Parts Peace Conf. 180.03401/23
CF–28
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 22, 1919, at 11:45 a.m.
Paris, May 22, 1919, 11:45 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- France
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Italy
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries. |
Count Aldrovandi. |
Professor P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
Members of the Committee which drew up the draft replies to the German
letters on the Saar Valley.
- America
- British Empire
- Sir Eyre Crowe.
- Mr. Headlam-Morley.
- France
1. Hungary. Resolution by the Supreme Economic council
Approved While the Council was assembling, the Resolution in
Appendix I authorising the Supreme Economic Council to announce that the
blockade on Hungary would be suspended as soon as supreme Economic a
Government is installed there which gives some assurance of settled
conditions, was approved.
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it
to the Secretary General with instructions to arrange for the Supreme
Economic Council to take the necessary action.
2. Saar Valley The Council had before them the
following documents relating to the Saar Basin:—
- (1)
- Letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau dated
13th May (Appendix II).
- (2)
- Letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau dated
16th May (Appendix III).
- (3)
- Draft reply to the letter dated May 13th (Appendix IV).
- (4)
- Draft reply to letter dated May 16th (Appendix V).
Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to the passage
in Appendix II, in which the German Delegation take exception to the
fact that the
[Page 814]
restitution of
the Saar Valley at the end of fifteen years is made to depend on the
ability of the German Government to re-purchase from the French
Government, in gold, all the coal mines of the territory and that if
this payment is not made, France would acquire the territory permanently
even if the population should unanimously vote for Germany. He read the
following extract from clause 36 of the Annex to Part III, Section 4 of
the Treaty:—
“If within the six months following the decision of the experts
the price above referred to has not been paid by Germany, the
said territory will be finally acquired by France.”
]
This meant that if the Germans could not pay the people
of the Saar would remain in servitude. If they could remain independent
he would not object to this clause so much, but he felt that at present
this was quite wrong.
President Wilson pointed out that the
difficulty might be met by providing that if the people of the Saar
Valley elected for Germany and the German Government could not pay, they
might at least be permitted to remain independent.
M. Tardieu drew attention to paragraph 6 of
Appendix IV from which he read the following extract:—
“If, on the one hand, the direct agreement authorised by
paragraph 38 came to nothing and if, on the other hand, as you
fear, the Commission on Reparations forbade the payment in gold
provided for in para. 36, it would then be the duty of the
League of Nations to consider the consequences resulting from
that refusal both for Germany and for the population of the
region under consideration—on condition, of course, that the
provisions of para. 37 were carried out.”
He then read a text which would meet Mr. Lloyd George’s
objections.
President Wilson pointed out that the Germans
were not so much afraid that they would not have the money, but that the
Reparation Commission would not allow them to use it. He understood that
the object of this new proposal was to prevent that. No doubt the
Germans could borrow the money on the security of the mines if the
Reparation Commission allowed them to. President’Wilson thought that
some special representation should be made to the Reparation Commission
on the subject. He then read the following alternative draft handed to
him by Dr. Haskins:—
“Substitute for the final paragraph of Article 36 on page 38 the
following:—
The price above referred to shall be paid by Germany within one
year after the decision of the experts.
[Page 815]
No provision of the present Treaty shall in any way
prejudice the right and obligation of Germany to make
any payment pursuant to the provisions of this Annex,
particularly the provisions of this paragraph and of
paragraph 38 thereof. |
The obligation of Germany to make such payment shall
be taken into account by the Reparation Commission and
for the purpose of the payment Germany may create a
prior charge upon her assets or revenues, upon such
detailed terms as agreed to by the Reparation
Commission.”Mr. Lloyd
George preferred this to the other text. |
Mr. Headlam-Morley said he felt that some
action of the kind was required, and that if it was not taken there
would be a serious situation. The fact of Article 36 quoted above being
in the Treaty was producing a bad effect on neutral countries where it
was being said “If Germany cannot pay the sovereignty will be
transferred to France”. He felt that the Allied and Associated Powers
ought to get out of this situation and to propose a fresh Article on
their own initiative.
President Wilson agreed.
M. Clemenceau said he was of the same
opinion.
President Wilson suggested that the words
quoted by Mr. Lloyd George should be omitted.
