Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 11, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. R. Lansing.
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
      • M. Pichon.
    • Italy
      • M. Crespi.
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui.
    • Secretaries
      • Mr. L. Harrison.
      • Mr. H. Norman.
      • M. Paterno.
      • M. Kawai.
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Lieut. Burden.
British Empire Capt. E. Abraham.
France Capt. A. Portier.
Italy Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Pichon took the Chair and explained that M. Clemenceau was detained in the Peace Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. He sent his apologies and would come later.

At this stage M. Tardieu, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, Mr. Leeper, M. Stranieri, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hudson entered the room.1Frontier of Austria with Hungary & Czecho-Slovakia

M. Tardieu said that he had been asked on the previous day to mark on a map the compromise he had suggested. This compromise gave back to the Austrians half of the ground given to the Czecho-Slovaks in the neighbourhood of Gmünd, only leaving the junction of the railways within Czecho-Slovakia. In the region of [Page 98] Feldsberg two-thirds of the territory was returned to Austria, only the railway and river remaining in Czecho-Slovakia. In compensation to Czecho-Slovakia for this reduction of territory, he proposed to attribute to her the Bridgehead at Pressburg and the railway junction. He would add that in the area round Feldsberg left to Czecho-Slovakia, there were a number of Czechs, which was not the case in the rest of the territories mentioned.

M. Crespi said that the Italian Delegation had made reservations particularly in respect to the Bridgehead. He could see no reason for bringing Czecho-Slovakia across the Danube. There were no military reasons and he thought it would be a cause of perpetual dissension between the two States. The possession of an isolated bridgehead had an offensive appearance both against Austria and against Hungary. Politically therefore there was little to recommend the transaction. The Italian Delegation would prefer to satisfy the Czechs in any other region than this.

Mr. Lansing asked what Mr. Crespi thought of the other changes suggested by M. Tardieu.

M. Crespi said that the Italian Delegation thought that it would be best to leave the frontier as previously decided, and also that no change should be made at Pressburg.

Mr. Balfour said that he understood M. Crespi’s feeling about the possession of the Bridgehead. Against this, he would set the consideration that nowhere else had a town been cut in two by a national frontier. There was an integral part of the town on the right bank of the Danube. If the river were taken as a boundary, an economic and social unit would be arbitrarily divided—moreover from the main town, the railway station, the electric works and the public gardens would be cut off, and a customs barrier would be established on the bridge connecting the two parts of the city.

M. Crespi said that he was told that the portion on the right bank of the river was not an integral part of the city but a suburb.

Mr. Lansing said that the United States had considerable experience of divided cities on the Mexican border. This kind of arrangement caused the greatest possible friction. He thought it was a mistake to make a river divide in two a Town, both parts of which had grown up together under one Municipal authority, and had never been separate. If, therefore, changes were to be made in other parts of the frontier, he would be disposed to allow the whole of Pressburg on both sides of the river to go to Czecho-Slovakia. Compensation could be given to the German population by frontier rectification elsewhere.

M. Pichon asked whether he was right in believing that Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing accepted M. Tardieu’s proposal which M. Crespi rejected.

[Page 99]

Mr. Lansing said that he was not quite in agreement on all points. M. Tardieu wished to give the railway junction near Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia. He did not think this necessary.

M. Tardieu said that this Junction exclusively served Czechoslovak interests. His proposal withdrew one line entirely from the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia. He considered, therefore, the retention of this Junction as economically essential.

Mr. Lansing said that he was informed that 99 per cent of the population in the Gmünd area was German. He therefore proposed that the historic line should be reverted to.

M. Tardieu said that on the previous day he understood that a compromise was to be sought. His instructions were that if a compromise could not be reached, the frontier announced on June 2nd was to be adhered to. He would add that according to the Czechs, a good deal of the population was Czech though he did not make himself personally responsible for this statement. Undoubtedly the majority was of German speech, whether or not of Czech origin. Further, the Czecho-Slovak Government had somehow learnt that an alteration of frontier was contemplated and M. Kramarcz had already made a protest. It must be remembered that there was a new Government at Prague inclined to seek a balance between the Allied and Associated Powers and German influence. If the compromise he suggested were accepted, the Czechs would no doubt complain.

