Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/1

CF–1

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 8, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, May 8, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • President Wilson.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau, President of the Council.
  • Great Britain
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P. (Prime Minister.)
  • Italy
    • M. Orlando, President of the Council.
    • Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Count Aldrovandi.	}	Secretaries.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B
Professor Mantoux—Interpreter.

1. There was some discussion on the subject of the meeting with the Germans on the previous day,¹ in the course of which M. Clemenceau said that he had heard on good authority that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau said he would not sign the terms of peace.

The Meeting With the Germans on the Previous Day M. Clemenceau raised the question as to whether Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposal for joint Commissions to examine the proposals on technical matters in the Treaty of Peace should be adopted.

President Wilson said he thought that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposal had related to the responsibilities of the war rather than to technical matters.

M. Clemenceau said that the Commission he had proposed on this matter was a neutral one: he had really made two proposals. He then read the draft of a reply which was to the following effect:—

(1) The proposed neutral Commission on responsibilities for the war would be contradictory to the articles in the Treaty of Peace on this subject.

(2) In regard to the proposal for technical commissions he must inform Brockdorff-Rantzau that verbal communications are and remain excluded. The German delegation must have its own Commissions and send replies to the Secretary-General.

(Before finally approving this draft it was agreed:—that the text of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s statement on the subject should be consulted.

Later in the meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau’s statement was available from which the following extract was read:—“Having regard to the disconcerting multiplicity of the problems which are raised by this aim pursued in common we must as rapidly as possible have the principal matters discussed by special expert commissions on the basis of the draft which you are submitting”. Translated from the French Summary.)²

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that this did not constitute a definite proposal which need be replied to.

M. Clemenceau agreed that it would be better to take no notice.

President Wilson agreed and suggested that one possible interpretation of the phrase was that if the Germans signed the Treaty they would want the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers in carrying it out.

(It was agreed:—

That no reply should be made to this statement in Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech.)

2. The Settlement of Former Austro–Hungarian Territory President Wilson read a summary prepared by the American Delegation of the present position in regard to the settlement of the territorial boundaries of former Austro-Hungarian territory, as well as Bulgarian territory. The summary pointed out that the United States, British and French experts had agreed in regard to Bulgaria, the Greek frontiers, the Czecho-Slovak frontiers, the Roumanian frontiers, and the Jugo-Slav frontiers. The question of the frontiers between Belgium and Holland had not been dealt with. In regard to the Polish frontiers, agreement had not been reached, except with regard to Germany and the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. The frontiers of Albania and of Russia were also unsettled.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the best plan would be the one he had suggested on the previous day, namely, deal first with the frontiers of Austria and of Hungary, and to determine their boundaries and their conditions. Once these were out of the way, the more contentious questions which arose between the Allies could be dealt with.

President Wilson pointed out that once peace was made with Austria and with Hungary, and once these countries had been made separate, and the Treaties of Peace with them had been completed, the present Conference would have no further authority. To leave it to the component parts to arrange matters between themselves would cause very serious trouble. He urged the importance of retaining the peace-making power in the present Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the difficulty could be surmounted by inserting an Article in the Treaty of Peace, binding Austria and Hungary respectively, to recognise the States contiguous to them, within the boundaries arranged by the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole.

President Wilson pointed out that this clause would not bind the new States to respect the decision of the principal Powers. If they did not, this would mean launching out in a new sea of negotiation.

Mr. Lloyd George said that if his Italian colleagues would pardon him, and he did not ask them to agree or to disagree in what he was about to say, the present atmosphere was not a favourable one for settling the more controversial questions. There was great public excitement, which was partly artificial and partly genuine. The best plan would be to give time for that to subside. It was not essential that [to] peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria and Hungary, that these controversial questions should be settled.

President Wilson said that he was anxious to arrange that the boundaries between various States should not be left to separate agreement. He proposed, therefore, that it should be provided in the Treaty of Peace that Austria and Hungary respectively should recognize the States contiguous to them, within boundaries which should be stated, where possible, but where they could not be stated, were determined by some definite authority, for example, the League of Nations.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the League of Nations ought not to be burdened at the outset with these tremendously difficult problems. They should be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments.

