Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/22
CF–22
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, at 4:15 p.m. on Wednesday, May 21, 1919
Paris, May 21, 1919, 4:15 p.m.
-
Present
-
United States of America
-
France
-
British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
-
Italy
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
Secretary.
|
| Count Aldrovandi |
Secretary.
|
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux |
Interpreter.
|
The following Members of the Polish-Ukrainian Commission were also
present:—
General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha, (President).
| Dr. Lord, |
United States of America. |
| Lieut-Colonel F. H. Kisch, |
British Empire. |
| General Le Rond, |
France. |
| M. Brambilla. |
Italy. |
| Captain Brebner |
} |
Secretaries.
|
| Captain Escoffer |
There were also present the following Members of the Ukrainian Delegation
to the Peace Conference:—
- M. G. Syderenko.
- Dr. B. Paneyko.
- M. Lozynsky.
- Colonel D. Witowsky.
Polish-Ukrainian Armistice
President Wilson stated that the reason for
the presence of the Ukrainian Delegation was the distressing
circumstances existing on the Polish-Ukrainian front and stated that the
Council of the Principle Allied and Associated Powers had invited the
Delegates to make a statement as to their views on these circumstances.
The Council would be glad if the spokesman would set forth those
views.
M. Syderenko expressed in the name of the
Ukrainian Delegation their gratitude to the illustrious representatives
of the Great Powers for the interest they were showing in the Ukrainian
people. He stated that Ukrainian territory had been devastated, the
people had suffered extremely, and that they all deplored the state of
war that existed between Poland and Ukrainia. They would like to live
with the [Page 776] Poles in peace and
harmony, and as brothers. They, however, were not the aggressors, but
were only defending the country of their forefathers. They had more than
once expressed their willingness to enter into an armistice and repeated
that willingness again. They trusted that the Peace Representatives of
the Entente would settle this question in accordance with the principles
of justice and right as enunciated by President Wilson and as accepted
by the Great Powers. Particularly anxious were they that the matter of
the Armistice should receive an immediate settlement. The Armistice
Commission had asked them to express their view and they had accepted
the terms of the Armistice proposed by that Commission, but in spite of
this they were informed that the Poles had made continuous attacks and
had occupied further parts of Ukrainian territory. With regard to this
point Dr. Paneyko the Vice President, would give further
information.
Mr. Lloyd George wished to know what the
attitude of the Ukrainians was toward the Bolshevists.
M. Syderenko, in reply, stated that the
Ukrainians were defending their national territory, and that the
Bolshevists had invaded and were ravaging their country. They regarded
the Bolshevists as their worst enemies, and were doing their best to
establish peace and order.
Mr. Lloyd George, to make this point clear,
asked whether that statement meant that the Poles were attacking the
Ukrainians on the Western side while the Bolshevists were attacking them
on the East. The answer was in the affirmative.
Dr. Paneyko stated that the population of
Eastern Galicia consisted of about 4,000,000 Ukranians. These had been
given over by the Austrian authorities to Polish domination, and that
was the reason why the Ukrainians greeted with joy the collapse of the
Austrian Empire and immediately proceeded upon that collapse to
establish their own national life and State. This State was founded on
the principle of self-determination, as accepted by the Entente, but at
the same time guaranteed the rights of minorities. From a social and
economic point of view, the State is based upon the principles of
democracy, and is introducing moderate reforms, chiefly with reference
to the agricultural situation. The estates of the great landowners have
not been declared forfeit, but a scheme has been adopted for buying out
these land-owners, the object being to obtain a middle class peasantry
as the backbone of the State. In spite of the rights of the Poles being
guaranteed, the latter, dreaming of the old historical Polish Empire,
extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, proceeded to attack this new
State. The Polish population within the borders of the State, chiefly
belonged to the bureaucratic and large landowning classes, but the bulk
of the population is Ukrainian.
[Page 777]
Mr. Lloyd George asked whether there was any
substantial difference between the Polish and Ukrainian languages.
Dr. Paneyko replied that all Slavic languages
are closely related, but the Ukrainian language is distinct from that of
the Poles. One is not a dialect of the other. The Russian Ukrainians
spoke the same language as those in Eastern Galicia. In religion the
Galicians are Greek Catholics, owning allegiance to the Church of
Rome.
Dr. Paneyko, continuing, stated that when the Government, established by
the German Military Command in Ukrainia, was overthrown, a movement for
liberating the Western Ukraine was commenced by the inhabitants.
Mr. Lloyd George put the question whether,
supposing Russian Ukrainia should remain part of Russia, the Western
Ukrainians would prefer to remain under Poland or under Russia as an
autonomous State.
Dr. Paneyko answered that it was difficult to
reply to this question. Their aim and object was complete national
independence, and he expressed the opinion that an autonomous State as
suggested would not solve the problem, but would only serve to create a
situation corresponding to the Balkan States.
M. Syderenko pointed out that the Ukrainian
people were now all united. At one time they had been divided between
Russia and Austria. Now, their common object was national independence.
No union with Poland was possible, as the Ukrainians counted a
population of some 40,000,000, while the Poles only totalled some
20,000,000. The Russians, on the other hand, had always only used
Ukrainia only for their own interests. All the Ukrainian parties from
Right to Left were united in the one aim of obtaining complete
independence as an indivisible State.
Mr. Lloyd George then asked if it was correct
to state that whatever happened to Ukrainia as a whole, the Ukrainians
would prefer to throw in their lot therewith. Did they want to be
separated from the Eastern Ukrainians? The answer was, No. What they
desired was a united independent Ukrainian State.
Mr. Lloyd George further enquired whether the Ukrainians were prepared to
stop fighting if the Poles should do the same, and, if so, would they
treat the Polish people fairly and with justice.
Dr. Paneyko stated in reply, that they had been
willing to stop and had so stated several times previously. Legislation
had also been passed guaranteeing to the Poles minority rights, which
legislation had been much appreciated by the latter. To a further query
of Mr. Lloyd George, whether, if ordered by the Delegation here in
Paris, the Ukrainian troops on the front would obey such order, the
reply was, Absolutely, and that the Armies under command of [Page 778] the Ukrainian Government were
well-organised and under complete control of the Ukrainian
Government.
Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether, if the
Ukrainians were relieved on this Polish-Ukrainian front, would these
armies be used against the Bolshevists on other fronts.