Mr. Lansing said that he would like to give Pressburg to the Czechs but not without full compensation, namely, the return of the German speaking inhabitants around Gmünd. As to the Feldsberg area, with the exception of four villages, containing he was told, 4,000 Germans and only 260 Czechs, which might without disadvantage be restored to Austria, he was content with M. Tardieu’s proposal. In the Gmünd region he would like to return to the historic frontier. He disliked the salient created by the proposal.

Mr. Balfour said that M. Tardieu’s compromise was like all compromises, open to criticism. Nevertheless, he accepted and supported it as the best way out of a difficult situation. In effect the Council was taking from the Czechs something already officially given to them. The problem was therefore, not quite an open one. It involved undoing something already done. He thought that if the portion of Pressburg on the right side of the Danube be given to the Czechs while the bulk of the German speaking people near Feldsberg and near Gmünd were restored to Austria, neither side ought to complain.

Mr. Lansing said that he would prefer to avoid the use of the word “bridgehead”. He would prefer to say that a suburb of Pressburg was restored to the city. The line proposed in Feldsberg with [Page 100] the exception of the four villages in the South East of the district, to which he had referred, he would accept. In order to obtain agreement he would also accept the line proposed in the region of Gmünd.

M. Tardieu said that he would like to add two remarks. The Committee thought that the course of the Morava and Thaia which now became a frontier line should be internationalised. The second remark was that the railway going south from Pressburg which was attributed to Hungary should have a servitude imposed on it ensuring free circulation for the Czecho-Slovak State. He would suggest that in the Treaty with Austria an addition be made to Article 313 to the following effect:—

After the first railway mentioned, the second should be:—

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyfalu–Zapabér–Zala Szent Ivan–Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu–Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second as at present mentioned should become the third.

Similar provision should be made in the Treaty with Hungary regarding the railway which was to be within the Hungarian boundary.

(It was decided to accept for the Austrian frontier the compromise proposed by M. Tardieu, subject to a slight modification proposed by Mr. Lansing.

The Slices of territory attributed to Czecho-Slovakia in excess of the former administrative frontier should be reduced in the regions of Gmünd and Feldsberg to a minimum by way of compensation for the suburb of Presbourg situated on the right bank of the Danube.

M. Tardieu’s Commission was asked to define the new frontier line and to forward it to the Drafting Committee.

It was further decided that the cost [course?] of the Morava and of the Thaia insofar as they became frontier lines should be internationalised.

It was also decided to modify Article 313 of the Treaty with Austria by the addition; after the first railway mentioned of a second

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyf alu–Zapabér–Zala Szent Ivan-Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu–Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second Railway at present mentioned should become the third. And to insert a similar provision to Article 313 in the treaty with Hungary.)

2. (After a short discussion, the recommendation of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways made at its Meeting of July [Page 101] 9th, was accepted, and it was decided that the following insertion be made in Article 33 of Part 12, as paragraph 2 of that Article:— Note From Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railway, on Frontier Stations in Austria

“The establishment of an the Frontier Stations between Austria and the contiguous Allied and Associated States, as well as the working of the lines between those stations, shall be settled by agreements similarly concluded.”)

3. With reference to a letter from the German Delegation of June 25th (see Appendix “A”), it was for consideration whether an answer should be sent. Answer to German Delegation Regarding Evacuation of Polish Territory

Mr. Balfour expressed the opinion that it was undesirable to send any answer. His colleagues concurred in this opinion, and it was decided that no answer should be sent.

4. M. Crespi begged that this question be adjourned. Treaty Between Principal Allied and Associated Power and Czecho-Slovakia

Mr. Lansing agreed, as he wished to have the differences between this Treaty and that with Poland Associated examined.

M. Crespi said that on the 17th of June Baron Sonnino had suggested certain additional clauses of general application.2 (See Appendix “B.”) This had been referred by the late Council of Four to the Council of Foreign Ministers.3 The Council of Foreign Ministers had now ceased to exist. He presumed that the question might be referred to whatever body now represented the Council of Foreign Ministers. The decision to refer the question to the Council of Foreign Ministers had been taken because the Commission on New States thought the proposals were outside their competence. He explained that the proposals were to the effect that the political clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria should be generalised in such a way as to apply to all the New States formed out of the former Dual Monarchy.

(After some discussion, it was decided to refer to the Committee on Political Clauses in Europe, Baron Sonnino’s proposal tending to apply the political clauses of the Treaty with Austria to all the States formed from the territories of the late Dual Monarchy.)

(At this point the Experts withdrew.)