President Wilson suggested the best plan would be [to] have them settled by the principal Allied and Associated Governments. The important thing was that the latter should not divest themselves of their authority.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that the matter could be dealt with on these lines. Austria and Hungary were both starving and Peace Treaties with them ought to be concluded as soon as possible. The only part of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech on the previous day which had made him feel uncomfortable was the passage where he had alluded to the starvation which had occurred since the Armistice had been signed.

M. Clemenceau said that his statement had to be proved.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, at any rate, there was no doubt that Austria and Hungary were starving.

President Wilson told M. Clemenceau that we ought not to blink facts because we were annoyed with Brockdorff-Rantzau. There was no doubt people had been starved because through no-one’s fault it had not been possible to get the Treaty of Peace ready earlier.

Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to an Article by Mr. Hervé in the Victoire, in which he said that after reading the summary of the Treaty of Peace, he withdrew all his attacks on the slowness in preparing the Treaty of Peace.

M. Clemenceau told President Wilson that he could give him an order to visit women from fourteen years of age to sixty, who had been violated by the Germans.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Sir Ernest Pollock had told him that documents before the Commission on breaches of the laws of war had been so bad that only parts of them were read. The Commission had become perfectly sick with reading them.

M. Clemenceau said that they had an awful case against the Germans.

President Wilson summed up the decision as regards the boundaries as follows:—Wherever they can be fixed, this shall be done, but where they cannot be fixed, the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to accept what the principal Allied and Associated Powers decide.

(There was no dissent from this.)

Mr. Lloyd George raised the case of the Ukraine. Could the principal Allied and Associated Powers settle that?

President Wilson said they could settle the boundary between the Ukraine and Poland. One difficulty was that the Ukraine declared herself independent of Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George said that this was part of the general Russian question, and he hoped that a special day would shortly be set apart for discussing this.

President Wilson suggested that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to make a comprehensive enquiry and to make recommendations as to all the frontiers of former Austro-Hungarian territory, except those specially concerning Italy.

Baron Sonnino recalled that there was one portion of the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Austria which was closely connected with the Italian problem. He thought the best plan would be for the Foreign Ministers to examine what the experts had proposed and to make recommendations.

(It was agreed:—

1. That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider at once, and to make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Austria and Hungary, and of the new States created out of former Austro-Hungarian territory, and States contiguous thereto, as dealt with in the reports of the various Commissions set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference.

2. That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to hold their first meeting on this subject on the afternoon of to-day, May 8th.)

(Although no formal resolution was adopted, it was also substantially agreed that the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain an Article binding the High Contracting Parties to recognise the frontiers of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian territory, within boundaries which should be fixed, wherever possible, but in cases where it was not possible to fix them, in time for the Treaties, within such boundaries as might be decided by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

3. Reparation: Clauses in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties Mr. Lloyd George suggested that this question should be referred to the same group of financial experts which had dealt with Reparation under the instructions of the Supreme Council, in connection with the German Treaty of Peace.

M. Orlando said he understood that the reparation experts were meeting to consider this subject on that very day, more particularly in connection with the scheme that he himself had proposed for a debit and credit account in regard to the countries formerly constituting part of the Austrian Empire.

President Wilson said that nevertheless there would be no harm in approving Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal.

(The following resolution was agreed to:—

That the group of financial experts which, under the immediate direction of the Supreme Council, completed the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Germany on the subject of reparation, shall re-assemble to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.)

4. Financial Clauses in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties (On the proposal Lloyd George, the following resolution was agreed to:—

That the group of experts which, under the supreme direction of the Supreme Council, completed the Financial Clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, shall re-assemble to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.)

5. Angtrian Treaty and Hungarian Treaty: Reference to the Drafting Committee Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the Drafting Committee should be asked to start work on the Austrian Treaty and on the Hungarian Treaty.

President Wilson said that the Drafting Committee were entitled to a rest after their very heavy labours in preparing the German Treaty.

(This was agreed to.)

6. Military Naval and Air Terms of Peace With Austria and With Hungary After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:—

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the Naval and Air Services of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers draft military, naval and air articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

(It was also agreed that the exact text of this resolution should be left to M. Clemenceau, who would then forward it as an instruction to the Military Representatives.)

7. Convention in Regard to the Military Occupation of German Territory West of the Rhine After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:—

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers a draft Convention in regard to the military occupation of the territories West of the Rhine, as provided for in Article 432 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It was also agreed that the military representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives was left to M. Clemenceau, who undertook to give the necessary instructions.

