Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/26

CF–26

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 23, 1919, at 11 a.m.

  • Present
    • United States of America
      • President Wilson.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
    • Italy
      • H. E. M. Orlando.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } Secretaries.
Count Aldrovandi
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter.

1. Private Property: Letter From Brockdorff-Rantzau M. Clemenceau reported that he had received from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau a letter on the subject of private property, dated May 22nd, 1919. (Appendix I.)

(It was agreed:—That this letter should be referred in the first instance to the Committee which has been advising the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the subject of Reparation in connection with the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary, who should be asked to draft a reply for consideration. (See below, Minute 6, regarding the composition of this Committee.))

2. International Labour: Further Letter From Brockdorff-Rantzau M. Clemenceau said he had received a further note from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, dated May 22nd, 1919, on the subject of International Labour. (Appendix II.)

(It was agreed:—That this letter should be referred in the first instance to the Committee which had dealt with the previous letter from the German Delegation on this subject, and which should be asked to draft a reply for the consideration of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

3. Russia M. Clemenceau said he had reason to believe that the Japanese Government were about to propose to the Allied and Associated Governments the recognition of the Omsk Government. He thought that these Governments ought to anticipate them. He did not like to leave it to Japan to take the initiative.

[Page 862]

President Wilson asked whether it was proposed to recognise this Government as representing all Russia, or merely as a local Government.

M. Clemenceau replied as representing all Russia.

President Wilson said he could not do that.

Mr. Lloyd George said he also was opposed to that. Mr. Kerr’s draft despatch to the Russian de facto Government was ready, and he thought that it ought at once to be considered.

(It was agreed:—To discuss Mr. Kerr’s draft letter in the afternoon.)

4. Luxemburg M. Clemenceau read a Memorandum he had received from the Quai d’Orsay, the gist of which was somewhat as follows:—In March, there was a vote in the Luxemburg Chamber in favour of the organisation of a double referendum on the following questions:—

1.
The form of the future State of Luxemburg, including the question of the dynasty.
2.
An economic union with one or other of Luxemburg’s neighbours.

The Belgian Government, apprehending that the political referendum was a manoeuvre in opposition to their own negotiations with Luxemburg, asked for its postponement. This was agreed to by the Council of Four and was notified on April 16th to the Luxemburg Government through the medium of the United States General in Luxemburg. Towards the middle of May, a report was received from the First Secretary to the United States Legation in Luxemburg to the effect that the referendum on the economic question was being organised to take place immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He added that the vote would probably be in favour of economic union with France, unless the French Government announced that it would not take it into consideration. It was, however, difficult for the French Government to take the responsibility for this, even though they were anxious to do nothing in opposition to the interests of Belgium. Public opinion in France would not stand it. The result of such action might be that Luxemburg, unable to unite economically with France, and unwilling to unite with Belgium, might relapse into her former relations with Germany. Hence, M. Clemenceau suggested, it would be desirable that the Council should notify Luxemburg that their request in regard to the political referendum applied equally to the economic referendum, and should advise the Luxemburg Government not to present the Peace Conference with a situation which would be tantamount to a fait accompli.

[Page 863]

President Wilson reported that, as he had been asked to, he had, after a short delay, written to the Luxemburg Government to say that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be glad to receive a deputation. He had, as yet, received no reply.

M. Clemenceau said that his position was that, if Luxemburg proposed economic union with France, he could not say no. Nevertheless, he did not want to do anything which appeared detrimental to Belgium.

Mr. Lloyd George said it was a question primarily for the people of Luxemburg and no attempt ought to be made to manoeuvre them into political or economic union with Belgium, if they did not desire it. Their wishes ought to be obtained.

M. Clemenceau made the definite proposal that President Wilson should inform the Luxemburg Government that the invitation to them to abstain from a political referendum applied equally to an economic referendum.

President Wilson hoped that the question would be settled by the reception of the Luxemburg deputation.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that this would be the best solution. It was purely a matter for the Luxemburg people themselves and the Powers should not meddle and compelled [compel] them to make up their minds.

President Wilson pointed out that it was undesirable to complicate matters with Belgium just now.