M. Clemenceau entered the room and the members of the Drafting Committee were summoned.

5. M. Hurst read the following: Ratification of Treaty by Germany

On he Ratification by Germany of the Treaty of Peace—Note for the Supreme Council

Article 6 of the law, dated February 10th, 1919, [Page 102] of the German Empire,4 relating to the provisional exercise of the Imperial Power, provides that:—

“The affairs of the Empire are conducted by an Imperial President. The Imperial President will represent the Empire in international matters, will conclude in the name of the Empire Treaties with foreign Powers, and will accredit and receive ambassadors.

Declaration of war and Treaties of Peace are made in conformity with the law of the Empire.

The instrument of ratification signed by President Ebert, and countersigned by Bauer, President of the Council of Ministers, mention being made of the approval of the “legislative bodies”, appears to fulfil the above stipulation.

It may be deemed that Article 4 of the same law, dealing with the preparation of the future constitution of the Empire, lays down that the territory of the German States cannot be altered without the consent of those States, but this provision appears only to restrict the powers of the National Assembly on this subject.

In these circumstances, the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Peace of June 28th, 1919, forwarded by the Government of the German Empire, is not in the opinion of the Drafting Committee open to objection, but may be regarded as complete, and in due form, from the international point of view.”

M. Clemenceau said that it followed from this opinion of the Drafting Committee that the blockade on Germany must be raised from the 12th of July, in accordance with a letter received by him from the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee. (See Appendix “C”.)

(It was decided to accept the interpretation given by the Drafting Committee, and to terminate the blockade on Germany from the 12th July, 1919.)

6. Mr. Balfour said that in connection with this subject he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that a blockade on Russia had been conducted under the guise of a blockade on Germany. The latter being now removed, it was for consideration whether any form of blockade could be continued with the object of preventing the passage of supplies and arms to the Russian Soviet Government. This Government had not been recognised and the Allies were not at war with it. It did not seem possible, therefore, legally to declare a blockade on it. Nevertheless, it was obviously a serious matter to allow Sweden and other countries to furnish Soviet Russia with the means of fighting our friends. He suggested this matter be considered and discussed at a very early date. Question of Blockade the Baltic

(It was decided to put on the Agenda for the following meeting the question of the consequences of the termination of the Blockade on Germany on the unofficial blockade of Russia.)

[Page 103]

7. At this stage M. Misu, M. Vaida-Voevod and M. Plessia of the Roumanian Delegation; M. Patchitch and M. Vesnitch of the Serbian Delegation; and M. Kramarcz and M. Benes of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation; Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Versailles Military Representatives and General Thwaites entered the room. Military Measures To Be Take Against Hungary: Hearing of Czecho-Slovak, Serbian & Roumanian Representative With Marshal Foch

M. Pichon gave the delegates a short account of what had taken place in Council at previous meetings on this subject. He also read to them the report made by the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles regarding the military measures to be taken to enforce respect for the armistice on Hungary. See HD–3
Para. 6,
Appen. B5

M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch to say what he thought of the projected operation.

Marshal Foch said that the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles contained no projected operation. It merely stated what forces were available for action. He understood the purpose was to make Hungary respect the conditions of the armistice. In the meantime Hungarian forces had increased from six to nine divisions, and the success obtained over the Czechs had improved the morale of these forces. If Hungary was to respect the armistice, she must be forced to reduce these troops to six divisions, and also to withdraw from certain territories. 84,000 men were said to be available for use to effect this. This number was small for the purpose. The main contributor to this number was Roumania. Not only was the total not great, but there was no cohesion between the various elements contributing to it. The Roumanian Army was under Roumanian Command, the Serbian army was under Serbian Command, the Czech Army was under a French General, and the French troops under French Command. A single Command was obviously the first requisite for a successful campaign. Moreover, the probable length of the operations must be taken into account. It seemed unlikely that the desired end could be obtained by one rapid stroke. If this were the case the troops above mentioned would require reinforcement. Obviously assistance must be looked for in this from the neighbouring states. Before making a plan it must be known what these States would do, how much they would contribute, and whether they would agree to act under one Command. The desired results were:—first to defeat the Hungarian army, and second to occupy Budapest. The first alone was difficult with the forces locally available. The second was still more difficult, as Budapest was the central fortress of the Hungarian plain. It was a considerable city, and if taken would require [Page 104] a large occupying force. Before embarking on the adventure there must first be a political understanding between the States taking part in it. Secondly a military understanding. Thirdly, a plan of operations.