Dr. Paneyko replied, Certainly. This army was
animated with a desire to proceed against the Bolshevists in their
country. The Ukrainian Delegation felt that such army would be more
successful against the Bolshevists because they understood the
population which was at present subject to Bolshevist rule, and would
get a sympathetic reception from their co-patriots. The Bolshevists had
over-run Ukrainia, because the latter’s army had to be withdrawn to
defend their homes against the ravaging and pillaging of the Poles.
Bolshevism would not find a rich field in Eastern Galicia, as the
population there had enjoyed constitutional liberties far more than the
Ukrainian population in Russia. The Ukrainians were anxious for the
support by the Entente in the way of officers, supplies, munitions of
war, etc. and stated that the Poles at the present time, with the
assistance of the Allies, were invading Ukrainia and burning and
ravaging the country. In the name of humanity, he called upon the
Entente to stop the Poles. Every day he received appeals for protection
from the Ukrainians.
(The Deputation then withdrew.)
President Wilson requested General Botha to
read the report of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, (Appendix
4). The report was then read by Colonel Kisch.
General Botha then pointed out that the
Ukrainians had accepted the draft Armistice terms subject to some slight
modification, and demonstrated on the map attached to the report,1 the various lines of
demarcation suggested by the Armistice Commission, the Poles and the
Ukrainians respectively. The Poles from the beginning had taken up the
attitude that it was essential for them, in order to fight Bolshevism,
to shorten their line and thus to join hands with Roumania and occupy a
line towards the East of the Eastern boundary of Eastern Galicia.
President Wilson wished to have the opinion of
General Botha and the Commission as to what effective steps could be
taken to make the Poles agree to the draft Convention. As far as he
understood the position from the reports that had come in, it appeared
that the Poles were continuing their plans of attack regardless of the
protests of M. Paderewski, and that Haller’s Army was being used on this
front.
General le Rond pointed out that the telegram
stating that Haller’s [Page 779] Army was
being used on the Ukrainian front came from Prague, and without further
reliable authority it could be hardly accepted as correct. The same
remark applied to the report that the Poles had taken Beltz, well within
the Ukrainian lines.
General Botha, in reply to President Wilson,
stated that, as a Commission, they had not gone into the political
question as to what steps should be taken to enforce the Armistice
terms. The Commission had impressed upon both parties the urgent
necessity for stopping bloodshed, had drafted a draft armistice attached
to the report, and submitted it to both parties for their acceptance. As
Chairman of that Commission, he could only refer to the unanimous
conclusion of the Commission, that when the Poles refused to accept the
draft armistice their mandate was at an end. He was of opinion that
bloodshed should be stopped at once for he feared that if it were
allowed to continue peace would never reign in this region. Furthermore,
if the Poles would stop this fighting it would give the Supreme Council
an opportunity of further considering the question of frontiers and thus
enabling a settlement to be obtained.
President Wilson then read a draft telegram
which it had been proposed to send to General Pilsudski (Appendix I),
before the latest telegram had arrived from M. Paderewski (Appendix II)
and asked whether this telegram met with the approval of General Botha,
pointing out that the effect of the telegram might be to create
starvation amongst the people and suggesting that the terms of the
telegram should be restricted to withholding military supplies.
General Botha suggested omitting all reference
to the kind of supplies, thus leaving it open for decision later on, but
President Wilson pointed out that such a course would be inadvisable
unless the Council had already decided what it would do should the Poles
prove obdurate.
General le Rond pointed out that the Poles had
always maintained that the continuous front from the Black Sea to the
Baltic Sea was essential for their safety as against Bolshevism and had
alleged that in their present line there was a gap, namely, the
Ukrainian front where communications were passing through between Lenin
and Bela Khun. If the Poles overthrew Paderewski and no other Government
could be established, the only alternatives were either to starve the
Poles or force them to become Bolshevists, and he suggested that the
telegram should be confined to food supplies. Both sides were filled
with ambitious aims but there certainly was some ground for the Polish
desire for a continuous front, more especially when the Polish Army
seemed to have the better morale.
General Botha pointed out that the Poles stood
under the protection of the Supreme Council, and were receiving
assistance in the [Page 780] shape of
troops, munitions of war and food. The Ukrainians fighting against them
had on the other hand not been recognised, were receiving no assistance
from the Allies; their country had been devastated by war, and the
suffering amongst the population must be great. Yet, both countries were
in the same position in this respect, that both owed their present
existence to the sacrifices of the Allies. He believed that it would be
to the interests of the Poles to listen to the Supreme Council. They had
already been told that in the matter of territory they should occupy by
force of arms. Such would not be taken into consideration in deciding
the ultimate frontiers. He considered the cry of Bolshevism to be a
bogey and felt it was impossible for the Supreme Council to allow a
small nation to be over-run by its neighbours on the ostensible pretext
of a defensive, strategical measure against Bolshevism, which at this
point was some hundred miles removed from the present Polish frontier.
The Poles owed their very existence to the great sacrifices of the
Allies and therefore the Allies had every right to demand that they
should be listened to. Furthermore, if the fighting on this front were
stopped, it would mean obtaining some sixty thousand men to assist in
waging war against the Bolshevists. Looking at the question from the
Ukrainian point of view, it must appear to the latter that they are
being deceived by the Allies. Military assistance is being sent to the
Poles by the Allies in the shape of Haller’s Army, and supplies, etc.,
are being forwarded and being used to over-run a neighbouring State
which like Poland owes its existence and continuance to the sacrifices
of the Allies. There was plenty of room along the Eastern frontier of
Ukrainia for the Poles to fight Bolshevism side by side in agreement
with the Ukrainians. He felt that the time had come for the Supreme
Council to take active steps. It was impossible after the Ukrainians had
expressed their willingness to accept the draft armistice terms to send
them home again without a settlement having been reached.
President Wilson sympathised with this argument
but expressed the fear that if strong action forced the downfall of the
Paderewski Government, Poland would turn Bolshevist, as had happened in
other cases. As far as he could judge the present temper of the Diet,
Poland would become anarchical if any extreme measure should be
adopted.
Dr. Lord pointed out that the draft Armistice
Terms had as yet not been agreed to by the Supreme Council, but had only
been submitted unofficially to the contending parties by the Armistice
Commission. He expressed the view that if the Supreme Council should
adopt the Armistice with such modifications as they thought fit and
formally submit the same to the Poles and Ukrainians, the former would
probably accept them.
