Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/19
CF–19
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 19, 1919, at 4 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- President Wilson.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Italy
- M. Sonnino.
- United States of America
| Count Aldrovandi | } | Secretaries. |
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. | ||
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. | ||
M. Venizelos was introduced.
1. The Italian Landings on the Coast of Asia Minor President Wilson drew attention of M. Sonnino to the memorandum handed to M. Orlando on May 17th (C. F. 17. Appendix).1 He said that what concerned the Council was that the landings seemed to have taken place without any justification.
Baron Sonnino handed round the text of a reply prepared by the Italian Delegation (Appendix I.) He doubted if the presence of M. Venizelos would be found helpful. He did not feel justified in assenting to his presence when the communication had been made to M. Orlando, especially in the absence of the latter.
(M. Venizelos then offered to withdraw and left the room).
President Wilson said he did not quite understand Baron Sonnino’s attitude. M. Venizelos was a member of the Peace Conference and equal with all the other members.
Baron Sonnino said he was not speaking in his own name, but for the President of the Council who was ill. He did not feel justified in agreeing to another party who had not been present when the memorandum was handed to M. Orlando taking part in its general discussion. He felt it was not quite fair, either to himself or to the Italian Delegation, more especially as M. Venizelos had a particular interest in all these questions.
President Wilson asked if it was because M. Venizelos was not interested that he should not be present.
[Page 717]Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that because he was an interested party, Baron Sonnino took this view.
Baron Sonnino said he knew very little of the circumstances in which the memorandum had been presented to M. Orlando. He could not understand why it should be discussed in the presence of a fifth party. The Italian Delegation had not been particularly asked to be present to discuss the sending of Greek soldiers to Smyrna.
Mr. Lloyd George said that not a single Greek soldier had left for Smyrna until the Italian Delegation had been consulted.
Baron Sonnino said that M. Venizelos had been invited to send the troops on May 6th.
President Wilson pointed out that the Italian Delegation at that time was not in Paris.
Baron Sonnino said that the Italian Delegation had had a general discussion earlier in the Peace Conference with the Greeks on this subject but it had been suspended pending the discussion of larger questions, including the Adriatic and mandates in Turkey, etc.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the reason for the decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna was that the Greeks were being massacred in that region. He, himself, had received a letter from a British merchant at Smyrna reporting massacres of Greeks. There were two or three hundred thousand Greek inhabitants at Smyrna and it had been necessary to provide some protection. This reason did not apply to the Italian landing at Scala Nuova as there were no Italians there.
M. Clemenceau said that he had had to make an exhaustive enquiry as to why a single Company of French troops had been landed at Heraclea. This landing had not been ordered from Paris and nothing had been known of it there. It had, as a matter of fact, been ordered at the request of the Turks by the Local French Command at Constantinople, the reason being that coal was wanted at Constantinople and owing to disturbances at Heraclea, it was not arriving. He declared that he was prepared to withdraw this single Company if the Conference demanded that he should.
President Wilson said that the memorandum handed by Baron Sonnino did not explain why 2,000 Italian troops had been landed at Scala Nuova.
Baron Sonnino said that there had been troubles in this district: for example, when the Greeks landed at Smyrna, there had been murders and massacres by the Greeks. In 1917, not only Scala Nuova but even Smyrna had been attributed to Italy. The question was still under discussion when the Greek landing was authorised.
Mr. Lloyd George said that Smyrna was not attributed to Italy by the Treaty of London.
Baron Sonnino pointed out that under Article 9 of the Treaty of London, it was recognised in a general mamier that in the event of [Page 718] the total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, Italy should obtain an equitable part in the Mediterranean region in the neighborhood of the province of Adalia.
Mr. Lloyd George said that Italy had shown no anxiety during the war to occupy any part of Turkey, neither Smyrna nor Budrum, nor Scala Nuova. At that time such action on their part would have been very welcome.
M. Sonnino said Italy had offered troops for the Turkish theatre several times.
Mr. Lloyd George said they were only Abyssinian troops, and then only about 1,000, when 200,000 to 300,000 were wanted to fight Turkey.