M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch whether he required more troops than were placed at his disposal. If so, would he name a figure.

Marshal Foch said he would have to study the question. The whole operation was conditioned, first by the terms of the agreement that might be made between the states concerned, and secondly by the probable length of the operations.

M. Clemenceau asked the Roumanian representatives to state the view of their Government.

M. Misu said that the Roumanian Government would certainly take into consideration the desires of the Conference. Roumania was greatly interested in the condition of Hungary by reason of its neighbourhood. Roumania was already bearing a heavy burden and maintaining seven divisions in Hungary. Two army corps were forming in Transylvania and were not yet ready. Four divisions were maintained on the Russian front, and two more were being mobilised with the help of equipment supplied by the Allies. He agreed with Marshal Foch that the first requisite was an understanding between the Governments concerned. On behalf of the Roumanian Government he felt entitled to say that a very willing spirit would be shown.

M. Clemenceau asked the Serbian representatives to express the views of their Government.

M. Vesnitch said he entirely agreed with Marshal Foch that a single Command was necessary. With this proviso he thought that the forces at present available, if assisted with arms and munitions, could achieve success without much difficulty. It should also be impressed on the Government at Budapest that the Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely at one, and seriously intended to have their will respected. This would produce a moral effect perhaps even greater than the military effect of the forces employed.

As to Serbia’s share, he had no instructions from the Serbian Government, but he thought he could go so far as to say that Serbia would make her contribution and he was prepared to advise his Government to do so. He must point out that Serbia herself was threatened at certain points and he would ask that, during the campaign, Serbia be guaranteed by the Powers against threats from without. He mentioned, for example, that the Bulgarians had not yet been disarmed.

M. Clemenceau asked how many troops Serbia would contribute?

M. Vesnitch replied that Serbia would contribute what the Military Representatives at Versailles had asked for, namely, one division.

M. Pichon said that he hoped Serbia might contribute more.

[Page 105]

M. Vesnitch said that perhaps the Serbian Government might see its way to making a larger contribution, but he could make no undertaking on its behalf.

M. Clemenceau asked how far he thought the Serbian Government would go?

M. Vesnitch replied that this depended on general circumstances.

M. Clemenceau observed that an Army could not be made of general circumstances.

M. Vesnitch said that the Military Representatives at Versailles had considered one division necessary.

General Belin explained that the report made by the Military Representatives had merely stated what troops were believed to be available. The figure mentioned was not a desideratum but a statement of what was ready for immediate use. The report had also stated that the troops locally available would require reinforcements.

M. Clemenceau said that it was evidently desirable to have exact figures. Once they were obtained, Marshal Foch could be asked if they were sufficient. M. Vesnitch had said that Serbia would contribute a division, but, if so, must be protected against the Bulgarians. In other words, what he offered with one hand he withdrew with the other.

M. Vesnitch said that he had declared Serbia’s readiness to help. Nevertheless, the precarious condition of the country must be taken into account. He was prepared to offer the whole of the Serbian Army on condition that, while it was away from home, the house should not be burgled. One division had been mentioned in the report of the Military Representatives; he had understood that they desired one division. He now understood from General Belin that more, if possible, would be acceptable. It was necessary, however, for the Serbian Military Authorities to judge what could be done under the circumstances. The first business of Serbia was to ensure her own existence. She was being asked to make an effort in the common cause and on her behalf he had expressed her readiness to do her best. Marshal Foch had said that action must be preceded by political agreement between the countries concerned, namely, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania. He would like to observe that, as a Military action was required and that as, for success, it ought to be rapid, a great deal of valuable time would be lost in conducting negotiations at Belgrade, Budapest, and Prague. He thought it would be best to place the available forces directly under Marshal Foch’s command.

M. Clemenceau asked M. Vesnitch if he could inform the Council of the present distribution of the Serbian Army.

M. Vesnitch gave the following information:—

The Morava division in the Banat.
The Drina division in Batchka and Slavonia.
The Danube division in Croatia and Slovenia.
The Choumadia division in Belgrade (one regiment) and on the Bulgarian frontier.
The Timok division in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Fiume.
The Yugo-Slav division in the Sandjak, on the Albanian frontier, in old Serbia and in Montenegro.
The Vardar Brigade in Macedonia.