[Page 781]
General Botha feared that delay had been the
root of all the trouble, and that every day that passed without a
settlement made the problem more difficult.
Mr. Lloyd George agreed that the Supreme
Council had hitherto acted rather weakly in this matter. He remarked
that it seemed to him that Poles were using Bolshevism as a cloak for
their Imperialistic aims. From the experience in Russia he had formed
the conclusion that the only way to fight Bolshevism was to use
nationals of the country affected. Wherever foreign troops intervened
the hands of Bolshevism were strengthened, and therefore to fight
Bolshevism in Ukrainia we should rather use Ukrainians than Poles.
Ukrainians may naturally say that the Poles in pretending to fight
Bolshevism really were pillaging and ravaging their country and the
result would be simply to force Bolshevism upon Ukrainia. We are told
that the Warsaw mob would overthrow the Paderewski Government if we took
strong steps. If that were so it showed pretty conclusively that the
Poles were quite unfitted to govern themselves. He hoped that the draft
telegram prepared by President Wilson would be sent and suggested that
the word “supplies” could be interpreted later. By using the wide term
“supplies” some advantage was to be gained and if a decision was
necessary the word could be restricted to military supplies. He
suggested that a telegram should be sent to General Haller stating that
rumours had come to the ears of the Supreme Council that in defiance of
their express instructions General Haller had allowed his troops to
march against the Galicians.
General le Bond suggested that instead of
telegraphing to General Haller the telegram should be sent to General
Pilsudski of the Polish High Command.
(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should send a telegram on the above
lines to General Pilsudski and at the same time forward through the
French Liaison Officer a copy to General Haller for his information.
General Le Rond and Colonel Kisch were instructed to submit a draft
telegram (see Appendix III).
After further discussion as to the terms of the draft telegram, it was
decided that President Wilson should re-draft the same with two
additions:—
- (1)
- Calling the attention of the Poles to the fact that they owe
their legal existence as a State to the Council and
- (2)
- Stating that the draft Armistice Terms had been adopted and
confirmed by the Council.)
(The Meeting then terminated.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 21 May, 1919.
[Page 782]
Appendix I to CF–22
Telegram From the President of the
Peace Conference to General Pilsudski, Head of the Polish
State
The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers feel that
it is their duty to call the attention of the Government of Poland
to facts which are giving them the greatest concern and which may
lead to consequences for Poland which the Council would deeply
deplore. The boundary between Poland and the Ukraine is under
consideration and it is as yet undetermined, and the Council has
more than once informed the Polish Government that they would regard
any attempt either by Poland or by the Ukrainian authorities to
determine it, or to prejudice its determination, by the use of
force, as a violation of the whole spirit and an arbitrary
interference with the whole purpose of the present Conference of
Peace, to which Poland, at least has consented to leave the decision
of questions of this very sort. The Council has, therefore, more
than once insisted that there should be an armistice on the
Ukrainian front, arranged in Paris and under the advice of the
Council itself. The Polish military authorities, while acquiescing
in principle, have in effect insisted upon such conditions as would
amount to a settlement of the very questions in controversy, and
have continued to use forces in maintenance of their claims. This
has inevitably made the impression on the minds of the members of
the Council that the Polish authorities were in effect, if not in
purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference of
Peace. The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most
friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the
Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the
guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters,
the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers will not be justified in supplying Poland any
longer with supplies or assistance of any kind. If it is her
deliberate purpose to set at nought the counsel proffered by the
Conference, its authority can no longer it is feared be made
serviceable to her.
Appendix II to CF–22
[Paraphrase of telegram from Mr. Gibson, American Minister at Warsaw,
to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, May 14, 1919, same as
first telegram in appendix I to CF–18B, printed on page 711.]
[Page 783]
Appendix III to CF–22
Telegram From the President of the
Peace Conference to General Pilsudski, Warsaw
(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on 21st May, 1919)
The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have heard
rumours from several sources to the effect that troops of General
Haller’s Army have recently taken part in operations against the
Ukrainian forces in Eastern Galicia, in the region of Belz or
elsewhere.
The Council would be glad to receive early information from the
Polish Government with regard to these reports, which the Council is
reluctant to believe, since definite engagements were undertaken by
General Haller not to take part in the operations against the
Ukrainians.
Appendix IV
Report (with Appendices) Presented to the
Supreme Council of the Peace Conference by the Inter-Allied
Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice Between Poland
and the Ukraine
Formation, Terms of Reference and
Proceedings of the Commission
Following upon the negotiations set on foot on the initiative of the
Council of Four during March, 1919, negotiations which proved
abortive (see Appendix I),2 the Council of Four at their meeting of the
2nd April,3 adopted
the following proposals:—
- I.
- That an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission should
immediately be appointed to conduct at Paris the
negotiations with Polish and Ukrainian representatives for
an Armistice in Eastern Galicia;
- II.
- That in order to avoid all suggestions of partiality, this
negotiation should be entrusted not to the Commission on
Polish affairs but to a Commission to be created ad hoc;
- III.
- That the Commission is to be made up of one military and
one civilian representative from each of the four Allied and
Associated Powers interested in the Galician
question;
- IV.
- That this Commission is to recommend such measures as it
deems necessary for the execution of the suspension of arms
in Eastern Galicia during the negotiation of the terms of
the Armistice. (While [Page 784] it is not yet certain whether a formal
suspension of arms has been signed in Eastern Galicia, the
Polish and Ukranian Commanders-in-Chief have accepted a
truce in principle, and the speedy conclusion of such a
Convention seems probable.)
At the same time, the Council of Four addressed the following
telegram, dated the 3rd April, to the Polish Minister of Foreign
Affairs at Warsaw:—
“To the Polish Minister of Foreign
Affairs:
“It will be recalled that in its note of the 19th March3a the Conference suggested to both the
Polish and Ukrainian Governments that a suspension of arms
should be arranged in Eastern Galicia pending the discussion
at Paris of an Armistice under the mediation of the Allied
and Associated Governments. To further these objects the
Conference has decided to appoint an Armistice Commission to
hear the representatives of the two belligerents, and this
Commission will begin its sittings in Paris as soon as it is
informed that a truce has been concluded and that accredited
Polish and Ukrainian representatives are ready to present
their views. To save time, it is suggested that
representatives be appointed from the Polish Delegation now
in Paris. If the plan of mediation proposed by the Allied
and Associated Governments is to be carried out, it is
essential that the Convention for the suspension of arms
which is now being arranged in Eastern Galicia should
contain nothing that would prejudge the nature of the future
Armistice, and the Allied and Associated Governments cannot
doubt that in the negotiation for a suspension of arms the
Polish Government will act upon this principle.