M. Sonnino said that Italy had her hands full fighting Austria.
President Wilson said he must respectfully remind M. Sonnino that this was not a conversation merely between Allies. The United States had a right to a place there, and further had a right to ask questions, regardless of the Treaty of London. This Treaty did not provide an effective reason why troops should be disembarked on the mainland, or why these places should be occupied.
M. Sonnino said that at Adalia there had been disorders amounting to anarchy.
President Wilson asked if the landings at Scala Nuova, Makri and Budrum had been due to the same cause.
M. Sonnino said there had been disorders at Makri; Marmaris had been occupied because it was necessary to keep ships off the coast of Adalia and Marmaris was the only place at which they could lie in all weather. These landings did not compromise the final territorial decisions.
President Wilson said that although it might not be the Italians’ intention to prejudice the decision by this action, in fact it was prejudiced.
M. Sonnino said it was necessary to avoid disorder. At Smyrna there had been disorder, and he was informed the Greeks had gone to Aidin. That was not in accordance with the recent decision.
M. Clemenceau said they had asked permission to go there, and that was why M. Venizelos was present.
President Wilson said that he and his colleagues had deemed it only courteous to M. Sonnino to invite him to be present when the question was discussed of giving a more extended region of occupation to the Greek troops.
M. Sonnino said that in the present discussion he would have preferred that M. Venizelos should not be present. The Italian Delegation had had discussions with M. Venizelos, and M. Venizelos had published what had occurred in the newspapers. The discussions had then been suspended pending the consideration of larger problems.
[Page 719]Mr. Lloyd George said that M. Venizelos had taken no action without the consent of the Council of Four. If Italy preferred to depend upon her own action she could not expect to take part in the discussions of the Council. As far as he was concerned, unless Italy removed her troops, he would take no further part in the discussion of the Italian claims in Asia Minor. The Italian action was a direct defiance of the Council. It had been done in a way that he did not like to describe. A discussion had actually been in progress with Italy, and the question of Scala Nuova had not been decided. He could not imagine anything more insulting to the Council than this action.
M. Sonnino pointed out that in 1917 Smyrna had been attributed to Italy.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that this had been subject to the consent of Russia. Russia, however, had never given her consent, and had gone out of the war. Then the United States of America came in, and the whole situation changed. Mr. Balfour had stated this in writing to the Italian Government.
M. Sonnino said that the French Government had stated that the 1917 agreement held good.
M. Clemenceau said that M. Pichon had never told him so. He had not been consulted.
M. Sonnino said that he recognised that the United States was not bound, but Article 9 of the Treaty of London clearly spoke of the regions round Adalia being attributed to Italy and it was in these regions that the landings had taken place.
President Wilson thought that Italy had taken a very wide interpretation of the phrase. He was sure his British and French colleagues would understand it when he said that the United States did not recognise their right to hand over Turkish populations to Italy. This was a world settlement, and all were partners in it.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the British and French Governments had agreed that the portion of the Turkish Empire for which it had been proposed that they should have mandates should be visited by a Commission. He asked if M. Sonnino was willing that this should apply also to Adalia.
M. Sonnino said that Italy had put no boundary excluding the Commission from Asia Minor.
Mr. Lloyd George said that this was a very important declaration.
President Wilson asked M. Sonnino if it would not be the right thing for Italy to withdraw from Scala Nuova.
M. Sonnino pointed out that there had been massacres at Smyrna, which was not far away.
President Wilson said that M. Sonnino had not even alleged massacres at Scala Nuova, Makri or Budrum.
[Page 720]M. Sonnino said there had been disorders at Makri and very serious disorders at Adalia, amounting to anarchy.
Mr. Lloyd George asked by what right Italy intervened.
M. Sonnino said that the Italians were established at Ehodes.
President Wilson pointed out that Rhodes had not been ceded to Italy.
M. Sonnino said that the Italians had been at Rhodes ever since the war with Turkey. They had been discussing the question of the Dodecanese with the Greeks, but these islands were provisionally occupied. No ill consequences had come from any of these landings, and no person had been hurt. Why, he asked, did the Council want Italy to withdraw their troops. The Italian Government had to consider public opinion in Italy, and there would be very serious agitation if this action was taken. There was no particular object in it. Surely it was not desired to do harm to Italy.