M. Clemenceau then asked the Czecho-Slovak representatives to state the case for their Government.

M. Kramarcz said that the Hungarian situation was undoubtedly a threat to Czecho-Slovakia. His Government did not desire Hungary to have a larger Army than that allowed to her in the armistice, but, the present moment was not propitious for action by Czecho-Slovakia against Hungary. When Czecho-Slovakia was attacked, the moment was more propitious. At that time, Czecho-Slovakia had mobilised 150,000 men, but munitions and equipment were lacking. The Conference had then imposed an armistice between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The Hungarians had observed this armistice and had evacuated Czecho-Slovakian territory. What pretext, therefore, was there for the Czechs to attack the Hungarians? The proposal now was to demand the reduction of the Hungarian forces to the number stipulated, but so far as Czecho-Slovakia was concerned, the Hungarians had fulfilled the conditions of the armistice required of them. He agreed with M. Vesnitch that a political agreement between the three States was not desirable. The question was one concerning the Entente. It related to the armistice negotiated between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers. No doubt Czech troops, if employed, would do their duty, but before they could be employed the Government at Prague must be consulted.

M. Clemenceau enquired what contribution from Czecho-Slovakia had been suggested in the Versailles report?

M. Kramarcz replied 20,000 men. He did not conceal that Czechoslovakia had more men than this available, but he could not say whether the Government at Prague would consent to act. As the Council knew, the Government had lately changed.

Marshal Foch said that he had just received a letter from General Pellé6 dated 8th July. He read this letter to the Council. (Appendix “D”). It followed from this letter that Hungary was determined to re-act against fate. It would seize its opportunity when the Allied nations had demobilised and disarmament had set in. He would like to explain that the preliminary understanding he had referred to was the kind of understanding that could be [Page 107] obtained in the Council. He did not suggest that the negotiations be carried on in Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade.

M. Clemenceau asked Mr. Balfour whether any British help could be expected?

Mr. Balfour replied that he had repeated to the British War Cabinet the argument he had set forth to the Council. He thought the Powers could not submit to a continued breach of the armistice by Hungary. This affected central Europe and perhaps even the whole of Europe. Unless this were put a stop to, there was no hope of peace or of restoring the economic condition of central Europe. It was of the utmost importance to act quickly. He thought an effort must be made and that all Allied countries must contribute. A decision on this subject was one of a very momentous character. Up to the present time, he had received no answer from the British War Cabinet. He did not know whether General Thwaites had received any answer from the War Office.

General Thwaites said that he had received no answer.

M. Crespi said that he had telegraphed to Rome in the same sense as Mr. Balfour. He thought all were agreed in regarding the question as one of European importance. He had so far received no answer. The question, however, was being considered. Italy was passing through a critical time. Demobilisation had proceeded even further than he had stated on the previous day. (M. Crespi handed to M. Clemenceau a paper on this subject— Appendix “E”.7) Italy was threatened by her own Bolsheviks. A general strike was possible if Italy acted against the Bolsheviks, whether in Russia or elsewhere. He expected M. Tittoni to be back in Paris on the following Sunday. He would then be able to make a statement on the subject.

M. Clemenceau said that the result of the discussion did not appear to furnish Marshal Foch with a very coherent force.

Marshal Foch said that, if the military resurrection of Hungary was to be prevented, action should be rapid. If all the Governments co-operated, he thought success could be achieved.

M. Benes said that one precaution must be taken if a campaign against Hungary were started. When the Magyars had attacked Czecho-Slovakia, it was found that there was considerable Austrian connivance with the Hungarians. It would be necessary to take all precautions that Austria did not hamper the military action undertaken by the Allies.

M. Clemenceau said that, to sum up, there appeared to be six Roumanian divisions, two French, one Serbian and a doubtful quantity of Czecho-Slovaks.

[Page 108]

M. Benes said there were troops in Czecho-Slovakia, but a scarcity of equipment. He was therefore not prepared to state a figure.

M. Clemenceau said that he would be glad to know what contribution Great Britain would make. Perhaps Mr. Balfour would be able to state this on the following day.

Mr. Balfour said that he hoped this might be so. There were no British troops at present on the spot.

M. Clemenceau said the question was whether any could be sent.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not know.

M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch whether he could act on this information.

Marshal Foch replied that preparations could be made. After discovering what each could contribute and the dates on which the contributions could be made, he thought that he would be able in a fortnight to elaborate the first outlines of a plan.