“Woodrow Wilson. G.
Clemenceau.
“D. Lloyd George. V. E.
Orlando.”
On the 18th April the Council of Four decided4 that the following
Powers, United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy,
should each nominate two representatives to sit on this
Commission.
The “Inter-Allied Commission for the negotiation of an armistice
between Poland and the Ukraine” was thus composed as follows:—
- United States of America:
- Dr. Isaiah Bowman, and later
- Dr. Lord (as from 12th May).
- Colonel S. D. Embick.
- British Empire:
- General the Et. Hon. Louis Botha
(President).
- Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Kisch.
- France:
- General Le Rond.
- M. Degrand.
- Italy:
- M. Brambilla.
- Commandant Pergolani.
[Page 785]
The following also took part in the proceedings of the Commission:—
- British Empire:
- Captain Brebner.
- Dr. Englenburg.
- France:
- Captain Escoffier (Secretariat-General).
- M. Meyer (Interpreter).
On the 8th May the Commission appointed a Sub-Commission to draft an
Armistice Convention. This Sub-Commission was composed of the
military members of the Commission:—
- United States of America:
- British Empire:
- Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Kisch.
- France:
- Italy:
The following also took part in the proceedings of this
Sub-Commission:—
- France:
- Captain de la Touche.
- Captain Escoffier (Secretary)
- Italy:
Proceedings of the Commission and
Sub-Commission
The Commission held nine and the Sub-Commission two meetings.
The Polish Delegation, composed as follows, appeared before the
Commission on the 29th April, and 6th, 12th and 13th May:—
- M. I. Paderewski, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
- M. R. Dmowski, President of the Polish National
Committee.
- General Rozwadowski, representing the Polish High
Command.
The following Ukrainian Representatives appeared before the
Commission on the 30th April, and 8th, 12th and 13th May:—
- M. G. Syderenko, President of the Delegation of the
Ukrainian Republic.
- Dr. B. Paneyko, Vice-President and Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
- M. Lozynsky, Under-Secretary of State: First Special
Delegate.
- Colonel D. Witowsky, Special Delegate.
Report Presented to the Supreme
Allied Council on the Conclusion of an Armistice Between Poland
and the Ukraine
In accordance with the Terms of Reference laid down for it by the [Page 786] Council of Four, the
Commission decided to convoke Polish and Ukrainian Delegates.
The Commission impressed upon the representatives of the two parties
still at war in Eastern Galicia, the necessity for putting an end to
bloodshed, at a time when the Peace Conference in Paris was
endeavouring to arrange for universal peace.
The Commission, in order to obtain information, and with a view to
preparing an equitable Armistice Convention, asked the Delegations
of the two parties to state the conditions on which they would agree
to a suspension of hostilities.
After having taken note of the answers received, the Commission, on
the 9th May, unanimously approved the draft Armistice Convention of
which the text is given in Appendix II. This was presented to the
two parties on the 12th May, and they were both informed that the
acceptance of the conditions of the Convention would in no way
prejudice the solution of the question of frontiers, which would be
decided by the Supreme Council. Both parties were, at the same time,
asked to submit in writing their observations with regard to the
draft Armistice Convention.
These written replies reached the Commission on the morning of the
13th May. The Polish reply is given in Annex IV, and the Ukrainian
reply in Annex V. These documents can be summarised as follows:
(a) On the Polish side:—
The Polish Government cannot consider the question of an Armistice
with the Ukrainian forces except as a factor affecting the general
military situation and the security of the whole country. Engaged on
the east in the struggle against Bolshevism, of which the progress
threatened the whole of the eastern frontier, and being in constant
fear of a German attack from the west, the Polish Government
considered it necessary to build up a continuous eastern front
composed of Allied troops. The Government could not, therefore, be a
party to an Armistice which did not contain clauses which would
allow of Polish troops effecting a junction with the Roumanians.
(b) On the Ukrainian side:—
The Ukrainian Representatives raised several objections to the Draft
Convention; the more important of their demands were as follows:—
- 1.
- An extension northwards, into Russian territory, of the
demarcation line laid down for Galician territory in Article
2 of the Convention, with a view to avoiding hostilities
between Poles and Ukrainians on the whole front.
- 2.
- A modification of the demarcation line so as to obtain for
the Ukrainians the Sambor-Sianki railway.
- 3.
- That one-third of the output of the oil-fields should be
assigned to Poland during the armistice, instead of
one-half, as proposed by the Commission (Article 10).
- 4.
- That a longer time should be allowed for the withdrawal of
the Ukrainian troops from the west of the demarcation line
(Article 3), and that some modification should be made in
Article 4, with regard to the zone in which 20,000 troops,
contemplated by the Commission, should be maintained.
After examining these arguments, the Commission again heard, on the
afternoon of the 13th May, the Polish Delegates and the Ukrainian
representatives, when both parties were asked whether they wished to
submit any further observations.
M. Dmowski declared that the written reply addressed to the President
of the Commission had been based on the conviction that he was in
harmony with the ideas of his Government and of the Polish High
Command; that he did not believe himself authorised to adopts a
different attitude; and that he had telegraphed to Warsaw on the
12th May repeating the conditions of the Armistice submitted by the
Commission and expected an answer to his telegram at any moment.
M. Dmowski further added that the special question of the conclusion
of an armistice with the Ukrainian forces was only part of the
general military situation of Poland, and that, from this point of
view, his Government would be glad to see this matter submitted for
the opinion of the Inter-Allied High Command.
The Commission informed M. Dmowski that it took note of his
observations, which it would report to the Supreme Council,
mentioning the answer from the Government at Warsaw should this
arrive in time for inclusion in the Report.
In the name of the Ukrainian representatives M. Lozynsky declared,
after discussion, that he accepted in principle the armistice
conditions as they had been formulated by the Commission.