M. Clemenceau agreed. He was very anxious not to have any trouble with Belgium. If Luxemburg were to vote for union with France, Belgium would say that it was the result of French machinations. The Belgians were just beginning to see that France did not want Luxemburg and he wanted to show them that France was playing straight. He believed it to be a real fact that the people of Luxemburg did not want political union with France, whom they regarded as a heathen people, being themselves subject to clerical influence. He, himself, would accept the union of Luxemburg with France, if offered by Luxemburg, but his first object was to continue in close accord with Belgium.

(It was agreed:—That President Wilson should wait a day or two and then send a reminder to Luxemburg.)

5. There was a short discussion on the subject of the military forces of Austria.

Military Forces of Austria M. Clemenceau said he thought the question was a very delicate one. He, himself, was prepared to come rather nearer than he had been to the views of President Wilson. In regard to the small States, there were two [Page 864] aspects; one financial and one political, apart from the military. The financial had been discussed yesterday. He was glad, however, that the report of the Reparations Committee had not been finally approved, and that it had been referred back for further drafting. He thought that the financial authorities had viewed it too much from a purely financial point of view and had not sufficiently taken political considerations into account. The question was really not disconnected from the question of the number of troops that small countries like Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should have. He agreed to a limitation of their armaments, but thought that they should not be reduced at once and too hastily.

President Wilson suggested the possibility that some gradual system of reduction might be introduced pending the solution of the Russian question, and that the reduction to the final figures might depend on the settlement of that question.

(It was agreed:—To adjourn upstairs and discuss this question in the first instance with experts.)

6. Reparation Committee for the Treaties With Austria, Hungary & Bulgaria Arising out of the previous discussion, M. Clemenceau said he wished to add a further political element to the Reparation Committee.

Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson said they had no objection.

M. Clemenceau proposed to add M. Loucheur and M. Tardieu.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, in that case, he would add General Smuts and Mr. Keynes.

(It was agreed:—That the Committee appointed to advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the question of Reparation with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria should be composed as follows:—

United States of America. Mr. Norman H. Davis.
Mr. B. M. Baruch.
Mr. T. W. Lamont.
Mr. J. P. Dulles.
Mr. V. McCormick.
British Empire. Lord Cunliffe.
Lord Sumner
General Smuts
Mr. J. Keynes.
France. M. Klotz.
M. Loucheur.
M. Tardieu.
M. Jouasset.
Italy. M. Crespi.
M. d’Amelio.

Villa Majestic, Paris, 23 May, 1919.

[Page 865]

Appendix I to CF–26

german property abroad

Translation of German Note

Sir: The provisions of the Conditions of Peace concerning private property of the nationals of both parties are chiefly inspired by the tendency of the Allied and Associated Governments to treat all German private property situated within their sphere of power as an uniform mass for distribution, out of which, in a bankruptcy-like procedure, both the private claims of their nationals and the state-claims to war indemnity are to be satisfied. This aim is to be arrived at by means of a series of provisions which, if carried through, would lead to the result that all German property situated in countries which are under the influence of the Allied and Associated Governments would be confiscated and all German nationals would be materially restricted in their legal capacity.

In the first place it is provided that all measures taken during the war against German private property in enemy countries are to remain in force as legally binding (Article 297d). This clause, it is true, provides for reciprocity, but only a semblance of reciprocity is given. For the enemy nationals are to be entitled to full compensation for all damages caused to them by German exceptional laws; furthermore they are to be granted the right of, in their free option, demanding restitution in full, and eventually, if such restitution cannot be effected of even claiming equivalents in specie (Article 297 e, f, g.). On the other hand, however, German nationals who have been subjected to exceptional laws of enemy countries are not only to be debarred from all possibility of replacement into the former state, but are also deprived of any claim to compensation against the enemy states or their authorities, so that the latter are not even then liable, if it can be proved that German property in enemy countries has fallen a victim to corrupt and fraudulent machinations (para. 2 of the Annex to Article 298).