M. Clemenceau suggested that Marshal Foch should give a sketch of the plan of operations in a week, in order that the matter should be kept before the Council’s attention.

Marshal Foch said that, if he were to do this, he must be authorised to treat with the Governments concerned and find out from them what they could undertake to supply and at what period they could fulfil their undertakings.

M. Kramarcz said that he did not know whether his Government would contribute to the operations, but should it do so he must ask that action be taken at Vienna, in order that munitions and arms stored there be delivered to Czecho-Slovakia.

M. Clemenceau replied that this point should be explained to Marshal Foch.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch after consulting the authorities of the countries concerned, should formulate the plan of operations and report progress to the Council in a week’s time.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, July 11, 1919.

Appendix “A” to HD–5


[The Secretary of the German Delegation (Von Haniel) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
No. 122

Mr. President: The Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate the following to you.

[Page 109]

“The German Government is informed that among the Oriental territories that Germany must cede in accordance with the Peace Treaty as well as among the administrations and minor military authorities there, doubt exists and wrong views are held as to the time when this cession must take place. In order to avoid misunderstandings and disagreeable incidents, and in the interests of the two parties, it seems necessary to inform the interested circles immediately that the Treaty of Peace will not come into force as soon as it is signed, but only at the time stated in the different Clauses of the Treaty, and until then, the actual state of affairs are still in force. As to that which concerns the territories situated within the line of demarcation, all that is necessary has been done on the German side. The Allied and Associated Powers are requested, without delay, to take corresponding measures in connection with the territories situated beyond this line.”

Accept [etc.]

Von Haniel

Appendix B to HD–5


Clauses Relative to the Reciprocal Relations of the Ceded Territories

Article 1

Separate agreements between the High Contracting Parties will provide for the regulation of the interests of persons remaining in territories detached from the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and transferred to each Contracting Party, with special regard to their civil rights, their trade, and the exercise of their profession, including the establishment and up-keep of emigration agencies.

Article 2

Insurance Companies which had their business head-quarters in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties formerly belonging to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, will have the right for a period of ten years to carry on their business in the detached portion of said Monarchy transferred to the other High Contracting Parties, and their change of nationality shall not in the least affect the juridical status which they previously enjoyed.

During the aforementioned period the business of said Companies may not be subjected by these High Contracting Parties to any tax or due higher than those affecting the business of their own national Companies nor can any action be taken with regard to their property which is not equally applicable to the property, rights and interests [Page 110] of national insurance companies, and suitable indemnities will be paid in those cases in which such measures may be taken in the territory of one or other of the High Contracting Parties.

The above provisions will be enforced within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties only in as much as and for so long as the Insurance Companies of said High Contracting Party are in enjoyment of the same right of carrying on their business in said territory, even if their business head-quarters are outside said territory.

It is agreed that after the expiration of the ten year period above referred to the Insurance Companies as above will enjoy the treatment of the most favoured nation, with special regard to the exercise of their business, the regulations and restrictions which might directly or indirectly affect this right, and the assessment of direct or indirect charges, dues and taxes, and no restriction may be placed on these companies which was not applicable to them on July 1st, 1914, unless same restriction is likewise placed on the national companies of said State.

N. B. The purpose is to maintain for a certain period the relations already existing in the matter of insurance in the territories of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Article 3

Persons habitually residing with[in] the territories of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy transferred to one or other of the High Contracting Parties, and who, during the war, were outside the territories of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or who were imprisoned, interned, or evacuated, will enjoy in full the provisions as under articles 300 and 301 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 4

A Special Convention to be drawn up between Austria, Hungary, and the other Allied and Associated States arising from the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or cedees of its territories, will determine the conditions of repayment in Austrian currency of the special war expenditure anticipated during the war by the territories of said Monarchy transferred to each of the High Contracting Parties, or by collective bodies of public interest in said territories, on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in accordance with Austro-Hungarian law, such as allowances to families of mobilised soldiers, requisitions, billeting of troops, subsidies to refugees, etc.

In the assessment of these sums account will be taken of the share said territories have contributed, with regard to Austria-Hungary, [Page 111] to the cost of said repayment, said contribution being reckoned on the basis of the proportional contribution to the revenues of the Monarchy made by said territories in 1913.