8. Size of the Army of Occupation After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:—

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers a scheme for the size of the Army of Occupation of the German territory West of the Rhine, as provided for in Articles 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It was also agreed that the Military Representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian Representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives was left to M. Clemenceau, who undertook to give the necessary instructions.

9. Questions Raised by the Supreme Economic Council Sir Maurice Hankey reported that the Supreme Economic Council had forwarded various resolutions for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, dealing with such matters as: Supply of Raw Materials to Czecho-Slovakia and Poland: Blockade of Germany and Hungary: and other matters.

He suggested that the most convenient procedure for dealing with these questions would be for the Supreme Council to meet the principal representatives of the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that all these questions were bound up with the elaboration of some scheme for providing credits for European countries, in regard to which he had already submitted a scheme.

President Wilson agreed, but said it would be necessary to find some alternative proposal, as the scheme submitted by Mr. Lloyd George did not commend itself to the United States experts.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the British Government was in the position not only of owing large amounts to the United States, but of being guarantors of what other countries owed to the United States. Great Britain was both a creditor and a debtor nation, but if she could collect all that was due to her from other nations, the balance would be on the right side. Hence, he felt in a good position to make this proposal. He pointed out that the United States of America had made large profits out of the belligerents during the early part of the war, when she had not herself been a belligerent. He did not say this in any spirit of criticism whatever, as she was merely in the position that Great Britain had been in 1870.

President Wilson pointed out that the wealth which the United States had drawn from these sources had not gone to the Government, but to particular financiers and to particular classes of the nation. Congress would take the view that the Government ought not to accept on behalf of the nation any obligations because certain interests in the nation had made profits.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Unless the United States of America and Great Britain agreed on some scheme for re-starting Europe, a very serious state of affairs would arise.

(It was agreed that the leading representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the Supreme Economic Council should be invited to attend at 10.30 on the following day to raise the various questions referred to the Supreme Economic Council.)

10. Surrender of German Merchant-ships Mr. Lloyd George read a telegram he had received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in London, to the effect that the Germans were continuing to delay the surrender of German merchant-ships in Spain by raising questions affecting cargoes, and neglecting to instruct their Captains to hand over the ships to the representatives of France.

On April 21st a warning had been sent to the German Government that if the matter was not expedited a reference would be made to the Supreme War Council. A consultation had since taken place at Rotterdam, but as no action had resulted the matter was now brought before the Supreme War Council with a recommendation that pressure should be put on the Governments concerned to proceed with the delivery to France of these ships.

President Wilson suggested that the pressure of the present treaty should be enough. In two weeks the Germans would be compelled to sign the whole treaty. He had only wanted to give them time to read and digest it, and get used to the idea that it would have to be accepted. He had never contemplated any additional matter being added.

(After some discussion it was agreed that Admiral Wemyss, on behalf of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers should be instructed, through the Armistice Commission, to draw attention to the failure to carry out this undertaking, and, in the event of no satisfactory reply being received, to make recommendations as to the action to be taken.)

11. Breaches of the laws of war in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties President Wilson asked if it was necessary to go into the question of breaches of the laws of war in connection with the Austrian and the Hungarian Treaties.

M. Sonnino said that there were a certain number of personal cases, although the question was less serious than in the case of Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that it had been agreed that the Austrian Emperor was not in any way responsible for the war.

M. Orlando said that there was a terrible record of crimes against some Austrians.

M. Sonnino pointed out that there were some bad cases in connection with submarines.

President Wilson asked if it was possible to distinguish German from Austrian submarines.

M. Sonnino said that in most cases it was not possible, but there was evidence in some cases.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that someone in Austria-Hungary must have taken the decision and given the necessary authority, so that there ought to be clauses in the Treaties on this subject.

(This was agreed to.)

12. Ports, waterways and Railway and the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties It was agreed that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be instructed to prepare articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Austria and with Hungary.

Villa Majestic, Paris, 8 May, 1919.

1. See minutes of plenary session of May 7, 1919, vol. iii, p. 413.
2. The translation in the minutes of the plenary session of May 7 reads as follows: “In view of the bewildering number of the problems which beset the fulfilment of our common purpose, we ought to refer the principal questions individually at the earliest possible moment to special Commissions of experts, for discussion on the basis of the draft presented by you.” (Vol. iii, p. 419.)