M. Lozynsky was informed that the Commission could in no way modify
its attitude with regard to the demarcation line which had been
fixed, nor with regard to the provisional distribution of the output
of the oil-fields; on the other hand, the Ukrainian demands with
regard to an increased allowance of time for the withdrawal of their
troops, and with regard to the number and disposition of these
troops, might be taken into consideration.
M. Lozynsky declared his acceptance: at the same time he asked the
Commission to take into consideration certain points raised in the
Ukrainian declaration, viz., the number and disposition of the
troops to be maintained respectively on the two sides of the
demarcation line: the subsequent extension of the demarcation line
northwards beyond the northern frontier of Galicia; and lastly, the
neutralisation of the Sambor-Sianki railway line.
M. Lozynsky was informed that the Commission took note of his
declaration which would be reported to the Supreme Council.
[Page 788]
Conclusions of the
Commission
The Armistice Convention drawn up by the Commission having been
submitted to and examined by the two parties, the Commission has the
honour to report as follows to the Supreme Council:—
- 1.
- That the Commission is unable to discuss the conditions
demanded by the Polish Delegation, since these raise
questions of general policy, which are beyond the competence
of the Commission.
- 2.
- Should the Draft Armistice Convention (Appendix II) be
taken as a basis for subsequent negotiations, the Commission
considers that due account should be taken of the requests
made by the Ukrainian Representatives relative to—
- (a)
- An increased allowance of time for the withdrawal
of their troops east of the demarcation line,
and
- (b)
- With regard to the number and disposition of these
troops.
As the Armistice Convention unanimously adopted by the Commission has
not been accepted by one of the two contending parties, the
Commission regard their mandate at an end, and can only report to
the Supreme Council the proposals which they have put forward with a
view to bringing the two parties to an agreement, and the causes
which prevented the success of their efforts.
-
Louis Botha
-
R. H. Lord
-
S. D. Embick
-
F. H. Kisch
-
H. le Rond
-
Degrand
-
G. Brambilla
-
M. Pergolani
Appendix I
Previous Negotiations
Several previous attempts had been made to bring about a cessation of
hostilities between the Poles and Ukrainians, but of these the only
negotiations which need be mentioned in this report were those
conducted towards the end of February by an Allied Mission. This
mission met with a certain measure of success in that it succeeded
on the 24th February, 1919, in concluding a truce which was duly
signed by delegates representing the two parties. The Armistice
Commission further drew up Armistice terms which it presented to the
Polish and Ukrainian Delegations on the 28th February, on which date
the suspension of hostilities was revoked by the Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief for military reasons (pour les
raisons d’un ordre purement [Page 789] militaire). The resumption of
hostilities followed automatically and the Armistice negotiations
were necessarily suspended.
On the 19th March the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference
despatched the following telegram to the Polish and Ukrainian
Commanders of the forces opposing each other at Lemberg:—5
In the course of its sitting of the 19th March the Supreme
Council of the Peace Conference has decided to request both
parties now opposing each other at Lemberg to conclude a
truce immediately on receipt of the present telegram.
“In consequence, the Chiefs of the Allied and Associated
Governments apply to General Rozwadowski (or; to General
Pawlenko) to acquaint him with the request from the Supreme
Council of the Peace Conference immediately to stop
hostilities, as far as he is concerned, in front of and in
the region of Lemberg; this request is simultaneously being
sent to General Pawlenko, commanding the Ukrainian forces
before Lemberg (or; to General Rozwadowski, commanding the
garrison of Lemberg).
“Throughout the duration of the truce, the troops of both
parties shall remain on their positions; the communications
by rail between Lemberg and Przemysl must, however, remain
open strictly in so far as is necessary for the daily
revictualling of the town.
“The Supreme Council adds that it is ready to hear the
territorial claims of both parties concerned, and to
approach the Ukrainian and Polish Delegations in Paris, or
whatever authorised representation the parties may select,
with a view to changing the suspension of arms into an
armistice.
“The hearing of the Ukrainian and Polish representatives with
regard to their respective claims, is morever, made subject
to the formal condition of an immediate suspension of
hostilities.”
The following reply was received on the 24th March from General
Pawlenko, the Ukrainian Commander:—
“With all my heart I accept the proposal of the Supreme
Council of the Peace Conference, dated the 20th March, in
order to give fresh proof that I and the Ukrainian army are
at all times disposed to put an end to bloodshed.”
The absence of any definite reply from the Polish authorities led to
the telegram, dated the 3rd April, quoted above, and to the
appointment of the present Commission.
Appendix II
Draft for an Armistice Convention
Between Poland and the Ukraine, Concluded Under the Mediation of
the United States of America, the British Empire, France and
Italy
Instructions shall be issued forthwith for the cessation of all
military action between the Polish and Ukrainian forces with effect
from 6 a.m. on . . . . . . . . .
[Page 790]
2. The military line of demarcation separating the Polish and
Ukrainian armed forces for the duration of the Armistice will be as
in Annex A, and is shown on the attached map.6
3. All Polish troops east of the above line will be withdrawn to the
west of it, and all Ukrainian troops west of it will be withdrawn to
the east of it within five days of the cessation of hostilities.
4. The number of Polish troops and of Ukrainian troops respectively
in East Galicia on either side of the demarcation line shall be
reduced within fifteen days of the cessation of hostilities to
20,000. It will be the duty of the Armistice Commission appointed
under Article 5 to decide whether it is possible subsequently to
reduce the above effectives.
The importation to Eastern Galicia of munitions of war during the
period of Armistice shall be limited to the quantities approved by
the Armistice Commission.
5. An Inter-Allied Armistice Commission formed of representatives of
the mediating Powers shall supervise the execution of the clauses of
the present Armistice. This Commission may delegate to
Sub-Commissions the duty of settling special or particular
questions.
The Armistice Commission shall fix the positions of the troops of the
two parties in such a way as—
- (a)
- To avoid all friction between Poles and Ukrainians.
- (b)
- To ensure the maintenance of order throughout the whole
country.
The Polish and Ukrainian authorities in Eastern Galicia will accept
all arrangements made by the Commission and will afford the
Commission every facility in the execution of its duties.
6. All Polish and Ukrainian prisoners of war held by the two parties
will be returned under arrangements to be concluded between them
within seven days of the cessation of hostilities.
