Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/20
CF–20
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20, 1919, at 11 a.m.
Paris, May 20, 1919, 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- France
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Italy
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries. |
| Count Aldrovandi. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. Suggested Reply to German Letter on Economic Effect
of Peace Treaty The Council had under consideration the German
note on the economic effect of the Treaty of Peace (Appendix 1A), and a
draft reply agreed to by American, British, French and Italian
representatives. (Appendix 1B.)
Mr. Lloyd George considered that, in paragraph
2, a statement should be given as to Great Britain’s imports of food and
iron ore, in order to show that Germany would only be in the same
position as Great Britain had been in for years. In paragraph 5, Mr.
Lloyd George suggested that the actual figures of shipping losses should
be given, in order to bring home to the German people the reasons why
they would suffer in common with the rest of the world from the shortage
of shipping.
President Wilson commented that the last
paragraph was somewhat weak. If any part of the German case was true, it
was a bad reply to point out that the millions of German citizens who
had been engaged in military matters could turn their activities to
works of peace.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the case of Great
Britain was the answer to this part of the German contention.
President Wilson pointed out the omission from
sufficient emphasis on the fact that all countries would be embarrassed
by lack of raw material owing to the shortage of shipping.
Mr. Lloyd George said his general comment on
the letter was that this was the most important of the replies to any of
the German letters. It was very important to make a thoroughly good
case, which should be supported by figures.
President Wilson agreed in this view. It should
be pointed out how small the proportion of imports that Germany would
lose would be to the total losses due to the war.
[Page 733]
M. Orlando said that Italy before the war could
only import one seventh part of the raw materials she required in
Italian bottoms. After the war, she could only import 1 fourteenth in
Italian bottoms.
Mr. Lloyd George thought that someone with the
gift of writing should be asked to re-draft the reply.
(After some discussion, it was agreed that Lord Curzon1 should be asked to
re-draft the reply for the consideration of the Council of the principal
Allied and Associated Powers.)
2. Reparation and Responsibilities: Reply to German
Note
M. Clemenceau signed a French translation of
the reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter of May 13th on the subject
of Reparation and Responsibilities.
(The German letter and the reply are contained in Appendix 2A, and
Appendix 2B.)
(It was agreed that the two letters should be published as soon as they
had been sent.)
3. German Views on Peace Terms
Mr. Lloyd George read extracts from views
expressed by Herr Dernburg, German Minister of Finance, on the Peace
Terms, to Colonel Thelwall of the British Mission, Berlin.
4. Committee on New States: Reference to Drafting
committee of Draft Treaty with Poland
Sir Maurice Hankey read a letter from Mr.
Headlam-Morley urging that the Draft Treaty with Poland attached Report
No. 2 of the Committee on New States should be referred to the Drafting
Committee.
(The following was accepted and initialled:—
“It is agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference
should carefully review the draft of a Treaty with Poland
attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States. The
Drafting Committee should suggest any alterations that may seem
to them advisable in order to carry out more effectively the
principles and objects with which this Treaty has been drawn up.
If there are any material alterations which the Drafting
Committee wish to suggest they should confer with the Committee
and render a joint report to the Council of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers.”
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward the resolution to the
Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)
5. Smyrna
Mr. Lloyd George read a telegram from British
G. H. Q., Constantinople, dated May 17th, to the effect that the Greeks
on landing had been fired on by Turkish gendarmes and that firing had
continued all day, the Greeks attacking and killing Turkish soldiers
whenever they were seen. It was further alleged in the telegram that the
wounded were killed and some of them
[Page 734]
thrown into the sea and that the Greek Officers
had made no attempt to restrain their men.
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to bring this to the attention of M.
Venizelos.)
6. The following resolution, carrying out the decision of the previous
day, was initialled by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd
George:—
Reparation: Article 232 of the Treaty With
Germany “The Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers have considered the attached letter from M.
Fromageot2 and have
agreed that the following words ‘during the period of the
belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against
Germany’, which had been omitted from the French text but
retained in the English text of Article 232 of the Treaty of
Peace with Germany, should be re-instated in the French
text.”
M. Orlando, however, pointed out that the
question had been examined by an expert Committee which had voted
unanimously an American proposition in favour of the omission of the
words quoted and the addition of other words at the end of the article.
He asked if this had been in mind when the decision had been taken on
the previous day. He suggested that before a final decision was taken,
the experts should be seen.
President Wilson said he had some vague
recollection of the incident. The proposal had been made by Mr. Dulles,
one of the American lawyers, whose thought had been for United States
citizens on board the Lusitania who, unless some
special provision was made, would get no reparation. From a pecuniary,
though not from a sentimental, point of view, this was a relatively
small matter. Whatever had been the attitude of the experts, however, it
was evident that nothing had got into the Treaty.
M. Orlando pointed out M. Fromageot’s letter
explained that the purpose was to exclude the claims by New States.
Mr. Lloyd George said this was not the case. He
proposed that the decision of the previous day should be adhered to.
M. Orlando reserved his consent, but undertook
to consider the matter with experts.
7. The Bolshevist’s Reply to Dr. Nansen The
Council had before them a copy of the reply by the Bolshevists to Dr.
Nansen’s letter,3 together
with a Memorandum agreed to by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M.
Clémentel, and Professor Attolico,4 with a covering letter from Lord Robert Cecil to
Sir Maurice Hankey.
(Appendix 3.)
[Page 735]
After a prolonged perusal of this document
M. Clemenceau said he did not see how any
change could be made in what the Council had tried to do. There was no
doubt that the Bolshevists were now going down hill. Dr. Nansen had
suggested a humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it
into a political course.
