Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/15½
2. The Italian Landing at Scala Nuova
Mr. Lloyd George said he had received
information from M. Venizelos sent by the Governor General of Samos, to
the effect that the Italians had landed 500 men at Scala Nuova and
occupied the Customs House. Consequently, they were now in possession of
the whole coast of Asia Minor from Scala Nuova to Adalia. He felt that
some immediate representation ought to be made to M. Orlando on the
subject.
(It was agreed that Mr. Lloyd George should prepare the draft of the
memorandum for consideration, and possibly for subsequent presentation
to M. Orlando, on the subject of the Italian landings on the Coast of
Asia Minor).
Appendix to CF–15A
[Memorandum by Mr. Balfour of the
British Delegation]
The Problem of Italy and Turkey in
Anatolia
The scheme provisionally accepted on Wednesday last at a meeting of
the “Three”,2 contemplates the final
destruction of the Turkish State. This is already condemned, and I
think rightly, to the loss of its European possessions, its
Arab-speaking population, and Armenia. It is therefore in any case
reduced, as far as the area of its Empire is concerned, to a mere
fraction of its former self; this fraction, however, we originally
proposed to preserve, thus leaving to the Sultan that great block of
Anatolia lying west [east] of the meridian of
Constantinople, which is not merely inhabited by a population the
vast majority of whom are Turks, but which contains within its
boundaries most of the Turkish race. For this scheme has now been
substituted one which cuts this region into two separate states,
with different capitals, different sovereigns and different
mandatories.
I look with much misgiving at this proposal. It will not only deeply
shock large sections of Mohammedan opinion, but I think it
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will also be made the
subject of a great deal of very unfavourable Christian commentary.
We are all most anxious to avoid as far as possible placing
reluctant populations under alien rule; but ought we not to be quite
as careful to avoid the opposite fault? Is it a greater crime to
join together those who wish to be separated than to divide those
who wish to be united? And if the Anatolian Turks say they desire to
remain a single people under a single sovereign, to what principle
are we going to make appeal when we refuse to grant their
request?
I think we must admit that no such scheme would ever have been
thought of, if it had not been necessary to find some method of
satisfying Italian ambitions. Unfortunately, this necessity haunts
and hampers every step in our diplomacy. The Italians, armed with
the Treaty of London, and supported by a passionate public opinion,
will never be content with fragments of Tyrolese and Jugo-Slav
territory in Europe; with French and British Colonial concessions in
Africa, and with the Caucasus in the Middle East. We have also to
find something for them out of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor. Now
I believe there are only two kinds of scheme possible by which the
latter operation can be accomplished;—the scheme of partition
advocated by the “Three”, and the scheme which I ventured to lay
before them. This last has not, perhaps, in all respects, been very
clearly understood; which is not surprising, for it was very hastily
written, and not very fully explained. But the matter is so
important that I may be permitted to return to it.
Under my scheme Turkey remained an undivided State without a
Mandatory. Its status was substantially that of the historic Turkish
Empire. Its territories were, indeed much diminished; it could no
longer count as a Great Power; but in other respects the Sultan
would reign at Brussa or Konia as his predecessors had formerly
reigned at Constantinople.
Now it must be remembered that even at Constantinople represent
atives of the Western Powers had special positions in his
administration, justified, and, indeed, rendered necessary for
various well-known reasons. The public debt, the customs, and in
some cases the police, were under the control or supervision of
foreign advisers. This system I do not propose to alter, but rather
to perfect. The Turks are familiar with it, up to a certain point
they welcome it, and they do not deem it inconsistent with their
unity or their independence.
The alternative scheme, which found favour on Wednesday, destroys
both; for it cuts Turkey into two halves; and puts each half under a
separate Mandatory. What are its compensating advantages? It is
said, in the first place, that it avoids the evils of a Condominium.
A Condominium, we are told, is never a success; it is slow moving,
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ineffectual and the
occasion of endless friction between the controlling Powers;—a
friction so acute as even to endanger the peace of the world.
But the plan I propose is not a Condominium. A Condominium, as I
understand it is the joint Government of a single State by many
powers acting collectively. Under such a system, the Powers first
agree upon a policy, and then impose it upon the subordinate State.