President Wilson said he had only asked for an explanation. He accepted what M. Sonnino had said about disorders at Adalia, but there had not been any serious disorders elsewhere.
M. Sonnino said that in order to retain Adalia, ships were necessary, and this explained the occupation of Marmaris.
Mr. Lloyd George asked what was the reason for the landing at Scala Nuova.
M. Sonnino said that no one had been hurt there.
Mr. Lloyd George asked if this meant that any power could occupy any place without the consent of the Allies.
M. Sonnino said that the United States of America was free to do so, but that Great Britain and France had entered into certain agreements.
Mr. Lloyd George said that Scala Nuova was not included in any binding agreement.
M. Sonnino referred to the agreement of 1917.
Mr. Lloyd George said that in his conversation at St. Jean de Mau-rienne he had made it quite clear to M. Sonnino that the agreement depended on Italy making an effort in Turkey.
M. Sonnino said that Italy had put everything she had into this war—every dollar and every man—and no country had suffered greater strain. The troops had had to be put however, where the pressure was greatest.
President Wilson said that he was not in any way reproaching M. Sonnino.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he was not, either. He had, however, repeatedly pressed on M. Sonnino at St. Jean de Maurienne that this agreement depended upon a great effort being made for the defeat of Turkey.
[Page 721]President Wilson said that the object of all was to occupy a position of common counsel. To hear that Italy, without a word to anyone, had landed troops in Asia Minor had been very disconcerting.
Mr. Lloyd George said that this was more especially the case as it was obviously done in order to peg out a claim. M. Venizelos had been told that he must not land Greek troops at Scala Nuova, because the question was sub judice. The Italians had done this without saying a word to people who were in the same room with him. He knew what would be said about a man of business who did such a thing.
(M. Venizelos was introduced.)
2. Condition of Greek Occupation of Smyrna Vilayet President Wilson told M. Venizelos that the Council wished to discuss with him the suggestions he had sent to Mr. Lloyd George for a more extended occupation in the Smyrna Vilayet.
M. Venizelos, misunderstanding the question, com-vifayet menced a historical dissertation on the Greek claims in Asia Minor, in the course of which he was interrupted by Mr. Lloyd George, who said it was rather the immediate action by Greece that it was proposed to discuss.
President Wilson said he understood there were two questions: (1) the sending of Greek troops to any part of the Aidin Vilayet, and, (2), the use of the Smyrna-Aidin railway.
M. Venizelos said that apart from the First Greek Division that had been sent to Smyrna, he had now ordered two more regiments as well as 500 gendarmes. He had done this because the Turks had commenced a sort of strike on the occasion of the Greek landing, and there had been no organised forces to keep order. The gendarmes had been sent to keep order in the town. The Greek Commanding Officer now had, he thought, enough men to spare some troops to go up country. He could send them, if necessary, to the Headquarters of the various Sand-jaks. At the moment when he had gone to the Council a despatch was being decyphered to the effect that the Turks had hoisted the Greek flag, and fiad asked for troops to be sent up country. He did not claim that this showed the Turks were enthusiastic about the Greek occupation.
Mr. Lloyd George asked if there had been any disturbances inland.
M. Venizelos said he had no information on the subject. The original disturbance at Smyrna had been partly due to the strike of Turkish officials, and partly to the opening of the prisons, after which there had been some looting. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that at the present moment the Turks were responsible for preserving order inland. He had not ordered any troops to Aidin, but he had no information as to whether troops had gone there.
M. Clemenceau asked him if he was sure he had not ordered troops to Aidin.
[Page 722]M. Venizelos said he had given general orders to the Greek Commanding Officer to send troops wherever it was necessary for the occupation of localities where disorder occurred. Consequently, he could not say for certain whether Greek troops had been sent. However, it took twelve hours to reach Aidin, and he thought it unlikely that they would have been sent without his hearing. His instructions had been that no troops were to be sent where there was any risk of their encountering Italian troops. He wished to say expressly that towards the South the furthest point to which he wished to send troops was Aidin. He did not wish to send any South or East of that point. He had no knowledge of any Greek troops outside the Smyrna district.