The operation of the measures taken by the Allied and Associated Governments during the war would, however, not suffice to lay hand on all available German property for the purposes contemplated. It is therefore on the one hand provided that, whereas Germany must immediately abrogate all exceptional laws enacted by her, the liquidation of German property in enemy countries may be proceeded with after the conclusion of peace, even under new war measures which may be enacted (Article 297 a and b). No time limit being [Page 866] fixed herefor, the enemy Governments evidently go so far as to reserve for themselves the possibility of extending the process of liquidation to such German property which may come within their territory in the future. Besides this temporal prolongation of war measures an extension as to the area of their application is contemplated which is of even greater moment. For Germany is to be forced to deliver up all securities held by her nationals and relating to rights in property situated in the territory of the Allied and Associated Governments, according to this, all shares and debentures of enemy companies would, inter alia, have to be delivered up (para. 10 of the Annex to Article 298). Furthermore, German property situated in the territories to be ceded by Germany is to be subjected to liquidation, so that e. g., the property of the numerous Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, who are not granted French nationality or are not expressly permitted to remain in the country, and particularly the whole of German private property in the German Colonies is subjected to compulsory sale (Article 53, Article 121). Finally, almost all German property situated in Russia, China, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey is to be added to the mass for distribution. The Allied and Associated Governments not being able to apply forthwith a direct process of liquidation in these countries, they select the circuitous way of empowering the Reparation Commission, beyond its other capacities, to demand from the German Government the immediate expropriation of all German public utility undertakings and all German concessions situated in these countries (Article 260).

The appropriation of the net proceeds, derived from these sales of German property, for distribution by way of bankruptcy, is provided for in the following manner (Article 297. h. and para. 4 of the Annex to Article 298). The net proceeds realised in Germany are to be paid in cash immediately in the currency of the enemy Government concerned at the pre-war rate of exchange, so that Germany would eventually be obliged to pay back a multiplex sum of the proceeds actually collected. On the other hand, the proceeds realised by the Allied and Associated Governments from the liquidation of German property are not to be paid to Germany, but, instead, are to be charged with a treble mortgage and thus to be wholly and finally withdrawn from the right of disposal by the German entitled thereto. In the first place are to be satisfied therefrom the claims of nationals of the enemy State concerned to compensation on account of exceptional laws having been applied against their property in Germany, further, private claims of such nationals against German nationals, and lastly, claims of such nationals to compensation growing out of all acts committed by the German Government or by German authorities [Page 867] since July 31st, 1914, and before the enemy State concerned entered into the war. (The authoritative appreciation of compensation claims of the latter kind is evidently to be left over to the free judgment of the enemy Government concerned.) In the second place are to be satisfied claims to compensation and private claims of nationals of the Allied and Associated States against the States allied with Germany or against the nationals of such States, thus making German private property liable e. g. also for the claims of British nationals against the Turkish Government or against Turkish nationals. The assets remaining after these two categories of claims have been satisfied are then to be applied to the payment of the war indemnity owed by Germany by being transferred to the clearing account of the Reparation Commission. This mode of procedure may, it is true, be departed from, it being provided that the proceeds of German liquidations need not be paid in cash but may be set off against the proceeds of enemy liquidations. Such proceeding, the details of which cannot clearly be inferred from the provisions of the draft, is, however, only to be adopted if the enemy Government concerned so thinks fit.

The German Peace Delegation feel bound to declare that the arrangement set forth above appears to them to be inacceptable in principle as being in different respects opposed to the most elementary conceptions of a peace of Right. This inconsistency is all the more manifest as the questions of private law here at issue belong to a subject-matter which should under all circumstances be excluded from a treatment guided by motives of political power.

If, as is proposed by the other side, the aggressions against private property effected during the war on grounds of exceptional laws be in principle acknowledged and upheld as final, this should of course apply equally to both parties. In any case, however, such settlement should only be applicable to measures adopted during the war. It may be left out of discussion whether and to what extent such measures may be regarded as admissible during the war; there should, however, be no doubt as to the necessity of these measures—which have always been designated as acts of warfare by the authorities responsible therefor—being immediately brought to a close on the cessation of the hostilities at the front. Germany must therefore in principle maintain the point of view that all measures of the kind here referred to which have been taken after the conclusion of the Armistice are illegal, as representing a continuation of hostilities. With still more emphasis, however, the imputation put to Germany, of assenting to a continuation of the aggressions against private property even beyond the conclusion of Peace, must be repudiated. This would, instead of restoring Peace, in truth mean to perpetuate economic war.