7. All Poles or Ukrainians who may have been interned or seized as
hostages by the Ukrainian or Polish Authorities respectively since
the 11th November, 1918, for political reasons will be released
forthwith.
Similarly, no obstacle will be placed in the way of the return to
their former place of residence or to the enjoyment of full rights
and liberty of all such persons, and of nationals of the Allied and
Associated Powers, even if they have participated in the present
war.
All property which has been confiscated belonging to persons in the
territory under the occupation of the Polish and Ukrainian forces
respectively will be returned to the persons entitled thereto, or
where that is impossible compensation will be paid.
[Page 791]
8. No person will be molested or injured in respect of his rights or
property on account of his nationality or his participation in the
war.
9. In the territory under the military occupation of the Polish and
Ukrainian forces respectively in accordance with Article 2, the
principles laid down in the regulations annexed to the Land War
Convention of 1907 (the Hague Convention)7 will
be strictly observed by the two parties, and due regard will be paid
to the desires of the inhabitants whose nationality differs from
that of the forces in occupation. Local Authorities, representative
of the majority of the inhabitants of the several districts
concerned, will be granted the maximum possible facilities.
10. The disposal of the output of the oilfields shall be on the basis
that one-half of the output of the oil-fields shall be delivered
monthly on rail to the Polish authorities against payment in cash or
in kind. The price charged shall be assessed by the Armistice
Commission on the basis of the cost of production inclusive of
administrative and transportation expenses.
11. All transactions relative to the property, rights and interests
(biens, droits et intérêts) appertaining
to the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers in the
territories placed under the control of the parties are prohibited
for the duration of the present Armistice and will be treated as
null and void. The above provision does not, however, prevent
transactions which are necessary for the exploitation of such
properties.
12. During the present Armistice no concessions shall be granted for
the rights of exploitation on the oil-fields lying on State land on
the territory of either party.
13. The provisions of the present Armistice must not be taken in any
way as deciding the definitive status of the territory of East
Galicia which will be determined in due course by the Allied and
Associated Powers in treaties or conventions to be concluded by them
at a later date. This Armistice will expire when such definitive
status is so determined.
Annex A
Reference Austrian Staff Map 1/200,000
The proposed Armistice Line—
leaves the Bug at its confluence with the Kozloroice and follows the
course of this river to its confluence with the Warezanka, passing
west of Uhrynow;
thence taking a line southwards through the trigonometrical points
246, 258, 208, 210 to a point on the course of the Blotnice river
immediately north of point 207 (passing east of Lubow and Waniow and
west of Siebieczow and Zabcze); [Page 792] thence taking a direct line to the confluence
of the Rata and Zeldec rivers and following the course of this river
upstream to the apex of the salient it makes at point 252 north of
Dzibulki;
thence in a south-easterly direction to the points 240, 238 (south of
Zottance), and thence eastwards to the point in the administrative
boundary between the districts of Lemberg and Kamionka immediately
west of point 262;
thence follow this boundary and the boundary between Lemberg and
Przemyslany to the extremity of the re-entrant 1,500 metres
southwest of point 276 north of Peczenia;
thence the southern boundary of the district of Lemberg to meet the
Dniester;
thence the Dniester upstream, then the Bystrzyca upstream to Mokrzany
where it meets the western administrative boundary of the district
of Drohobycz;
thence the latter boundary southwards to point 1,001 (Bukowska);
thence by the water-parting south-south-westward to point 1,132
(Szymoniec), then following a stream south-westwards passing Radycz
to meet the river Zawddka;
thence the river Zawddka downstream to its confluence with the
Stryj;
thence the river Stryj upstream to its confluence north-west of
Matkow with a tributary flowing from Krywka; thence the course of
the latter tributary southwards and continuing so as to meet the old
boundary between Hungary and Galicia at point 831 (Jaszenowa).
Appendix III
Draft for an Undertaking To Be
Made by the Ukrainian Representatives, Supplementary to the
Armistice Convention Between the Polish and Ukrainian
Forces
In signing the Armistice Convention of even date, the undersigned is
authorised to undertake in the name of the Ukrainian authorities de facto in power in Eastern Galicia that the
said authorities will take all necessary measures to ensure that the
forces to be maintained in Eastern Galicia shall not include any
officers who belonged to the German or Austro-Hungarian Armies, or
who belong to the German, Austrian and Hungarian Armies other than
natives of Galicia.
Appendix IV
Reply of Polish Delegation
(Translation)
Mr. President: In the draft terms made by
the Commission under your chairmanship, the Armistice between the
Polish and Ukrainian [Page 793]
forces is looked upon from the point of view of being a question
which exclusively concerns the relations between the Poles and
Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia.
When summoned before the Commission, the Polish Delegates had the
honour of explaining that in view of the dangerous situation in
which their country at present was placed, military action in
Galicia should be determined by the demands of the general military
situation of Poland.
While whole-heartedly associating themselves with the desire of the
Commission to put an end to bloodshed as soon as possible in this
territory, the political future of which will be decided by the
Peace Conference, the Polish Government is bound to view the
question of an Armistice from the standpoint of the military
security of their country as a whole, which unfortunately still
finds herself in a state of war along her whole eastern
boundary.
The Polish Supreme Command had accepted without reserve the draft
Armistice of the 28th February, because at that time this portion of
our front was not so directly menaced by the Bolsheviks. The
tentative suggestions of an Armistice made towards the end of March
had no result, because it became necessary to obtain adequate
safeguards against the danger of Bolshevism, which was increasing
amongst the Ukrainian forces. To-day this danger has become much
greater, as the Bolshevik troops have advanced to the frontier of
Galicia, and the Bolshevik movement is making rapid progress amongst
the Ruthenian troops of Galicia. The disorganisation amongst these
troops is proceeding rapidly to-day.
On the other hand, the reports received by the Polish Government as
to the German preparations against Poland, and an entente between
the Germans and the Bolshevik Government of Russia, give ground to
the fear of a simultaneous attack upon Poland from the east and the
west. If, at the moment of such attack, Eastern Galicia were exposed
to an easy invasion by the Russian Bolshevik armies, the military
situation of Poland would become hopeless—threatened on the west by
German troops, pressed on the east by Russian Bolshevik armies, she
would find herself soon enveloped in the southeast, and thus be
separated from Roumania, from whom she is awaiting military
co-operation.
