Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/5
CF–5
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 10, 1919, at 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- President Wilson.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Italy
- M. Orlando.
- United States of America
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. | } | Secretaries. |
| Count Aldrovandi. | ||
| Professor P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. | ||
(Marshal Foch and General Weygand were introduced.)
Action in the Event of the Germans Refusing To Sign 1. M. Clemenceau explained to Marshal Foch that the Council had under consideration the possibility, though not probability, that Germany might refuse to sign the Terms of Peace. They wanted Marshal Foch’s views as to the means available and the action to be taken in such an eventuality.
Marshal Foch said that on April 24th last, he had held a meeting with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Belgian, British, French and United States Armies and they had made a sum of their total forces. It had been established that, for the whole of the month of May, at least 40 divisions with 5 cavalry divisions would be available to operate on the front of the Khine. He required 8 days’ warning to put them in a state to march. The reason for this was that many men were on furlough and many officers were away on commissions or leave. Everything was prepared, and, at the end of 8 days, the army would be ready to march. If and when the moment came to intervene the action to be taken would be organised according to the objects aimed at. If it was a case of a regular Government refusing to sign, it would be necessary to strike at the centre of that Government. For example, Weimar and Berlin. It might be, however, that the situation would be less clear and that the German Government might say that it could not decide or that it required a plebiscite. Still, if the resistance was that of a regular Government at Berlin or Weimar, this resistance must be broken. The shorter roads should be followed with the maximum possible forces. The army would start from its bases at Cologne and Mayence. [Page 538] Advancing from this base line towards Weimar and Berlin, the army would penetrate a zone very favourable to its advance, as its flanks would rest to the north on the River Lippe and to the South on the River Main. This zone was so advantageous for the advance that the enemy might be expected to capitulate before the armies reached their objective. Further, by advancing from the Rhine along the valley of the Ruhr, the result would be achieved of considerably reducing the enemy’s financial resources. Advancing from the Rhine by the valley of the Main, the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers would cut Germany off from Bavaria, and, in addition, would be in a position to join hands with the Czecho-Slovaks. This was a perfectly feasible and not dangerous operation, and might achieve results without bringing the operations to a conclusion. These lines of advance would take the Allied Armies into the heart of the German Government. In reply to M. Clemenceau, he said that he envisaged action by the Czechs, which would be combined.
General Weygand, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that the Czechs had 3 complete divisions formed, but these were now disposed along the Hungarian frontier. They had also several brigades, but a good deal of organisation would be required.
Marshal Foch said that information on this point had been asked for. He then explained his plan by reference to a large map. He added one advantage to those he had already given, namely, that if, for any reason, the march had to be stopped, a line could be established on the River Weser parallel to the Rhine where the armies could rest in conditions very similar to those prevailing on the Rhine. In reply to President Wilson, he said there were no fortified places on the way and that neither Weimar nor Berlin were seriously fortified. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said that he certainly contemplated action by Polish troops which were already in occupation of Posen. In reply to President Wilson, he said that the nominal strength of the German forces was 450,000 men, but they were disarmed and dispersed and practically Germany could offer no resistance at all. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he added that he did not contemplate action by sea, as this was not feasible with modern artillery. He summed up by saying that, with 8 days’ warning, he was prepared and was in accord with the various Commanders-in-Chief for an advance with incontestable superiority of forces and with his flanks secured. He would undertake to cut off Bavaria from Germany.
M. Clemenceau asked whether he anticipated any danger from the mass of the working population.
Marshal Foch said mainly in regard to their feeding.
M. Clemenceau alluded to Marshal Foch’s request for 8 days’ warning. This might be difficult for the Governments to give. He [Page 539] asked if Marshal Foch could reduce it, so that if the Governments saw the storm coming they could give an order which would be followed by action in less than 8 days.
Marshal Foch said that this was practicable by stopping leave in the Armies.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that if leave was stopped and the men came back, the Germans would at once know it.
M. Clemenceau said that this would not be a bad thing.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that it might be done in such a way that Cologne and Mayence should see what was happening.
Marshal Foch said that he had prepared a series of measures with the object of impressing the German people. Next week, for example, he proposed to go to the Rhineland and inspect the troops.
General Weygand said that the great difficulty was that, if the Germans were given warning, they would denude the railways both of material and personnel, which would make the advance very difficult. Consequently, under Marshal Foch’s directions, he had prepared a surprise operation with motor cars and cavalry, in order to leap forward at a moment’s notice and seize certain junctions and important places. This could be done in a few hours.
Marshal Foch said that he contemplated a surprise operation of great range, which involved very few troops and which would produce a surprise and considerable effect. He was now studying the execution of this measure, but it involved having 2 or 3 divisions in each army ready to march at a moment’s notice and this could only be done by cancelling leave.
M. Clemenceau asked when the plan could be ready.
General Weygand said it could be ready to-morrow.
M. Clemenceau said there was no need for it for 10 or 12 days but it ought to be got ready.
Marshal Foch said he could stop leave in, say, 2 divisions of each army, which would be enough to carry out this part of his plan.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that it might be an advantage to have some demonstration at an early stage. The Germans were now making up their minds. Possibly they thought that the Allied and Associated Powers would not march.
M. Clemenceau said that that was exactly what the Germans were saying. They believed the French Army incapable of marching and that the United States Army was going home.
Mr. Lloyd George said that it might be too late 10 days hence and he thought some action ought to be taken now to show that the Allied and Associated Powers had made their minds up. He would like a demonstration made within a day or two. The most impressive form of demonstration would be to bring the cavalry to the front.
[Page 540]Marshal Foch said that his cavalry were too few for a great demonstration, but he proposed himself to make an immediate visit to the Commanders-in-Chief of the various armies in such a way that while apparently secret, it would be known to everyone and all Germany would be puzzling to know what he was up to.
President Wilson suggested a secret journey with careful leakage.
Marshal Foch said that this was what he intended.
Mr. Lloyd George asked what he proposed to do about cancelling leave.
Marshal Foch said that during his trip he proposed to ask each Commander-in-Chief to stop leave in 2 divisions of his army and to get these divisions ready to march. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that he could start any day next week.
M. Clemenceau said the sooner the better.
President Wilson agreed in this.
M. Clemenceau said he had received two documents, one of which stated that Scheidemann and Ebert would sign and the other that they would not sign.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the demonstration should be immediate, in order that Germany might know that we meant business. Monday would be too late. The Germans were making up their minds and it was important to influence them before they settled down in an attitude of refusal.
Marshal Foch pointed out that nothing could happen before the 22nd, when the Germans might refuse the peace terms, so that if he commenced his visit on the 12th that would be soon enough. He would be back by the 18th.
M. Clemenceau said that he was already receiving papers from the Germans. He suggested that Marshal Foch should support his tour by troop movements.
Marshal Foch agreed, and added also movements of munitions.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that it would take some time for the Germans to know that Marshal Foch was there The German mind was not a quick one. Consequently, Monday was, in his view, too late for Marshal Foch’s start.
M. Clemenceau agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that it was important to press the Germans as soon as possible.
President Wilson and M. Orlando also agreed.
Marshal Foch undertook to leave at the earliest possible moment.
(Marshal Foch, ascompanied by General Weygand, withdrew.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 10 May, 1919.