Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/181/4

CF–18A

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 19, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, May 19, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson
  • The British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
    • Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary.
    • Professor P. J. Mantoux, Interpreter.

Marshal Foch and General Weygand were introduced by M. Clemenceau.

Action in the Event of the Germans Refusing To Sign Marshal Foch reported that he had visited the Allied Armies in the occupation zone of the Ehine. He had first visited the French Army at Mayence. The French had eighteen divisions ready to march, three of which were in the Belgian zone. Not all these were complete with full cadres, but they had sufficient to start at once. There were a few men on leave who would have to be recalled. The men at the head were in a good frame of mind, and ready to do what was required at once. The army was fully equipped with munitions and transport. In short the French army was ready to march with fifteen divisions, besides three in the Belgian zone and three cavalry divisions.

To the left of the French army was the United States Army at Coblenz. This consisted of the First Army composed of three divisions of Infantry, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. After the 27th May, the 3rd Division would be withdrawn; hence the position was that three Divisions were available till May 27th, and thereafter two Divisions. In addition, if necessary, the 4th and 5th Divisions, which were about to be withdrawn, could be made available by countermanding the transport arrangements, which would commence their withdrawal on the 21st. By cancelling these arrangements, five Divisions could be made available. The United States divisions had everything complete; artillery, ambulances, ordnance, munitions. He had offered the United States Commander-in-Chief a French cavalry Division, in order that he may maintain communication with the British Army on his left. The only thing which might be insufficient was the number of Divisions.

President Wilson pointed out that the American Divisions were 27,000 men strong.

Marshal Foch continuing, said that to the left of the United States Army was the British Army at Cologne. It consisted of ten Divisions which, however, were not ready to march without seven days’ warning. The officers who had conducted the campaign were being gradually replaced by young officers, but this process was not yet complete. The British Army lacked certain things, for example, guns on motor carriages and cavalry, but it would be ready to march after seven days’ warning. He asked Mr. Lloyd George’s permission to draw General Wilson’s¹ attention to the deficiencies, and to arrange matters with him as rapidly as possible so as to reduce the time within which the army could march.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Secretary of State for War was in Paris, and the best plan would be for Marshal Foch to see him.

Marshal Foch continuing said that north of the British Army was the Belgian Army, consisting of six infantry Divisions, and one cavalry Division, with three French Divisions already referred to in support. The Belgian Army was in excellent condition. It had lacked some motor transport, which the French Army had supplied, and it was now quite ready to march. From this review of the situation it resulted that the whole army would be ready to march as soon as the British effectives were completed, and a French cavalry Division moved to the left of the United States Army. At the same time the Polish Army was being rapidly transported. 192 trains had already passed, each conveying a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, or a battery of artillery, or supplies. About 100 trains remained to complete the transport. At the rate of 6 trains a day, 17 or 18 days would be required to complete operations. Hence in little over a fortnight the new Polish army would have been completely concentrated in Poland. It was well constructed with complete cadres. In reply to M. Clemenceau he said that it contained at least 600 French officers. It was a new, fresh army, and it would be acting from a very advantageous geographical situation.

As regards the Czecho-Slovak army, he gathered from the correspondence that it was hoped to send at least one Division in the direction of Nuremberg, which would be able to join with the Allied troops marching eastwards from Mayence.

From the above the conclusion he drew, although it was open to reservation, was that it would be best not to launch the offensive until the whole of the Poles had been transported, as otherwise at the least hint of an offensive by the Allied and Associated Powers, the transport across Germany would cease.

The above was all he had to say from a military point of view, but he wished to report that Dr. Hayne [Heim],² a representative of Bavaria, had asked a fortnight ago to see someone from G. H. Q. The day before yesterday he had reported that he was ready to enter into relations with the French representatives. Consequently an officer had been designated to meet him at Luxemburg, with instructions to hear what he had to say, but not to commit himself in replying.

In the course of a short subsequent discussion, Mr. Lloyd George put the question as to how soon the Allied troops could march, supposing first that Marshal Foch were to arrange with Mr. Churchill in the course of the day to make good the deficiencies of the British Army, and second, supposing the Germans were told on Thursday next that they must sign within five days, or the armistice would expire.

Marshal Foch said that if the British deficiencies were made good, the armies could march at the expiration of the five days.

Mr. Lloyd George then authorised Marshal Foch to make any arrangements he could with Mr. Churchill, so as to enable the army to march at the end of this period. He felt that if the order were given for them to march, the armies should be in a position to march at once.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should see Mr. Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War, at once, and make all arrangements with him to put the British Army on the Ehine in a position to march without delay.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdrew.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 19 May, 1919.

1. Field Marshal Sir Henry H. Wilson, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
2. Georg Heim, member of the Bavarian Volkspartei; member of the Peace Committee in the Reichstag. For the resulting interview between Dr. Heim and General Desticker, see appendix I to CF–28, p. 906.