It is these considerations which have influenced the Polish
Commander-in-Chief to aim at an effectual junction in Eastern
Galicia of the Polish and the Roumanian armies, in order to
establish an uninterrupted front with Roumania against Bolshevik
invasion from the east. The Polish General Staff hope that this
junction will be effected during the current month.
[Page 794]
I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that the conclusion of
an Armistice between the Polish and Ukrainian forces must not stand
in the way of the realisation of this aim. If we should be obliged
to accept the proposed Armistice drafted by the Commission, having a
front which makes such a considerable curve towards the west, our
troops would find themselves exposed to dangerous surprises, and at
the same time the realisation of a continuous Polono-Roumanian front
would become impossible.
In order to safeguard Poland’s safety, the conditions of the
Armistice should contain the following clauses:—
- 1.
- The occupation by the Polish or Roumanian troops of the
railway lines Lemberg-Halicz-Stanislawow-Czernowitz, and
Stanislawow-Koromego [Körosmezö].
- 2.
- The right to introduce into the territory of Eastern
Galicia a number of Polish or Roumanian troops sufficient
for the establishment of a common front on the line of the
Dniester, of the Zlaota-Lipa and of the Styr, in order to be
able efficiently to protect the above-named railway
lines.
An Armistice, in which these clauses are not stipulated, would not, I
am convinced, meet the necessity of the safety of my country; and I
should not deem myself authorised to accept it on behalf of the
Polish Government.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my high regards.
Appendix V
Reply of Ukrainian
Delegation
Statement concerning the Proposition of the
Armistice Conditions between the Polish and Ukrainian Forces, as
presented through Mediation of United States of America, Great
Britain, France and Italy, to the Ukrainian Delegates on May 12,
1919*
The proposition of the Armistice conditions as handed over to the
Delegates of the Western Ukraine (Ukrainian territory of the late
Austro-Hungary) imposes upon Ukrainians great sacrifices. It
abandons to Poles not only the Ukrainians ethnographic territory,
occupied by them contrary to the principle of the self-determination
of nationalities through abuse of the Allies’ help, but compels
Ukrainians to cede that part of the territory which since the
beginning of the Polono-Ukrainian conflict remained under the
control of the Ukrainian Government and its army. This proposition
abandons to the Poles 18,000 square kilom., with a population of
2,000,000 (according [Page 795] to
1910 census), which has an overwhelming Ukrainian majority,
excluding the Jews who have given an incontestable proof of their
unwillingness to be subjects of the Polish State on account of
pogroms perpetrated on them and who have manifested their desire to
be included in the Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian population
constitutes 70 per cent, of the population of the whole territory on
the basis of their mother-language and 65 per cent, on the basis of
their religion (Uniate); it forms the indigenous and productive
population. The Poles, on the other hand, constitute the immigrated,
movable, bureaucratic part of the population, concentrated for the
most part in Lemberg. (They form here the maximum 50 per cent, of
all the inhabitants.)
The predominance of this Polish population till November, 1918, was
based exclusively upon the Secret Conventions entered into in 1865
and 1867 between the Polish aristocracy and the dynasty of
Haps-burgs, which resulted in the formation of a
German-Magyar-Polish triolism in the whole of the monarchy, in a
Polish absolutism in Ukrainian Galicia; this is the reason why the
Ukrainian population is rejoicing at the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian empire, as it had afforded it an opportunity to
free itself from the Polish bureaucratic bondage.
In the name of the principle of free self-determination of
nationalities the Ukrainians have organised themselves into a
national State under the name of the Western Ukrainian Republic,
based on the democratic principles which have no relation to social
Utopias. They have guaranteed the liberty of person and property,
granting an autonomy to each of its national minorities. Constituted
by the will of the people, the Government (State Secretariat) has
organised a national army. (A lack of officers has compelled the
general staff to accept into the ranks of its army a few
non-Ukrainian officers in insignificant numbers, Czechs, Croats,
Roumanians, subjects of former Austria and few Austrians of German
speech. These officers have all belonged to the ranks of the former
Galician regiments recruited in the Ukrainian territory. On this
occasion we affirm most categorically that not a single German
officer ever entered into our army.)
The latter, comprising 100,000 men at the beginning of hostilities,
was obliged to oppose enemies on two fronts:—
- 1.
- Western front against the Poles, who, desiring to force
their supremacy over the Ukrainian territory, had decided to
destroy at any price Ukrainian sovereignty. With this object
in view, they began on the 11th November, not without a
participation of non-Polish officers of the Austrian army,
an organised campaign.
- 2.
- The Eastern front against the Bolsheviks, who had vast
forces with which they made an invasion of the territory of
the Ukrainian Republic, which had been already proclaimed in
the Ukrainian territories [Page 796] of the former Russian empire, and this
compelled the State Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic to
extend its aid to the Government of Eastern Ukraine with
which Galician Ukraine had formed a federative union.
Reinforcing continuously the anti-Bolshevik front from
Roumania to Pripet marshes, the Government of the Western
Republic has fulfilled a part of the mission that had been
imposed upon it by history; while the Ukrainians under the
old Czarist regime were deprived of the conditions which
might have developed their social and political life, their
brethren in Galicia and Bukovina, thanks to their work,
developed their own institutions, and were enabled since the
middle of the 19th century to create some appreciable amount
of social experience and spirit of initiative, qualities
indispensable in the life of an independent State. This is
the reason why Western Ukraine and its Government believe
that their most important task, in the very interests of the
European culture, is to be the Piedmont of the whole Ukraine
by supplying same with military and civic forces. Only these
creative internal forces are able to achieve the
pacification and organisation of liberated Ukraine. With
this object in view the principal task is the struggle
against the Bolshevik imperialism, against that expansion of
civic and political experiment.
If this task is not achieved yet as it should have been, if a part of
Ukrainian territories has been subjected to Bolshevik ravages, the
reason is that the Ukrainian army, instead of expelling the
Bolsheviks from its country and building foundations for law and
order, is obliged to defend its territory against Polish invasion.
That is how the Poles are working hand-in-hand with the Red Guards
in order to crush this Ukrainian Piedmont, while the Ukrainians have
prevented a junction of the Russian Bolsheviks with the Hungarians,
preparing thus the fall of the latter.