President Wilson said that Lenin’s argument was
that the price the Allied and Associated Powers were trying to exact for
food was that their enemies should beat the Bolshevists by compelling
the latter to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop
aggressive fighting by the Bolshevists, because this was inconsistent
with food distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the
Allies were supporting Koltchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure
on them to stop fighting. Lenin’s argument was that for him to stop
fighting was to sign his death warrant.
M. Clemenceau pointed out that Lenin was not in
the hands of the Allies.
President Wilson replied that if supplies were
stopped, Koltchak and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.
M. Clemenceau said it was impossible to stop
Lenin fighting, and his word could not be trusted.
President Wilson said he did not feel the same
chagrin that he had formerly felt at having no policy in regard to
Russia. It had been impossible to have a policy hitherto.
Mr. Lloyd George said there had been very
little choice. There had been a lunatic revolution which certain
persons, in whom little confidence was felt, were trying to squash. The
only reason why the Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany
from getting supplies. They were, however, now entitled to say, having
supported us so far “you cannot leave us in the lurch.”
President Wilson said that the Americans had
only gone to Siberia to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had
refused to go.
Mr. Lloyd George said that his Government’s
object had been to reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in
doing this, though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to
establish it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent
the Germans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the
blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible now to
leave these people in the lurch.
President Wilson said that at least pledges
could be exacted for further support.
M. Clemenceau fully agreed.
[Page 736]
Mr. Lloyd George agreed, and said it could be
done in either of two ways:—
- (1)
- By a formal dispatch;
- (2)
- By summoning the representatives of the various Russian groups
now in Paris and putting the conditions to them.
President Wilson preferred the first proposal.
The second would be contrary to the idea that had been at the basis of
the Prinkipo scheme, namely, that it would not be fair to hear one party
without hearing the other. His view was that a formal demand and notice
ought to be sent to the various Russian groups. He had himself sent
something that was almost equivalent to this, as he felt he was entitled
to do.
(After some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Philip Kerr5 should be asked to
prepare a draft for the consideration of the Council.)
Mr. Kerr was sent for. While awaiting Mr. Kerr
President Wilson read extracts from a document
which had been alluded to at a discussion on the previous day, signed by
M. Kerensky and some of his friends, and which contained a number of
proposals, including the following:—
- (i)
- That the Powers should only help the various Russian groups on
certain fundamental conditions for the establishing of Russia on
a democratic basis with a constituent assembly, and Governments
which declined to agree should not be supported.
- (ii)
- That as a Constituent Assembly could clearly not be called at
the present time, Regional Assemblies should be elected on a
democratic basis for the re-establishment of Local
Government.
- (iii)
- That a representative mission should be sent by the Great
Powers to Russia to give assurance of sympathy and
assistance.
- (iv)
- That proposals for supplying food were harmful.
These proposals in short, President Wilson continued, were that the
Powers should obtain an assurance from each group that it would be
united with the other groups to form an all Russian Government on a
constituent basis, and that in the meantime each group should do what it
could in its own area.
Mr. Lloyd George was afraid of splitting up
Russia.
President Wilson said it was merely proposing
to substitute a democratic for an autocratic basis.
(After some further discussion Mr. Kerr entered.)
President Wilson informed Mr. Kerr that the
Council desired to make a further effort with Russia along the lines of
definite assurance to the several groups as to what they were aiming at.
They had been reading a document prepared by certain Russian groups in
Paris who, though anti-Bolshevist, were suspicious of reactionary
tendencies among the groups fighting the Bolshevists. These suggested
that pledges should be demanded from the various groups fighting the
[Page 737]
Bolshevists to establish a
government on a democratic basis. In the meanwhile it was proposed to
establish a democratic Government in these Regions by setting up
Provincial Central Assemblies. The idea of the Council was to embody
these demands in a message to the several Governments, and they hoped
Mr. Kerr would prepare a draft for their consideration.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the question
of the Baltic Provinces had not been discussed. All the other Russian
groups fighting the Bolshevists were violently opposed to any
recognition of Esthonia and Latvia and the other Baltic provinces. They
alleged that to recognise them would be to tear up Russia and to bar
access to the sea.
Mr. Kerr asked what promise was to be given to
the various Russian groups to encourage them to give these
undertakings.
Mr. Lloyd George said it was not a question of
promising more, but of continuing the assistance which was now
given.
President Wilson said that the dispatch should
intimate that without satisfactory guarantees no further help would be
given.
Mr. Kerr asked if they were to accept the
frontiers laid down by the League of Nations.
Mr. Lloyd George said they must.
President Wilson said there was no other
solution. He then produced a letter from Mr. Hoover on the subject of
the Baltic Provinces, where there was an appalling shortage of food.
This was due, according to Mr. Hoover, not to lack of financial or
shipping facilities, but to the absence of order. He suggested that
enough naval force should be given to provide for the protection of
relief in the coast towns, and for its distribution along the coast. In
this way the established governments should be helped to preserve order.
The situation was so appalling from the humanitarian point of view, that
he hoped the Council would be willing to hear a deputation composed of
the British and the United States Naval authorities and himself.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that in the first
instance, Mr. Hoover should discuss the matter with the Admirals.
(This was agreed to.)
(Mr. Kerr withdrew with instructions to draft a letter of [for] consideration.)
8. Prisoners of War. Reply to Brockdorff-Rantzan’s
Letter The Council had before it a draft reply prepared by Mr.
Philip Kerr, under instructions from Mr. Lloyd George, to
Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter of May 10th on the subject of prisoners of
War. (Appendix 4.)
(The reply was approved.)
