Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/16
CF–16
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 17, 1919, at 11.10 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- President Wilson.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Italy
- M. Orlando.
- United States of America
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. | Secretary |
| Count Aldrovandi | Secretary |
| Professor P. J. Mantoux. | Interpreter. |
1. Publication of the Treaty of Peace With Germany M. Clemenceau reported that there was a very strong demand for the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He was informed that the Germans themselves had published certain portions, so that the text of these portions would soon be in the hands of the Press. Consequently, he had yesterday spoken to President Wilson and Mr. Balfour on the subject, and had gathered that they were favourable to publication.
President Wilson said that he had only expressed himself favourable to the publication of those parts which the Germans had already published, and even so, he had insisted that the decision must be reserved until Mr. Lloyd George returned.
Mr. Lloyd George recalled that only a few days before, he had raised this very question in consequence of a telephone message from Mr. Bonar Law,1 and as a result of their discussion, an emphatic reply had been given that the Treaty would not be published. His objection was, that when the Treaty was once published, it was very difficult to alter it, and there might be some details which we ought to concede to the Germans, if it would make it more acceptable to them.
(At this point M. Orlando and Count Aldrovandi entered.)
President Wilson said there was a great difference between what was published by the Germans and what we gave officially to our own people. Once we had published them to our own people, the Clauses assumed an official form, and made it very difficult to change.
[Page 674]Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the original Treaty had been somewhat defective and yet it was rather difficult to publish a different document to what the Germans had received. He was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that it was physically impossible to publish the Treaty before Tuesday or Wednesday, as it could not be printed in London before then. By Wednesday, however, the German reply was due, and he thought the matter might be postponed until then. He did not like going back on a previous decision.
M. Clemenceau said he would do whatever Mr. Lloyd George wished.
(It was agreed that the Treaty of Peace as handed to the Germans, should not be published at present.)
2. Action in Event of Germans Refusing To Sign Mr. Lloyd George said that on the previous day, he had addressed some British troops, and had pointed out to them how disastrous it would be to throw away the results of five years warfare, by not seeing the matter through. He had told them that in certain eventualities, it might be necessary to go to Berlin, and they had shown themselves to a man, quite ready to do so, if necessary. This was a division that had lost nearly 9,000 men in the advances of last year.
3. Prisoners of war: Reply to Brockdorff-Rantzau’s Letter M. Clemenceau handed in a list of material which could be supplied by the French Government, if it were so decided, in order to provide outfits for German Prisoners of War. (Appendix I.) He said that the remainder of the Let£r captured material had already been used to supply the German prisoners.
Mr. Lloyd George said he was informed that the quantities that the British Government could supply were very small, but he had no details up to the present.
President Wilson said he had not received his list.
4. Saar Valley: Reply to the German Letter M. Clemenceau handed to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a draft [reply], prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, to Herr Brock-dorff-Kantzau’s letter on the subject of the Saar Valley.2
5. Reparation. Reply to Brockdorff Rantzau’s Letter M. Clemenceau handed to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a copy of a draft reply, prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Peace Conference to Herr Brockdorff-Kantzau’s letter on the subject of reparation.3
[Page 675]6. Supply of Armaments for the New States of Central and Eastern Europe M. Clemenceau drew attention to a Memorandum prepared by Mr. W. T. Layton, of the British Delegation, and circulated at the request of Lord Robert Cecil, on the subject of the supply of Armaments to the new States of Central and Eastern Europe (Appendix II).
Mr. Lloyd George recalled that during the war the Ministers of Munitions used to confer together on such matters.
M. Clemenceau suggested that the first step was to find out what was being done.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that M. Loucheur and Mr. Layton should confer on the subject.
M. Clemenceau agreed.
M. Orlando said he would nominate a representative.
President Wilson said that the United States of America had not supplied any armaments, except a few to General Koltchak.
M. Orlando asked what the states affected were.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Roumani-ans, Serbo-Croats, and he added that the various nationalities formed out of Old Russia and Siberia should also be considered.
(It was agreed that M. Loucheur, Mr. W. T. Layton, and an Italian representative to be nominated by M. Orlando should report on the facts as to what supplies of armaments or munitions have been or are being sent to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Serbo-Croatia, Montenegro, Greece, and the various States formed or forming out of the former Russian Empire, including Siberia.)
7. Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the reference to this Committee was closely connected with the reference to the Military Representatives at Versailles to consider the size of the military forces of the new States in connection with the Military Peace Terms of Austria and Hungary.