The best proof that the Ukrainian Government does not entertain any
imperialistic plans is in the fact that it conducts the war against
the Poles exclusively under compulsion, and that it has protested
through diplomatic channels only against the partial occupation of
the Ukrainian Bukovina by Roumanians and Hungarian Ruthenia by the
Czecho-Slovakia; believing that the Peace Conference will settle
these differences in the spirit of national equity, in the same
manner, in order to give proof of our moderation and our confidence
in the Allied Powers, we declare in the name of our Government our
acceptance in principle of the proposition which has been given to
us. But we believe that it is indispensable, both in our interest
and in the interest of all concerned, to make in some articles of
this proposition the following modifications which we shall
endeavour to expound in the following lines:—
article i.
Accepted without reservation.
article ii.
We request to alter the demarcation line on two points: [Page 797]
- 1.
- In the north it should begin from the Dnieper, then follow
the river Pripet as far as Pinsk, then run along the course
of the river Pine, follow the Dnieper-Bug Canal, return
along the river Mouk-havetz up to Brest-Litowsk, from there
along the Bug up to the confluence with the river Kozlovice,
&c.
- 2.
- In the south the line should start from the point where
the administrative borders of the districts of Lemberg,
Premyselany and Bobrka (village Peczenia) meet and follow
the administrative borders between the districts of Lemberg
and Bobrka, up to the point 375, whence it is to follow
Lemberg approximately, from Szczerzec to the administrative
border of the district of Grodek near the station Stawceany,
then the administrative borders between the districts of
Orodek-Rudki, Mosciska-Rudki, Mosciska-Sambor,
Przemysl-Sambor, Przemysl Stary Sambor, Dobromil-Stary
Sam-bor, Lisko-Stary-Sambor, Lisko-Turka up to the old
Hungarian frontier (vide the line
traced on the map).
Motives.
- Ad. I.—If the demarcation line ended at the Bug River, the old
Austro-Russian frontier, the Western Ukrainian Republic,
occupying only the territory of former Austria, would be placed
in a precarious strategic position, at the moment when Polish
armies would appear in the north and in the east at the same
time.
- Ad. II (a).—The alteration proposed by
us on this point corresponds better to the present military
situation; and as compared with the situation at the moment of
the appeal made by the Supreme Council on the 19th of March our
line offers even considerable advantages to the Poles.
- Ad. II (b).—But the most important
reason for this modification is found in consideration that,
foreseeing an Armistice of long duration, we Ukrainians would be
connected by a single railway line (Stryj-Lawoczne-Munkacs) with
the Czecho-Slovaks, Hungarians, Yugo-Slavs, Italians and
Austrians, with most of which our Government has already
concluded commercial treaties. The Stanislau-Körömezö-Sziget
line is devoid of all commercial value; moreover, it leads into
the territory occupied by the Roumanians, with whom we have more
convenient ways of communication through Bukovina.
It would be disastrous for the economic life of Ukraine, considering
that Poles would have six double-track railways communicating with
the above-named countries, therefore, our request for the
Sambor-Sanki line does not appear unreasonable.
article iii.
As to the term of evacuation of the Ukrainian troops from beyond the
demarcation line, which concerns practically only Ukrainians, we
propose to extend same, on account of the inconvenient railway net
and bad condition of our rolling-stock and locomotives, so much more
so as Article 4 imposes already upon our railroad administration
very trying obligations.
[Page 798]
article iv.
The maximum of the Ukrainian troops prescribed by this article seems
to us prejudicial for the following reasons:—
1. Under Ukrainian administration will remain more than twice the
extent of territory and population than under Polish administration,
consequently the relation of the two territories demands twice as
large an Ukrainian contingent as is proposed by the plan.
2. As it has been already indicated in the introduction, our
principal national task consists in the organisation of our forces
for the struggle against the invaders of Eastern Ukraine—the
Bolsheviks. This organisation is not possible except in the
territories remaining under the legitimate power of the Government
of the Ukrainian Western Republic, viz., Eastern Galicia.
If the contingent does not surpass the figure of 20,000 men, which
number is hardly sufficient to maintain order in the country, such a
military preparedness would be entirely impossible, while Poles will
have every facility for organisation and concentration of their
troops in Western Galicia, in former Russian Poland, Poznania,
&c. …
3. Consequently we propose a modification of Article VI in this
direction, that on the east of the demarcation line which is to be
fixed, a zone should be created more or less equal in width to the
part of the territory in Eastern Galicia occupied by Poles.
Only there the Ukrainians should be obliged not to raise their
contingent above the number fixed for Poles in Eastern Galicia (in
this instance the number of 20,000 would be exaggerated). We propose
that east of this zone the Ukrainians should be at liberty to
organise forces against the Bolsheviks.
article v.
Accepted without reserve.
article vi.
See Article III.
articles vii and viii.
Accepted without reserve.
article ix (according to
English text).
It would be just that part of East Galicia occupied by Poles should
be subjected to a special military and administrative jurisdiction,
the same as the territory occupied by our armies.
article x (according to
English text).
As the production of petroleum represents practically the only
article of export for East Galicia and otherwise Poles possess rich
oil-fields in Western Galicia amply sufficient to satisfy their
wants, we consider that portion of oil demanded by Poles should be
limited to their needs but not become an object of export. Therefore
we [Page 799] propose to limit the
quantity of oil apportioned to Poles to one-third of the total
production.
article xi.
Seeing that the Armistice may last a long time, we propose to
supplement this Article in the following manner: that the
prohibition as foreseen in this Article should not be applicable
except at the moment when such prohibitions are in force with the
Allied and Associated Powers.
articles xii and xii.
Accepted without reserve.
In case more explicit information should be necessary, we are
prepared to supplement the above modifications by verbal
explanations.
additional engagement.
We propose to alter it in the sense that only those officers of
German tongue shall be dismissed who are not natives of Galicia and
Bukovina and to the extent of their being replaced by Allied or
neutral officers.
Dr. Paneyko
,
State Secretary of Foreign
Office.
Dr. M.
Lozynsky
,
Under-Secretary of
State.
First Special
Delegate.
Dmytro
Witowsky
,
Special
Delegate.
Délégation de la République
Úkrainienne,
37, Rue La
Pérouse,
Paris
, May
13, 1919.