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to ask the Secretary-General to
translate it into French for M. Clemenceau’s signature.)
(It was agreed that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter, together with the reply
should be published after despatch to the Germans).
[Page 738]
9. Reparation. Serbia’s Claims The Council had
before them a letter from the Serbian Delegation6 urging that out of the initial one thousand
million pounds to be paid by Germany, eighty-million pounds should be
specifically assigned to Serbia, together with a Memorandum by the
Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian Treaty,
to whom it had been referred on May 13th.
(The Memorandum of the Committee was approved, subject to the omission of
the first paragraph of Clause 2, and the first four words of the second
paragraph.) (Appendix 5A. and Appendix 5.B.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 20 May, 1919.
Appendix IA to CF–20
German Peace
Delegation,
Versailles,
May 13,
1919.
[The Head of the German
Delegation (Brockdorff-Rantzau) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
Translation of French
Translation of German Original
M. Président: In conformity with my
communication of the 9th instant,7 I
have the honour to present to Your Excellency the Report of the
Economic Commission charged with the study of the effect of the
conditions of Peace on the situation of the German population.
“In the course of the last two generations, Germany has become
transformed from an agricultural State to an industrial State.
As long as she was an agricultural State, Germany could feed
forty million inhabitants.
In her quality of an industrial State she could ensure the
nourishment of a population of sixty seven millions. In 1913,
the importation of food stuffs amounted, in round figures, to
twelve million tons. Before the war a total of fifteen millions
of persons provided for their existence in Germany by foreign
trade and by navigation, either in a direct or an indirect
manner, by the use of foreign raw material.
According to the Conditions of the Treaty of Peace, Germany will
surrender her merchant tonnage and ships in course of
construction suitable for overseas trade. German shipbuilding
yards will build for five years in the first instance tonnage
destined for the Allied and Associated Governments.
Germany will, moreover, renounce her colonies; all her overseas
possessions, all her interests and securities in the Allied and
Associated countries, and in their colonies, Dominions and
protectorates, will as an instalment of the payment for part of
the reparation, be subject to liquidation, and be exposed to any
other economic war measure which the Allied and Associated
Powers think fit to maintain or to take during the years of
peace.
[Page 739]
By the putting into force of the Territorial Clauses of the
Treaty of Peace, Germany would lose to the East the most
important regions for the production of corn and potatoes, which
would be equivalent to the loss of 21% of the total crop of
those articles of food. Moreover, the intensity of our
agricultural production would diminish considerably. On the one
hand, the importation of certain raw material indispensable for
the production of Manure, such as Phosphates, would be hindered,
on the other hand, this industry would suffer like all other
industries from lack of coal. The Treaty of Peace provides for
the loss of almost a third of the production of our coal mines.
Apart from this decrease, we are forced for ten years to deliver
enormous consignments of coal to various Allied countries.
Moreover, in conformity with the Treaty, Germany will concede to
her neighbours nearly three quarters of her mineral production,
and more than three fifths of her zinc production.
After this diminution of her products, after the economic
depression caused by the loss of her Colonies, of her merchant
Fleet, and of her possessions abroad, Germany would not be in a
state to import from abroad a sufficient quantity of raw
material. An enormous part of German industry would therefore
inevitably be condemned to destruction. At the same time, the
necessity of importing food stuffs would increase considerably;
whilst the possibility of satisfying that demand would diminish
in the same proportion.
At the end of a very short time, Germany would, therefore, not be
in a position to give bread and work to her numerous millions of
inhabitants, who would be reduced to earning their livelihood by
navigation and by trade. These persons would have to emigrate,
but that is a material impossibility, all the more so because
many countries and the most important ones will oppose any
German immigration. Moreover, hundreds of millions [thousands] of Germans expelled from the
territories of the Powers now at war with Germany, from the
Colonies and territories which Germany must surrender, will
return to their native land.
The putting into execution of the conditions of Peace would,
therefore, logically bring about the loss of several millions of
persons in Germany. This catastrophe would not be long in coming
about, seeing that the health of the population has been broken
down during the War by the Blockade, and during the Armistice by
the aggravation of the Blockade of famine.
No help, however important, or over however long a period it
might be distributed, would prevent these deaths “en masse”.
Peace would impose on Germany numberless human sacrifices that
this War of four years and a half did not demand of her,
(1,750,000 killed, nearly 1,000,000 dead, victims of the
Blockade).
We do not know, and indeed we doubt, whether the Delegates of the
Allied and Associated Powers realise the inevitable consequences
which will take place if Germany, an industrial State, very
thickly populated, closely bound up with the economic system of
the world and reduced to the obligation to import enormous
quantities of raw material and food stuffs, suddenly finds
herself pushed back in the phase of her development which would
correspond to her economic condition and the numbers of her
population as they were half a century ago.
[Page 740]
Those who will sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of
many millions of German men, women, and children.”
I thought it my duty, before entering upon a discussion of other
details of the Treaty, to bring to the knowledge of the Allied and
Associated Delegations this summary expose of the problem of the
German population.
I have at the disposal of Your Excellency statistical proofs of the
above statements.
I have [etc.]
Appendix I (B) to CF–20
Suggested Reply to German Note on the
Economic Effect of the Peace Treaty
M.166
(Agreed to by the American, British, French and Italian
Representatives)
- 1.
- We have noted the communication of the German Delegation of
May 13th with reference to the studies of its Economic
Commission as to the Treaty of Peace.8 Our
observations upon the communication are as follows:
- 2.
- In general, we would point out that though Germany will lose
territories in which grain, iron ore, coal and the like are
produced, such commodities are not thereby made unavailable for
Germany. The importation of food and materials, which took place
on a large scale before the war, may be expected to continue in
the future.