President Wilson asked whether M. Venizelos did not think it best in all the circumstances to await developments before putting in operation any more extended plan for occupation. The Council was always available for consultation, and things were just now at such a nice point that it would be better to determine action by common counsel.
M. Venizelos said that he was ready to issue an order that no Greek troops were to go inland at all. Nevertheless, to provide against the possibility of serious disturbances and massacres, he would like to arrange some procedure which did not necessitate the delays involved in sending dispatches to Paris, consulting the Council, and sending dispatches back. He proposed, therefore, that no troops should be sent without the authority of Admiral Calthorpe.2 He would propose to instruct the Greek Commanding Officer not to act except under Admiral Calthorpe’s order. If every decision had to be approved at Paris, action might be taken too late to stop massacres.
President Wilson said that this was a very sensible suggestion, provided that Admiral Calthorpe was on the spot.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that Admiral Calthorpe or the Officer Commanding the Allied Fleet at Smyrna, who might be a British or a French Admiral, should give the necessary authority.
President Wilson thought this a very good plan. The use of the Smyrna-Aidin railway would be contingent on circumstances.
M. Venizelos asked that the French railway should also be available.
M. Clemenceau accepted Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal.
M. Venizelos said that there were a large number of refugees from Turkey, resident in Greece and the islands. If these could be landed now, they might be re-settled in time to commence agricultural operations. He explained on a map that they inhabited the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali. He asked for authority for Greek troops to be sent into these two districts without obtaining special [Page 723] authority for the purpose of establishing order and protecting the returning refugees.
(This was agreed to).
(M. Venizelos withdrew).
A few minutes later Sir Maurice Hankey read a draft of the dispatch to Admiral Calthorpe, which, after some discussion, was approved in the following form:—
“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has approved that in the event of disorders in the Vilayet of Aidin anywhere North of Aidin inclusive, Greek troops may be sent to restore order, but only after obtaining the approval of the Senior Naval Officer of the Allied Fleets at Smyrna, who will be the final judge as to whether the circumstances justify the despatch of troops. Greek troops, however, may be sent without special authority to the districts within the Sandjak of Smyrna, but not South of Ayasoluk and within the Kaza of Aivali for the purpose of establishing order and protecting the returning refugees. The Greek military authorities should be given facilities on all railway lines radiating from Smyrna for carrying out this movement. M. Venizelos is sending instructions to the Greek authorities to conform to these arrangements.”
3. Retention of Italian troops Sir Maurice Hankey was drafting the above dispatch during the following conversation, the notes of which are consequently very brief.
M. Sonnino again reverted to the question of the Itlitan Troops, and asked for the agreement of his colleagues to keep things as they were without withdrawing the Italian troops.
President Wilson said that as far as he was concerned the Italian Government must take the whole responsibility for the retention of these troops.
Mr. Lloyd George said that this was his view.
M. Clemenceau said it was his view also.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Italian action was most prejudicial to the work of the Conference. M. Orlando, when asked for an explanation had said he knew nothing about the matter, and it was perfectly clear that he did not. Apparently the Head of the Government had not even been consulted.
M. Sonnino said that of course M. Orlando was kept informed.
(It was at this point that Sir Maurice Hankey read the Draft dispatch quoted above).
4. Responsibility for the war and Reparation. Reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s Letter The Council had before it Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter on the subject of Reparation (Appendix II), and the draft reply prepared by a Committee under M. Klotz (Appendix III (a)).
(This letter was approved, subject to the following alterations:—
In the sixth paragraph, the substitution of the word “claimed” for the word “admitted”.
[Page 724]In the seventh paragraph, line 1 to read as follows:—”she did not act upon the principle she now contends for either in 1871” etc. … instead of “she did not recognise this principle either in 1871” etc.
In the eighth paragraph delete the words “you will not be surprised to learn that” and substitute “in reply we beg to say that”.)