Mr. Lloyd George said that Germany must have
some guarantee that this action should not be taken since it constituted
something equivalent to servitude for debt.
President Wilson suggested that the best plan
would be to leave it to some authority to decide at the end of 15 years,
and this authority had best be the League of Nations.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the experts
should retire and draft a clause to meet the case.
(The Experts withdrew.)
(After an interval the experts returned with a draft clause which was
accepted.)
After a short further discussion the meeting was adjourned in order that
the Expert Committee might reassemble and revise the two draft letters
in the light of the discussion.
Note. The various documents referred to, not
being available at the time when these Minutes were drafted, they will
be contained in the Minutes of the next discussion on the subject.1
3. The Economic Effect of the Treaty of Peace
M. Clemenceau reported that he had signed and
dispatched the reply approved on the previous day2 to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter dealing
with the economic effect of the Treaty of Peace.
[Page 816]
4. Prisoners of War. Reply to Herr
Brockdorff-Rantzan’s Letter
M. Clemenceau reported that he had signed and
dispatched a reply3 to Herr
Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter on the subject of prisoners of war.
5. Covenant of the League of Nations. Omission of
References to the Air Service
Sir Maurice Hankey reported that the Head of
the Aerial Section of the British Delegation had strongly urged that
wherever the Naval and Military Services were mentioned in the Covenant
of the League of Nations, the Air Service should also be mentioned.
General Groves had pointed out that elsewhere throughout the Treaty of
Peace the Air Service was mentioned whenever the Naval and Military
Services were mentioned and he considered that this omission from the
Covenant of the League of Nations thereby became conspicuous and might
lead to the inference that Aerial warfare was excluded.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the change
could not be made without summoning a Plenary Meeting of the Allied and
Associated Powers represented at the Peace Conference.
President Wilson pointed out that Aerial
warfare in its belligerent forms was included either in the Naval or in
Military warfare and he did not think that any misunderstanding could
arise from this omission. He thought it was unnecessary to introduce the
change which, as Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out, could only be
effected by a Plenary Conference.
Sir Maurice Hankey pointed out that the British
Air Service was entirely separate from the Naval and Military Services
and he was under the impression that the same was true in Germany. He
also understood that the French were contemplating a separation of their
Air Service from the Naval and Military Services.
(It was agreed that the alteration in the Covenant of the League of
Nations should not be made.)
6. Committee on New States. Clause for Insertion in
the Treaties With Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria The Council
had under consideration the following clause, submitted by the Committee
on New States for insertion in the Treaty with Austria, together with
corresponding clauses for insertions in the Treaties with Hungary and
with Bulgaria:—
“The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes accepts and agrees
to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said
Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Serbia, who
differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or
religion.
“The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes further accepts
and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the said Powers such
provision as they may deem necessary to protect freedom of
transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other
nations”.
[Page 817]
(The above clause was approved and initialled by the Four Heads of
Government.)
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary General
for communication to the Drafting Committee together with an intimation
that the initials to the clause for the Austrian Treaty would cover the
clauses for Treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 22 May, 1919.
Appendix I to CF–23
The French Minister of Commerce,
Industry, Posts, and Telegraphs to the Secretary General of the
Peace Conference
No. 609 S.C.I.
I have the honor to bring it to your attention that the Supreme
Economic Council at its meeting of May 19 had before it an English
proposal relating to the blockade of Hungary of which the text is as
follows:
“It is desirable to let it be publicly known that the
blockade of Hungary will be suspended as soon as a
government is installed there which gives some assurance of
settled conditions.”
The Council adopted this proposal, which it decided to submit to the
Council of Heads of Governments.
Appendix II to CF–23
German Peace
Delegation,
Versailles,
May 13,
1919.
saar basin
Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau
to M. Clemenceau
Translation
M. le President: The German Peace
Delegation has learnt from Your Excellency’s letter of the 10th
inst.,5 that the Allied and
Associated Governments, in drawing up the conditions of the Treaty
of Peace, have been constantly inspired by the principles in
accordance with which the Armistice and the peace negotiations were
proposed. The German Delegation does not of course, wish to throw
any doubt on this statement, but it must reserve the right
[Page 818]
to set forth the
conditions which, in its opinion, are in contradiction with the
intentions of the Allied and Associated Governments. This
contradiction is most obvious when those conditions of the draft
Treaty are considered which concern the cession of different parts
of the territory of the Empire inhabited by a German population.