- 3.
- The German note ignores the great relief to German productive
industry which will be afforded by the reduction of armaments,
and it takes no account of the diminution of German consumption
owing to the transfer of territory with nearly six million
inhabitants.
- 4.
- The gradual transformation of Germany from an agricultural
State to an industrial State has not affected in the past, nor
should its continuance in the future, affect the nourishment of
the population; inasmuch as the products of industry are readily
exchangeable for the products of agriculture. The severance of
agricultural territory which is restored to Poland will not
destroy its productivity like the devastation wrought by the
German armies in the West. Nothing in the Treaty will prevent
the products of these regions from finding a market, as
heretofore, in Germany.
- 5.
- As to the merchant marine and the Germans employed in that and
any coordinate industries, it will be recognized that the
destruction of merchant shipping has created throughout the
world a shortage, and has added to the sufferings of all those
who follow the sea
[Page 741]
as
a means of livelihood. There can be no special consideration
evolved for the seamen of Germany at the expense of the seamen
of the Allied and Associated Nations, who lost their livelihood,
owing to the destruction of a large portion of the world’s
shipping which German methods of warfare brought about; an
amount far in excess of the tonnage which will be transferred
under the terms of peace. The transfer of German ships to Allied
flags will not prevent Germany from carrying on overseas
trade.
- 6.
- The statements pertaining to the production of fertilizers are
apparently founded on a misconception. Phosphate has always been
imported by Germany, and there is no stipulation in the Peace
Treaty which prevents such continued importation. As regards
Coal, it is to be noted that the transferred territories include
important areas of coal consumption as well as of production.
Through the destruction of the coal mines of France, the
shortage throughout the continent of Europe has been needlessly
intensified. The industries of the Allies should not be the
first ones to suffer through such wanton destruction.
- 7.
- The cession of the Briey Basin containing iron ore deposits is
simply a return of these properties to their original owners.
All raw materials, such as iron ore, will naturally seek
industries to which they are essential. No restrictions are
imposed by the Treaty upon Germany’s importation of such
materials.
- 8.
- The world is faced with the necessity of drastic
re-adjustments in industry and the means of livelihood; and it
is obvious that Germany must, like the other countries,
re-adjust itself to changed conditions. When the world’s
shipping tonnage has again become normal, an adequate supply of
raw materials should be available to all countries, including
Germany.
- 9.
- In the framing of the Treaty of Peace, there has been no
intention, on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments,
to destroy Germany’s economic life. On the contrary, the
necessity for a return to more normal economic conditions has
been borne constantly in mind. For example, the Reparations
Commission is, in various clauses, charged with specific
instructions to this end.
- 10.
- The wholesale sacrifice of life and health, and the wanton
devastation of territory and the destruction of wealth which
have marked this war are bound for many years to impose enormous
burdens on the Nations of the world. These burdens are not
created or aggravated by the conditions of Peace nor could any
conditions be drafted which would remove them. The Treaty
certainly does not impose an excessive share of these burdens on
Germany. Germany will, moreover, find new resources by reason of
the fact that millions
[Page 742]
of her citizens, who up to now have been employed in military
affairs, or in preparation for war, can now turn their whole
activities to works of Peace.
Appendix II (A) to CF–20
[The German note of May 13, 1919, is printed as appendix II to CF–19,
page 727.]
Appendix II (B) to CF–20
Reply to Principal German
Plenipotentiary, Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers
Sir: In your note of May 13th9 you state that Germany, while accepting in
November 1918 ‘the obligation to make reparation’ did not understand
such an acceptance to mean that her responsibility was involved
either for the war or for the acts of the former German
Government.
It is only possible to conceive of such an obligation if its origin
and cause is the responsibility of the author of the damage.
You add that the German people would never have undertaken a war of
aggression. Yet, in the note from Mr. Secretary of State Lansing of
November 5th, 1918, which you approve of and adduce in favour of
your contention, it is stated that the obligation to make reparation
arises out of ‘Germany’s aggression by land, sea and air.’
As the German Government did not at the time make any protest against
this allegation, it thereby recognised it as well-founded.
Therefore Germany recognised in 1918 implicitly but clearly, both the
aggression and her responsibility.
It is too late to seek to deny them to-day. It would be impossible
you state further that the German people should be regarded as the
accomplices of the faults committed by the ‘former German
Government’. However, Germany has never claimed and such a
declaration would have been contrary to all principles of
international law that a modification of its political regime or a
change in the governing personalities would be sufficient to
extinguish an obligation already undertaken by any nation.
She did not act upon the principle she now contends for either in
1871 as regards France, after the proclamation of the Republic, nor
in 1917 in regard to Russia after the revolution which abolished the
Tsarist régime.
[Page 743]
Finally, you ask that the report of the Commission on Responsibility
may be communicated to you. In reply, we beg to say that the Allied
and Associated Powers consider the reports of the Commissions set up
by the Peace Conference as documents of an internal character which
cannot be transmitted to you.
Appendix III to CF–20
British
Delegation,
Paris, May 16,
1919.
feeding of russia
M.163
Copy of Letter From Lord Robert Cecil
to Sir Maurice Hankey
My Dear Hankey: When the Nansen scheme was
first started, I understand that Hoover, Clémentel, an Italian and I
were appointed as a Committee to advise the Supreme Council as to
the steps to be taken in connection therewith.
Yesterday Mr. Hoover brought to me the reply that Lenin has sent to
the Nansen letter, and suggested that we should take some action
upon it. I enclose a copy of Lenin’s reply.