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to see that the necessary alterations were made in the French version and to prepare a copy for M. Clemenceau’s signature.
(It was further agreed that after signature Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter, together with the reply, should be published.)
The letter as finally approved is contained in Appx III(b).
5. Saar Valley The Council had before them a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, together with a draft reply.3
On Monsieur Clemenceau’s suggestion the subject was adjourned until the draft reply to a second letter from the Germans on the same subject was available.3a
6. Mr. Lloyd George read the following information he had received in regard to the supply of clothing to German prisoners:—
- (1)
- Prisoners of War. Reply to Herr-Brockdroff-Rantzau There is no German clothing available of any kind.
- (2)
- All the German prisoners now held by us have underclothing and boots sufficient for them to be sent straight back to Germany.
- (3)
- As regards their civilian clothing, our prisoners of war are wearing prisoners of war coats and trousers. They could be returned to Germany wearing the trousers already supplied, but not the coats.
We have no stocks of civilian clothing available. All available stocks were bought up for the British who have been demobilised and the stocks available for this purpose were insufficient.
Mr. Lloyd George said his attention had been drawn to the suggestion that altered British uniforms might be used. For instance, the military buttons might be cut off and uniforms made for all intents and purposes into civilian suits. He said he was informed that we were actually 200,000 suits short for our own soldiers. Hence he thought that the question should be treated as one in which we were unable to give any help.
President Wilson said that the United States Army had no civilian supplies at all; only military supplies.
M. Clemenceau instructed M. Mantoux to ascertain the state of Prisoners of War in France.
President Wilson suggested that the reply should be that we would supply the prisoners with the best clothing we had, but should explain that we had not enough to give a complete equipment to every prisoner.
[Page 725]Sir Maurice Hankey asked whether any repayment was to be exacted for the clothes provided, as contemplated in Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter.
Mr. Lloyd George said that if they were merely to go in the best makeshift that could be arranged, this was unnecessary.
(It was agreed that Mr. Lloyd George’s draft should be revised in the light of the above discussion).
7. Russia President Wilson said that he had ordered an enquiry to be sent to Koltchak, direct from the State Department, asking him to specify Russia his programme and policy.4 He said he had also received information from M. Kerenski.5 He would not regard this as a good source of information unless it happened to tally with information he had received elsewhere. Kerenski and his friends hoped that there would be no recognition of Koltchak or anyone else as representative of all the Russias and that as a condition of further assistance, certain agreements should be exacted from all the parties opposed to the Bolshevists, by which they would pledge themselves to a certain progressive policy. They should be informed that a departure from this would cause them to lose the support of the Allied and Associated Powers. This seemed to provide the rudiments of a policy.
Mr. Lloyd George agreed that it was important to impose conditions.
President Wilson said that these Russian groups could be broken down at any time by our failure to support them.
Mr. Lloyd George said he was amazed at the amount of material that had been supplied. They had received something like £50,000,000 of armaments and munitions.
8. The following resolution submitted by Sir Maurice Hankey was approved:—
Prisoners of War and the Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Treaties “It is agreed that the Committee which drew up the Articles in regard to Prisoners of War for the Treaty with Germany, should meet again to prepare, for the consideration of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.”
President Wilson read a copy of a letter from M. Fromageot, a copy of which had been handed him by Sir Maurice Hankey, who had received it from Mr. Hurst. (Appendix IV).
Reparation. Correction to Article 232 in the Treaty of Peace With Germany (After a short discussion it was agreed that the words “during the period of the belligerency of each Germany as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany” should be reinstated in the French text of Article 232.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 19 May, 1919.
[Page 726] [Page 727] [Page 728]- Ante, p. 688.↩
- Admiral Sir Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople and Allied commander in chief in the Eastern Mediterranean.↩
- Appendices II and IV to CF–23, pp. 817 and 823.↩
- Appendices III and V to CF–23, pp. 820 and 824.↩
- See telegram of May 15 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Amhassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 349.↩
- Alexander F. Kerensky, Prime Minister of Russia, July to November, 1917.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 468.↩
- See IC–181C, p 478.↩