M. Clemenceau said that this was a very difficult question, and it would be necessary in his view to secure the intervention of the League of Nations.
President Wilson thought it would not be very difficult to get an agreement if all the nations were included in the group.
8. Supplies to Serbia Arising out of the above discussion, attention was drawn by Mr. Lloyd George to reports he had received to the effect that the supplies promised to Serbia were not reaching the Serbian Army.
(At M. Clemenceau’s request, he undertook to give M. Clemenceau a memorandum on the subject).
[Page 676]9. The Polish-Ukrainian Armistice President Wilson said that he had seen a report in the newspapers to the effect that the Polish Diet refused the view of M. Paderewski in favour of stopping operations on the Ukrainian Ukraine front, as desired by the Allied and Associated Powers. M. Paderewski had refused to accept the view of the Diet, and threatened to resign. If Poland continued fighting, he thought that the representatives of Poland ought to be asked to withdraw from the Peace Conference. His information, however, was entirely derived from the newspapers.
M. Clemenceau doubted if this impression was correct. He had information to the effect that the Polish orders to continue fighting had been recalled.
Mr. Lloyd George read extracts from a telegram received from General Carton de Wiart4 to the effect that the military preparations were too far advanced, and public opinion was too firmly set for the operations to be stopped from Poland, and that hostilities could only be brought to an end by the direct intervention of the Peace Conference.
He then read a comment by Lord Kobert Cecil, suggesting that the Supreme Economic Council should on Monday inform M. Dmowski5 that no further supplies would be sent unless hostilities ceased.
President Wilson said that M. Paderewski had a letter in his possession from Mr. Hoover, informing him that aid would only be extended to Poland so long as he was in charge.
Mr. Lloyd George then read extracts from a letter by General Botha, Chairman of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, who pointed out that, the Supreme Council was being brought into contempt by the neglect of its decisions by the Poles, and that the League of Nations would become nugatory unless the present Conference could enforce its decisions. He pointed out that the Ukraine was the only state formed out of the old Russian Empire to whom no armaments had been supplied, though they were fighting the Bolsheviks.
M. Clemenceau said that the Ukrainians were more than half Bolshevik themselves.
President Wilson agreed with General Botha, and pointed out the difficulty that there were no means of obtaining exact information.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers was carrying on temporarily, pending the formation of the League of Nations. Its orders could not be defied without weakening the League of Nations itself.
[Page 677]President Wilson said it was the Conference, rather than the League of Nations, that would be discredited. The Conference was engaged in a final settlement, rather than on these temporary disputes. The fixing of the frontier between the Ukraine and Poland was a very difficult matter.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Ukraine was willing to stop fighting, and that it was the Poles who were making the difficulty.
President Wilson asked if General Haller’s Army was still being transported to Poland? Could the transport of the remainder be stopped? His own opinion was that if 2 Divisions had gone, that was enough for the present.
Mr. Lloyd George said that M. Paderewski ought to be supported, as he was a very honest and loyal man. He should be given an intimation that if the orders of this Council were not carried out, no further support would be given. He would do this through the Foreign Ministers.
President Wilson said it was important not to give even a superficial idea that M. Paderewski was not being supported. He had played the game straight throughout. The message ought to be sent, not to M. Paderewski, but to General Pilsudski, the Head of the Polish State.
Mr. Lloyd George asked if it was possible to address the Head of the State.
President Wilson said that it was.
M. Clemenceau asked President Wilson to draft a despatch.
(It was agreed that President Wilson should draft for consideration a draft addressed by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to General Pilsudski.)
10. Designation of the Council During the above discussion the question at Grand arose as to what was the proper designation of the Council of Four.
Sir Maurice Hankey reported that he had been using the term “Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”.
President Wilson demurred to the use of the word “Supreme”, which some of the smaller States disliked.
(It was agreed that in any future communications the nomenclature to be adopted should be “Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”, but that no announcement should be made.)
11. Teschen There was a short conversation on the subject of Teschen.
President Wilson said that on the previous day he had seen M. Benes6 and M. Kramar.7 M. Benes had given a very intelligent [Page 678] and unbiassed description of the Teschen question. He had explained that the question of coal was only one part of the subject. In any case, most of the coal basin, of which the Teschen coal mines formed a part, must form part of Poland. There was an important question, however, owing to the fact that the only lines of railway running east and west in the north of Czecho-Slovakia, ran through Teschen territory.
Mr. Lloyd George asked what the population was.