Leaving aside the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the
occupation of Kehl, the articles concerning which I reserve for
later treatment, Germany is required to resign to a foreign
domination, temporary or permanent, the following territories:—the
district of the Sarre, the circles of Eupen and Malmedy with
Prussian Moresnet, Upper Silesia some German parts of Middle
Silesia, of Posnania and of West and East Prussia. The provisions
concerning the administrative district (Regierungsbezirk) of Slesvig are equivalent to a cession
of parts of German territory.
The German Delegation does not fail to recognise that in favour of a
number of provisions relative to territorial changes, contained in
the Draft Treaty of Peace, the right of the self determination of
peoples can be adduced, seeing that some populations which till now
were under German domination, as, for example, the Polish
population, do not consider themselves German. National reasons can
also be adduced in the case of the question of Slesvig, though the
German Delegation is unaware of the powers by virtue of which the
Allied and Associated Governments make this—a frontier question for
settlement between Germany and Denmark—the subject of peace
negotiations. The neutral Government of Denmark well knows that the
present German Government has always been disposed to come to an
understanding with it for the delimitation of a new frontier
corresponding with the principle of nationalities. If the Danish
Government nevertheless prefers to push its claims by the devious
method of peace negotiations, the German Government has no intention
of raising objections.
This attitude of the German Government does not however, extend to
territories of the Empire which are not undoubtedly inhabited by a
population of foreign race. The German Government considers it most
of all inadmissible that German territories should, by the Treaty of
Peace, be made the subject of bargains between one sovereignty and
another, as though they were mere chattels or pawns in a game, in
order to ensure the satisfaction of the financial and economic
claims of the adversaries of Germany.
This is especially true in the case of the Sarre Basin. Nobody could
deny that this Basin is inhabited by a purely German population. The
Draft Treaty nevertheless provides for a change of domination in
this partly Prussian, partly Bavarian territory, which will bring
about a complete amalgamation in matters of customs, coinage,
[Page 819]
administration,
legislation and jurisdiction and which, at least in so far as those
matters are concerned, will completely sever the connection between
the territory of the Sarre and the rest of the Empire. The
authorities of the occupying Power cannot be unaware that the whole
population refuses with the greatest energy to be separated from its
Fatherland. The few who, in order to flatter the occupying Power or
to gain profit for themselves, pretend otherwise, need not be
considered.
It will be vain to argue that an occupation of 15 years only is
contemplated and that, at the end of that period, the future
nationality of the population will be decided by a plebiscite, since
the restitution of this territory to Germany is made to depend on
the ability of the German Government to repurchase from the French
Government in gold, in a short time, all the coal mines of the
territory, and, if this payment could not be made, France would
acquire the territory permanently even should the population
unanimously vote for Germany. According to the financial and
economic clauses of the Treaty, it seems impossible that, at the end
of 15 years, Germany will be able to dispose of the necessary amount
of gold and, moreover, even if she possessed it, the Commission on
Reparations, which would then dominate the country, would probably
not allow it to be used for this purpose. There is in modern history
no example of a civilised Power binding another to subject its own
nationals to a foreign domination as the equivalent of a sum in
gold.
Public opinion in the enemy countries represents the cession of the
territory of the Sarre as just compensation for the destruction of
the mines of Northern France. The German Delegation also recognises
that an indemnity in money alone would not offset the deterioration
of the economic position of France. While the justice of the demand
for an indemnity in kind is recognised, this indemnity should and
can be found by other means than by a foreign domination which,
notwithstanding the most humane intentions on the part of the
authorities, will always remain odious.