[Page 868]

Another point of view which has evidently also been disregarded by the Allied and Associated Governments leads to the same result. The proposed appropriation of the German private property situated in foreign countries amounts to a so extensive confiscation of private property of all kind, that a general undermining of the fundamental principles of international legal intercourse will of necessity result therefrom. Under the present conditions it ought to be the special task of the Powers to bring the principle of inviolability of private property, which has been subjected to so many restrictions during the war, into full force again in international intercourse. Germany has up to now presumed that this view would be advocated by the Allied and Associated Governments with the same consistency as has been expressed in a judgment of the highest English Law Court, the House of Lords, on January 25th 1918 in a law suit between a German and an English Firm. In this judgment the following passage is contained:

“It was not the Law of this country that the property of enemy subjects were [was] confiscated. Until the restoration of peace the enemy could of course make no claim to have it delivered up to him; but when peace was restored, he was considered entitled to his property with any fruits which it might have borne in the meantime”.

The same view has been taken by the highest German Court in a well known leading judgment of October 26th 1914, by which the private rights of a French subject are acknowledged as continuing to exist in Germany during the war. This conception which has been upheld by the Courts of both parties during the war would be turned into its reverse by the Treaty of Peace if the Allied and Associated Governments henceforth lay hands on all German private property within their reach in order to satisfy therefrom state and private claims which are not directed against the concerned owner himself. Such appropriation must appear as especially arbitrary if not even claims against Germany or against German nationals are involved but claims against the states allied with Germany and the nationals of such states. If the Allied and Associated Governments try to veil the confiscatory character of the procedure by expressly providing for the indemnification of the owners through means of the German Empire, they cannot thereby change the nature of the matter.

The disastrous consequences which the contemplated confiscation of Germany’s property abroad would entail from an economical point of view have already been mentioned in my note dated 13th inst.1 and are too patent to require further illustration. On the other [Page 869] hand the German Peace Delegation is conscious of the fact that under the pressure of the burden resulting from the Peace Treaty for the whole future of German economic life German property abroad cannot be maintained in its former extent. In order to be able to discharge her pecuniary obligations Germany will rather have to sacrifice this property abroad in a large measure. To do so she is prepared. Germany must however maintain that the right of disposal over property abroad be regulated in a manner having regard to the legal principle above enunciated. The German Peace Delegation is convinced that between this point of view and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments a compromise could be found. A number of the scruples pointed out would already be made to vanish if the principle of reciprocity were applied, as is in concordance with the spirit of the League of Nations. For the rest it would indeed be requisite that the questions at issue be discussed viva voce in detail by the experts of both parties.

Accept [etc.]

Brockdorff-Rantzau

Appendix II to CF–26

international labour legislation

Translation of German Note

Sir: In the name of the German Delegation I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Reply-Note, dated May 14th, 1919,2 which has been given us on our Note concerning International Labour Legislation.

The German Delegation takes note of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments are of one mind with the German Democratic Government in believing domestic peace and the advancement of humanity to be dependent on the solution of labour questions. The German Delegation, however, does not agree with the Allied and Associated Governments as to the ways and means of arriving at the solution.

In order to avoid misunderstandings and false impressions, the German Delegation deems it to be necessary to elucidate the fundamental conditions precedent underlying their Note of May 10th, 1919.3

[Page 870]

In the opinion of the German Democratic Government the final decision in questions of Labour Law and Labour Protection belongs to the workers themselves. It was the intention of the German Delegation to give occasion, even while the negotiations of Peace are proceeding, to the legitimate representatives of the working people of all countries of casting their vote on this point and bringing into conformity the Draft of the Conditions of Peace, the proposal of the German Democratic Government and the resolutions of the International Trade Unions Conference held at Berne from February 5th to 9th 1919. Contrary to this proposal, the Allied and Associated Governments do not think it necessary to call a Labour Conference at Versailles for this purpose.