President Wilson said they had not gone into this question. M. Benes had told him it was impossible for the Poles to agree with the Czecho-Slovaks, as they had been asked to do. The reason was that in Poland it was a party question and no party could afford to give way. This was not the case in Czecho-Slovakia.
Mr. Lloyd George asked if everyone there was agreed to grab all they could.
President Wilson said that one of the strongest arguments in favour of the Czecho-Slovaks was that this part of Teschen had been the acknowledged boundary of Bohemia in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had received a letter from Mr. Hoover to the effect that the coal output of Teschen had been reduced owing to the uncertainties of the situation to 25% of the normal. Mr. Hoover was urging him to suggest that some temporary international management should be adopted, in order to bring the output of coal up to the normal.
12. Committee on New states Report No. 2 The Council had before them Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.8
President Wilson said that the only controversial part of the report arose in connection with Annex B, dealing with the subject of the Jewish Sabbath.
(After a short discussion, the first paragraph of Annex B was agreed to).
(Mr. Headlam-Morley entered.)
President Wilson asked Mr. Headlam-Morley to give his views on Annex B. He understood that he had been the supporter of this clause, and had stood alone on the Committee.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that he had conferred with representatives of the Jews on this matter. M. Lucien Wolff, whom he had found to be the most moderate representative, was against the extreme claims of the Zionists, and was supported by M. Neymer of the British Foreign Office. They all insisted, however, that the provisions in Annex B were of extreme importance.
President Wilson said that he and his colleagues were quite agreed as to the first paragraph.
[Page 679]Mr. Headlam-Morley said the second paragraph had been suggested by Sir Esme Howard, who was himself a Roman Catholic.
President Wilson asked whether the object of this paragraph, which suggested that elections should not take place on a Saturday, was put in to prevent action by the Poles, which otherwise would amount to a virtual disenfranchisement of the Jews.
Mr. Headlam-Morley replied that this was the case. He added that his colleagues had felt that this was rather a small matter to insert in a Treaty, and might be provided for by an exchange of Notes. In view of the great importance attached to it by the Jews, however, he, himself, had felt that he would not be doing his duty if he did not bring it before the Council.
President Wilson said that Mr. Miller, the American representative on the Committee, had suggested that in view of the Continental practice of holding elections on a Sunday, it would make Saturday rather more sacred than Sunday.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that arrangements might be made for the Jews to record their votes separately on another day.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said he presumed an opportunity would be given to the Poles to make their comments on this matter, which was of great importance to them. He suggested that they should be given an opportunity to send a formal note on the subject, in order to place their views on record. If their note was of a favourable character, this might meet the case.
President Wilson thought it would not. All sorts of technical difficulties would be raised about carrying out this decision. For example, in Roumania, by a quibble over the use of the word “citizen”, the Jews had, in effect, been deprived of their rights. He feared that any sanction less formal than a Treaty would be read in such a way as to render it useless. It would be said that the assurances were informal and would be got around somehow.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the Committee had left out one clause, which the Jews had suggested, namely, that not only should they not have to work on their Sabbath, but that they should be allowed to work on the Christian Sabbath.
Mr. Lloyd George thought the Committee was right in this. To allow the Jews to work on Sunday would be regarded as an unfair advantage against the Christians. Such, at any rate, was the feeling in England, as regards the opening of Jewish shops.
President Wilson asked whether the last word of the first paragraph should not be “Saturday” instead of “Sabbath.”
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that Sabbath was the correct word, but that the word before—“the”—was a misprint for “their”. The report was being reprinted, as it contained several inaccuracies.
[Page 680]President Wilson said that he, personally, was converted to the inclusion of Annex B.
Mr. Lloyd George said it should be submitted to the views of the Poles.
President Wilson said he not only had a friendly feeling towards the Jews, but he thought it was perfectly clear that one of the most dangerous elements of ferment arose from the treatment of the Jews. The fact that the Bolshevist movement had been led by the Jews was partly due to the fact that they had been treated largely as outlaws. They had no affection for a country where they were only permitted to live on tolerance, with every man’s hand against them. He therefore felt it was necessary to put them on a proper footing.
Mr. Lloyd George said the proper thing was to do as the Germans were doing, and make an intelligent use of the brains of the Jews. He had noticed that half the German Delegates were Jews.
M. Clemenceau said that the Council ought to hear what the Poles had to say about the matter.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the Committee had suggested that their report should be communicated officially to the Poles, and that the Committee might then be permitted to receive the Polish Delegation and discuss the matter with them. First, however, they wished to have the report approved in principle.