Accordingly, a meeting was held today in the Astoria, attended by Mr.
Hoover, Professor Attolico and myself. Monsieur Clémentel was
invited but was prevented from coming. At that meeting it was agreed
that Mr. Hoover should send immediately the following reply to
Nansen’s question at the end of the Lenin telegram:—
“Please inform Nansen that until whole matter has been given
further consideration by the Governments here we consider it
extremely inadvisable to arrange any meeting with Bolshevik
representatives.”
We further agreed upon the memorandum of which I also send you a
copy. Will you please inform the Supreme Council.
Yours very sincerely,
[Enclosure 1—Telegram]
[The Representative at Copenhagen of the
American Relief Administration (Swenson) to
the Commission to Negotiate
Peace]
Copenhagen, May 14, 1919.
Reed. Paris 10 a.m., 15.
Ammission, Paris.
Crab 104, May 14th. For
Hoover.
[Page 744]
Following telegram10 was received by wireless through Swedish station to
Mr. Friduof Nansen:
“Sir: Your very kind message of April 17th10a containing your exchange of
letters with the Council of Four reached us only on May 4 by
way of the Nas Wireless Station and was at once given to the
People’s Commissariat of Social Welfare for thorough
examination. Wish in the name of the Russian Soviet
Government to convey to you our heartiest thanks for the
warm interest you manifest in the well-being of the Russian
people. Great are indeed the suffering and privations
inflicted upon the Russian people by the inhuman blockade of
the Associated and so-called Neutral Powers and by the
incessant wars forced upon it against its will. If left in
peace and allowed free development Soviet Russia would soon
be able to restore her national production, to regain her
economic strength, to provide for her own needs and to be
helpful to other countries. But in the present situation in
which she has been put by the implacable policy of the
Associated Powers help in foodstuffs from abroad would be
most welcome to Russia, and the Russian Soviet Government
appreciates most thankfully your human[e] and heartfelt
response to her sufferings, and considering the universal
respect surrounding your person will be especially glad to
enter into communication with you for the realisation of
your schemes of help which you emphasise as being purely
humanitarian. On this basis of humanitarian work or help to
suffering people we would be disposed to do everything in
our power to further the realisation of your project.
Unfortunately your benevolent intentions which you indicate
yourself as being based upon purely humanitarian grounds and
which according to your letter must be realised by a
commission of fully non-political character have been mixed
up by others with political purposes. In the letter
addressed to you by the Four Powers your scheme is
represented as involving cessation of hostilities and of
transfer of troops and war material. We regret very much
that your original intentions have thus been fundamentally
disfigured by the government[s] of the Associated Powers. We
need not explain to you that military operation[s] which
obviously have in view to change external or internal
conditions of the involved countries belong wholly to the
domain of politics and that likewise cessation of
hostilities which means preventing the belligerent who has
every reason to expect successes from obtaining them is also
a purely political act. Thus your sincerely charitable
intentions have been misused by others in order to cover
such purposes which are obviously political with the
semblance of an action originally humanitarian only. Being
ready to lend every assistance to your scheme so far as it
bears the character you have ascribed to it in your letter
we at the same time do not wish to be the objects of foul
play, and knowing that you like ourselves mean business and
wish really to attain the proposed, we would like to ask
whether this incantation [intermixture?] of heterogeneous purposes has been
finally adopted by yourself. We expect that we will be able
to make it clear to you that in order to realise our [your?] intentions this interpretation
[Page 745]
must be
carefully avoided. You are no doubt aware that the cessation
of the wars upon the Russian people is likewise the object
of our most warm desires and it must be known to you that we
have many times proposed to the Associated Governments to
enter into negotiations in order to put an end to the
present bloodshed and that we have even agreed to take part
at the Conference at Prinkipo notwithstanding the extremely
unfavourable conditions proposed to us and also that we were
the only party to accept it. [We] responded in the same
peace loving sense to overtures made by one of the Great
Powers. The Prinkipo Conference was frustrated not by us but
by our adversaries, the protégées of the Associated Powers,
the counterrevolutionary governments of Koltchak, Denikin
and the others. These are the Thislu [tools?] with the help of which the Entente
Governments are making war upon us and are endeavouring to
obtain our destruction and wherever they are victorious
their victory means the triumph of the most extreme
barbarity and bestiality, streams of blood and untold
sufferings for the labouring masses [, domination] of the
wildest reaction. Koltchak from the East, Denikin from the
South, the Roumanian Feudris [feudals], the Polish and Finnish most reactionary
militarists, the German Barons and Esthonian white guards
from the West and Russian white guard bands from the north,
these are the enemies whom the Entente Governments mob [move?] against Soviet Russia and
against whom as against Entente troops we are carrying on a
desperate struggle with ever-growing success. The so-called
Governments of Koltchak and Denikin are purely monarchical,
all power belongs there to the wildest adherents of Tsarism,
extreme Tsarist papers are in every way imported [supported?] by them. Tsarist hymns
are constantly sung [at] their ceremonies. The so-called
constitution of Koltchak is in reality monarchical; among
their soldiers they distribute only Tsarist literature,
under the domination of Denikin the adherents of
Constitutional government of the people are persecuted and
under the domination of Koltchak the adherents of the
constituent assembly are imprisoned or shot. Program [Pogrom]-making literature is being
widely distributed by these so-called governments and
whenever Jews come under their domination they are the
object of the most horrible bestialities. In the West the
Polish legionaries and the troops of the Ukrainian counter
revolutionary Petliura who are both supported and even
directed by Entente officers have perpetrated such massacres
of Jews which by far surpass the most horrible misdeeds of
the black hundred of old Tsarism. As the Russian Red Cross
in its appeal to the International Red Cross on April 28
states whole villages, whole towns were turned the Russian
[sic] neither sex nor age was
spared and in numerous places the whole Jewish population
was literally wiped out by these troops headed by Entente
Generals and officers. The [In the?]