The International Labour Conference contemplated to be held at Washington, to which you refer in your reply-Note of May 14th 1919, cannot replace the Conference demanded by us, because it is to be held on the principles which are established by the Draft of the Treaty of Peace for the organization of Labour. The latter, however, disregards the demands raised by the International Trade Union Conference at Berne in two material directions.

The first divergence is in respect of the representation of the workers. According to the proposal of the International Labour Conference at Berne, one-half of the members of the Conference entitled to vote must consist of representatives of the workers of each country who are organised in Trades Unions. The German Delegation has endorsed this proposal by transmitting the Protocol of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne. Contrary to this, the draft of the Treaty of Peace grants to the workers only one quarter of the total votes at the International Conference; for, according to the Draft of the Allied and Associated Governments, each country is to be represented by two Government Delegates, one employer, and only one worker. The Governments are even in a position, according to Article 390 of the Draft of the Treaty of Peace, to exclude the workers’ vote by not nominating an employer and thus giving to Governmental bureaucrats the casting vote as against the representatives of practical life. This system is at variance with the democratic principles which have, to the present day, been upheld and fought for in common by the whole international work-people, and will deepen the impression held among the workers that they are, as before furthermore only to be the object of a legislation governed by the interest of private capital.

The second divergence refers to the legally binding force of the resolutions of the Conference. According to the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne the International Parliament of Labour is to issue not only International Conventions [Page 871] without legally binding force, but also International Laws which, from the moment of their adoption, are to have the same effect (legally binding force) as national laws (Proclamation to the workers of all countries, adopted by the International Trade Union Conference at Berne, 1919, at the motion of Jouhaux, the delegate of France). The Draft of the German Democratic Government endorses this resolution and makes the passing of such laws depend on the assent of four fifths of the nations represented. No such resolutions can be passed by a conference which is called on the basis of Part XIII of the Draft of the Treaty of Peace, but only Recommendations or Drafts which the Governments concerned may adopt or repudiate, — and for such non-obligatory proposals a majority of two thirds of the votes cast is even required.

In so providing, the Draft of the Conditions of Peace deviates to such an extent from the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne that a discussion and decision by the Organisation of Labour, as part of the Peace Negotiations, is absolutely imperative. This would at the same time be in accordance with the demand raised by the International Trade Union Conference at Berne that the minimum claims of Labour agreed upon be, already at the conclusion of Peace, turned unto [into?] International Law by the Society of Nations. Moreover a firm foundation for the Peace of the World shall be erected by this means, whereas a Treaty concluded by the Governments alone without the assent of the organised workers of all countries will never bring fprth social peace to the world.

The Allied and Associated Governments give no place to these considerations in their Reply. As have above been illustrated, the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne are, in fact, not taken into consideration by Part XIII of the Draft of the Treaty of Peace, so that the fears expressed by the German Democratic Government with regard to social justice are in reality not taken into account. This fact must be noted. If we are apprized by the Reply-note that the representatives of the Trade Unions of the countries represented by the Allied and Associated Governments have taken part in the elaboration of the clauses of the Conditions of Peace relating to labour, we must on the other hand make note of the fact that they have made no announcement of any kind notifying a change of their views on the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne, much less of an abandonment of these resolutions which they themselves have adopted.

The German Delegation again moves to call a conference of the Representatives of the national organisations of all Trade Unions, before the Negotiations of Peace are terminated. Should this motion [Page 872] again be rejected, an utterance of the leaders of the Trade Unions of all countries is at least necessary. In moving this in the second line, we desire to bring about, that the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to Labour may also have the approval of all Trade Union Organisations.

Accept [etc.]

Brockdorff-Rantzau
  1. Appendix IA to CF–20, p. 738.
  2. The text of the reply as sent is identical with the draft reply in appendix II to CF–13, p. 610, except for the substitution of the signature of M. Clemenceau for Mr. Barnes’ initials on the draft.
  3. Appendix I to CF–9, p. 571.