Mr. Lloyd George urged that the report should be communicated to the Poles in Poland, as the Polish representative in Paris, M. Dmowski, did not represent the democratic opinion in Poland.
President Wilson suggested that the Committee should be authorised to present their report formally to the Polish Delegates in Paris, and to discuss it with them while the report should also be transmitted to the Polish Government for observations.
Mr. Headlam-Morley raised the question as to the right of appeal by minorities to the League of Nations. They thought that this right was reserved nominally only for the Governments of States. They had, nevertheless, felt that it would not be advisable that the Germans in Poland should only have the right to approach the League of Nations through the German Government.
President Wilson pointed out that one of the Articles of the League of Nations gave the representatives of every State the right to call attention to matters affecting the peace of the world, whether the Government was interested in them or not, and this was not to be regarded as an unfriendly act. By the application of this Article, the Jews of Poland would be able to introduce [induce? their friends in other countries, such as the United States of America, Great Britain or France, to draw the attention of the League to their position. In any case, however, the League of Nations could not change the minds [Page 681] of the people. Dislike of the Jews in Poland would continue in spite of everything.
Mr. Headlam-Morley asked President Wilson’s permission to send him a memorandum on this subject.
President Wilson said he would be glad to receive it.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said he hoped that the economic and financial clauses, which were under Consideration by the experts, would be ready very soon. He said that the Committee was about to proceed to its examination of the Preamble to Czecho-Slovakia.
(It was agreed:
- 1.
- To approve in principle Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.
- 2.
- That the Committee should communicate the Report officially to the Polish Delegation in Paris, and should confer with them on the subject.
- 3.
- That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should telegraph the gist of the Report to the Polish Government, and invite its views.)
(13). Montenegro With reference to C. F. 14 Minute 4,10 President Wilson said that M. Vesnitch when asked for explanation as to the reports of maltreatment of Montenegrins by the Serbians, replied that King Nicholas was surrounded by bad people. The answer was of course totally irrelevant, since King Nicholas was in France and was not taking any part in the administration of Montenegro. He himself was very anxious to get someone to represent Montenegro at the Peace Conference.
Mr. Lloyd George asked what had occurred in regard to the investigations which President Wilson undertook on January 12th to make.
President Wilson said that the investigation had been undertaken, and that he was expecting the report in the near future.
(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion pending the receipt of the report expected by President Wilson).
(14). International Labour Organisation Question of Admission of Germany With reference to C. F. 14 Minute 2,10 the Council had before them the reply from the Committee composed of Mr. Barnes, Mr. Shotwell, M. Fontaine and M. G. de Grunne11 to the question referred to them by the Council, namely, as to whether Germany should be admitted to the Labour Organisation before she is admitted to the League of Nations (Appendix III).
Mr. Lloyd George expressed agreement in the report of the Committee.
[Page 682]M. Clemenceau also expressed himself in favour of the proposal that Germany should be admitted immediately after the Washington Conference.
President Wilson agreed, but suggested that it would be preferable to send it to the Washington Conference with a recommendation in its favour.
(It was agreed that the accompanying letter should be remitted to the Washington Conference with a favourable recommendation from the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate in this sense with the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference).
(15). The German Delegation At the end of the Meeting a telephone message was received from the Secretariat-General to the effect that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau was leaving for Spa this evening to confer with his Government and intended to return by Monday evening, May 19th.
(16). Instructions to the Drafting Committee To Be initialled by the Council With reference to C. F. 13. A., Minute 8,12 the following decision was approved as carrying out the intention of the Council and was initialled by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando.
(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference shall not accept any decisions of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which does not bear the initials of M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee).
(17). Indian Delegation At Mr. Lloyd George’s request it was agreed to hear the Indian Delegation in the afternoon at 4:30 p.m.
Villa Majestic, Paris, 17 May, 1919.
- British Lord Privy Seal; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.↩
- Appendices II and IV to CF–23, pp. 817 and 823.↩
- Appendices II and III (a) to CF–19, pp. 727–729.↩
- British representative on the InteraUied Mission to Poland.↩
- Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.↩
- Edouard Beneš, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.↩
- Charles Kramar, Czechoslovak President of the Council of Ministers; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.↩
- The text of this report does not accompany the minutes. It presented a draft of minorities provisions for the treaty between Poland and the Allied and Associated Powers (Paris Peace Conf. 181.23202/9).↩
- Ante, p. 625.↩
- Ante, p. 625.↩
- British, American, French, and Belgian representatives, respectively, on the Subcommission on Labor for the Study of the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace.↩
- Ante, p. 617.↩