realm of Koltchak and Denikin everything that was gained by
the peasants through the revolution is being taken back from
them. Koltchak declares solemn manifestoes that peasants
must not have possession [of] land taken by force from the
nobility. He orders in his decrees that the seizure of the
land of the gentry by the peasants should be prosecuted as a
serious crime and brushes [crushes]
the resistance of the peasants by wholesale massacres during
which [in some] parts
[Page 746]
of Siberia many thousands of peasants
were killed en masse. For the workers this domination means
every possible persecution, oppression, wholesale arrests,
and [in] many cases wholesale shootings, so that in some
towns the workers were simply wiped out by the enraged
ex-Tsarist officers who are [at] the head of Koltchak’s
troops. The horrors perpetrated by these Koltchak officers
defy description, and their victims are innumerable
including all that is progressive, all that is free thinking
in Siberia. Inebriated officers are torturing, flogging,
tormenting in every way the unfortunate labouring population
under their domination and to be a worker is to be
predestined to be the object of their brutalities. These are
the adversaries owing to [against]
whom we are engaged in a desperate struggle and whom the
Associated Governments are in every way supporting,
providing them with war material, foodstuffs, financial
help, military commanders and political advisers and on the
north and east fronts sending their own troops to help them.
In the hands of these barbarous bandits Entente rifles and
Entente cannons are sending death to the Russian workers and
peasants struggling for their life and liberty. The same
Entente Governments are the real source of the military
supplies with the help of which our Polish Roumanian Finnish
and other adversaries from the west are uninterrupted by
[uninter-ruptedly?] attacking us
and it was officially declared in the French Chamber of
Deputies and in the British House of Commons that the policy
of the Entente is now to send against Soviet Russia the
armies of these nationalities. An American radio of May 8
[6?], sent from Lyons says most
emphatically that the Entente encourages the movement of the
troops raised by the Russian counter revolutionary General
Youdenitch which presumably threatens Petrograd that the
Entente expects that the Bolsheviki will be forced to
withdraw to Moscow and that the Associated Governments
[intend in connection herewith to bind (abandon) your plan of revictualling Russia. While
declaring they have abandoned the idea of intervention the
Associated Governments]11
are in reality carrying on the most reckless interventions
policy and even the American Government, despite all the
statements to the contrary published in the American Press,
seems at present to be wholly dominated by implacable
hostility of the Clemenceau Ministry against Soviet Russia.
This being the case we are in a position to discuss
cessation of hostilities only if we discuss the whole
problem of our relations to our adversaries, that is in the
first place to the Associated Governments. That means to
discuss peace and to open real negotiations bearing upon the
true reasons of the war waged upon us and upon those
conditions that can bring us lasting peace. We were always
ready to enter into peace negotiations and we are ready to
do it now as before and we will be glad to begin discussing
these questions but of course directly with the other
belligerents, that is with the Associated Governments or
else with the persons empowered by the latter. But it is of
course impossible for us to make any concessions referring
to these fundamental problems of our existence under the
disguise of a presumably humanitarian work. This latter must
remain purely humanitarian
[Page 747]
and nonpolitical and we will welcome
every proposal from your side made to us in the spirit of
your letter sent by you to the Council of Four on April
3rd.11a [To] these wholly nonpolitical
proposals we respond most gladly, we thank you most heartily
for your good intentions, we are ready to give you every
possibility of controlling the realisation [of] such
humanitarian scheme, we will of course cover all the
expenses of this work and the cost of the foodstuffs and we
can pay if you desire by Russian goods. But seeing that your
original plan has been so unfortunately disfigured and
considering that the most complete and difficult questions
that have been created must first be thoroughly elucidated,
we would suggest that vou take the necessary steps to enable
delegates of our Government to meet you and your
collaborators abroad and to discuss these questions and we
asked you kindly to indicate the time and place for this
conference between our delegates and the leaders of your
commission and what guarantees can be obtained for the free
passage of our delegates through countries influenced by the
Entente. Signed People’s Commissary for Foreign Affairs,
Tchitcherin.[”]
Nansen adds “Please tell Hoover that I intend to meet Lenin’s
delegates perhaps Stockholm but shall be glad to hear Hoover’s
opinion soon as possible.”
[Enclosure 2]
[Memorandum on the Nansen Proposal]
Lenin’s reply to Nansen really amounts to this:
“I shall be very glad to accept supplies but not to cease
from fighting, though I would be prepared to enter into
negotiations for a general Russian peace.”
It is now for the Associated Governments to take the next step, and
before deciding what that step should be they must make up their
minds what is to be their policy in Russia.
It seems to me they have two courses open to them: They may either
decide that so long as the Bolshevik Government is in power there is
no hope for Russian peace, and that therefore the first thing to do
is to smash the Bolshevists. If this is to be their line they must
strain every nerve to support Koltchak, Denikin, the Letts, the
Esthonians, the Poles, and even the Finns in attacking Russia. They
must furnish them with supplies and money and instructors, and do
everything to make their coming campaign against the Bolsheviks
successful. They must also break off all relations direct and
indirect with the Bolsheviks, and advise Nansen to say that in view
of Lenin’s response his scheme for relief is at an end, and that
nothing further of that sort can be looked for by the Russian
Government. That is one policy. It may be the
[Page 748]
right one, but it undoubtedly involves
much further bloodshed and destruction of material wealth.