They control, actually or potentially, the whole administration. If
they differ, the administrative machinery stands still. If their
differences are due to their being moved by inconsistent interests,
they may become acute and even dangerous. The subordinate Government
is perpetually tempted to play one off against the other, and the
whole country becomes the theatre of rival intrigues. Everybody
quarrels, and nothing is done.
Now nobody will pretend that the Constantinople Government was a good
one, but it was not as bad as all this. There were, of course,
endless [intrigues], political and financial. There was a perpetual
struggle to obtain influence with the Sultan and his Ministers.
There was much corruption; there was much mal-administration. But it
was never a Condominium. The Sultan appointed his ministers; he
appointed the Governors of his Provinces; he raised and commanded
the Army; he directed the foreign policy of his country, and was in
tyese and all other important respects, an independent sovereign.
Certain branches of his administration were no doubt controlled, not
by a foreign Condominium but by foreigners. He remained,
nevertheless, in quite a different position from that which he would
have held either under a Condominium or under a Mandatory.
Another objection raised against my scheme is that it gives special
privileges to Italy in the southern part of the Turkish state. This
is quite true, and of course I should greatly prefer that it were
otherwise. But inasmuch as the whole plan is primarily devised in
order to do something to satisfy Italian appetites, that is, I am
afraid, inevitable. From an administrative point of view, the scheme
would no doubt be much better if the Italians played no part in it.
I freely admit it—but I submit that the argument is irrelevant The
Italians must somehow be mollified, and the only question is how to
mollify them at the smallest cost to mankind.
Then it is said that to give the Italians a first claim to
concessions in any district is to violate the principle of equal
opportunities for all nations. Again, I am not prepared to deny the
charge. My whole object is to give the Italians something which they
will really like, and it seems that they have a great liking for
concessions. I remember, when the Marquis Imperiali was comparing
the advantages which the French would get out of Cilicia with the
advantages which Italy was
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likely to get out of her share of Asia Minor, he was wont to dwell
upon the wonders of a certain copper mine, which he said, I am sure
quite truly, was to be found somewhere in the French zone. In the
same way, I observe that Baron Sonnino’s eyes are lovingly fixed
upon a very indifferent coal mine on the Southern shores of the
Black Sea. Personally, I regard these hopes and expectations with
considerable scepticism. I doubt the existence of these hidden
riches in Southern Anatolia. Even if they exist, I doubt whether
their exploitation is going to make Italy rich; and I have a strong
suspicion that even if these industrial enterprises are started
under Italian patronage, they will be found after no great lapse of
time to be under German management. But all this does not seem to me
to be to the point. The object is to find some privileged position
for the Italians in Southern Anatolia; and I particularly beg the
“Three” to remember that she has already got the germs of such a
position by a pre-war arrangement which she made with the Turks, in
respect of the region neighbouring on Adalia. My suggestion only
extends and emphasises her privileges. It does not create them.
In any case, as Italy is not, under my plan, intended to occupy the
position of a Mandatory in these regions, the general principle—that
no Mandatory has a right to exceptional trade advantages in the
country which it controls—is not violated. The only difference that
I can see between what would happen under my plan, and what would
happen if nothing were done for the Italians in Asia Minor, is that
in the first case Italy would without question or controversy have
the refusal of all concessions within a certain area: in the second
case these concessions will be scrambled for at Brussa by the rival
company-mongers of every country under Heaven, supported, no doubt,
by their respective Ministers. The first plan may be an infringement
upon the liberty and equality, nominally at least, secured by the
second; but 1 do not know that these most excellent things are seen
to the best advantage when they are enjoyed by corrupt
administrators and greedy speculators.
But once again, this is relatively unimportant compared with the main
objects of the scheme I am endeavouring to support. This is designed
to do two things; to maintain something resembling an inde pendent
Turkish Government, ruling over a homogeneous Turkish population;
the other is to find a position for the Italians within this Turkish
state which will make a sufficient appeal to the ambitionsj the
Italian Government. From every other point of view the plan is, I
admit, a bad one; but from this point of view—which is the one at
the moment chiefly occupying our thoughts—I still think it worthy of
serious consideration.