The German Delegation is ready at once to enter into negotiations
with the Allied and Associated Governments with a view to examine
how to make good the deficiency of coal till the mines destroyed had
been put back into working order, a task which Germany has
undertaken to accomplish. In the course of these negotiations she
would propose to find some more just arrangement than the primitive
and unsuitable method of compensation involved in the surrender of
the mining Basin of the Sarre. In the place of the deficient coal
supply of northern France, it would be necessary to deliver coal
from German mines, i. e., not only from the Sarre but also from the
Ruhr. Leaving aside the fact that it would not be
[Page 820]
practical, on account of conditions of
communication, to use as compensation only coal from the Sarre
which, till now, has found its natural outlets in other directions,
it seems indispensable to give to the country of the Ruhr a share in
the deliveries of coal, because the damaged districts need the
products of the Ruhr region as much as they do those of the
Sarre.
The German Delegation feels sure that it would not be difficult to
make on the subject of this delivery of coal an arrangement which
would satisfy all the legitimate claims of France, provided only
that the experts of the two parties enter into direct relations and
work out the conditions of delivery on a commercial basis.
As regards Belgium, Germany is ready to repair to the full extent the
damage inflicted on her. Germany therefore does not see why she
should be forced to cede Prussian Moresnet and the circles of Eupen
and Malmédy. It is impossible to furnish proof that these circles
are inhabited by an undoubtedly non-German population. The
plebiscite by means of which it is proposed to give to the
population the apparent right to participate in the settlement of
its own fate has therefore no basis in the agreed principles of the
Peace. But according to the Draft Treaty of Peace the plebiscite
will not even be decisive, but rather an appeal in which Germany
would take no part and which decides arbitrarily the future of a
territory even if the population expressed the wish to remain under
German sovereignty. This provision is unjust in itself and in
contradiction with the principle that no national aspiration should
be satisfied if its satisfaction would create new discord and
conflict.
The German Delegation reserves the right to express later in a
special note its opinion on the provisions concerning the
territorial changes in the East of Germany.
Accept [etc.]
Appendix III to CF–23
German Peace
Delegation,
Versailles,
May 16,
1919.
saar basin
Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau
to M. Clemenceau
(Translation)
Sir: In my Note, dated 13th, inst.,6 on the territorial provisions of the Peace
Draft relating to the West of Germany I pointed out, in the name of
the German Delegation, that the guarantees which
[Page 821]
are required, especially for the
reparation of the damages caused to the coal mines of Northern
France, could best be given by economical agreements which should be
discussed viva voce by the experts of both parties. It does not
appear to the German Peace Delegation to be advisable that such
agreements should be delayed to the extent provided for by paragraph
38 of the Annex to Articles 45 to 50 of the Conditions of Peace, i.
e. till the fifteen years’ period of occupation, intended for the
Saar Basin, has expired.
In connection herewith I beg to transmit to Your Excellency the
enclosed draft of a proposal which has been elaborated by the
experts of the German Peace Delegation, requesting You to submit the
same to the experts of the Allied and Associated Governments for
examination and to let us have a reply as to whether a viva voce
discussion of the proposal can be taken into view.
The German Delegation would only contemplate to publish the experts’
proposal, if the Allied and Associated Governments should on their
part attach value thereto.
Accept [etc.]
[Enclosure]
Proposal of the German Experts
According to article 45 of the Peace Treaty, the chief object of the
measures proposed in part III, section IV, concerning the Saar
Basin, is to furnish compensation for the destroyed coal-mines in
the North of France and to make good in part the war-damages caused
by Germany. According to article 46 the full freedom of exploitation
is to be ensured by the provisions contained in chapter II of the
annex.
The point at issue is therefore to satisfy and safeguard economic
interests of France. In a like sense the provision of paragraph 38
of the annex could be taken, provided that the agreements therein
mentioned between France and Germany are to be understood as being
of an economic nature.
We are of opinion that this end could be attained by other measures
than those mentioned above, namely by such as are conducive to an
adjustment of the interests of both part[ie]s. We therefore propose
the following:
1) Having in view the necessity of adequately supplying France with
coal, it does not seem advisable to treat the question of the Saar
territory without having regard to the coal supplies to France and
some of her Allies, provided for in part VIII, Annex 5. In order to
meet the interests in question as completely as possible the
following questions must be answered:
- a)
- Which quantities of the different kinds of coal are
required to meet the total inland demand in France and
Belgium?
- b)
- Which quantities of coal are to be supplied to the
different regions, in particular of France?