Article 5

In those cases in which the property referred to under article 12 of the financial clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria belonged to an association or public corporation carrying on its work in territories which have come to be separated as a result of said Treaty, special Conventions shall regulate the assessment of such property.

Article 6

Records, registers, plans, deeds and documents of all kinds bearing on the civil, military, financial, judicial or other administration, existing within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties and concerning ex-Austro-Hungarian territories transferred to another of the High Contracting Parties will be handed over to same without delay.

If any of the documents, records, registers, deeds or plans have been displaced they will be returned on the request of the Government concerned.

Article 7

Contracts drawn up between ex-Austrian nationals who have become nationals of one of the High Contracting Parties on the one hand and ex-Austrian nationals who have become nationals of another of the High Contracting Parties on the other hand, are valid except contracts for the purchase or sale of goods entered into before August 1st, 1914 and not yet carried out, which are annulled.

N.B. This clause corresponds to that foreseen under art. 50 of Sec. VIII of Part X of the Treaty with Austria, except that the uni-lateral cancellation of contracts between Allied States cannot be recognised. Nevertheless with regard to pre-war contracts the general interest makes it advisable that they be mutually cancelled in view of the long period which has elapsed since they were entered into.

Article 8

All railway rolling-stock which, in violation of the terms of art. 3 of the Armistice of November 3rd, 19188 (Villa Giusti) has been transported beyond the armistice frontier during and after the negotiations for said armistice, must be returned to Italy within a period of two months, apart from the material which will be due to [Page 112] her under the reparation clauses of art. 311 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

The quantity and quality of the rolling-stock to be thus returned will be determined for engines in accordance with direct ascertainment, and for cars and trucks in the ratio of twenty for each engine, one tenth of same to be passenger cars and one twenty fifth goods trucks.

Article 9

A special convention to be drawn up between the High Contracting Parties will regulate the payment of all civil, ecclesiastical and military pensions due to ex-Austrian nationals who by the Peace Treaty with Austria become nationals of one or other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 10

Without prejudice to the provisions of article 6 of part XII of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the High Contracting Parties undertake to maintain on their own lines the railway rates in force before the war for traffic with the Adriatic ports and the Black Sea in relation to their competition with German North Sea ports, with special reference to the pre-existing relation between the railway rates for traffic with the Port of Trieste on the one hand and the Port of Fiume on the other.

Persons, goods, ships, means of transport, and postal, telegraphic and telephonic services coming from or going to the port of Trieste on the one hand and of Fiume on the other hand will be treated in all the ports and on all ways of communication in the territories of the High Contracting Parties formerly belonging to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on a footing of perfect equality with special reference to matters affecting the freedom of transit, sanitary control, customs and police, dues and taxes of all kinds and the conditions made, the facilitations granted and the restrictions imposed on trade and traffic in general.

Article 11

As an exception to the provisions of article. … (Art. 4 of the Peace Treaty with Poland) and for a period of five years from the enforcement of the present Treaty, each of the States to which under the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary Adriatic ports belonging to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have been ceded, shall recognise to any other of these same States the right to carry on coasting trade between these ports in conditions of complete reciprocity.

[Page 113]

Article 12

While expressly maintaining, in principle, for the nationals of Adriatic riparian States the exclusive right to fish along their respective coasts, said States will, for a period of three years from the enforcement of the present Treaty, reciprocally grant to the inhabitants of the Adriatic coast of one State the right to fish along the coast of the other States. Coral and sponge fishing will, however, be excepted from this rule, as also fishing within one sea mile of the coast, which is exclusively reserved to the inhabitants of the country.

Article 13

As an exception to the provisions of article. … (article 3 of Part XII of the Peace Treaty with Austria) and for a period of three years from the enforcement of the present Treaty, goods imported into Yugoslavia through ports, or in transit through ports which, before the war, belonged to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, will be entitled to proportionate reductions of duties corresponding to those applied to the same products under the Austro-Hungarian customs tariff of February 13th, 1906 when imported into Austro-Hungary through said ports.

Article 14

Objects of all kinds, and more especially antiquities, works of art, documents, records and scientific and bibliographical material which during the war, or in the imminence of hostilities, were removed from invaded regions or from territories transferred by the Peace Treaty with Austria, and which are now in other territories placed under the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting Parties, will be repatriated by these same High Contracting Parties within six months from the date of the enforcement of the present Treaty.

Appendix C to HD–5


Note to the Council of the Heads of Delegations

Raising of the Blockade.