The other policy would be to ask the military authorities to define
as nearly as they can what is the position of the various forces
fighting in Russia. As soon as the line dividing the combatants has
thus been determined, each and all of them should be admonished to
retire, say, 10 kilometres on their own side of the line, and to
refrain from all future hostilities. They would be told that
international commissaries would be sent to the various fronts to
see that these directions were obeyed. If, and so far as, they were
obeyed, the Associated Powers would do their utmost to supply to the
various Governments concerned food and clothing and other
necessaries. If some refuse and some accept, those who accept should
be supported. Those who refused would be deprived of all assistance.
The Governments should further be informed that the Associated
Powers or the Council of the League of Nations would immediately
take into consideration the whole Russian problem. Their first step
would be to call upon all sections of the Russian people, or any
part of them who express their adherence to this policy to elect by
free and universal suffrage, under the supervision of the League of
Nations, a constituent assembly for the purpose of determining the
future constitution of the Russian Government. In the meantime
Nansen would be advised to say that so long as the Soviet Government
declined to abstain from fighting he was powerless to help them.
This policy is in accordance with the general principle underlying
the Covenant of the League of Nations—namely, that national
grievances must not be settled by a resort to arms unless every
other possible means of settling them has been first tried. It does
not in any way prejudge the rights of any Russian quarrels, but it
proceeds upon the principle that in any case peace is to the
interest of all concerned.
I believe that either of these policies has a fair chance of success,
and may be defended by powerful arguments. What is not defensible is
a combination of the two: a suggestion that Lenin must cease
fighting while we are supplying arms and equipment to Denikin and
Koltchak; or, conversely, that Koltchak and Denikin should be
encouraged to wage war against Lenin while we are negotiating with
the latter to give him economic assistance. Compromises of this kind
can only lead to a prolongation of hostilities in Russia, and the
spreading in that country of the belief that the Associated Powers
cannot be trusted.
May 16, 1919.
[Page 749]
Appendix IV to CF–20
prisoners of war
Copy of Reply Approved by Council
of Principal Allied and Associated Powers to Letter From Herr
Brockdorff-Rantzau Dated 10 May, 1919
(See WCP 783)
Sir: The representatives of the Allied and
Associated Powers have given consideration to the note of the German
Peace Delegation dated 10th May 191912 in regard to the repatriation of the German
prisoners of war. In reply they wish to state that they cannot agree
that prisoners of war and civilian prisoners who have been guilty of
crimes or penal offences should be released. These crimes and penal
offences have been committed on Allied soil and have been dealt with
by the legally constituted authorities without reference to the fact
that the wrongdoer was a German rather than an Allied citizen. For
instance a certain German prisoner broke at night into the house of
a farmer on whose estate he was set to work and murdered the farmer
and his wife in cold blood with a bill-hook. For this double murder
the said prisoner was sentenced to death on June 11th 1919, by a
regularly constituted court martial. Under the Berne
Convention,13 however, the
execution of the sentence is suspended until peace has been signed.
Justice would certainly not be satisfied if, as a consequence of the
Treaty, this murderer were reprieved. For these reasons the Allied
and Associated Powers cannot agree to alter the provisions of the
Draft Treaty in respect of prisoners of war who have been guilty of
crimes or penal offences.
In regard to the second question, the German Peace Delegation makes
no specific suggestions as to the alleviation which they would
propose for the prisoners of war and interned civilians between the
date of the signing of peace and their repatriation. The Allied and
Associated Powers are not aware of what alleviation it is possible
to make seeing that they have scrupulously endeavoured to observe
both the laws of war and the dictates of humanity in the treatment
which they have given to prisoners of war, and that as provided in
the last section of article 218 it is essential that prisoners of
war and interned civilians should remain subject to discipline and
control pending their repatriation in the interests of all
concerned. The German Peace
[Page 750]
Delegation may rest assured that it is the intention of the
Allied and Associated Powers to treat their prisoners of war during
the period between the signing of peace and repatriation with full
consideration of their feelings and their needs.
The restitution of personal property to prisoners of war constitutes
a legal right which the Allied and Associated Powers have every
intention of respecting. As regards information about the missing
the Allied and Associated Powers have always endeavoured to supply
the German Government with all information in their possession on
this subject and they will certainly continue to do so after peace
is signed. Concerning the care of graves they would point out that
articles 225 and 226 would appear to assure to the German people
that the graves of their fellow citizens shall be both respected and
properly maintained and that so far as is practicable under clause
225 the bodies of their soldiers and sailors may be transferred to
their own country.
In regard to the German request for complete reciprocity the
representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have to state
that they felt it necessary to include Article 222 in view of the
treatment which their own nationals have received while interned in
Germany during the war. As there was no parallel between the
treatment which was accorded to prisoners of war by the German
Government on the one side and the Allied and Associated Powers on
the other no claim for reciprocity in this respect can arise.
In regard to the third question, the representatives of the Allied
and Associated Powers are ready to do everything possible to
repatriate German prisoners of war and interned civilians properly
fed and in good condition after the conclusion of peace. They
regret, however, that the pressing demands upon them from
territories recently liberated from the German yoke as well as from
their own nationals will probably make it impossible for them to
supply the prisoners of war with the clothing etc., for which the
German Peace Delegation asks.
Finally in regard to the appointment of a Commission to deal with the
repatriation of prisoners of war, the representatives of the Allied
and Associated Powers will be glad to set up such Commissions
immediately upon the signature of peace. They regret, however, that
they do not see their way to appoint them until they are notified of
the intention of the plenipotentiaries of the German Empire to sign
peace.