We are prepared immediately to ascertain to what extent we are
capable of supplying the required quantities and for this purpose to
draw up a plan of delivery. In so doing regard will have to be taken
to the necessity of providing for increased transport by sea in view
of the long expanse of time over which the obligation to deliver
coal is extended.
It would be necessary to fix the details of delivery in viva voce
negotiations between the experts of the Powers interested.
2) As to reparation of the war damages suffered by the coal-mines we
propose the following: the concerns damaged in Northern France to be
participated [to participate] by shares to an
extent agreed upon in such German coal-mines as are charged with the
delivery of coal to the regions mentioned.
The details of this transaction to be settled mutually by the German
and French experts.
3) The object of the measures provided for in article 49 and in
chapter II of the annex to part III. section IV. concerning the Saar
territory is, just as that of the occupation of the territory to the
left of the Rhine and of the bridge-heads provided for in Part 14,
section I., to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations, which will
be undertaken by Germany.
These measures as well as the measures of control carried out and
contemplated up to now by the Allied and Associated Governments,
measures which mean a restriction or cancellation of the liberty of
German economic life would, apart from the heavy political danger,
moreover paralyse the productive capacity of Germany, the entire
maintenance of which is of the utmost importance also for her
neighbours. In lieu of these measures we are ready to propose a
system of guaranties of economic nature, perfectly on a par with the
former. As far as supplies of coal enter into account we allow
ourselves to be guided by the following principles:
The desired guaranties for regularity of production and of delivery
may be given in the following way:
- a)
- By the participation of French concerns (mentioned sub
voce 2) which is to be realised to an extent insuring to
them a considerable influence upon the administration of the
German concerns in question;
- b)
- By the grant of a right of precedence as to the surplus of
the entire German output in coal over and above the
home-requirements. Should this surplus not suffice for the
discharge of the quantities of supply agreed upon, the
consumption of coal from Germany, France and Belgium will be
rationed in due proportion; for the purpose of
superintending the putting into execution of the above
mentioned measure a committee consisting of representatives
of Germany, France and Belgium is to be established. This
agreement would likewise have to take into account the
interests of Italy.
[Page 823]
Appendix IV to CF–23
Draft Reply to the Letter of Count
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dated May 13, 1919, Relative to the Regime
of the Basin of the Saar
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May
13th, 1919.7
The Allied and Associated Governments formally deny that any of the
provisions alluded to in that letter have the effect of transferring
people “from one sovereignty to another” as though they were mere
chattels or pawns in a game. Public opinion will in fact be
consulted in the case of all parties in question. The situation on
the spot has in each case been kept in view in settling the methods
by which this will be done.
As regards the Basin of the Saar, in particular, the Allied and
Associated Governments, while maintaining their point of view have
the honour to observe that:
- 1.
- The Reparation constituted by the cession of the mines is
not only a special reparation limited to coal, but forms
part of the general reparation due by Germany for the
systematic destruction which she has wrought; Article 45 of
the Treaty clearly lays this down.
- 2.
- The Allied and Associated Governments deny that the
population of this Basin is purely German. It is on account
of the mixed character of this population that special
provisions have been made. The plebiscite which is to take
place after 15 years will make possible an impartial
judgment, not one favouring France or Germany, but one
favouring the interests of the population as freely judged
by it.
- 3.
- It is completely untrue that the change of Government
would place the Basin of the Saar under the authority of
France. The “dominations” called “odious” in your letter, of
the 13th May is the administration of the League of
Nations.
- 4.
- The Treaty secures to the inhabitants the maintenance of
all their present safeguards and liberties; and moreover, as
regards fiscal and social questions, provides for a number
of special advantages.
- 5.
- There is no confusion in the Treaty between the commercial
contracts of which coal from the Ruhr will be the object
(Annex V, Part VIII) and the cession of the mines of the
Saar. The two questions are essentially distinct, as stated
above in para. 1.
- 6.
- Para. 38 of the Annex relating to the Basin of the Saar
expressly reserves the possibility of a direct arrangement
between France and Germany at the end of the fifteenth year.