The Allied and Associated representatives on the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee, having taken into consideration the note of July [Page 114] 10 from the German delegation with regard to the ratification of the treaty of peace and requesting the immediate raising of the blockade, deem, that, if this communication is considered by the Council of the Heads of Delegations as the official notice “of the regular and complete ratification” envisaged in the letter sent June 27 to the German delegation by the President of the Peace Conference,11 the blockade of Germany should be raised from the 12th of July.

They inquire whether this opinion is shared by the Council of the Heads of Delegations.

Appendix D to HD–5


General Pellé,

To the President of the Council
Minister of War
(E.M.A.) Paris.

As I have had the honor of recounting to you, the Hungarian troops before the evening of July 4 withdrew from the border demarcating the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic to the frontier designated by the radiogram of June 13 from the president of the Peace Conference.13 A neutral zone of four kilometers—two kilometers on each side of the frontier—has been established.

Whatever the exact reason may be that dictated this retreat for the Hungarian Army, there is reason to believe the truce which resulted will be only momentary.

In spite of the difficulties of the internal situation the Hungarian Government continues to produce armaments.

During the recent retreat a number of French, English, and American officers were in contact with the Magyar troops. They were able to talk with civil and military officials of all ranks of the former regime serving the Bolshevik government, with the leaders of the Bolshevik movement of Buda-Pest, and with the working people, laborers converted into leaders of bands or commanders of regiments.

All these officers give the same testimony. They did not meet any Hungarian who is not determined to fight to the end in order to restore his country within its former frontiers, or at least to reconquer Slovakia. The cultured Hungarians, in particular the officers of the [Page 115] old Army, tried to create in these foreigners a good impression of the discipline and courage of their troops; at the same time they were intent upon proving to them the justice of their national claims. Bolsheviks of every degree revealed themselves no less fanatical and even more passionate in asserting their rights and they do not recoil before any violent means of Magyarization.

The Hungarian people are confident of the future. In a few months the armies of the Entente will have been demobilized and the Hungarian military forces will be ready; the fate of Slovakia will be quickly settled.

But as I have already indicated in my note of June 11, the frontier drawn for Czecho-Slovakia by the Peace Conference gives to Hungary all the strategic advantages; it cannot be defended by the Czechoslovak Army, or more exactly, the sole means of defense would be to anticipate the enemy if possible and to take the initiative in operations.

The situation would become still more unfavorable if the Hungarians, rulers of Vienna, should hem in Western Slovakia on three sides.

If bolshevism takes root and grows in Hungary with the aid of the tolerance which it has enjoyed up to the present from the Entente, it would not delay much in seizing Vienna, whence it will threaten Italy and Switzerland or rejoin Bavaria.

If the bolshevism of Budapest yields its place to a government less inimical to the social order, but equally dominated by nationalist opinion, war will come again to Central Europe in another form, but always against our vital interests.

Today, as yesterday, military intervention against Hungary by the Entente appears to me as an inevitable necessity. In the absence of any other reason, the plain violation by the Hungarian state of the conditions of disarmament established by the armistice convention justifies this intervention. The effort to carry this out will be more costly tomorrow than it would have been several weeks ago; it will be still more so if it is postponed again.

  1. André Tardieu, French representative and president, Central Territorial Committee; Gen. Le Rond, French representative and president, Sub-Commission on Territorial Questions and Sub-Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; Jules A. Laroche, French representative, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; Alexander Leeper, British representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs; A. Stranieri, Italian representative, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; Allen W. Dulles, United States representative, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; and Dr. Manley O. Hudson, United States representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.
  2. For Baron Sonnino’s remarks and note concerning the need for additional articles, see CF–74, minute 4 and appendix III, vol. vi, pp. 530 and 541.
  3. CF–77, minute 2 and appendix II, vol. vi, pp. 570 and 574.
  4. Germany, Reichs-Gesetzblatt, 1919, No. 33, pp. 169, 170.
  5. Ante, pp. 59, 67.
  6. Gen. Maurice C. J. Pellé, of the French Army, commander in chief of the Czecho-Slovak Army.
  7. Appendix “E” does not accompany the file copy of the minutes.
  8. vol. ii, p. 175.
  9. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  10. See CF–95, minute 2, vol. vi, p. 720.
  11. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  12. Appendix V (E) to CF–65, vol. vi, p. 413.