[Page 751]
Appendix V A to CF–20
Memorandum on the Request of the
Serbian Delegation Enclosed in Sir Maurice Hankey’s Letter of
May 15 [11], 1919
The suggestion of the Serbian Delegation that, out of the initial
£1,000,000,000, 2 milliards of Francs or £80,000,000, should be
specifically assigned to Serbia, seems to us, in that form,
inadmissible.
- 1)
- There is no reason to think that the total of the Serbian
claims bear such a proportion to the total of the claims ranking
against Germany and likely to be accepted by the Commission,
even if the fact that Serbia gains large territories at the
expense of Austria is not treated as ground for a reduction of
her claims.
- 2)
- [There is not in the case of Serbia the special ground, which
existed in the case of Belgium, that the damages inflicted on
her were caused in a war which was specially a violation of her
international status as well as generally aggressive and
accompanied by inhuman conduct.
On the other hand]* we think
that Serbia’s claim to prompt and even generous assistance is
strong. Her population has been left in great distress; her country
was thoroughly pillaged by processes equally methodical and
merciless; and the resumption of her agricultural industry is half
paralysed by lack of live stock, of agricultural implements and of
means of transport by road and rail. The difficulty is to find a
practical relief for her.
Serbia has many partners in this condition of urgent need. It is
probable that, on the one hand, the rate at which her injuries can
be repaired is slow, since so much of it is damage to buildings,
while, on the other, a relatively small amount of aid, if given in
the right form and very promptly—such as rolling stock, agricultural
implements, tools and breeding stock—would quickly produce extensive
benefit.
Apart from the specific share of these things, which may be assigned
to her out of the reparation in specie that can be obtained from
Austria, from Hungary and from Bulgaria, the only thing that can be
done is an immediate creation of credit by an immediate promise of a
defined amount from the first sums realised out of the German
reparation. Live stock and agricultural implements are hard to buy:
the available quantity is small and the purchases are many and are
pressing, but if Serbia is given money or the means of getting
money, she must take her share with the rest and buy what she can.
The British, French and Italian representatives suggest a promise of
£5,000,000 forthwith or of £1,000,000 every three months for fifteen
months, and the representatives of the United States of America now
assent to this proposal.
[Page 752]
Appendix V B to CF–20
Peace
Conference, Secretariat General, Quai d’Orsay,
Paris, 11 May, 1919.
serbian claims for one-tenth of
total sum of first instalment of reparation demanded from
germany
Translation
The Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference has the honour to
transmit herewith to the Secretariat-General of the British
Delegation, for urgent communication to Mr. Lloyd George, copy of a
letter addressed by Mr. Pachitch to M. Clemenceau and requesting
that two milliards out of the twenty milliards required from Germany
as an instalment in respect of Reparation for damage should be
allotted to Serbia.
The Secretariat General of the British
Delegation.
[Enclosure]
Delegation of
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the Peace
Conference,
Paris, May 9,
1919.
Translation
Mr. President: As no other country has
suffered more than Serbia during the war which has so happily
terminated, and no other country has received so small a measure of
relief, our people finds itself in the greatest degree deprived of
all means of recovery, and even of existence. Moreover, the Germans
and Austro-Hungarians have regarded as an enemy country not only
Serbia, properly speaking, but also all the provinces of the former
Hapsburg Monarchy, which are inhabited by our racial kinsmen,
especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Smyrna [Slovenia?] and have behaved accordingly
towards their inhabitants. The definite ruin of our unfortunate
country was, however, only completed on the day when Marshal
Mackensen invaded it at the head of German troops in October, 1915.
In Serbia the enemy not only carried off or destroyed all privately
owned instruments of production, but likewise destroyed all means of
communication and all elements indispensable for the restoration of
economic life. Serbia finds herself absolutely incapable of resuming
her economic activity in default of means of communication and of
the necessary instruments. Our Delegates on the Reparation
Commission urged this point in the most pressing manner and handed
in lists of objects of first necessity. They had previously asked
that we should be authorised to recover in Germany, Austria, Hungary
and Bulgaria, the live
[Page 753]
stock, the instruments of production, the tools and means of
communication which had been removed by the enemy
from our country. The Germans, more especially during their
retreat, relentlessly seized the livestock and carried it off;
it was their army which destroyed the means of
communication.
Our request on this point was not met and it thus comes about that
the Germans are returning to their Allies Serbian
livestock in compensation for the livestock removed, and
that certain Serbian dealers are repurchasing in Bulgaria Serbian livestock at exorbitant prices.
While bringing this situation to the notice of the Supreme Council of
the Allies, we pray that it may receive their most favourable
consideration. We think that there is no exaggeration in the idea
that it would be just and equitable that, out of the twenty
milliards which Germany will have to hand to the Allies as an
instalment of Reparation for damage, two milliards should be
allotted to us for the immediate reconstruction of our country and
especially for the purchase of livestock, instruments of production,
tools and means of communication.
We beg leave once more to insist on the point that it is the Germans who have been the principal authors of
the destruction of our railways and of our ways of communication, as
well as of the pillage of our livestock and provisions. Throughout
the occupation of our country special German trains, “loot trains”
(Beutezüge) carried off from our country
everything which the German army had removed both from public and
private properties. The Austro-Hungarians and the Bulgarians did
likewise.
We therefore have the honour to beg the Supreme Council of the
Allies, over which your Excellency presides with so great a spirit
of solidarity, to be so good as to right this injustice and
guarantee to Serbia without delay two milliards in respect of
Reparation for damage, and thus enable her to resume her economic
life, failing which our country can only look forward to a gloomy
future.