The fears which you express on the subject of the possible
consequences of paras. 36 and 37 are not, therefore,
justified in fact. If, on one hand, the direct agreement
authorised by para. 38 came to nothing, and if, on the other
hand, as you fear, the Commission on Reparations forbade the
payment in gold provided for in para. 36, it would then be
the duty of the League of Nations to consider the
consequences resulting from that refusal both for Germany
and for the population of the
[Page 824]
region under consideration—on
condition, of course, that the provisions of para. 37 were
carried out.
As regards the cession of territory allowed to Belgium, perfect
liberty is secured for popular opinion to express itself within six
months in the case of the circles of Malmedy and Eupen. The only
exception made relates to the part of the territory of Prussian
Mo-resnet, which lies to the West of the road from Liege to
Aix-la-Chapelle the population of which is under 500 and the woods
of which have been transferred to Belgium as partial reparation for
the destruction of forests wrought by Germany on Belgian
territory.
As regards Slesvig, the Peace Conference took cognisance of the
question at the request of the Danish Government and of the
population.
Accept, etc.
Unanimously adopted on May 15th by the Committee composed of:—
Dr. S. E. Mezes |
(United States of America) |
Sir Eyre Crowe |
(British Empire) |
M. André Tardieu |
(France) |
Marquis della Torretta |
(Italy) |
M. H. Ijuin. |
(Japan) |
Appendix V to CF–23
Draft Answer to the Letter of Count
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dated May 16, 1919
M. 172
I have the honour to acknowledge Your Excellency’s letter of 16th
May,8 enclosing a memorandum
from German Experts which makes a proposal with respect to supplying
France with coal other than by the transfer of the mines of the
Saar.
The Allied and Associated Governments maintain their letter of . . .
. . in answer to your letter of . . . . .
The proposal of the German Experts rightly notes that the transfer to
France of the coal mines of the Saar Basin is to be made “as
compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of
France and as part payment towards the total reparation due by
Germany for the damage resulting from the war.” It does not,
however, keep these ends clearly in view in the alternative
arrangements which it proposes and which it seeks to assimilate to
the right of option on the purchase of certain amounts of German
coal, provided for in Part VII, Annex V, which is a quite distinct
matter.
[Page 825]
Any such arrangement as proposed for the supplying of a quantity of
coal other than the amounts provided in Part VIII, Annex V,
inevitably involves a still greater degree of uncertainty than
contemplated at the end of Clause 2 of that Annex. No possible
arrangement of this sort could give France the security and the
certainty which she would receive from the full ownership and free
exploitation of the mines of the Saar.
Similarly, the proposed handing over of shares in German coal mines,
situated in German territory and subject to German exploitation,
would be of doubtful value to French holders. The full and immediate
transfer to France of mines adjacent to the French frontier, with
proper credit upon the reparation account due from Germany,
constitutes a more prompt, secure and businesslike settlement of the
matter of compensation for the destruction of French coal mines,
while at the same time it makes full use of those mines as a means
of payment on the general account of reparation.
The object of the measures provided for in Article 49 and in Chapter
II of the Annex to Part III, Section IV, to which the note of the
German experts refers, is stated in Article 46, namely “to assure
the rights and welfare of the population and to guarantee to France
complete freedom in working the mines”. These measures are quite
independent of the occupation provided in Part XIV, Section I.
With regard to Paragraph 38 of the Annex to the Treaty, relating to
the Saar, it has already been said and it is hereby confirmed that
this paragraph only applies to the particular eventual agreements to
intervene between France and Germany, as to the re-purchase of the
rights of property of France in case the League of Nations, after a
plebiscite, should decide in fifteen years the union to Germany of
all or part of the territory of the Saar Basin.
The resort to the procedure provided for by the said paragraph is
therefore at present out of the question.
As for the quality of the coal and to the places of delivery, it is,
as has already been said a question distinct from that of the Saar
and settled by Part VIII of the Treaty.
Your economic propositions are therefore in the opinion of the Allied
and Associated Governments inoperating. They provide none of the
necessary guarantees mentioned in Articles 45–46–47. Finally, in a
general way the Allied and Associated Governments state that the
particular form of reparation was chosen, as it was felt that the
destructions of the mines in the North of France was an act of such
a nature that a definite and striking retribution should be exacted,
different from the mere provisions of a specified or unspecified
amount of coal.