-West
Major-General, British Section, Supreme War Council
Stanley D. Embick
for
Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council

Given at Versailles on 11th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true Copy of the original Document.

W. N. Wicks, Capt.

Secretary, British Section, Supreme War Council

Appendix G [to HD–7]

[Translation]28

General Franchet d’Esperey

To the President of the Council.

In passing through Sofia on my return from Hungary I insisted to the president of the Bulgarian Council that Bulgaria accept the consequences of her defeat, and demobilize her Army effectually.

[Page 152]

The present Government appears to be disposed to obey the Entente, but it is not so with the Army.

The Communist Party, which takes national integrity as its platform, is working actively among the young Bulgarian officers. Negotiations with the Turks are being begun in order that Bulgaria and Turkey may lend one another mutual support. Italy openly proclaims her sympathy for Bulgaria. General Bertramon, commanding the Ivres Brigade, at a private dinner toasted the Bulgarian Army and nation and recognized the legitimacy of its cause.

It is possible that Bulgaria in such an ambient situation may resist the peace conditions imposed upon her.

It will be easy to repress this resistance with the forces at our disposition if it manifests itself in the form of a popular movement at Sofia. But the repression will be more difficult if it is a question of military sedition extending throughout the country; this sedition must be foreseen and if possible anticipated.

The Smyrna incident29 must be a warning to us. No limit was imposed on the Greek advance and the Turks were not warned; the result of this lack of precaution was to be expected.

Furthermore it would be essential that I should be notified sufficiently in advance of the peace conditions for Bulgaria and of the date when this peace will be given out. As I have telegraphed, it will be necessary at this time to send sufficiently large Allied missions, within which the English and Italian flags should be seen at the side of the French flag. Under our supervision, the Greek advance should make progress.

I hope thus to be able on one hand to intimidate Bulgaria whose principal centers and coal mines we occupy, and on the other to prevent massacres like those in Asia Minor.

General Franchet d’Esperey

Appendix H [to HD–7]

[The Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

[Translation]30

Mr. President: I have the honor of informing you that, according to the news which comes to me from Constantinople, military preparations [Page 153]are being continued by Turkey in an undeniably aggressive spirit, and are assuming such a magnitude that one risks seeing the war kindled again in all Anatolia and the settlement of the affairs of the East rendered impossible.

Nearly 60,000 men are already concentrated at Konia. Mobilization continues throughout the country and it is probable that a total force of 300,000 men will soon be on a war footing. The leaders of this organization, with whom the Minister of War himself collaborates will have at their disposal material and munitions in sufficient quantity for such an army.

This information is known by the Allied Military Command at Constantinople.

I am forced to say that the gravity of this news is increased by the fact that the Turks appear to be encouraged in their designs by the Italian authorities.

Indeed, it has been proven that the zone occupied by the Italian forces south of Aidin served as a base of operations for the Turks in their successive aggressions against the Greek troops north of the Meander. The first Greek division has just seized Turkish proclamations dated July 4, in which was printed a telegram sent from Mylassa by the Italian general reassuring the Turks that they had nothing to fear from the Greeks because their troops were obliged to withdraw to the north of the Meander and that in case they did not, the Italian forces would take the necessary measures.

Moreover, two distinguished young Turks who are very influential, Mahmoud Essad and Chukri, have just gone from Lausanne to Milan, for the purpose of directing the attentions of the Italian authorities to a position on the coast of Smyrna. It is likely that they were accompanied by their friend Kiazim Nourri, deputy of Aidin, relative of the ex-vale of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey.

Under these conditions, I believe, Mr. President, that the situation will be aggravated to the point of compromising the settlement which the Peace Conference plans in the East, if prompt and energetic measures are not taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to restrict the mobilization of the Turkish Army and to put an end to the encouragement encountered up to now from the abettors of dissension.

Please accept [etc.]

E. K. Venizelos

His Excellency Mr. Clemenceau
President of the Peace Conference

  1. Ante, p. 120.
  2. CF–62, minute 8, vol. vi, p. 351.
  3. Sir William Mitchell Thomson, British representative, Superior Blockade Council and Supreme Economic Council; Sydney Philip Waterlow, British representative, Committee on Blockade of the East; Capt Cyril Thomas Fuller, head of Naval Section, British Delegation; Charles L. A. J. Seydoux, French representative, Superior Blockade Council, Committee on Blockade of the East, and Supreme Economic Council; and John Foster Dulles, United States representative, Supreme Economic Council.
  4. Vance C. McCormick, United States representative and chairman of the Superior Blockade Council; also chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.
  5. Admiral Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak, proclaimed on November 18, 1918, at Omsk, Supreme Governor of Russia.
  6. Gen. Anton Ivanovich Deniken, commander in chief of the armed forces of South Russia.
  7. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxxvii, p. 1370.
  8. Commander in chief of the Allied Armies in the East.
  9. Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni, commander of the Italian forces in Asia Minor.
  10. Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/7.
  11. Appendix B to HD–6, p. 125.
  12. HD–6, minute 6, p. 120.
  13. vol. ii, p. 183.
  14. Appendix V (A), V (B), and V (F) to CF–65, vol. vi, pp. 411, 412, and 416.
  15. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  16. Omission indicated in the original French.
  17. Omission indicated in the original French.
  18. Gen. Rudiger von der Goltz, commander of the German Armies in the Baltic Provinces.
  19. Omission indicated in the original French.
  20. Karlis Ulmannis, Latvian Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Supplies.
  21. This document was referred to in the meeting of the Council of Four on June 17, 1919, 4 p.m., but it does not accompany the minutes of the meeting. See CF–74, minute 5, vol. vi, p. 530.
  22. See appendix D to HD–7, p. 144.
  23. CF–74, minute 5, vol. vi, p. 530.
  24. Appendix IV to CF–74, vol. vi, p. 541.
  25. CF–93, minute 21, vol. vi, p. 703.
  26. This report appears to have been inadvertently omitted from the present set of minutes. A copy in French was found under file No. 874.00/131.
  27. Translation supplied by the editors.
  28. HD–3, minute 12, p. 65.
  29. Although entirely in agreement with the principle of an equal inter-Allied contribution, the British Military Representative considers himself obliged to make the following reservation: The British Ministry of War has already laid down that the only force which it could furnish would be one platoon (1 officer and about 40 men).

    The Italian Military Representative believes himself obliged to’ declare that, so far as the assistance to be given by the Italian Army is concerned, this could not exceed one infantry battalion—which is in line with communications previously made. [Footnote in the original.]

  30. The American Military Representative makes the following reservation: Since the United States is not concerned with this question, the American Military Representative has no objection to any of the solutions reached by the Military Representatives in the interest of the powers concerned—it being well understood that the United States will not be bound to any participation. [Footnote in the original.]
  31. CF–93, minute 21, and CF–96, minute 5, vol. vi, pp. 703 and 726.
  32. See CF–57, minute 6, vol. vi, p. 295.
  33. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  34. See HD–8, minute 1, p. 154.
  35. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.